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Abstract 
Children’s failure to re-use knowledge will continue to be problematic until 
processes that contribute to conceptual growth are better understood. 
The notion that conceptual knowledge, soundly constructed and 
reinforced, forms the basis of future learning, as the learner uses it 
unproblematically to make sense of new situations in related areas, is 
appealing. This thesis will show this to be an overly simplistic view of 
learning, failing to take sufficient account of fine-grained processes that 
contribute to the micro-evolution of knowledge and of connections 
between cognition and other factors. 
Much previous research focused on abstraction as key to learning. This 
thesis examines the role of abstraction in the development of 
mathematics concepts by children aged 8-9 years, using negative 
numbers as a window on their development of knowledge in a new 
domain. The assumption, prevalent in the literature, that abstraction is a 
requirement for transfer of knowledge is questioned.  
Three research questions are explored: 
1. What resources shape the nature of transfer and the 
growth of knowledge about negative numbers? 
2. What is the role of the interplay of resources in the micro-
transfer of knowledge about negative numbers? 
3. What is the relationship between abstracting and 
transferring knowledge about negative numbers? 
Methodology is based on a case study approach, initially recording the 
work of 3 small groups of children throughout a series of tasks and using 
progressive focusing techniques to create two case studies which are 
analysed in depth.  
The thesis reports how the extent of conceptual development about 
negative numbers was influenced by interpersonal and intrapersonal 
learner characteristics, and describes a complex interplay between 
cognitive and affective factors. Micro-transfer and intermediate 
abstractions, and reinforcement of the connections that these construct, 
are found to be crucial for conceptual growth, though abstraction is not a 
condition for transfer at the micro-level. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
My motivation for conducting research in this area arose from my 
experience as a primary teacher. I like to think that I was an effective 
teacher; one who strived to develop my pedagogical and subject 
knowledge in order to maximise the potential for children to “learn” what I 
want them to learn. And yet, even where careful assessments informed 
me that “success criteria” had been met, and that children had learned 
what I had wanted them to learn, it often became clear, later, that they did 
not apply that learning in other relevant situations. For example, when I 
was a classteacher, Shaun had successfully measured a number of 
pencils and had been able to record their lengths in order; he knew that 
21.4cm was longer than 21.25cm. However, in another lesson later in the 
same week, he was ordering a list of numbers and stated that 13.65 was 
bigger than 13.7. This exemplifies a phenomenon commonly described 
by teachers; that when faced with similar problems in other situations, 
children do not realise that they can use knowledge that had been 
effective in another situation previously to solve the problem: the new 
problem is regarded as novel, rather than a variation of one already 
encountered. 
Another example from my experience as a primary teacher is the case of 
Sophie who had demonstrated (what appeared to be) secure knowledge 
about acute, obtuse and right angles. In a subsequent lesson, she was 
learning how to use a protractor to measure angles and, when faced with 
the decision of which scale around the protractor to use, seemed to 
choose one or the other quite arbitrarily. She therefore measured a 75° 
angle as 115°. Had she thought to use the knowledge  that she had about 
acute and obtuse angles, she would have been able to work out that the 
angle she was measuring could not be 115° because i t was clearly less 
than 90°. It is apparent that children are often no t able to “apply” their 
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knowledge – that is, they fail to transfer knowledge developed in one 
situation, to a new situation. Of course, such a description is a 
simplification of what we are actually asking children to do, as I shall 
show. 
The mathematics curriculum in UK primary schools is presented as a 
spiral curriculum, whereby pupils are exposed to the same ideas many 
times, each time in a slightly different guise, intended to facilitate 
understanding that grows in depth and complexity. Prevalent within the 
curriculum are Piagetian principles relating to learning through 
experience, starting with what pupils already know, and to knowledge 
being a product of the way that individuals respond to and reflect on their 
experience. It is something of a paradox, therefore, that “The Primary 
Framework for Literacy and Mathematics” (DfES 2008) sets out a 
programme of teaching that is provided in each year of primary schooling. 
Mathematics education in UK primary schools is, therefore, currently 
based on a set of assumptions about what children need to learn 
according to their age. 
I believe that the UK primary mathematics curriculum presents an overly 
simplistic view of the development of mathematical knowledge. It is 
portrayed as a stage process in which attainment of one level prepares 
the learner for the next and in which development occurs in a particular 
sequence. This model suggests that knowledge exists in different forms 
at different stages, and that it is perceived and experienced passively, as 
something that is possessed by the learner. This assumption – that 
knowledge is something to be possessed; that it can be given or acquired 
or lost – is, I believe, highly questionable; I question whether the learning 
pathway for individuals is so predictable. I also am unconvinced that 
children are able to revisit ideas often enough or in appropriate ways to 
facilitate effective conceptual growth and change. 
In my view, the development of mathematical knowledge is far more 
complex than the “Primary Framework” suggests, both within each 
developing knowledge “thread” and in relation to other threads, which co-
exist in various states of development.  
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Previous research in education has led to the development of a variety of 
theories and perspectives on learning. The roots of the curriculum are in 
research and theory. It is interesting to relate some of the dominant 
theories to concept development in mathematics and to consider whether 
the model for learning described above, that dominates our classrooms 
and curricula, actually coincides with, and is appropriate to, the 
development of mathematical concepts. If not, it may not be an 
appropriate way to be teaching primary children. 
Constructivist principles underpin many of the ideals implicit in our 
modern curriculum. Although there are many variations of constructivism, 
a common focus, on learning by doing, and on building from existing 
knowledge, is apparent. von Glaserfeld (1983, cited in Lerman 1993) 
states that, 
“We come to see knowledge and competence as products of the 
individual’s conceptual organisation of the individual’s experience.” 
(p66)  
Confrey (1999) points out that Piagetian learning theory leads to a focus 
on the operational aspects of mathematical concepts. She notes that 
symmetry is therefore understandable through the action of folding and a 
circle is “defined in relation to the action by which they are made” (p6) 
There are many examples in the UK primary curriculum of the facilitation 
of concept development from operational foundations such as: young 
children begin to learn about position and direction through physical 
activities involving movement and rotation of their own bodies; counting 
and calculating begins with movements on a number track.  
However, in my view, constructivism and Piagetian learning theory fail to 
describe how learners manage the vast number of links and connections 
that must form networks or webs of knowledge; or how it is possible for 
knowledge structures (which are already multi-dimensional and in varying 
states of development) to remain stable under additional pressure from 
the huge cognitive load which must be caused by the processes of 
continuously modifying those, as well as “new”, knowledge structures. 
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The constructivist view does, however, emphasise the role of the learner 
and of the learner’s experience as being crucial in shaping the learning 
that occurs. I agree that this is central to any understanding about the 
cognitive mechanisms which are in play during learning. Constructivism 
does not satisfactorily illuminate the processes that enable boundaries 
between contexts to be overcome when similarities are not clear.  
Having noted a few examples from my experience as a primary  class 
teacher of children failing to re-use knowledge appropriately, it is also 
interesting to consider that in my current role as a senior lecturer in initial 
teacher training I now work with young adults who frequently demonstrate 
that they too have developed poor understanding of many mathematical 
concepts and skills. They are often not able to solve problems or even to 
perform elementary mathematics processes because they are unable to 
remember procedures and routines on which they had depended for their 
previous success in examinations at the end of their secondary 
education. One example is Rosemary who gave the answer 380 when 
asked to multiply 26 by 45. She explained that she didn’t know how to “do 
long multiplication” and showed that she worked it out this way: 
       26 
  x  345 
     380 
She explained, “I did 6 times 5, that’s 30 so put zero here and a little 3 up 
there. Then, 2 times 4, that’s 8. Bring the 3 back in so it’s three hundred 
and eighty? It’s probably wrong ‘coz I can’t remember how to do it.” 
Rosemary not only failed to use an appropriate algorithm, she also failed 
to realise that the answer should be a much larger number.  
I see many examples of students’ difficulties when I ask them to add and 
subtract negative numbers. In every group of students that I teach, I find 
several who are very uncertain about what to do when asked to carry out 
simple operations with negative numbers. Some find it difficult to add a 
negative number; even more are unable to subtract a negative number. 
My students often tell me that they did “do” negative numbers at school 
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but never understood it; that they just guessed the answers and 
sometimes got them right. Some students remember rules such as “ two 
minuses make a plus” but can’t explain what that means; why the rule 
“works”. The young adults who I teach are the outputs of the education 
system and the mathematics curriculum in the UK.  
It would appear that it is not only my students who have difficulties with 
negative numbers; in November 2007, a National Lottery scratchcard was 
withdrawn because the public did not understand how to order negative 
numbers. A report in the Manchester Evening News (Leeming 2007) 
explained: 
“The Cool Cash game - launched on Monday - was taken out of 
shops yesterday after some players failed to grasp whether or not 
they had won.  
 
To qualify for a prize, users had to scratch away a window to 
reveal a temperature lower than the figure displayed on each card. 
As the game had a winter theme, the temperature was usually 
below freezing. 
 
But the concept of comparing negative numbers proved too difficult 
for some. Camelot received dozens of complaints on the first day 
from players who could not understand how, for example, -5 is 
higher than -6. 
 
Tina Farrell, from Levenshulme, called Camelot after failing to win 
with several cards.  
 
The 23-year-old, who said she had left school without a maths 
GCSE, said: "On one of my cards it said I had to find temperatures 
lower than -8. The numbers I uncovered were -6 and -7 so I 
thought I had won, and so did the woman in the shop. But when 
she scanned the card the machine said I hadn't. 
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"I phoned Camelot and they fobbed me off with some story that -6 
is higher - not lower - than -8 but I'm not having it.  
 
"I think Camelot are giving people the wrong impression - the card 
doesn't say to look for a colder or warmer temperature, it says to 
look for a higher or lower number. Six is a lower number than 8. 
Imagine how many people have been misled."  
 
A Camelot spokeswoman said the game was withdrawn after 
reports that some players had not understood the concept. 
 
She said: "The instructions for playing the Cool Cash scratchcard 
are clear - and are printed on each individual card and in the game 
procedures available at each retailer. However, because of the 
potential for player confusion we have decided to withdraw the 
game." 
It would seem that many young adults have been failed by the 
mathematics curriculum in the UK since, for many, it does not appear to 
enable the development of good conceptual knowledge. 
As well as teaching young adults at university and children in primary 
schools I have also worked with children in schools where I was not 
employed as a teacher but worked as an education researcher. For two 
years I worked with children in primary and secondary schools and 
encountered there, too, many examples of poor conceptual knowledge. In 
one school, Gavin, aged 8 was explaining to me that he could work out ¼ 
of a number by halving it and then halving again. He told me that he was 
annoyed with himself, however, when calculating the length of each side 
of a square with perimeter 48cm, that he couldn’t do that because “I don’t 
know my 4 times table that far, I can only go 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 
36 …  up to 40cm.” Clearly, Gavin knew what “perimeter” means and 
knew that squares have 4 equal sides but he did not know that the 
halving strategy he had learned in another context would help him with 
the square problem. 
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My research focus, on the finest grain processes that are involved in 
learning, has therefore evolved out of my experience as a teacher, 
manager and researcher in different contexts. The “Webkit” project 1 was 
a 2 year study which explored a potential application for novel 
technological user interfaces (“TUI”s) in schools. It considered 
affordances of real-world and virtual environments and evaluated the 
effect of using tangible interfaces across the 2 settings on the likelihood 
of knowledge learned, through one task or experience, being re-used in 
another (i.e. application or transfer). In the lifespan of the project it was 
not possible to evaluate re-usability with any confidence. However, what 
did emerge, that was of interest to me, was evidence of robust and 
flexible learning that related to some difficult concepts (using a TUI). This 
was an interesting outcome because the quality of children’s learning 
evident on completion of their tasks was higher than I would “normally” 
have expected to see, based on my own primary mathematics teaching 
experience. This prompted me to consider features of the research 
sessions that might have contributed to improved effectiveness of 
teaching and learning. 
An aspect that inspired particular interest for me was the insight that the 
research trials provided into the ways children developed understanding 
and new knowledge by linking it with experiences and “old” knowledge 
and with other new knowledge. Analysis of trials data provided insight into 
ways that children used a wide range of resources available to them. I 
was intrigued to note that children’s existing knowledge included 
knowledge in many different stages of construction. Pre-existing pieces of 
knowledge had been processed in some way and were available as 
resources to help children make sense of their task. 
It was also possible to infer different ways in which the children were able 
to make links “in-action” – i.e. whilst actually engaged with the task given, 
they were becoming aware of connections with other aspects of the task 
and of their own thinking. Such thinking-in-change was also evident in  
1
 This is a European project “Webkit: Intuitive physical interfaces to the WWW” (IST-
2001-341 171). 
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children’s responses to each others’ contributions. Marie, for example, 
whilst subtracting using a number line, suddenly remarked, “So, adding a 
minus 3 is the same as taking away 3. Hang on ... that’s 2 lots of minus 3 
is minus 6, 2 times minus 3 is minus 6! Hey! When Father Christmas 
goes somewhere 3 degrees colder its like taking away 3 degrees and its 
like adding minus degrees, adding coldness. So they’re the same??!!” 
So, the focus for my research, emerging out of a longstanding interest in 
the pedagogy of mathematics, and out of my Webkit experience, is on 
learning, and particularly on factors and processes (both real-world and 
cognitive) that affect the re-usability of knowledge.  I want to understand 
more about the mechanisms by which children process knowledge and 
experience and understanding in order to create new knowledge; 
changing and reshaping old knowledge and incorporating new 
knowledge. I want to understand better what it is that enables or 
facilitates (and, by implication, inhibits or limits) the re-use of knowledge 
in new situations.  
In order to be able to learn about the way children use and re-use 
resources (to develop knowledge) and knowledge (as a resource) we 
must create the conditions where this might occur and can be observed. 
These, and other key methodological and research design issues will be 
fully addressed in Chapter 4. 
Learning is complex; in acknowledging that complexity, I imply that 
complexity is also required in order to observe and understand what is 
involved.  I would argue that, until more is known about re-use of 
knowledge in a range of tasks and environments, the potential for those 
tasks that are used in empirical research studies to illuminate the 
complex cognitive processes (that are involved in learning) is inevitably 
limited by the extent of our understanding of those processes. Therefore, 
in a broad sense, research must, necessarily, be iterative if research 
methods are to converge in a way that means that the finer processes are 
fully observable. My own research methodology has been devised in the 
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light of current understanding and is therefore a tentative dipping of a toe 
into the water. I would, therefore, expect my research to generate more 
questions than answers.  
What I have set out to do is to shed some light on cognitive processes - 
relating to learning, to conceptual growth, and to the application or 
transfer of knowledge - that will contribute to a deeper understanding of 
those processes. A valuable outcome of my research would be that it 
informs an increasingly appropriate and relevant methodology for 
subsequent studies. Those studies might, thereby, be enabled to discern 
and describe cognitive processes leading to conceptual development 
more precisely and more certainly than I am able to. It is only when we 
know more about how children learn mathematics that studies can be 
designed to optimise tasks and conditions in order to maximise the scope 
to be able to see their learning.  
In the next chapter, I shall explore a range of literature in the field of 
learning in mathematics, particularly about conceptual growth and change 
and the re-use or “transfer” of knowledge. Through an analysis of relevant 
literature, I shall state my own position and develop and clarify my 
research questions. 
My research focus is on learning and conceptual change and transfer; I 
need to observe those processes in some detail as they occur if I am to 
be able to elucidate them. Therefore, I need to select an area within 
mathematics where these processes are likely to be invoked. I have 
already identified negative numbers as an area within mathematics that 
my pupils and students find difficult. I shall therefore, in Chapter 3, review 
research findings about learning about negative numbers and consider 
why this might be an appropriate domain to use as a window through 
which I might observe learning processes and sub-processes. 
Chapter 4 will describe and rationalise my methodology which is based 
on a series of teaching sessions with children in a primary school. I shall 
describe the tasks that I devise with the intention of introducing new 
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knowledge and then extending the range of contexts in which children 
may or may not re-use their new knowledge.  
In my analysis of my findings, in Chapter 5, I shall focus on the work of 
two individuaI children and detail the cognitive changes that I am able to 
infer from the data. In Chapter 6, I shall discuss my findings in a more 
thematic way, considering factors, identified in my review of the literature, 
that might influence learning and reflecting on patterns and peculiarities 
that emerged. 
In the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, I shall draw together all the facets 
of my research interests and my data analysis in order to re-draw core 
relationships between learning, transfer and conceptual change. I shall 
conclude that conceptual change is linked to many factors, only one of 
which is cognition. I shall conjecture that cognition is so deeply connected 
to other factors that it is not possible to understand learning unless the 
nature of those connections is understood and taken into consideration. 
Moreover, I shall suggest that, if  the only changes considered worthy of 
investigation in the field of mathematics education research are cognitive 
changes, it is unlikely that our knowledge about learning can progress.
 12
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Disparity in the focus of previous research 
I must consider the theoretical frameworks and perspectives that 
underpin research in this field and try to highlight the commonalities and 
shared understandings that exist, even though the labels that are used for 
them may vary. I will go on to present my view that apparent confusion 
and disagreement within the literature is not actually that; rather, it is 
simply the result of a differential focus – brought about by differences in 
perspective, leading to differences in the grain size of the processes 
selected for investigation in the development of a range of theories about 
learning and knowledge transfer. There are at least 3 different levels at 
which development can be observed and described; 2 at what might be 
described a macro-level, and a third at a micro-level: 
Level 1: Grand Theory 
“Grand theory” is a term used to describe broad theoretical frameworks 
that describe some aspect of the world or human experience in its most 
general sense. They are abstract and normative and, in the social 
sciences, seek to explain the nature of vast populations. In the physical 
sciences contributors to grand theory include Einstein and Newton – 
responsible for such well-known contributions such as Einstein’s Theory 
of General Relativity and Newton’s Laws of Motion. In education, Skinner, 
Piaget and Vygotsky have contributed and I shall briefly consider ways in 
which their contributions relate to my interests. In the physical sciences, 
such theories serve to unify and bring together other theories and rules 
and can be used to explain phenomena at very specific, as well as 
general, levels. The appeal of grand theory in education is, I believe, the 
way it offers logical, well-argued analysis which illuminates many of the 
issues which concern those of us who have an interest in education: it 
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provides hope and purpose and direction. However, at the classroom 
level, the experience of teaching and learning does not always follow the 
rules that educational grand theory would predict. For teachers and 
pupils, there are variations and deviations from the expected path that are 
often complex and convoluted. Very often, the learning pathway diverges 
from that which grand theory would have predicted and never re-joins the 
original expected route or attains the “normal” outcome. Educational 
grand theory, has, thus far, been unable to unify the diverse theories that 
have been developed to describe aspects of learning. It does not 
accommodate the messiness and noise that characterises the real world. 
This messiness and noise often leads to distortion and disturbance of the 
directions and outcomes of learners’ experience. Grand theory cannot 
and should not, therefore, be used to predict the learning pathway of 
individuals and small groups within the whole population. 
diSessa & Cobb (2004) describe what might be seen as a taxonomy of 
theories. Their focus of interest is design research; in my opinion, that is 
not to say that their observations are not applicable to a wider audience 
than those who consider themselves design researchers. diSessa & 
Cobb begin by acknowledging the importance of research being related 
to theory but go on to state that, unlike theories in the physical sciences, 
“Theories concerning educational matters seem to replace one 
another, rather than subsume, extend, or complement other 
theories. While the state of the art constantly changes, it is often 
difficult to tell that progress is being made.”(p79)  
diSessa & Cobb point out that the difficulties with grand theory are 
typically due to, 
“ … some combination of being, as yet, immature (e.g. false as 
categorical prescriptions of cognitive or social processes), 
imprecise (so that implications at the level of design decisions are 
unsure), or simply too high-level to inform the vast majority of 
consequential decisions in creating good instruction. To take a 
specific case, Piaget developed his theory to address 
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epistemological issues that concern the nature and growth of 
knowledge. Nonetheless, his work had a strong educational 
influence from the 1960s at least through the early 90s. We feel, 
as many others do, that Piaget’s ideas were overextended into 
education.” (p80) 
Burkhardt & Schoenfield (2003) agree, 
“Most of the theories that have been applied to education are quite 
broad. They lack what might be called “engineering power”. To put 
it a different way, they lack the specificity that helps to guide 
design, to take good ideas and make sure that they work in 
practice. ….. Education lags far behind in the range and reliability 
of its theories. By overestimating theories’ strength (or perhaps 
better, by not constraining their application appropriately) damage 
has been done. ….. The harm comes from overestimating their 
generality and power, and underestimating the need to specify the 
contexts in which they are effective and the steps necessary to 
implement them successfully.” (p10).  
This concurs with my own view, previously stated, that grand theory 
should not be expected to explain or predict the ways that learning occurs 
at the level of the individual or classroom. 
Level 2: Subject-focused theories 
Other theories, whilst emerging from a subject-specific base have, 
nonetheless, described understanding about knowledge and learning that 
is more generally applicable. It might be argued that these, too, constitute 
grand theory. These include Sfard (1991), Dubinsky (1991) and Lave 
(1988). These authors have developed theories describing learning, 
including explanations of aspects of the learning process. These 
contributors offer sensible, rational and interesting characterisations of 
key issues and processes; yet, these too, at the classroom level, fail to 
explain the processes and mechanisms involved in learning in sufficient 
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detail for me to evaluate, or sometimes even recognise, them in my 
classroom. Sfard, for example, describes the journey towards 
achievement of what she calls “abstract objects” through three steps: 
interiorisation, condensation and reification. She emphasises that this is a 
difficult process and that reification is a complex phenomenon. Dubinsky 
also considers the transition from processes and actions to the 
conceptualisation of those processes as mathematical objects; he calls 
this “encapsulation”, part of the process of reflective abstraction. Lave 
was concerned that what is learned in school does not appear to be 
utilised in the real world; that knowledge did not transfer across school-
real world boundaries. She concluded that knowledge was situated in the 
context in which it had been learned and that educators need to 
acknowledge the weakness of a system for education that assumes 
relatively unproblematic transfer of knowledge across different contexts 
and settings. 
Any attempt by me to apply such theory to individual children in my 
primary classes was largely unsuccessful. I discovered that I didn’t 
actually know what reification or encapsulation looked like: I didn’t 
understand what the indicators might be that would show that it had, or 
had not, occurred. The notion that knowledge was unlikely to be used in 
situations away from school simply because they were outside school 
was a prospect that I, as a classteacher, found frustrating and unhelpful. 
It is apparent that these theories, though finer-grained than grand theory 
are still too “grand” to be useful at the classroom and individual level. 
Later in this chapter, I shall briefly review theories of learning that are 
helpful, in some way, at the macro level and I shall also go on to consider 
those that have focused on more subject-specific learning, particularly on 
the development of concepts relating to mathematics and science.  
Level 3: Micro-level theories 
There are some ideas and theories that are emerging from even more 
finely grained analyses of learning processes and it is these that offer the 
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most promise for developing my own understanding about learning. It is 
the work of researchers such as diSessa (1993); diSessa & Wagner 
(2005); Pratt & Noss (2002) that provides greatest insight and scope for 
development of a deeper understanding. I shall therefore consider the 
work of these contributors in more depth. 
Initial research questions 
So far, I have described a taxonomy of types of theories and ways in 
which they vary in terms of their generality. I have suggested that the 
level of generality is directly associated with their lack of applicability and 
usefulness for teachers and others working with individual learners. I 
have explained that I shall review theories at 3 levels of generality: grand 
theory crossing all subjects; subject-focused theories that aim to describe 
and predict, in some detail, general learning pathways and behaviours for 
the whole population; and fine-grained theories that focus on 
understanding particular learning experiences for individuals, i.e. “micro-
level” theories. 
My initial research questions are fairly general: 
• How do children learn? 
• How do new concepts develop? 
• Do all children construct new knowledge in the same way? 
• Why do children so often fail to transfer knowledge from one 
setting to another?  
Why should I focus on concept development? 
It is not possible to consider or observe transfer unless the conceptual 
development from which it arises is also considered. Moreover, it is not 
enough to only describe or identify the underlying conceptual change 
(which is, itself, learning); it needs to be deeply understood if transfer 
arising from it, or within it, is to be understood. The focus for my review of 
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the development of theory is not, therefore, transfer itself, but must be the 
broader concept of learning, i.e. of concept development or conceptual 
change. 
It is interesting, at this point, to consider the impact that research in 
education has had on policy and practice. Commitment to pedagogical 
transformation is notoriously difficult to achieve and even more difficult to 
sustain at the classroom level (Bishop et al 1993; Harries & Spooner, 
2000). So, has educational research, historically, succeeded in 
illuminating the flaws and needs within the system? Furthermore, has it 
succeeded in developing theories that ultimately inform and improve 
practice? It might be argued that the lack of clarity and consensus that 
characterises research in this field to date means that the impact of 
research on policy and its influence on children’s learning outcomes must 
be questionable. 
Sfard (1998) contrasts 2 metaphors for learning which are evident in 
contemporary education research: acquisition and participation. She 
begins by acknowledging a consensus put forward by “all theoreticians of 
intellectual development” , that “new knowledge germinates in old 
knowledge” (p4). She implies that there is a conflict or tension within 
education systems generally, relating to knowledge about what actually 
constitutes learning and what learning requires. She believes that the 
“acquisition metaphor” and the “participation metaphor” are implicit or 
explicit in a wide range of educational research. She points out that the 
acquisition metaphor is a more old-fashioned focus than the participation 
metaphor which (she finds) dominates more recent studies. It is, after all, 
a more modern idea to emphasise the social, apprenticeship, activity-
based aspects of learning that have formed the basis of whole fields of 
study within the education arena. Nevertheless, I would point out that, in 
the prevailing statutory and non-statutory requirements and 
recommendations that drive primary mathematics education (DfEE/QCA 
1999; DfES  2008) in England and Wales today, it is evident that the 
notion of acquisition is prevalent in policy makers’ conceptions relating to 
learning mathematics. For example, the teaching programme relating to 
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calculation strategies is highly prescriptive: the “Primary Framework” 
(DfES 2008) sets out a portfolio of mental and written strategies that 
should be taught in each year group. There is little scope within this for 
children to discover or invent strategies for themselves. Also, although 
group work is a feature of one segment of mathematics lessons, such 
work is usually highly structured and adult- (or text book-) led. It could be 
argued that the UK primary mathematics curriculum is, almost literally, 
“delivered” by a prescriptive programme of teaching to a pupil population 
who are expected to take on board concepts and skills as possessions 
that are acquired, rather than as understandings that are developed 
through participatory experience of them. 
Moreover, I would suggest that, in developing the notion of 
apprenticeship, it is important to realise that, if authenticity of the 
environment, (including the task and its purpose) is crucial, opportunities 
for learning are limited to those experiences in the real world that offer 
authentic purposes, contexts and outcomes. However, such opportunities 
are not usually available to teachers and learners in educational settings. 
As Sfard (1998) points out, “ … real-life situations which would be rich 
enough in mathematical content to become for mathematics students 
what craftsman’s workshop is for the apprentice are extremely difficult to 
find “ (p10) (I would add that Sfard’s reference to “rich”-ness of 
mathematical content is an interesting notion in itself since in the real 
world, content would lead to open-ended and unpredictable outcomes. It 
is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to plan (as good teachers often 
strive to) for the unpredictable. I would argue that authenticity is not 
achievable in classrooms since any activity that is conducted in the 
classroom is not authentic practice from any other setting. The metaphor 
of the learner as apprentice is not, in my opinion, reconcilable with the 
school setting. 
Sfard describes a shift in the language used by “the new researcher” and 
concludes that, “The talk about states has been replaced with attention to 
activities …. the permanence of having gives way to the constant flux of 
doing.” (p6)  
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In recommending ways forward for educational research, Sfard stresses 
that, 
 “Educational research can only do its job properly if it makes room 
for both Acquisition and Participation Metaphors” (p7);  
that, 
 “The relative advantages of each of the two metaphors make it 
difficult to give up either of them: Each has something to offer that 
the other cannot provide.  The basic tension between seemingly 
conflicting metaphors is our protection against theoretical 
excesses, and is a source of power.” (p10).  
She warns of dire consequences for the acceptance of one metaphor 
rather than the other in guiding research in education:  
“When a theory is translated into an instructional prescription, 
exclusivity becomes the worst enemy of success. Educational 
practices have an overpowering propensity for extreme, one-for-all 
practical recipes…. Because no two students have the same 
needs and no two teachers arrived at their best performance in the 
same way, theoretical exclusivity and didactic single-mindedness 
can be trusted to make even the best of educational ideas fail.” 
(p11). 
This is what diSessa & Cobb (2004) and Burkhardt & Schoenfield (2003) 
were referring to when they highlighted the potential for harm caused by 
the over-extension of grand theory into instructional practice. 
So, learning is the development of concepts, whether by acquisition or 
participation or both. Perhaps there is a connection between these ideas 
in that one or other is more appropriate to either “grand” or micro-level 
theoretical frameworks?  
I am aware of, and have experienced, the lack of explanatory power of 
grand theory in the classroom, and understand that “managing the gap” 
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between grand theory and classroom practice (diSessa & Cobb 2004) is 
a challenge for contemporary theory development. Having established 
that it is necessary to consider learning in order to be able to understand 
transfer, that they are both elements of conceptual growth and 
development, it is vital to acknowledge that learning is, in itself a 
problematic concept. It is pertinent, at this point, to consider how some of 
the key theories in this field have attempted to describe learning and the 
mechanisms by which it is achieved. 
2.2  Historical changes in focus 
In the first part of the twentieth century, mathematics education was 
influenced by theories about learning based on notions of conditioning 
and behaviourism. Thorndike & Woodworth (1901) considered a range of 
what they called “functions”; these might be thought of as abilities or 
competencies (e.g. estimating magnitude such as estimating the length of 
a line on a page). Thorndike and Woodworth studied the effects of 
training aimed at improving performance in those functions. They were 
particularly interested in the range of situations in which trained functions 
appeared to be applied.  
In the 1930s, Skinner (1938) found that the efficacy of reinforcement of 
behaviours was dependant on factors such as its frequency and the 
length of time between the behaviour and the reinforcement. 
Clearly, the impact of behaviourism meant that it was the teacher/trainer, 
or, more correctly, the programme of rewards and punishments that was 
considered to be the key to learning; no real consideration was paid to 
the learner. However, such stimulus-response theories left too many 
aspects of learning unaccounted for; for example, Steffe 1983 (citing 
Brownell 1935) points out that, 
“Only 40% of the responses given by 32 third grade children to 16 
addition combinations were taken as memorized associations in 
spite of the fact that the children had been taught the 100 addition 
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combinations on the basis of drill theory. The rest were taken as 
either counting or indirect responses (37%) or guesses (24%).” 
Stimulus-Response theories were, evidently, limited in their scope for 
describing, and helping us to understand, learning since so much of what 
is known could not be attributed to what has been taught.  
Dewey (1938/1998) changed the focus: he acknowledged that the 
learner, and the learner’s experience, shaped his/her response to stimuli, 
to tasks and to learning. Dewey was interested in motivation and the 
notion that stimuli come from the learner, not from external sources.  
From the middle of the twentieth century, more learner-focused research 
became the catalyst for change in education. The work of Piaget in the 
1950s has evolved into a particularly well-known tradition in education. It 
is interesting to note that, implicit in Piaget’s focus on staged 
development (Piaget & Inhelder 1969), is a belief that there is a limit to 
the learning that can be achieved, according to the development stage of 
the learner and that, while it might be possible for learning to be 
accelerated within a development stage, it is not possible to accelerate 
development. The concept of cognitive structures is key to Piaget’s 
theory. He believed that there are 4 principle structures, or development 
stages, and that these change through 3 processes of adaptation. The 
first of these processes is assimilation, in which new experiences “fit in” 
with existing knowledge. Accommodation occurs when existing mental 
structures or concepts have to change or expand in order to make sense 
of the new knowledge. Where new experience conflicts with existing 
concepts, equilibration must occur for cognitive harmony to be achieved. 
Piaget’s approach may be described as cognitive constructivism. 
Other constructivist theories of learning that emerged from the middle of 
the twentieth century were put forward by Bruner (1966) and Vygotsky 
(1962; 1978). These were more socially than cognitively focused. Bruner, 
more than Piaget, was concerned with the processes of learning and 
explored the place of language and the role of the teacher. So Bruner 
accepted the notion, introduced by Dewey and Piaget, that the learner 
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was a key influence in their own learning, but also embraced the 
significance of the teacher and of communication and attempted to 
explore and describe how they fitted into the whole learning process. One 
point on which Piaget and Bruner disagreed was regarding the potential 
effect of teaching on learning. Bruner (2006) wrote, “ .. any subject can be 
taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any 
stage of development…. It is a bold hypothesis and an essential one in 
thinking about the nature of a curriculum.” Piaget, on the other hand, 
maintained that potential learning was limited by the developmental stage 
attained by the learner. Bruner holds that there are “three systems of 
processing information by which human beings construct models in their 
world, through action, through imagery and through language” (2006; 
p68) 
Bruner’s view is that the mode of presentation of new knowledge must be 
such that it can be grasped readily by the learner. He describes 3 modes: 
the enactive mode; the iconic mode and the symbolic mode. Bruner 
believes that the development of these three modes of representation, 
“for how we move, perceive and think” (p68), “is in that order, each 
depending upon the previous one for its development, yet all of them 
remaining more or less intact throughout life.” (p69).  
Vygotsky’s work came to the attention of the western world in “Thought 
and Language (1962), though it had been conducted in Russia in the 
1920s. He fundamentally believed that learning is an interactive process 
between the learner and his/her environment, including people, which of 
course, in some contexts, includes teachers.  Vygotsky framed his ideas 
about learning on the notion of 2 levels of performance – assisted and 
unassisted. The unassisted level may be equated with Piaget’s 
developmental level. The assisted level is that which is achievable with 
good teaching, sometimes referred to as the learning level. Quite simply, 
the gap between these 2 levels is what is perhaps the best-known 
Vygotskian construct; the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD). 
In Vygotsky’s view, learning might begin to occur when assistance is 
offered at appropriate points in a child’s learning – i.e. when the child has 
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reached the limits of his/her unassisted performance. Vygotsky stresses 
that learning is therefore dependent on meaningful social interaction. 
Clearly, a skilful teacher may have a powerful influence on a child’s 
learning. 
A more advanced stage in learning is when the child becomes his/her 
“own assistant” (Vygotsky 1962). In this, control of learning is being taken 
up by the child him/herself. This suggests, to me, that the child might be 
aware of his/her own learning; that meta-cognition is suggested, even for 
young learners. 
This brief overview of some of the major contributors to grand theory in 
education reveals some themes that are recognisable in education policy 
and practice in the UK today, such as: the idea that development occurs 
through stages in some way; that learners’ experience has an effect on 
their learning; that social interaction and language are important elements 
of learning, including high quality teaching; ultimately, independence in 
continuing learning is attainable and desirable. 
As well as such theories that illuminate processes and features of the 
development of knowledge and understanding in the broadest sense, 
there are other theorists who have concerned themselves more with 
certain aspects of learning and cognitive growth (e.g.  van Hiele 1986; 
Sfard 1991). These often propose a hierarchical framework of concepts 
whereby knowledge of particular concepts at a particular level of 
sophistication is pre-requisite for beginning to develop similar or related 
concepts at a higher level of sophistication.  
Pegg & Tall (2002) identify what they call “a fundamental cycle of growth 
in the learning of specific concepts” – a sequence of changing cognitive 
structures that evolve and develop to become necessary tools or 
requisites for further development of more sophisticated structures. They 
show how such cycles are evident within the processes of “conceptual 
growth” (p41) described by those whose interest is the science of learning 
and the mechanisms and processes by which learning occurs. Pegg & 
Tall present comparisons between a range of theories related to broader 
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(i.e. not necessarily concept-specific) long term growth of the individual, 
including some of those previously mentioned, and suggest that, 
“What stands out from such theories is the gradual biological 
development of the individual, growing from dependence on 
sensory perception through physical interaction and on, through 
the use of language and symbols, to increasingly sophisticated 
modes of thought” (p42).  
Mason & Spence (1999) recognise that a belief that knowledge is built on 
previous knowledge in hierarchies is evident in the current framework for 
teaching primary mathematics in the UK, the National Numeracy Strategy 
(DfEE 1999). Current educational policy and practice in UK would appear 
to have been strongly influenced by research-based beliefs about how 
children learn; for example, our system acknowledges, and is dominated 
by, a notion of hierarchical knowledge. 
To recap, research throughout 20th century has revealed that there are 
many influences on learning and on the quality of learning outcomes. 
Although, in the first half of the century, the focus was on external (to the 
learner) factors, more recent research found that the impact of the learner 
him/herself (and of his/her experience) were far more significant 
influences, on the way new experiences are perceived and understood, 
than had previously been realised or acknowledged. Moreover, I believe 
that to focus exclusively on the child’s part in the process would be to limit 
the potential for him/her to learn; I believe that the teacher also influences 
the child’s learning outcomes, through the design of programmes of 
learning, tasks and experiences and through skilful provision of 
appropriate levels of support for learning. The teacher’s role in designing 
and facilitating their own interactions with the child, as well as those 
amongst groups of children, is also, I believe, a significant influence on 
children’s learning; on their conceptual growth and development. 
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2.3 How is mathematics learned? A focus on abstraction 
Some researchers in the domain of mathematics education, and 
specifically in the area of conceptual growth in mathematics have 
developed theoretical frameworks describing how concepts are 
developed to a level at which they are likely to be re-used in new 
situations, through a process of abstraction. This might be seen as a 
logical focus since mathematics, particularly that which might be 
described as “advanced” is not directly accessible through our senses but 
exists only in some kind of abstract form.  
Workers in this area include Dubinsky (1991), Sfard (1991) and Davis 
(1986). They present mathematics learning as a hierarchical process, 
progressing through a series of stages. They believe that children begin 
with physical, enactive experiences through which they are introduced to 
a process which (it is intended) will come to be understood and used as a 
condensed form of the original sequence of actions. The next stage is 
reached when condensed procedures come to be understood as tools 
and objects themselves which can be called upon in order to “tame” 
(Dienes, 1960) other processes. The researchers who uphold these 
theories accept that there are certain similarities and parallels cutting 
across their theoretical frameworks. Pegg & Tall (2002) and Barnard & 
Tall (2001) explicitly set out to identify and understand the similarities and 
commonalities across different theories (Davis 1984, Dubinsky 1991, 
Gray & Tall 1994 & 2001, Biggs & Collis 1982 - all cited in Pegg & Tall 
2002) by contrasting themes and artefacts within them and mapping 
structurally similar elements across theories. They highlight similarities in 
stages in development of conceptual growth within the different theories 
in terms of actions, object, procedures, processes, schemas and entities, 
implying that although the terminology might be different they are simply 
different labels for the same (or similar) things.   
Pegg & Tall (2002) and Tall & Barnard (2001) attempt to map the way 
that abstraction is seen to occur in each theory, highlighting the notion 
that when new concepts are constructed, they may or may not be 
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qualitatively different to earlier concepts; if they are, they move the 
learner towards a more abstract understanding of that concept. If the new 
concept is no more sophisticated or abstract than the existing one, it 
simply enriches the concept already held, acting as potential to trigger a 
more abstract version in its next construction. Pegg & Tall (2002) also 
state that there are “different kinds of learning” (p45), depending on 
whether the focus of the learner’s attention is on the “base objects” or on 
the actions. There are similarities, here with the distinction between  
“figurative” and “operative” schemes drawn by Steffe 1983.  
However, I would suggest that there are two major shortcomings of these 
theories, for those concerned with improving the potential for every child 
to learn in school: firstly, the theories do not describe what it is that 
makes a new concept qualitatively better, more sophisticated than the 
previous one – what is it that leads to abstraction; and secondly, there is 
a lack of clarity about the definition of “abstraction” – specifically, whether 
the term is being used as noun or verb – outcome or process. 
2.4 What is involved in the learning of mathematics? 
I now turn to research that is more specifically focussed on students’ and 
children’s learning of mathematics to discover whether they can offer 
any further insight. 
Pegg & Tall (2002) suggest that learning that develops from a focus on 
the “base objects”, itself focuses on “the nature and properties of those 
objects”. Similarly, where the learner has focused on the actions on the 
objects, the concept that then develops is one that is concerned with the 
nature and properties of the actions, the use of symbols to represent the 
actions, and the sequencing of actions to form procedures and, 
ultimately, processes. 
Perhaps children’s difficulties with “abstracting” mathematics from 
teaching activities arise because children develop an object-based 
understanding of the concept, rather than an actions-based knowledge. If 
this is so, it begs the questions of whether there is something inherent in 
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the nature of common teaching activities that enables the development of 
objects-based knowledge more readily than of actions-based knowledge. 
Whilst it might be interesting to consider that there are different types of  
learning processes, leading to different types of knowledge, it is also 
interesting to explore the idea that there are different types of learner. In 
particular, I question whether there is potentially a bifurcation in the 
process for children who are more or less successful in their 
mathematics: a point (or multiple points) along the journey at which 
learners may continue along the same path or may begin to move along 
another path. Certainly, it seems to me logical to compare the knowledge 
of high and low attaining children in mathematics in order to illuminate the 
differences in the nature and quality of their knowledge.  
If we can uncover what it is that successful learners are able to do, 
cognitively, that their less successful peers cannot, we might infer 
aspects of cognitive development that might lead to the development of 
understanding and superior performance. A particular aspect of that 
cognitive development is where there is a change from instrumental to 
relational understanding (Skemp 1976). If research can illuminate the 
nature of the gap or difference between the learning that more and less 
able children are able to achieve, then logically it might be possible for 
teachers to assist the less able more effectively and enable transfer and 
the development of knowledge to occur for more learners, more often, 
more readily. 
Gray, Pitta & Tall (2000) focused on the role of imagery in children’s 
development of understanding about number. They concluded that 
qualitative differences arise between children who concentrate on 
different aspects of images: that high-achievers tend to describe visual 
prompts at an impersonal level (“It is …”) as well as by relating them to 
personal, specific and action-based episodes (e.g. “I have five fingers”). 
Gray et al labelled these 2 types of images “episodic” and “semantic”, 
“to draw a distinction between images arising from memory 
associated with the recollection of personal happenings and 
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events, and images associated with organised knowledge, having 
meaning and relationships.” (p408).  
They found that low-achievers did not offer “semantic” responses – that 
their images were only, or mainly, episodic, action-based, concretised. 
Gray et al believe that this is evidence that low achievers’ thinking is tied 
up with access to previous experience and that high achievers have 
detached (at least in some part) that experience from their thinking. 
Gray et al also report that, 
“Though they initially focused on core concepts, the high-achievers 
could traverse, at will, a hierarchical network of knowledge from 
which they abstracted these notions or representational features.” 
(p407).  
Steffe (1983) also looked at qualitatively different modes for working 
mathematically. He was interested in the “observed difficulties of primary 
and secondary school students in developing the “proper” mathematical 
methods” (p109). He was keen to discover how children make the 
transition from using operative schemes (e.g. counting) to using figurative 
schemes (e.g. written algorithm for addition), a transition which, he 
stresses, occurs through their own construction.  
Pegg & Tall (2002) state that knowledge is objects-based or actions-
based,  but I would suggest that it is also interesting to consider that 
possession of both types of knowledge might confer an advantage for 
learners. Gray 1991 (focusing on differences between high and low ability 
children) considered the alternative strategies used to obtain solutions to 
basic arithmetical problems. He notes that, 
“… divergence between the strategies available to the less able 
and the more able children is revealed. The alternative strategies 
used are based either on counting, procedural strategies or on the 
use of selected known knowledge – deductive strategies. Above 
average children have both available as alternatives; evidence of 
deduction is rare amongst below average children. The more able 
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child appears to build up a growing body of known facts from 
which new known facts are deduced. Less able children – relying 
mainly on procedural strategies – do not appear to have this 
feedback loop available to them.” (p551).   
In other words, Gray feels that there are some things that low achievers 
do not or cannot do – i.e. that high achievers have a much wider range of 
knowledge and strategies at their disposal. 
Askew, Bibby & Brown (2001) believe that, 
 “traditional models of remedial programmes in numeracy (that) 
tend to concentrate on the inculcation of arithmetical “facts” (are) 
inadequate” (p3). 
This is a logical conclusion if we consider that remedial programmes that 
are designed this way require low achieving children to work in ways that 
they have already shown they cannot do. Askew et al feel that it is the 
children who are able to make links between known and derived facts 
who are able to expand not only their knowledge of number facts but also 
their range of strategies for deriving new facts. They found that it is not 
necessary to “wait for children to be “ready” to be taught new strategies”; 
that, “through carefully targeted teaching, pupils who have not developed 
these strategies for themselves can indeed learn them” (p9). This might 
be seen to be at odds with Piagetian notions of developmental stages 
being determinant of readiness; however, Piagetian principles would 
predict that, as long as learners are in a particular developmental stage, 
their learning can be accelerated within that stage, though not beyond it. 
Also, this supports the findings of Gray 1991 and supports my own 
contention that teachers are vital influences on the quality of learning that 
can be facilitated.  
Furthermore, I would point out that it is not only remedial programmes 
that would appear to be expecting learners to employ strategies for 
learning which they do not possess. After all, it is not only groups 
identified as “low achievers” in school who fail to achieve even basic 
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understanding in mathematics: Askew et al (2001) note that there are 
many children at the end of primary school who rely on procedures such 
as counting to carry out calculations, rather than use known or derived 
number facts. This is in line with Brownell’s (1935; cited in Steffe 1983) 
findings more than 60 years earlier in that children who “failed” to use 
“standard computational methods” used “either counting or indirect 
strategies … ”  i.e. they would seem to be “stuck” in an operative mode of 
thinking, have not moved on to a figurative knowledge (Steffe 1983). We 
see then that researchers and theorists have been identifying the same 
issues for a long time; however, this does not mean that we are any 
closer to understanding those issues well enough to enable us to “teach” 
mathematics better, so that more learners can develop better quality 
knowledge and understanding.  We know that children often fail to re-use 
knowledge about concepts that they have learned (or, at least, that 
teachers think they have taught,) in primary school; that children revert to, 
or fail to develop from, earlier, more naïve strategies. I want to find out 
how to help children to learn; how to move on from that naïve knowledge 
and to avoid the development of an inadequate cognitive toolkit – i.e. one 
that contains predominantly procedural/instrumental approaches.   
A new imperative for education research about learning and transfer 
Grand theory does not, in my view, furnish educators, who work at the 
chalkface, with knowledge that enables them to design or engineer more 
effective teaching and learning. In other words, as previously stated, 
grand theory lacks explanatory or engineering power.  If mathematics-
focused learning theories (e.g. Sfard 1991; Gray and Tall 1994; 2001) are 
considered, it is clear that a common theme evident within this work is a 
focus on abstraction as key to the development of higher levels of 
thinking. These workers see abstraction of concepts as the key to 
children’s ability to transfer or re-use knowledge; that without abstraction 
transfer cannot occur. These workers appear to use “abstraction” to refer 
to a process that leads to knowledge which is abstract in its nature – i.e. 
abstraction that produces abstractions; there is a subtle difference 
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between this and “abstracting” in a less “grand” fashion, as part of the 
process of concept formation and development. Sfard (1991) sets out her 
understanding that mathematical concepts are developed through 3 
stages: interiorisation, condensation and reification. She explores in some 
depth the reification phase of the process and points out that there are 
degrees of abstraction and of integration. She states that abstract notions 
can be conceived in “two fundamentally different ways: structurally – as 
objects, and operationally – as processes.” (p1) (There are similarities 
here with Pegg & Tall’s (2002) comments about learning being objects-
based or actions based.) Sfard points out, 
“the crucial, qualitative, difference between the two modes of 
thinking lies in the basic, usually implicit, beliefs about the nature 
of mathematical entities. In other words, there is a deep ontological 
gap between operational and structural conceptions.” (p4)  
It is worth noting, at this point, that Sfard uses the terms “object” and 
“structural” in a particular way: when she refers to objects, she means 
“mathematical objects” – i.e. abstract objects that are often, themselves, 
the result of some process. Indeed, Sfard believes that concepts are 
hierarchical, moving from operational to structural. 
Sfard notes that there have been many accounts of knowledge as 
dichotomies, such as relational or instrumental (Skemp 1976), conceptual 
or procedural (e.g. Lesh & Landau 1983; Hiebert & Lefevre 1986). 
However, she stresses that the 2 types of knowledge that she discusses, 
structural (focused on mathematical objects) and operational (focused on 
actions and processes) do not represent a dichotomy but, rather, a 
duality. There are clear parallels here with the ideas of Pegg &Tall (2002); 
Steffe(1983). Sfard notes that,  
“ … These two approaches, although ostensibly incompatible, are 
in fact complementary. It will be shown that the processes of 
learning and of problem-solving consist in an intricate interplay 
between operational and structural conceptions of the same 
notions.” (p4) 
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Sfard goes on to state, 
“ …..  what is conceived purely operationally at one level should be 
conceived structurally at a higher level. Such hierarchy emerges in 
a long series of reifications, each one of them starting where the 
former ends, each one of them adding a new layer to the complex 
system of abstract notions.” (p16) 
It seems that Sfard’s description of mathematics knowledge as a 
hierarchical system is rather simplistic and, therefore, difficult to reconcile 
with her suggestion of “intricate interplay”. I also feel that her explanation 
is, from a micro-perspective, at least, incomplete and therefore 
unsatisfactory. I feel that Sfard, like other theorists who concern 
themselves with a broad view, does not make clear exactly what it is that 
happens in reification that marks the point at which it occurs. How can the 
teachers or the learners know when it has occurred; when they have 
“understood”? Even if a learner is confident that it has happened, it is 
often not until that new knowledge is tested that it becomes apparent that 
it is not secure after all.  
Gray & Tall (1994) do not believe that abstraction is always brought about 
in the same rigid sequence. They focus on the differential mathematical 
success experienced by individuals and propose that the underlying 
mental structures that enable some children to think flexibly and solve 
problems more efficiently are bound up with development of a 
“proceptual” system. That is to say, those who are most successful in 
their mathematics are those who are able to deal with different 
understandings of a mathematical idea (i.e. as process and as object) 
and to switch effortlessly between them. This is similar to the interplay 
(“between operational and structural conceptions”) mentioned by Sfard 
(1991, p1), that she says leads to learning and problem solving. 
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Do these ideas apply to learning in all areas of mathematics? 
Gray & Tall (in Boero et al 2002) draw on a range of studies to show that 
when learners endeavour to use and develop their proceptual knowledge 
in different situations, they are likely to encounter difficulties that are 
specific to particular areas of the mathematics. Gray & Tall believe that,  
“ .. it is a laudable aim to have a general theory of construction, but 
we observe that specifics often overwhelm the broad sweep of 
such a theory. The acquisition of mathematical knowledge from 
early years to undergraduate level involves a variety of 
reconstructions. Each new reconstruction refines that which was 
established earlier …”  (p119) 
It would seem that knowledge and knowing and understanding are not 
consistent for any individual across different settings. There are important 
implications for this for educational research and for learning about 
learning – that is, that though particular knowledge might not be evident 
in one situation it cannot be inferred that the learner does not possess 
that particular knowledge; only that, if it does exist, it was not activated in 
that situation and that it might become evident in a different situation. 
Tall, Thomas, Davis, Gray & Simpson (1999) set out  “the transition 
between process and object” as presented by different researchers 
(Piaget, Dienes, Greeno, Dubinsky, Sfard and Gray & Tall). All of these 
theories are based on the idea that the outcome of the process is an 
object and that mathematics is about working with these objects, to 
subsequently create more objects. Moreover the objects are considered 
as abstract, context-free, formal. Gray & Tall (2007) reflect on their 
development of ideas and knowledge about abstraction which, they say, 
occurs through a process of compression. They  identify 3 types of 
concepts that are abstracted in mathematics learning, noting that, 
“Compression involves taking complicated phenomena, focusing 
on essential aspect of interest to conceive of them as whole to 
make them available as an entity to think about.” (p25) 
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How are concepts and pieces of knowledge (compressed or otherwise)  
recognised as potentially relevant in any situation? Mason & Spence 
(1999) distinguish between “knowing-about” and “knowing-to”. “Knowing-
to” can be thought of as recognition of a relationship between some 
elements of existing knowledge and some aspect of a new situation. How 
does the brain “know-to”? Gray & Tall (2007) do set out their 
understanding of how the brain is able to link concepts, in physiological 
terms involving “long-term potentiation” (p26); however, this does not 
resolve the matter of how similarity is recognised at the level of the 
individual in a classroom setting. 
It is my contention that, if the aim of a system for education is for learners 
to learn (i.e. to develop their knowledge and understanding), it is 
necessary to take account of a wide range of factors that are known to 
impact on learners’ capacity to learn. 
However, I have shown that grand theory does not provide us with 
sufficiently wide-ranging knowledge to achieve this; nor, should we 
expect it to. The very nature of such broad, generic theories might be 
helpful for predicting patterns of behaviour or achievement on a grand 
scale but, since they do not focus on individuals, should not be used to 
predict outcomes for individuals. 
2.5 An alternative focus 
The idea that conceptual knowledge changes as it develops is not 
problematic for me – that much feels obvious and natural. However, I 
think that within the research there is ambiguous use of the term 
abstraction and that this confounds central issues about what comprises 
learning.  
The use of the word abstract to describe the end product of the process 
leads us to conceptualise the process that leads to it as abstraction, 
which is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as,  
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“The act or process of separating in thought, of considering a thing 
independently of its associations; or a substance independently of 
its attributes; or an attribute or quality independently of the 
substance to which it belongs.” (Oxford English Dictionary;2008) 
In my opinion, and for the sake of clarity in my presentation of ideas and 
arguments, I prefer not to use the term “abstraction” as a noun that refers 
to a piece of abstract knowledge; rather, I choose to refer to those as 
abstract notions. I am comfortable with the use of the term “abstraction” 
to denote the process that generates abstract notions. However, I would 
add another term, from the same root meaning, to describe the process 
of coming to recognise common features across knowledge resources; 
this recognition constructs connections between concepts, – 
“abstracting”. Abstracting does not, therefore, lead directly to abstract 
notions but to a degree of detachment from contextual references, 
through a shift in focus to the connections between those references. By 
distinguishing between abstraction and abstracting and abstract notions, 
within my own conceptualisation of these terms, I am able to analyse and 
articulate my own and others’ ideas about these issues more effectively. 
I have already noted that Gray, Pitta & Tall (2000) discovered that high 
achieving children have action-based, episodic concrete mental images 
as well as semantic images, in their thinking. This implies that, for these 
children, context has not been lost and that their knowledge remains 
richly connected to contextual information. This leads me to pose the 
question of whether high level thinking needs both sorts of images or just 
one - are the episodic images required for high-level thinking or is 
possession of semantic images sufficient? That is, do semantic images 
actually replace episodic images or supplement them?  
I believe that, if we are to understand how contextual information is used 
or lost when concepts are formed and developed, it is necessary to find 
ways of observing conceptual growth taking place. Interestingly, it is to 
children’s activity in situations which are designed to facilitate learning 
that we might turn to be able to observe (or more correctly, infer) their 
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cognitive activity. Children’s activity in the classroom is, paradoxically, 
both a means by which their conceptual growth occurs and the window 
through which we, as observers, might see it happening. 
Schwarz, Hershkowitz & Dreyfus (in Boero 2002) set out to work directly 
with children to seek and observe “epistemic actions” which they claim 
are “constituent of abstraction”. They describe a model, the “dynamically 
nested RBC model of abstraction”, that they used as an analytical tool 
with which they were able to observe various processes that occur as 
part of the broader process of abstraction. Their theory arises very 
explicitly from a view of abstraction as activity; and from the premise that 
abstraction can be observed and provoked in a classroom setting, during 
students’ activities. (The authors’ intention in their use of the term 
“abstraction” is unclear.) 
Evolving research questions 
Issues arising from my review of the literature around theoretical views of 
learning (generally and within mathematics) enable an expansion of my 
initial research questions that now includes questions relating to 
abstraction and transfer in more depth: 
• How is knowledge re-used? 
• Is it possible to observe different types of transfer? 
• How do old and new concepts relate to, and affect, each other? 
• How do children recognise situations in which old knowledge is 
relevant? 
• Is it possible to observe abstraction and/or abstracting in 
mathematics in the primary school? 
• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and 
abstraction? 
• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and 
abstracting? 
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• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and transfer? 
• What are the relationships between abstraction and transfer, and 
abstracting and transfer? 
• What happens to the contextual references in children’s 
knowledge as their knowledge develops? Is it possible that they 
are preserved? 
These are questions, somewhat  naively formed at this stage, that I 
expect to elaborate through continued interrogation of the literature. 
2.6 “Micro-level” approach 
Many workers are interested in what individual children do while learning. 
This type of research is at a different grain size to research that 
culminates in the development of grand theory and other macro-level 
studies.  “Micro-level” findings have the potential to illuminate the gap 
between grand theory and children in the real world. 
In line with the Realistic Mathematics Education (RME) stance that formal 
mathematics develops out of children’s mathematics activity, Gravemeijer 
& Doorman (1999) believe that informal solution procedures might act as 
“foothold inventions … that become catalysts for curtailment, 
formalisation or generalisation” (p117). This seems to be in line with 
observations and theories about similar phenomena noted in the work of 
others, such as: Noss & Hoyles (1996); Pratt & Noss (2002); Dubinsky 
(1991); diSessa (1993); Wagner (2006).  These workers take the view 
that concepts are modified, rather than replaced by “more advanced” 
concepts. For example, Noss, Healy & Hoyles (1997) believe that, 
“ … abstracting – considered as a process – can be seen as a way 
of layering meanings on each other, rather than as a way of 
replacing one kind of meaning (concrete, referential) with another 
(abstract, de-contextualised). The emphasis is on connections 
between ways of knowing and seeing, rather than on the 
replacement of one by another.” (p226)  
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Resources for learning 
Learning can be considered as an interaction between the individual and 
the world. A range of resources might be utilised in such interactions. 
Resources can be:- 
External – (acting from the world upon the individual) e.g. 
environment, materials, teacher, tasks; 
Internal – (acting from the individual upon the world) e.g. 
knowledge, experience, memory, attitudes, skills. 
The ways that learners utilise these resources has been a focus for some 
researchers. (e.g. Lave 1988; Noss & Hoyles 1996)  
Noss et al (1997) emphasise that abstraction is not what determines 
mathematical activity but that it is a resource for activity. Noss & Hoyles 
(1996) focus on meaning as the key to understanding how mathematics 
is learned. They do not accept the focus on ascension towards 
abstraction held by Gray & Tall, Dubinsky, Sfard and others, believing 
that meaning cannot be found in a de-contextualised world. Noss & 
Hoyles (1996) state that, 
 “abstraction is a process of connection rather than ascension”. 
(p48) 
Here we see that different authors use the word “abstraction” to mean 
very different things; something that I believe causes confusion within the 
literature, leading to a focus on the use/misuse of the word, rather than 
on the real learning issues. Noss et al (1997) use abstraction to describe 
a process of abstracting – i.e. at a low level, in a mundane way, as part of 
the early learning of a concept. Gray & Tall, Dubinsky and Sfard, on the 
other hand, refer to abstraction at a higher “grand”-er level, as the end 
product of a series of cognitive transitions as well as a way of describing 
the process through which those abstractions are achieved. 
Noss & Hoyles (1996) feel that to consider the connections that the 
individual learner makes with their own previous learning is to focus too 
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narrowly and they go on to consider a range of other resources that may 
be involved in the process of mathematical abstraction.  Noss & Hoyles 
put forward two main ideas. The first of these is webbing. This describes 
the way that learners construct and repeatedly modify a network of 
connections within and across concepts. Webbing is ongoing and 
iterative and has the effect of extending and enriching the links between 
knowledge resources. Noss & Hoyles go on to propose the notion of 
“situated abstractions”  to describe how learners emerge from learning 
situations having abstracted some aspects of concepts experienced in 
that learning situation. They present evidence that abstraction of a new 
concept is situated, in that it is linked cognitively to the situation in which it 
was developed and that it is triggered by situations that are perceived as 
similar. Situated abstractions, themselves, become resources for sense-
making where similarities are perceived. We see, then, that resources  
have potential to facilitate the formation and recognition of connections 
and that resources are therefore linked to the potential for transfer or re-
use. What is not clear is how newly abstracted knowledge (the result of 
recognition of commonalities across problems or contexts or experiences) 
is used in unrelated or dissimilar situations. The distinction between 
abstracting, at the micro-level, and abstraction that creates abstract 
notions that are conceived as mathematical objects, at the macro-level, is 
key to describing and defining learning. 
The human aspect 
We find, then, that many issues are relevant when attempting to 
understand learning and transfer. Moreover, I believe that re-use of 
knowledge and the development of concepts is about even more than the 
classroom, practitioner, technical and practical attributes of an 
experience. In considering the whole range of available resources, we 
must include intra-personal resources such as cognition, memory and 
motivation.   
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Memory 
Some researchers have focused on the human aspects of learning, for 
example motivation and memory, in their pursuit of understanding about 
learning and the growth of knowledge. 
Clancey (1989) explains that human memory is better characterized as a 
capacity than as a repository. A knowledge engineer may represent what 
someone knows in terms of formal linguistic descriptions, such as the 
rules in an expert system, but these rules are not literally stored in the 
expert's head. In fact, knowledge bases often contain models of the world 
that go beyond what anyone has said before. 
Other workers in this area (Suchman, 1987; Agre, 1988; also Clancey, 
1992) present similar conclusions, believing that human memory is not a 
place where things (e.g. schemas, categories, rules, procedures, scripts) 
are stored: such representations—when they are not stored in the 
environment—are always constructed each time they are used.  
Resources, both internal and external, and their potential to activate 
existing knowledge, are therefore crucial for enabling learning and the 
development of knowledge through conceptual development and growth. 
Situated cognition 
Another group of researchers have focused on the role of setting, and the 
“situated-ness” of knowledge. This is the notion that knowledge is 
embedded in the context within which it was generated and only has 
meaning in those settings or in settings that are perceived as related. 
Lave (1988) set out to explore the relationship between education, 
cognitive theory and everyday practice. She observed the arithmetic 
strategies used by “just plain folks” in various everyday activities such as 
shopping and dieting. These were compared with performance on tests in 
a more controlled setting. She found that there was only very limited use 
of school mathematics in real world settings, that, 
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“…… when we investigate learning transfer directly across 
situations, the results are consistently negative ..”   (p68).  
Lave develops a critique of learning transfer research and goes on to 
assert that knowledge does not develop out of learning transferred from 
one situation to another. Of course, the logical development of this view is 
that learning acquired in schools is unlikely to be used in the real, 
material world, without significant and problematic transformation being 
necessary. 
She analyses the relationships between activity, practice, mind, person 
and knowledge and goes on to assert that knowledge is constructed by a 
learner, as a result of the dialectical relationship that exists between the 
learner, the setting and the activity.  
Nunes et al (1993) investigated what they call “street mathematics”. They 
found that fishermen were able to refine and reformulate the calculating 
strategies they normally used at work and use them in other real-world 
“street” domains. This is evidence of flexibility and generalisability – that 
people who engaged in street mathematics can generalise the schemas 
they develop in a particular “street” setting to other street settings. This 
shows us that there is some link between everyday maths practice and 
knowledge that can be activated in other contexts.  
It would seem, therefore, that though Lave may have found that transfer 
did not occur between formal and informal settings, Nunes et al (1993) 
did find evidence of transfer between informal settings. 
I believe that the work by Nunes et al might serve to lead us out of the 
situationist “cul-de-sac” (Noss & Hoyles, 1996, p33) – to illuminate a way 
forward to understanding more about how we learn. The situationist view 
is that knowledge, and knowing, and coming-to-know are highly situated 
and not transferable to new situations. Since the very nature of 
mathematics, particularly that of advanced mathematical thinking, 
depends on working with abstract ideas and pattern, it would seem that 
(theoretically at least) there can be no mathematical activity if the situated 
cognitionists’ view is correct. This prompts the questions as to whether 
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mathematics is truly formal and abstract:  I would question whether, 
perhaps, it is only the most advanced mathematics that is truly formal; 
that perhaps the mathematics that young learners need to engage with, in 
order to develop more advanced understanding, is not. It is possible that 
even the most advanced mathematics depends on situated roots. There 
may be no evidence of this in the symbolic notations through which the 
mathematics is presented but perhaps advanced mathematicians, in 
making sense of the symbols, rely on concepts and intuitions that are 
rooted in situated knowledge; knowledge that has extended the range of 
contexts in which it is considered relevant. Clearly, whilst we might accept 
that the role of setting in learning is important, we cannot accept the 
extreme view that learning is completely situated and cannot be 
abstracted (or “uncoupled” (Lave 1988)) from the setting in which it was 
created. We need to learn more about the relationship between setting 
and learning.  Furthermore, we need to understand the role of the 
resources that are available in different settings. This might help us to 
understand why contextual aspects of mathematics experience are so 
important.  
It is children’s response to and utilisation of resources connected to a 
task that research might usefully consider. A focus on their informal 
strategies in their response to a situation or problem might help illuminate 
the learning process, including development towards more formal 
knowledge. 
Recognition of similarity  
The Realistic Mathematics Education movement in the Netherlands is 
committed to the design of “learning trajectories” that provide sequences 
of contextualised tasks from which, it is intended that, for learners, 
models will emerge and more formal mathematical knowledge will be 
achieved. Context problems are therefore one of the keystones of the 
RME philosophy. Gravemeijer & Doorman (1999) define context 
problems as “problems of which the problem situation is experientially 
real to the student.” (p111). If we accept that context problems might 
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provide a valid window through which we might attempt to observe and 
evaluate the learning process, it is important to remind ourselves that, in 
order to design context problems with any confidence, it is necessary to 
have confidence in our knowledge of what children will perceive as 
relevant.  
Although it could be argued (from an extreme situationist view) that 
transfer or re-use of prior learning in new situations does not occur, it is 
clear to me that in order to function as human beings, it must be possible 
to apply knowledge or behaviour learned in one context in other 
situations. I would argue that the question is not of whether learning can 
be transferred or re-used but of how it happens. (It is entirely feasible, in 
the light of my review of research in this field and reflecting on my own 
developing knowledge and understanding of these issues, that it will be 
shown that knowledge does not actually transfer, if we accept that the 
meaning of the verb “to transfer” means that something is moved or 
conveyed from one place or person to another. I already see that this is 
not an appropriate description of what happens; that actually, knowledge 
is caused to change or develop or transform but that it does not re-locate. 
Transfer is not, therefore, an appropriate term for what I prefer to call re-
use of knowledge contributing to conceptual growth. However, for the 
sake of conciseness and consistency with the prevailing jargon, I shall 
refer to “transfer” where others do so.)  
To accept that, for children to be able to make sense of new mathematics 
they must be able to connect it to existing knowledge, and that this 
cannot happen in a contextual vacuum, is to acknowledge that setting 
plays an important part in teaching and learning. There is a learning 
paradox which educators need to resolve which I call the “paradox of 
situations”: that is, that the most valuable learning is that which can be 
useful in new situations – and yet, new learning is only meaningful in the 
situation in which was acquired.  All too often, children appear to learn 
(even master) something in one lesson that they seem unable to 
remember in another. Clearly, new learning does sometimes become 
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locked in to specific situations (at least temporarily) and children are often 
not able to apply it in new situations.  
It follows that, for relevance of some previous experience or knowledge to 
be recognised, some aspect of a new problem must be perceived as 
similar. This perception of relevance is a vital piece in the jigsaw which is 
the “gap” between informal knowledge and more formal abstract 
mathematical understanding which is, I feel often overlooked.  
I conjecture that it must be the activation of mental connections and 
pathways to prior learning through recognition of similarities in new 
contexts that is key. For prior learning to be activated, any similarities 
must be recognised by the child. Therefore, one way in which we can 
facilitate learning is by providing feedback to children about the relevance 
of previous experience and explicitly pointing out similarities. Of course, 
good teachers do this all the time (Askew, Brown, Rhodes, Wiliam & 
Johnson (1997) reported on the links between “connectionist” teaching 
and high levels of effectiveness). 
Some researchers have focused not on learning generally but particularly 
on the re-use of prior knowledge itself; and most particularly on strategies 
and mechanisms that facilitate the creation of meaning across concept 
boundaries – i.e. the perception of similarity. This crossing of boundaries 
constitutes a type of transfer that I shall show is only one type: there are 
other processes involved in conceptual change and growth that are also 
types of transfer. Incidentally, it is interesting to consider that repeated 
crossing of boundaries, in itself, leads to blurring and dissolution of those 
boundaries. 
diSessa and his colleagues, and Mason and his colleagues, have made a 
significant contribution to the literature in this area, which I shall now 
consider. 
diSessa & Wagner (2005) challenge research in the field of transfer to 
address with clarity the nature and role of knowledge, 
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“We question the assumption that high-level abstractness is the 
principal quality of knowledge that provides for its applicability 
across diverse situations.” (p121)  
They claim that research often misdirects its focus and studies 
performance without validating its link with knowledge. diSessa & Wagner 
go on to say that, 
”… theories purporting to explain transfer must be held 
accountable for describing and determining knowledge – not 
merely successful or unsuccessful performance.” (p121)  
diSessa & Wagner (2005) describe Co-ordination Class Theory, which 
identifies different elements of the “complex knowledge system” which, 
they belief, characterises knowledge itself, 
“We, (and others …. ) view knowledge as a complex system of 
many kinds and instances of knowledge elements and structures. 
Learning, say, a concept entails co-ordinating a large number of 
elements in many ways. Furthermore, many of these elements 
(following a constructivist orientation) come from the prior 
conceptual competence of the learner.” (p125)  
They go on to point out that any model of a complex knowledge system 
will inevitably be complex itself, (as Co-ordination Class Theory is). 
diSessa & Wagner (2005) believe that there are different kinds of 
knowledge and that they “have different properties in transfer”. Their 
focus is “specific conceptual knowledge”. 
They point out that, previously, interest has been in abstraction - “the 
problem of how knowledge is generalized so as to become applicable 
across a wide range of situations”. Co-ordination Class Theory, on the 
other hand, emphasises the earlier phases of the actual construction of 
knowledge which occurs incrementally and over time, including what I call 
abstracting.  
diSessa & Wagner stress that,  
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“Co-ordination Class Theory is not a theory of transfer. 
Nonetheless, transfer can be found within it, notably in the relation 
of a co-ordination class to the multiple contexts in which it can 
operate. Co-ordination class theory shows how a concept can 
become robust enough so that it is applicable fluently across a 
wide range of situations (p139). 
They distinguish between different types of transfer: 
 Class A Transfer– “where an adequately prepared set of ideas is 
used unproblematically in new situations” (p148); “the knowledge 
whose transfer is at issue is assumed to be, or can be 
demonstrated to be, well prepared and does not, in principle, 
require further learning to apply” (p124). diSessa & Wagner note 
that this is important for schools who “want students to be able to 
solve problems other than the ones used in teaching them 
concepts” (p125); 
 Class B transfer – knowledge constructed that is “presuming 
subjects’ persistent effort… sufficiently prepared so that transfer 
can be reliably accomplished in acceptable periods of time (e.g. in 
a few hours or days… )”  (p125) 
 Class C transfer– How do “relatively unprepared subjects 
(students) use prior knowledge in early work in a domain?” (p125); 
“where bits and pieces of “old” knowledge are invoked, 
productively or unproductively, typically in early stages of learning” 
(p148). Class C transfer might be considered as the processes 
that lead to transferable knowledge. (p125) 
It is interesting to consider that the Class A transfer identified by diSessa 
& Wagner is what is often labelled as “abstraction”; what I have called 
high level abstraction to produce abstract notions. Class B and Class C 
transfer might be considered as “abstracting” at a lower level, or “micro-
transfer”. 
Co-ordination Class Theory (unlike abstraction theories that dominated 
the literature in the 1980s and 1990s) asserts that contextual information 
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in and from learning experiences is not stripped away: on the contrary; 
constructs of Co-ordination Class Theory (CCT) explicitly include 
attention to situation-specific knowledge.  For example, “readout 
strategies” (cognitive tools with which (according to CCT) we glean 
information and understanding about a situation) are thought to be highly 
context-dependent and particular; and wide “span” (the range of new 
situations to which knowledge is considered by the learner to be at all 
relevant) is accomplished, 
 “by accumulating a lot of situation-specific knowledge, rather than 
by deleting reference to particular features in the abstract and thus 
generalized knowledge.”(diSessa & Wagner 2005; p140) 
Co-ordination Class Theory would seem to provide an alternative, more 
realistic characterisation of what occurs, within learners’ cognition, that 
enables transfer, as opposed to abstraction theories which, I have 
argued, cannot lead to transfer because they fail to describe the links 
between existing and new knowledge. One of the underlying principles of 
CCT is that the similarity between situations that must be perceived is not 
similarity of structure but similarity of some item or aspect of the 
situations. 
Royer, Mestre & Dufresne (2005) also dismiss the idea that recognition of 
structural similarity is key to transfer. They point out that there are 2 
broad categories of theories about learning and transfer: “environmental”; 
and “cognitive”. Royer et al stress that, 
 “Rather than transfer being dependent on stimulus similarity, 
cognitive theory proposed that transfer was dependent on 
conceptual similarity.” (pxvi)  
This represents a significant shift in the factors that research needs to 
consider since it stipulates that transfer occurs only where there is 
similarity between the way that new and previous experiences or 
problems are conceptualised or understood. That is to say, any similarity 
that must be recognised lies within the learner, not in the setting itself. 
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diSessa & Wagner (2005) consider that, 
“Felt relevance ….. We believe its role has been much 
underplayed in transfer research.” (p147)  
I would add that another aspect of transfer that is not sufficiently attended 
to or explored (and is not therefore understood) is that of the level of 
preparedness of prior knowledge that is necessary for Class A transfer to 
occur. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears (2005) consider a type of transfer 
which they call “preparation for future learning” (“PFL”). They, like 
diSessa &Wagner, maintain that transfer is not necessarily the direct 
application of existing knowledge; that it is also the process by which 
existing knowledge provides a framework, a resource, that enables 
learners to know what sort of information is useful in working towards a 
solution to a new problem so that they are not completely lacking focus or 
direction. We see, then, that much contemporary research is, therefore, 
focusing on the early stages of knowledge building. 
Wagner (2006) carried out a micro-level analysis of the work of 
undergraduates learning about “the law of large numbers”. He went on to 
develop further (what he calls a “micro-genetic analysis”) the work of one 
student, Maria.  
Wagner (2006), like diSessa, believes that abstraction is not the primary 
source of the generalizeability of knowledge; and that transfer results, 
“not from the acquisition of a single, sufficiently abstract 
understanding of a concept, but from the construction of a 
collection of knowledge resources.” (p56).  
Wagner’s approach is aligned with diSessa’s “knowledge-in-pieces” 
(diSessa & Sherin 1998) epistemology in that he expected the elements 
of the co-ordination system, including knowledge resources, to be 
sensitive to context; that the patterns of re-use of knowledge would be 
variable. According to Co-ordination Class Theory, these knowledge 
resources facilitate, 
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 “ … conceptual recognition, interpretation and reasoning 
according to the contextual circumstances under which particular 
collections of (distributed) elements best function.” (Wagner 2006; 
p56) 
In Wagner’s study, he showed that, 
“Maria was not abstracting structure from the problem situation, 
but actively structuring it by the most active knowledge frame 
available to her”. (p57) 
I believe that the knowledge that she used must have been triggered by 
contextual features and that resources that are cued are therefore 
sensitive to contextual variation. However, I do not feel that this means 
that knowledge is situated, as we usually understand it. 
Wagner (2006) describes,  
“incremental growth, systematization and organisation of 
knowledge resources that only gradually extends the span of 
situations in which a concept is perceived as applicable”. (p10) 
This reveals a clear relationship between learning and transfer; a link that 
is developing reciprocally – i.e. learning leads to transfer and as transfer 
occurs, knowledge (including that of its own span of relevance and 
efficacy) develops further. Wagner describes this process as one,  
“by which ideas once cued only in particular contexts can be 
actively and flexibly developed, combined and co-ordinated such 
that they are more likely to be used in an increasingly wider span 
of situations”. (p6) 
Obversely, 
“pieces of knowledge previously unassociated” are more “likely to 
be cued together, and contexts that once cued more limited frames 
were now more likely to cue this larger, enriched frame”. (p54) 
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Wagner (2003) mentions the relationship between knowledge, 
understanding and transfer and explains that deeper understanding can 
be understood as extending co-ordination. This was evident in that,  
“Maria’s “rule” was incrementally transferred to a wider span of 
problem aspects as new co-ordination knowledge took hold”. (p63) 
There are several key ideas which I have drawn from the work of diSessa 
(1993), diSessa & Sherin (1998), diSessa & Wagner (2005) and Wagner 
(2006), relating to the perception of similarity:- 
• Perception of similarity is arguably the main key to transfer. Where 
no similarity is perceived, relevant knowledge resources will not be 
“brought to mind”. There are many ways in which a situation or 
problem might be similar (or dissimilar) to another situation or 
problem, including problem type, aspect or context. A learner’s 
ability to perceive similarities is therefore dependent on him/her 
having some knowledge of situations where elements of problem 
type, aspect or context are similar to those of the new situation. 
• However, though necessary, it is not sufficient for relevant 
knowledge resources to exist in the mind of the learner: if they are 
to be rendered available in new situations similarity (in some way) 
must be perceived and recognised by the learner. Recognition of 
similarities is both facilitated and limited by the learner’s span of 
experience and existing knowledge resources of many kinds. 
• The perception of relevance emerges in the relationship between 
the situation and the individual’s interpretive knowledge that 
frames the situation. 
• Interpretive knowledge is that which learners develop out of their 
experience of concepts, skills and connections and associations in 
all aspects of their learning. It is this that they use to make sense 
of new situations. One dimension of that knowledge is the 
development of strategies for extracting information from a 
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situation (readout) and for making sense/meaning through co-
ordinating this with other knowledge and experience. 
• Reorganisation and systematization of interpretive knowledge 
involves integration of descriptive and explanatory knowledge. 
• Structure within a problem situation is neither rigid nor objective; it 
is constructed as part of the problem solving activity itself by the 
problem solver. This knowledge can only develop through 
experience with situations which have some similarity, though they 
do not need to “match” structurally. 
At this point in my review of the literature, the importance of internal and 
external resources – their nature and learners’ use of them – as well as a 
focus on the need to understand the role of learners’ perception of 
similarity has become very clear. It is appropriate, therefore, to further 
expand my list of research questions to include: 
• How do children use all types of available resources, both external 
and internal? 
• Where do similarities (that might be recognised) reside? – in the 
problem context? – in its structure? – or somewhere else? 
2.7 Relationships between knowledge, learning and 
transfer. 
Mutual bootstrapping of conceptual knowledge 
Wagner (2006) resonates with my own intuitive beliefs about learning, 
knowledge and transfer. In the development of my own conceptual 
knowledge, I am aware of a sense of a hand-over-hand process whereby 
the growth of span of relevance and of the applicability of situations to 
knowledge resources (and vice versa) which constitutes conceptual 
development, is characterised by a small change in one dimension 
facilitating a small change in another dimension, after which the first 
dimension is enabled to grow or change a little more. Wagner describes 
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how his main subject revealed her incremental development of a 
particular concept; bootstrapping different aspects of the concept: 
“Within the active knowledge framework, Maria expected 
representativeness and accuracy to be relevant explanatory ideas, 
but the role they served in the particular problem, and the role they 
served in co-ordination with other ideas in the framework, had yet 
to be clarified. These incremental moves are a hallmark of a 
knowledge-in-pieces perspective on the growth of conceptual 
understanding, as well as the transfer-in-pieces perspective on 
how knowledge of a principle develops to span more and more 
situations.” (p62) 
I find the work of diSessa (1988), diSessa & Wagner (2005) and Wagner 
(2006) very appealing. It provides a framework for identifying the different 
aspects of the learning process and offers a well drawn rationale for 
characterising the relationships between knowledge and learning and 
transfer, taking account of what I call “micro-transfer”. Though other 
theories have offered models (often hierarchical) for moving 
understanding and knowledge from that of the particular to that of 
something more generic that might be inserted into a new, structurally 
similar situation, they have not succeeded, for me, in filling in the gaps – 
the major shortcoming of abstractionist, or encapsulation theories is in 
their failure to meaningfully (for me) address the question of perception of 
similarity and, therefore, relevance. It has been clear to me that 
application of knowledge in a new situation requires some understanding 
of the relationship between the existing knowledge and the demands of 
the new situation as well as some notion of correspondence or mapping 
between contextual attributes old and new. Wagner (2006) highlights, 
 “the in-separability of the perception of structure in a problem from 
the knowledge of the principles needed to solve it.” (p61)  
We see no more than what our knowledge leads us to expect to see:  
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“seeing complex structures within a given situation depends on our 
having complex expectations – not necessarily ready-made 
structures previously stored that are retrieved in their entirety, but 
complex associations of descriptive and explanatory knowledge 
resources that have proven to be mutually supportive in other 
circumstances. These associations are learned.” (Wagner 2006; 
p63) 
Mason (2002) also acknowledges co-evolution of an individual’s capacity 
to recognise connections between resources with the development of 
some experience with those resources, 
”Perception and preparedness to be able to perceive emerge 
together as the result of perceiving and preparing to perceive.” 
(p229) 
To recap, transfer may be understood as follows:- 
• Transfer requires an incremental growth of span of relevance; 
• Transfer enables an incremental growth of span of relevance; 
• These processes together constitute a “hand-over-hand” growth of 
interpretive knowledge (includes descriptive, explanatory, readout, 
co-ordination); 
• Transfer is dependent on perception of similarity, which is 
dependent on development of span of relevance; 
• Transfer does not require general (abstract) expression; to 
illustrate this point, Wagner (2006) states that “We expect no 
single understanding of the law of large numbers to be applicable 
anywhere and everywhere, rather different combinations of 
distributed elements  may support its recognition and use in 
different circumstances” (i.e. is sensitive to context and takes 
account of it  p56). This is a key idea, vital for shaping 
understanding about knowledge and transfer. 
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How does abstraction relate to transfer? 
In considering what transfer is, what it looks like and what it entails, it is 
clear that abstraction, as opposed to abstracting, is not necessary for 
transfer (of Class B or Class C) to occur. Interestingly, Maria did develop 
and express, 
“an increasingly invariant understanding of a statistical principle as 
she incrementally constructed an interpretive knowledge frame 
that widened the span of phenomena to which she understood the 
law of large numbers to apply. …. Maria’s attempts at stating a 
generalised principle took place only in the aftermath of the 
development of interpretive knowledge frames at a much finer 
level of detail.” 
Therefore,  
“ .. abstraction was a consequence of transfer and the growth of 
understanding, not the cause of it.” (Wagner 2003 p72) 
It was argued previously that the perception of relevance emerges in the 
relationship between the situation and the individual’s interpretive 
knowledge that frames the situation. Since the “individual’s interpretive 
knowledge that frames the situation” might be more simply referred to as 
the learner’s understanding of the situation, it is clear that understanding 
is related to both transfer and abstraction. A learner with deep 
understanding is likely to perceive similarities with the greatest span of 
relevant knowledge resources. Therefore, we see that understanding 
supports transfer and transfer contributes to understanding. Eventually, 
when sufficient examples have been experienced and understood at 
some level (facilitated through recognition of similarities), generalisation 
across situations will become possible – i.e. when multiple instances of 
transfer have occurred, abstraction is enabled; this in turn will deepen 
understanding. This model locates abstraction (rather than abstracting) 
as an outcome of (Class C) transfer, rather than a prerequisite for it. 
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Why is evidence of transfer so elusive to researchers? 
Co-ordination classes are, according to diSessa & Wagner (2005), those 
concepts which are complex and comprise multiple layers and 
dimensions of meaning and relationships. It is this complexity that means 
that co-ordination classes are difficult concepts to learn.  
Not all concepts are co-ordination classes but many of the more 
problematic concepts (in maths and science learning) are (diSessa 1993).  
An alternative contribution to the field comes from Mason and Spence 
(1999) and it is interesting to contrast their ideas with those of diSessa 
and Wagner and others. Mason & Spence describe a framework that, like 
the contribution of diSessa and Wagner focuses on the earlier “precursor” 
stages of knowledge-building in order to illuminate the cognitive 
mechanisms for “transfer” of that knowledge into new situations. They 
explain their view that  
“Knowing-about, that is, knowing-that, -how, and –why forms the 
heart of institutionalised education: students can learn and be 
tested on it. But success in examinations gives little indication of 
whether that knowledge can be used or called upon when 
required, which is the essence of “knowing-to”. Although knowing-
to does of course depend on training in behaviour, it is based, as 
we shall see, in awareness. It has to do with the structure of 
attention.” (p138) 
I feel that this latter point is an interesting one; that knowing-to is more 
than a behaviour that can be trained – it is about awareness and what is 
attended to (or is not). I agree with Mason & Spence (1999) that knowing-
to is clearly not the same as reacting – i.e. it cannot be achieved simply 
by training. 
Once knowing-to has occurred, the other aspects of knowing-about are 
enabled: without the trigger of knowing-to, all that is known-about is not 
accessible . After all, 
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“No-one can act if they are unaware of a possibility to act; no-one 
can act unless they have an act to perform.” (Mason & Spence 
1999, p135) 
It is interesting to note, at this point, that Mason & Spence seem to 
support the view that transfer (“knowing-to”) precedes abstraction 
(“knowing-about”). It is also clear that, in order to “know-to”, it is 
necessary to know something; this, I would argue, entails “knowing-
about”. Papert (1996) introduced what he called the “Power Principle”. He 
described how children working with LOGO were able to learn about 
angle by working with angle to construct shapes: they were learning by 
using; Papert posed the question, “What comes first, using it or getting 
it?” (p4). 
Anecdotes of learners failing to re-use knowledge that they are thought to 
have learned are rife in schools the world over. This might be described 
using Mason & Spence’s (1999) parlance: that learners who have 
demonstrated that they know-about in some way (know-that, know-how 
and/or know-why) do not apply any of that knowledge in a situation in 
which it would facilitate them to access the problem, possibly solving it. 
Presumably, we might infer, this might be because they do not realise the 
relevance of the knowledge-about to the new situation and so do not use 
it – i.e. they do not know-to. In terms of diSessa and Wagner’s “CCT” 
lexicon, their span is not sufficiently developed. 
Broudy 1977 (cited in Schwarz et al 2005) believes that there are 3 kinds 
of knowledge: “replicative”, “applicative” and “interpretive”. This provides 
a valuable framework with which to analyse the elements and demands 
of tasks and through which we might understand the reasons for an 
apparent lack of transfer. Transfer research is often based on 
measurements of retention of skills and knowledge after a learning event. 
Replicative and applicative knowledgeare relatively straightforward to 
assess and these form the basis of a great deal of what are used as 
assessments of knowledge. However, replicating and applying old 
knowledge in the same ways and in similar problem situations is achieved 
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by performance rather than through understanding. Tests and 
assessments and research tasks that facilitate such “performance” after a 
learning episode may actually find transfer, if transfer is understood as 
“the degree to which a behaviour will be repeated in a new situation” 
(Detterman & Sternberg 1993, cited Schwarz et al 2005). This is the 
classic definition of transfer. If, however, we hold that transfer actually 
involves modification and adaptation of old knowledge to new situations, 
then the third kind of knowledge identified by Broudy  - i.e. interpretive - is 
required and would need to be evident in research tasks. Interpretive 
knowledge is that which enables learners to interpret the content and 
context of new situations in order to select appropriate knowledge skills 
and understanding for addressing a new problem. Schwarz et al point out 
that research into transfer has not, traditionally, designed methodologies 
that enable interpretive knowledge to be used and/or observed. 
Mason & Spence (1999) believe that, 
“The state of sensitivity-awareness of the individual, combined with 
elements of the situation which metonymically trigger or 
metaphorically resonate with experience, are what produce the 
sudden knowing-to act in the moment.” (p146) 
This reference to “elements of the situation” suggests that this approach 
to understanding the mental processes involved in transfer of knowledge, 
allows for attention to contextual information, rather than focusing on 
structural similarity. I would suggest that, if we accept this account of the 
processes involved in transfer, it would be helpful to gain some 
understanding of ways in which educators might effectively sensitise the 
“triggers” to which Mason & Spence refer. Or, to use Co-ordination Class 
Theory terminology, strategies for extending span, including testing 
alignment need to be explored and developed. 
Mason & Spence conclude that, 
“Knowing is not a simple matter of accumulation. It is rather a state 
of awareness, of preparedness to see in the moment.” (p151) 
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They go on to consider whether knowing-to can be prepared for (a more 
appropriate term than taught or trained). They believe that, even if 
metaphors are deliberately provided, children’s uptake and use of them is 
highly variable; that attempts to “implant” the metaphors and images are 
unsuccessful and that children need to actively and personally take on 
board metaphors that might be suggested from within or outside of 
themselves. 
Some of the ideas of Schwarz, Bransford & Sears (2005) resonate with 
the work of Mason & Spence. Schwarz et al describe how much transfer 
research has been based on a “sequestered problem solving” (SPS) 
approach to assessing transfer of knowledge and learning and they posit 
that this only facilitates the measurement of certain types of knowledge 
since it looks for “direct application” of old knowledge in a new situation. 
They propose that this type of research neglects and is blind to a range of 
modifications and adaptations to old knowledge that might facilitate 
problem-solving in the future rather than in the test situation. This 
“preparation for future learning” (PFL) is a more helpful view of what 
transfer actually entails since it extends the range of situations where it 
might be evident.  
Wagner (2003;2006) can be seen to have implanted metaphors (or 
prepared Maria for learning). He designed a sequence of learning 
activities for Maria that exposed her to certain ideas. It would seem then 
that attempts to “design-in” exposure to relevant and potentially helpful 
metaphors might help knowledge to develop, although Mason & Spence 
(1999) thought it not worthwhile. This tension in the findings from different 
studies is not disconcerting: I believe that work in this field, with a sharp 
focus on the minutiae of conceptual change and growth, is only beginning 
to develop and that findings from one worker do not necessarily predict 
outcomes in other settings, even where they appear to be similar. 
I think transfer might be different for different knowledge domains. 
diSessa &Wagner (2005) assume this might be the case: 
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“We, ….., do not presume transfer is homogenous with respect to 
kind of knowledge or with respect to other such dimensions. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to examine transfer in a particular, 
reasonably well-elaborated case.” (p139) 
This is what Wagner chose to do when he focused on one undergraduate 
student for his (2003;2006) study.  
Research at this micro-level, focusing on an individual in one setting in 
order to discover at least how that individual thinks and learns will, I 
believe, help us to develop experience and understanding of those 
particular subjects in those particular settings. If a model of learning for 
transfer is built on the idea that understanding of multiple examples of 
particular situations is what leads ultimately to generalisation and deeper 
understanding then it is appropriate that micro-level research is the way 
forward. That is to say, an accumulation of knowledge about how 
individuals are able to effect conceptual growth might be the most 
appropriate way forward if we are to begin to understand learning and 
transfer in a way that might subsequently contribute to the development 
of more macro-level theories. 
Research into the development of knowledge and understanding 
presents significant challenges in the 21st century. The theories which 
dominated the field for most of the latter part of the 20th century have 
been rigorously challenged. We have now been shown that an abstract 
understanding in/of mathematics, stripped of any context-based 
references, is not necessarily an appropriate goal for teachers and 
learners (or researchers) in primary schools. It is no longer abstraction 
which is the key objective for mathematics education; there is now a 
bigger challenge. Research in this area must develop strategies for 
changing its focus, perhaps for zooming-in on individual instantiations of 
learning and transfer. I am happy to adopt some of the terminology 
introduced by diSessa and Wagner (2005) as I summarise some of their 
ideas which, I believe, are thorough and meaningful; I believe, also, that 
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they reflect, develop and represent realistically and accurately what 
learners actually have and do: 
• in cases where a co-ordination class is well prepared, almost by 
definition, subjects will be able to “transfer” that knowledge to any 
related problem within a sensible range; 
• mismatch of contextual characteristics will prevent prior knowledge 
being used but so will underdeveloped readout strategies and naïve 
or flawed co-ordination knowledge of a concept; 
• transfer research has found failure because it is looking for Class A 
transfer where it is unlikely to be found – i.e. knowledge is unlikely 
to be sufficiently prepared; 
• Class C is a frequent, “blind” (understandably) process involved in 
the extended preparation that is required for Class A transfer to be 
enabled; 
• investigating Class C “depends strongly on our ability to see 
particular knowledge in action even if it does not show up as 
context-transcending success.” (diSessa & Wagner 2005; p 148). 
Some of these points will be discussed in later chapters in relation to 
findings from my study. 
2.8 Partial states of knowledge construction: 
Schemas, models – where do they fit in? 
Within the field of cognitive science, the terms “schema” and “model” 
abound. However, it is not always clear exactly what it is that these terms 
are being used to describe. Generally, these terms are intended to 
describe the way we represent (internally and externally) what is in our 
heads. “Schema” is often used to label a kind of mental map; “model” is 
sometimes equated with some sort of analogue or metaphorical 
representation. 
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Fischbein (1987) set out 3 requirements for an effective model: 
“comprehensiveness”, “obviousness” and “correctness”.  
Chinnappan (1998) focused on schemas and mental models and 
considered the nature of,  
“possible interactions between the state of organisation of 
available geometric knowledge and the accessing of that 
knowledge during problem solving”. (p214)  
He judged that, 
 “attention to the qualitative aspects of knowledge development 
and utilisation has the potential to improve current levels of 
understandings about why some mathematics students experience 
difficulties in applying previously learnt knowledge.” (p214);  
a view I have previously expressed. He goes on to consider the relevance 
and appropriateness of certain models and representations in different 
areas of mathematics. 
There are some aspects of Chinnapan’s view that might be seen to 
parallel the findings of diSessa and Wagner (2005), as I shall now 
describe. 
Chinnapan (1998) was interested in the relationship between the quality 
of children’s knowledge base and their ability to access and make 
effective use of that knowledge. He considers whether more able children 
are more likely to use a greater number of different schemas and more 
often than lower ability children. This, of course, implies that more able 
children might have a more sophisticated relational knowledge base than 
their less able peers. Relational knowledge is that which is rich in 
connections which, is, of course, the way that diSessa and Wagner (and 
others) characterise knowledge and conceptual growth. Clearly, 
Chinnappan also views the extent to which knowledge is relational as key 
to “ability”. He sees mental models as images or representations of what 
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exists/occurs in the mind of the learner. Chinnappan believes that there 
are “key concepts that anchor other concepts” (p203) and that, 
“Two characteristics are important to understanding geometric 
schemas; organisation and spread. Organisation refers to the 
establishment of connections between ideas, whereas spread 
refers to the extent of those connections.”  (p203)  
There are similarities, even parallels, here with diSessa & Wagner (2005); 
for example transfer and alignment correspond at some level with the 
idea of “organisation”, including scope for complexity and sophistication. 
The term schema suggests mapping of elements from one case to 
another; this implies a focus on structure which, I have argued, is not 
appropriate for describing learning. However, perhaps schemas are an 
appropriate description of what learners are able to construct through 
repeated experience? Schwarz et al (2005) think so. 
Schemas and models contribute to what Schwarz et al describe as 
“efficiency” – i.e. that through repeated opportunities to work with similar 
tools to solve similar problems, developing “replicative” and “applicative” 
knowledge, schemas and models are developed and readily utilised. 
They go on to stress, however, that the development of interpretive 
knowledge that equips learners to learn, also increases efficiency, 
Schwarz et al find that, 
“ … enhanced learning does indeed occur when people have an 
opportunity to develop the interpretive knowledge that prepares 
them to learn.” (p11)  
They also stress that learners need to interact and to access additional 
resources, obtaining feedback. This, clearly, is in stark contrast to much 
of the transfer research that has been based on “Sequestered Problem 
Solving” (SPS) i.e. in which, 
“Tests of the ‘direct application’ view [that] typically place people in 
sequestered environments, where they have no access to 
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‘contaminating’ information sources other than what they have 
learned previously, and where they receive no chances to learn by 
trying out an idea and revising as necessary.” (p5) 
There is clearly a conflict and tension in the design and management of 
research into learning wherein the methodology is based on SPS: if 
learners are denied opportunities for feedback and revision, they will not 
be able to show learning. 
Partial states; grey areas 
Wilensky (1993) believes, like Piaget, that interaction and familiarity with 
a concept lead the learner to make more and more connections between 
other experiences and the new concept. However, in contrast to Piaget 
(who was, after all, considering processes and outcomes on a grand 
scale), Wilensky is concerned more about learning at the level of the 
individual and believes that concreteness is, 
"..  not a property of an object but rather a property of a person's 
relationship to an object" (p198)  
and that, as the relationship becomes stronger, it becomes more 
concrete. Concreteness is, therefore, something to which a learner 
aspires, rather than from which he/she develops. Abstraction, using 
Wilensky’s terminology, occurs through concretisation.  
Wilensky also sees conceptual growth as augmentation of connections 
and that this may facilitate abstraction. Wilensky’s notion of concreteness 
also suggests a continuum – i.e. partial states, rather than a have/have 
not model.  
diSessa & Wagner (2005) also feel that much educational research in this 
area is guilty of over simplifying the process of learning. They point out 
that, 
“ … we should expect no sharp line between “having” and “not 
having” a concept.”  (p6) 
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They go on to state that, 
.... "states of partial construction are much more important to 
describe”  (p6)  
and emphasise that with a “complex knowledge system” perspective, it is 
necessary to acknowledge all the grey areas, the intermediate states.  
diSessa & Wagner believe that there is a need to characterize partial 
constructions, particularly the early phases in the construction of a true 
co-ordination class. 
Schwarz et al (2005), in exploring issues of efficiency and innovation and 
the balance of these 2 aspects of knowledge, emphasise the need for 
efficiency in that, 
“ … if people confronted with a new complex problem, have solved 
aspects of it before, this helps make these sub-problems routine 
and easy to solve. This frees attentional bandwidth and enables 
people to concentrate on other aspects of the new situation that 
may require non-routine adaptation.” (p30) 
They also explain that efficiency is insufficient for innovation and that both 
are required if learners are to continue to learn and solve new problems. 
Schwarz et al note that, 
“ … innovation is often preceded by a sense of disequilibrium that 
signals that certain processes or ways of thinking (e.g. previously 
learned routines) are not quite working properly …” (p32) 
Pratt & Noss (2002) acknowledge the importance of the grey areas when 
they explore the notion of situated abstractions. They found that recently 
constructed situated abstractions might be called upon in new situations 
in which similarities are recognised, but that children will, initially, attempt 
to use other long-established internal resources. (This resonates with the 
“disequilibrium” noted by Schwarz et al (2005)). This is because 
resources are “brought to mind” according to a priority order that is 
established and modified over time, according to feedback regarding the 
 65
“success” of resources utilised. diSessa (1993) offers the related notions 
of cueing priority and reliability priority: cueing priority refers to the 
likelihood that a resource will be activated as potentially useful in a 
situation; reliability priority is established according to feedback regarding 
the usefulness of the resource on previous occasions, taking account of 
other resources also activated. Thereby, high cueing priority and high 
reliability priority (diSessa referred to these together as “structured 
priorities”) take time to develop, and new resources can only have low 
reliability priority (and will not, therefore, be utilised in novel situations) 
until they are tried and tested. 
Pratt & Noss (2002) put forward a theoretical model in which meanings 
constructed in one setting might also be valuable in another setting. They 
observed and analysed the way children made sense of the effects of 
using a variety of computational devices that simulate everyday situations 
familiar to the children, but offering enhanced functionality in the virtual 
world. Pratt & Noss believe that there is a distinction between abstraction 
and de-contextualisation which is generally overlooked in the literature. 
They point out that, 
“A central issue is the extent to which mathematical abstraction 
depends on decontextualization … “ (p454) 
They acknowledge the differences between macro- and micro-level 
research and sought to illuminate the ways that the findings of research 
both macro- and micro-  might be related and therefore reconciled. They 
attempt to achieve this by elaborating the relationship between 
mathematical abstraction and de-contextualisation. Pratt & Noss maintain 
that, 
“situated abstraction is observable as more or less tacitly 
articulated invariance of relations, framed within the situation 
itself”. (p457) 
They explain that, 
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“Situated abstractions emerge during activity as internal resources 
that serve as relatively general devices for making sense of 
situations that arise within a setting.” (p456) 
Pratt & Noss go on to say that situated abstractions are, 
“ … types of knowledge that enable learners to reflect on the 
structures within a setting a make sense of phenomena that hold 
true across it.” (p456) 
They show that situated abstractions “are expressed in a language [ …] 
that remains embedded in the situation in which it was constructed”. 
(p456) 
This analysis (Pratt & Noss, 2002) suggested that children: 
• will, when making sense of devices, articulate situated abstractions of 
the way they work; 
• will, when encountering superficially new situations, initially attempt to 
use long-established internal resources for making sense of such 
situations, rather than situated abstractions recently constructed; 
• will, subsequently, employ recently constructed mental resources as 
long as: 
a) feedback from the system emphasises the lack of explanatory 
power of the long-established resources  (increases cueing 
priority), and 
b) there is sufficient similarity between the old and new contexts. 
Pratt & Noss’s model contributes to my view that learning is not about 
detachment from contextual features but development of increasingly rich 
and intricate networks of attachments comprising aspects of experience 
of, and within, those features. Therefore, if abstraction depends on 
decontextualization, it follows that learning cannot be dependant on 
abstraction. This point is becoming increasingly clear to me: that 
abstraction (of abstract notions) might be an outcome of learning that, in 
itself, might enable advanced functioning at high levels within the domain, 
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but it is not the cause of earlier stages of concept development. 
Therefore, I do not believe that abstraction (understood as 
decontextualization) is necessary for learning. 
Salomon & Perkins (1989) offer a view which acknowledges different 
models of transfer: 
“ .. we argue that transfer is not at all a unitary phenomenon. 
Rather, transfer can occur by different routes dependant on 
different mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms.” (p115) 
They propose 2 types of transfer – “high-road” and “low-road”, whereby 
the former, 
“ … occurs by intentional mindful abstraction of something from 
one context and application in a new context.” 
And the latter, 
“ .. depends on extensive, varied practice and occurs by the 
automatic triggering of well-learned behaviour in a new context.” 
(p113) 
This acknowledgement of different kinds of transfer is most helpful: it 
accommodates and validates the range of behaviours and outcomes that 
research has observed. Moreover, it might provide a way forward in that it 
might provoke future work in this field to clarify its aims and match these 
to appropriate methodologies and theoretical frameworks. 
2.9 Summary of Chapter 2: Reflections on the literature 
It appears to me that much of the modern research recently conducted in 
the area of the development of understanding and conceptual 
development has converged on the need to explore and develop 
knowledge about the intermediate states of concept development. I 
welcomed this approach as I rejected simplistic views that knowledge 
becomes abstract and reduced to its structural essence so that it can be 
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unproblematically plugged into new situations as necessary. Also, I found 
that I could not subscribe to the preoccupation with abstraction and the 
assumption of a have/have not dichotomy that has, at times, dominated 
this field. The theoretical frameworks that appeal to me are those that 
acknowledge, and seek to illuminate, the complexity of the processes 
involved in retaining cognitive links with contextual resources. Our 
understanding about learners’ development and refinement of  their 
knowledge - that may eventually lead to the effective application of that 
knowledge in new situations - necessitates exploration of the nature of 
conceptual knowledge at all stages of its development.  
Evident within a significant portion of the literature (e.g. diSessa & Sherin 
1998; Wagner 2003; 2006; Mason & Spence 1999; ) is a persistent 
intuition on the part of conceptual researchers that concepts are always 
bootstrapped within relational structures for other concepts. This 
coincides with my own intuitive beliefs. 
diSessa & Wagner’s work with Maria (2005) also inspired me. They found 
that, “span was particularly hard-won in her (Maria’s) learning” (p133).  
This, coupled with my own ultimate professional goal – to improve the 
quality of primary mathematics teaching, compels me to discover whether 
younger children expand and develop their knowledge in similar ways to 
Maria (who is a more mature and sophisticated learner). 
I have not, so far, found much of the published research in this field 
particularly valuable in showing me how to help children to “learn maths 
better”. I had, however, found the reporting of the work of several 
researchers – their rationales and outcomes - to be very interesting and, 
as John Mason might say – metaphorically/metonymically resonant.  
I have come to believe that the reason why I could not transform the 
excitement I often felt on reading such reports into positive transformation 
of my own (and recommendations for others’) teaching practice is 
because the key differences between “abstractionists”, “situationists” and 
any other “…ists” is not in what they found but in what they were looking 
at. I now believe that, as in every other aspect of our work, the approach 
 69
we take in our attempts to understand something which we previously 
failed to understand will be shaped by our deeply held views about what 
is important. Consequently, some researchers who feel it is important to 
learn about trends in large populations will inevitably reach conclusions 
about those populations and might be able to describe patterns in overall 
behaviour or general outcomes. Conversely, researchers who seek to 
understand issues at the level of the individual will set about their 
research in a very different way and will look for and try to understand 
quite different findings. I now believe that grand theory and other theories 
that describe vast populations cannot be useful for understanding 
individual or small groups.  
So, my focus is on how children in primary schools use and re-use 
knowledge and other resources within and across their experiences. It is 
not specifically transfer that I wish to observe, though it might be one 
aspect of what I find. I am more interested in all stages of concept 
development. I wish to design a research methodology that optimises the 
opportunity for me to infer the way that children use knowledge 
resources. In order to design an effective methodology I must therefore 
understand these hypothetical issues and theories about what children’s 
knowledge resources might look like or manifest themselves in order to 
have any opportunity of observing them. I must also take heed of the 
theoretical tensions embodied by certain methodologies in the past and 
ensure that research design is coherent and well-founded and well-
matched to my aims. 
My research questions thus far stated are: 
• How is knowledge re-used? 
• Is it possible to observe different types of transfer? 
• How do old and new concepts relate to, and affect, each other? 
• How do children recognise situations in which old knowledge is 
relevant? 
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• Is it possible to observe abstraction and/or abstracting in 
mathematics in the primary school? 
• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and 
abstraction? 
• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and 
abstracting? 
• What is the relationship between conceptual growth and transfer? 
• What are the relationships between abstraction and transfer, and 
abstracting and transfer? 
• What happens to the contextual references in children’s 
knowledge as their knowledge develops? Is it possible that they 
are preserved? 
I must now add to this questions relating to the micro-aspects of the 
process, using some of the vocabulary developed by workers in this field 
where appropriate: 
• How do children respond to or use metaphors in their construction 
of new knowledge? 
• Can children’s development of a concept be tracked to observe the 
states of partial construction? This might illuminate the relationship 
between old and new concepts and enable identification of 
increasing span and alignment? 
The above list has been compiled in the light of my review of the literature 
about conceptual change, learning and transfer. It is now necessary to 
consider an appropriate medium within which I might observe and 
analyse children learning – I must choose an area of mathematics in 
which I am likely to be able to evaluate how children are developing 
knowledge and understanding about a new concept. For reasons which 
shall be elaborated, I have decided to work in the domain of negative 
numbers. It is therefore appropriate, at this point, to review the 
mathematics education literature relating to teaching and learning about 
negative numbers. This is presented in the next chapter, where I shall 
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also problematise the teaching and learning about negative numbers in 
relation to what I have learned in the literature about conceptual change 
and growth. The review and analysis of research about negative numbers 
in the next chapter will enable the development of more precise, more 
rigorous research questions about conceptual change and growth, 
learning and transfer. 
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Chapter 3: Aims of this study: Negative numbers 
as a window on transfer 
3.1 Core themes 
The core themes, identified and explored in the previous chapter, are: 
• the microevolution of conceptual knowledge; 
• micro transfer within the processes of change and growth of 
concepts; 
• transfer of knowledge within and across the contexts in which 
learning occurs. 
3.2 Negative numbers as a window for observing micro-
evolution of knowledge 
I need to observe children in situations in which their thinking is provoked 
to change as they are introduced to a new concept. For reasons which 
are explained in Chapter 4: Methodology, my research about my core 
themes is situated in the domain of negative numbers as it is taught in UK 
primary schools. It is therefore appropriate, at this point, to turn to the 
literature about negative numbers to learn about the successes and 
problems associated with teaching and learning in this domain. 
3.2.1 Review of the literature relating to teaching and learning about 
negative numbers 
Before entering into a painstaking design process for the creation of 
teaching and learning tasks and resources to facilitate them, it is 
necessary to understand about different approaches to teaching in this 
domain, possible reasons for children’s difficulties, and the successes 
and failures of a variety of strategies and models. 
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My analysis reveals several emerging themes: 
• relevance of negative numbers in primary mathematics teaching; 
• descriptions of children’s difficulties and the underlying cognitive 
difficulties; 
• dimensions in which negative number situations are cognitively 
experienced; 
• use of metaphors and the development of mental models.  
Each of the above is now considered. 
3.2.1.1 Relevance of negative numbers in primary mathematics teaching 
Some writers, in analysing and describing the cognitive and pedagogical 
challenge presented by negative numbers, conclude that it might not be 
appropriate or relevant in the primary curriculum. 
Fischbein (1987) claims that negative numbers only exist mathematically 
– that they cannot be represented concretely or modelled effectively so 
should not be taught until pupils can cope with “intra-mathematical 
justifications” (p.281). This would require understanding and facility with 
algebraic representations of negative numbers which would not normally 
be expected in the primary school. 
However, Ryan & Williams (2007) emphasise the development of pre-
algebraic thinking that is enabled through learning about negative 
numbers, through the facilitation of generalising from knowledge of 
natural numbers to integers – gaining experience and familiarity with the 
integer as process. 
3.2.1.2 Descriptions of children’s difficulties and the underlying cognitive 
difficulties 
Gallardo (2002) evaluated 12/13 year-old students’ understanding of 
negative numbers by constructing measures of understanding related to 
that evident in ancient texts from a range of historical periods and 
cultures. He found that students of this age were not able to demonstrate 
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formal understanding of a negative number as part of the family of 
integers. However, they were able to demonstrate some acceptance of: 
relative or directed numbers; opposite quantities; a negative number as 
an isolated number or as the result of an operation. 
This is in line with the findings of Lytle (1994). When asked to give a 
meaning for a given negative number, students responded with ideas 
relating to position, “something missing”, the result of subtraction, or 
“opposite”. In a preliminary test Lytle found that, amongst a group of 
students in 7th Grade classes, “ … most were successful in operating on 
a negative number, but not with one.” (p.195). This would mean that, for 
example, students could multiply -2 by 3 but they cannot multiply 3 by -2. 
Hayes (1996) also presents findings from his secondary school study, 
showing that many students fail to develop understanding in the topic. He 
also describes a workshop for 4th year trainee mathematics teachers in 
which, “not one could prove or give an explanation for either “0 -  -6 = 6” 
or “
-2 x -3 = 6”. Hayes (1996) goes on to claim that, 
“A large proportion of students emerge from secondary school with 
a seriously flawed and incomplete understanding of the real 
number system. Any area or application of mathematics requiring 
the use of negative numbers and related concepts is likely to 
produce difficulties.” (no page numbers in online text) 
Some workers suggest reasons for such widespread difficulty. For 
example, Linchevski & Williams (1999) state that, 
“Traditionally, negative numbers introduce a new aspect into the 
study of mathematics: for the first time reasoning in an algebraic 
frame of reference seems to be required.”  (p.134) 
Tang (2003) believes that the concept of negative numbers is outside the 
scope of an innate number sense that helps us learn about natural 
numbers and basic operations on and with them.  Findings of a study of 7 
and 9 year-olds working with negative numbers (Bristow & 
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Desforges,1995) support this view since children involved revealed a 
persistent conception of zero as unpassable, “impenetrable”. Tang 
believes that conceptual metaphors play a major role in embodying or 
bringing to life mathematical ideas.  Linchevski and Williams (1999) also 
believe that, by exploiting metaphors, it is possible to extend children’s 
innate arithmetic. 
Peled (1991) presents a useful framework for describing and assessing 
levels of understanding about negative numbers. 
The basic level is when the child is aware of the existence of negative 
numbers and has some vague understanding of them as opposite to the 
non-negative integers already known. Another aspect of this basic level is 
a willingness to move through zero when faced with a simple, and 
otherwise uncomplicated, problem. 
At the next level, children are able to operate on and with both positive 
and negative numbers, as long as both numbers in the problem have the 
same sign. When children achieve the most advanced level, the numbers 
or quantities do not need to be of the same type. (This is in tension with 
Lytle’s finding mentioned previously in that it seems to suggest that 
children will find  -2 x -4 easier than -2 x 4. In my professional experience, 
this was not generally the case.) Peled believes that children hold 
multiple images of negative numbers simultaneously and that they call 
upon different images, depending on the nature of the number problem to 
be solved. 
3.2.1.3 “Dimensions” in which negative numbers are cognitively 
experienced 
Peled (1991), in her framework setting out levels of knowledge about 
signed numbers, describes knowledge in 2 dimensions: what she calls 
the “number line dimension”; and the “quantity dimension”. My analysis 
reveals that these would appear to map onto 2 main types of models for 
supporting the construction of mental images: firstly, a number line 
model, in which numbers are used as both points and vectors; and, 
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secondly, a “neutralisation” or “cancellation” model which deals with 
numbers as quantities.  
Many of the teaching experiments which have been conducted in this 
domain were set up to compare the effectiveness of these 2 models (e.g. 
Hayes, 1996; Liebeck, 1990). Aspects of some of this work are described 
in more detail later. 
Bruno & Martinon (1996;1999) recognise Peled’s (1991) 2 dimensions, 
though they would extend the framework to include 3 dimensions  by 
replacing the quantity dimension with distinct “abstract” and “contextual” 
dimensions. They explain that the contextual dimension includes 
situations that are described by numbers – i.e. states, combinations, 
variations and comparisons. 
Bruno & Martinon (1996) set out to discover what they call the 
transferences between dimensions.  They found that, for example:- 
• When asked to transfer information presented in an abstract format 
into a presentation on a number line: the least able children found it 
extremely difficult; the more able found this easier than when 
changing information from an abstract to a contextual representation; 
• When taking information presented in a number line format, and re-
presenting it abstractly (symbolically): all groups generally found this 
easier than when they tried to do it the other way around; all groups 
were significantly less likely to succeed than when moving from a 
contextual format to the abstract; 
• Less able children consistently performed better when transferring 
between contextual and number line dimensions (in either direction) 
than when transfer to or from the abstract dimension was required; 
• All students found it more difficult to pass from the abstract to the 
contextual than in the opposite direction.  
In their conclusion, Bruno & Martinon (1996) note, 
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“ … we can see that transference from the abstract to the 
contextual dimension implies greater difficulty than transference 
from the contextual to the abstract. It is easier to arrive at 
representations on the number line from the contextual than from 
the abstract.”      (p.168)  
(It is important to note that Bruno & Martinon refer to “abstract” in the 
sense of a formal symbolic use of the notation for negative numbers.) 
3.2.1.4 Use of metaphors and the development of mental models 
As previously outlined, the model for the development of mathematical 
knowledge propounded by Sfard (1991) highlights a stage which Sfard 
calls reification; wherein a major cognitive shift is required that effectively 
transforms understanding of mathematical processes into an assimilation 
of those processes as objects in themselves. The mechanisms by which 
reification might occur are not well understood. Linchevski & Williams 
(1999) suggest that, where such intuitive gaps exist, it is appropriate to 
use extra-mathematical knowledge to support children’s learning. 
Linchevski & Williams (1999) believe that, 
“Situations and models must describe a reality that is meaningful 
to the student in which the extended world of negative numbers 
already exists and the student’s activities allow them to discover 
it.” (p.134) 
However, they also raise the issue that, even where contexts are selected 
carefully, to reflect children’s culture and experience, and activities may 
be seen as highly “authentic”, this “authenticity” seldom “survives the 
transfer to the classroom situation” (p.132). They suggest that this occurs 
because, although many characteristics of the real-life context can be 
reproduced, the goals cannot. 
Tang (2003) cites Lakoff & Nunez (2000) who propose 4 grounding 
metaphors for arithmetic. These are fundamental cognitive mechanisms 
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that stimulate and develop arithmetical ideas and understanding. They 
are: 
• “arithmetic as object collection; 
• arithmetic as object construction; 
• measuring-stick metaphor; 
• arithmetic as motion along a path”  (p.236) 
All of these metaphors are recognisable in contemporary mathematics 
teaching in the UK. Tang holds, what he calls, an “embodied realistic” 
view of mathematics and believes that abstract concepts are understood 
metaphorically. He believes that the use of myth, stories and fantasy is 
supportive of children’s learning in mathematics. Tang, therefore, does 
not use “abstract” in the same way as other authors mentioned in this 
section in that an “embodied realistic” view is, necessarily, connected 
through metaphors to contextual references. 
As previously mentioned, there are 2 main models that have been used 
for teaching and learning about negative numbers: number line; and 
neutralisation. Workers in the field do not agree about the effectiveness of 
the two models. Neither is there consensus regarding the purpose of 
developing models at all. Sometimes they are seen as tools for learning 
which are abandoned when concepts become developed in a more 
formal way. However, models may also be retained in the mind of the 
learner so that, at times of subsequent uncertainty, the model can be 
recalled and the concept refreshed or rediscovered. The perception of the 
purpose of models is, I believe, connected with the researcher’s 
understanding of the process of abstracting or learning in mathematics. 
Janvier (1985) points out that subtraction is difficult to model, whatever 
type of model is selected, without performing “acrobatics”. He explains 
that,  
“ … in many models, subtraction has no contextual meaning but is 
represented as the addition of the element opposite in nature.” 
(p.136) 
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This is especially true in “neutralisation” scenarios whereby, when the 
quantity to be subtracted is greater than the starting quantity, it is 
necessary to first increase the starting quantity by a number (at least) as 
great as the difference. It is far from intuitive and leads to children 
learning rules rather than developing understanding. Difficulties with 
subtraction using a neutralisation model were noted by several workers 
(e.g. Lytle, 1994; Linchevski & Williams with their “Disco Game”, 1999; 
Liebeck, with her “Scores and Forfeits”, 1990). 
The number line model also has its critics. In developing her rationale for 
researching a model based on the neutralisation principle, Lytle (1994) 
cites studies and surveys that found children were less successful when 
using number lines for arithmetic tasks than using other methods (e.g. 
Ernest, 1985; Rathmell, 1980; Kuchemann, 1981 – all cited Lytle 1994). 
The main criticism is that, though children are able to locate points on a 
number line and to carry out simple addition and subtraction by moving to 
the right or left, they are not able to represent more sophisticated addition 
and subtraction calculations as situations and “stories” on the number 
line. This suggests that children do not intuitively connect the number line 
with the operation beyond the simplest of structures. 
But Bruno & Martinon (1999) say the number line is an appropriate model 
where it represents a way of  working which is applicable to all integers, 
not only non-negative numbers. This, of course, precludes the use of 
numbers to express cardinality. Bruno & Martinon (1999) suggest that 
numbers that represent the measurement of scalar magnitude would be 
appropriate since it is relevant for negative as well as non-negative 
numbers. They report that the number line became an indispensable tool 
for students solving problems in their experiment; that, 
“they exhibited more confidence in the results obtained on the 
number line than through calculations “ (p.808) 
Research by Fischer (2003) and Fischer & Rottmann (2005) suggests 
that negative numbers might be cognitively represented in the left space, 
on a “mental number line”. I would point out that, if this is shown to be 
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true, that learners associate negative numbers with “left”, then the case 
for focusing on a number line model for teaching and learning about 
negative numbers is strengthened. 
Peled, Mukhopadhyay & Resnick (1994) found that children who had not 
received any instruction about negative numbers had, nonetheless, 
formed a number line representation of an extended number system. 
Moreover, Peled et al suggest, 
 “ … children seem able to develop pre-instructional intuitions 
about purely mathematical entities (the negative numbers) by 
elaborating previously developed ideas about number (additive 
composition and partitioning) that were originally rooted in physical 
experience but have, through practice, become so familiar as to 
become intuitions in their own right.” (p.109) 
3.2.1.5 Metaphors: 
There are several contextual situations that are reported in the literature 
as being exploited in teaching and learning about negative numbers as 
metaphors: 
• credit/debt (have/owe); 
• creation/annihilation; 
• temperature; 
• journey left/right or forward/back; 
• chronology (before/after an event); 
• Yin/Yang. 
Some are more appropriately modelled by one method than the other; 
some may be represented using either number line or neutralisation 
models. In the prevailing curriculum guidance in the UK (currently the 
Primary National Strategy, Framework for Literacy and Mathematics 
(DfES 2008)) where a context is suggested for work on negative 
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numbers, it is the context of temperature (e.g. in Year 4 Counting, 
partitioning and calculating, Unit 1). 
3.2.2 Implications for my study 
Teaching and learning about negative numbers is, historically, 
problematic. It is, therefore, a worthwhile focus for my study in that my 
research will make an epistemological contribution. It is possible, also, 
that it might ultimately contribute to the development of philosophy, tools, 
strategies, materials or curricula that improve education in this domain. 
Both existing models for teaching about negative numbers have been 
criticised in some respects so neither would be a more nor less 
appropriate model than the other, upon which to base my own teaching 
intervention, as long as weaknesses inherent in the model are 
acknowledged and addressed, 
The issue of “authenticity” should be considered; in particular, I wish to 
consider ways to replicate the goals of an activity (for example, 
Linchevski & Williams (1999) reported that the notions of teams and 
points-scoring was authentic in their study). 
Borba & Nunes (2001) found that children were significantly better at 
solving negative number problems when they were allowed to use writing 
or manipulatives to represent the problems and the solutions than when 
they were required to do it orally, without writing or using any apparatus. 
Though this was not the focus of their study, it does provide evidence that 
explicit, external support is likely to improve children’s potential for 
learning about negative numbers. 
Bruno & Martinon (1999) consider that children are facilitated to extend 
their number system in different ways, including the negative numbers 
extension. They point out that, when children learn about different 
extensions in isolation, they do not understand that they are all part of the 
same system. Bruno & Martinon go on to analyse sequences of learning 
about extensions leading to the concept of the real number system. They 
feel that, where teaching about negative numbers is backwards from the 
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real number system (i.e. the real number system is the starting point, as it 
is taught in Spain), it is more difficult to learn than if it were taught from a 
starting point of  forwards towards the real number system (as it is taught 
in UK). This suggests that the overall structure and aims for extending the 
number system for children in UK primary classrooms is valid and should 
be retained. 
3.3 How do issues arising from negative numbers 
research relate to what I have learned about broader 
learning issues considered in Chapter 2: Literature 
Review? 
It is interesting to note that work in the domain of negative numbers has 
raised questions and issues about conceptual difficulties that I can relate 
to what I have learned from my review of broader issues about 
conceptual learning. For example, Fischbein (1987) and Linchevski & 
Williams (1999) point out that children in primary schools cannot be 
expected to have developed sufficient algebraic knowledge to be able to 
manage the concept of negative numbers effectively. Ryan and Williams 
(2007), however, claim that work with negative numbers is a good way to 
develop algebraic thinking. Perhaps, then, Papert’s Power Principle 
(1996) is evident here – that learners learn about new concepts by using 
them? 
I suggest that Gallardo’s (2002) observation, that pupils aged 12/13 years 
could not demonstrate formal understanding of negative numbers but 
clearly had other related knowledge of negative numbers, is evidence that 
their concept of negative numbers was partially constructed; that the span 
of a new concept does not extend rapidly and suddenly to new contexts, 
but by increments. Lytle’s (1994) finding, that students could operate on 
but not with negative numbers, is evidence that negative numbers were 
understood as point before they were understood as vector; this also 
supports a hypothesis that knowledge in this domain is constructed 
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Bruno & Martinon’s (1995) observation, that children found zero to be 
“impenetrable” might suggest that zero lies at the boundary of a concept 
– and that crossing of this boundary is problematic, at least until the 
concept boundary is moved when span is extended; when the contextual 
neighbourhood is broadened. 
I am able to see that Bruno & Martinon’s work on transferences across 
dimensions in which children encounter negative numbers would be 
predicted by research in the broader field of conceptual learning and 
transfer. They found that, in general, students were unable to “translate” 
information presented in the abstract dimension into a story or problem in 
a contextual dimension or on a number line. The same students were 
generally able to transfer between contextual dimensions or from 
contextual to abstract dimensions. If we consider that abstract knowledge 
develops from context-based learning it should come as no surprise that 
students, when presented with information which for them has no 
contextual anchors or references (since it was not constructed by them 
from their experience and learning) were not able to invent those 
references and add context to something which, for them, had not 
emerged as a development from such references. 
3.4 Research questions revisited 
It is pertinent, at this stage in my thesis, to refine previously emergent 
research questions in the light of my developing knowledge about 
teaching and learning about negative numbers. It should then be possible 
to articulate more clearly defined research questions that might be 
rigorously explored in order to illuminate the micro-processes that are 
inherent in conceptual development and transfer of knowledge. 
The principle themes that emerge from my research questions are: 
1. What resources shape the nature of transfer and the 
growth of knowledge about negative numbers? 
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2. What is the role of the interplay of resources in the micro-
transfer of knowledge about negative numbers? 
3. What is the relationship between abstracting and 
transferring knowledge about negative numbers? 
 
3.5 Key constructs for analysis of core themes 
In order to elaborate these research questions, it is necessary to be clear 
about a range of key constructs that emerge as critical from my reviews 
of the literature on conceptual change and from that on learning about 
negative numbers.  
Table 1 below sets out key constructs that I find valuable for describing 
and analysing the processes related to my core themes of microevolution 
of knowledge, and the transfer and micro-transfer that occur as part of 
conceptual change and growth. These are taken or adapted from 
theoretical frameworks considered in Chapter 2, either directly (in these 
cases, authors are acknowledged) or indirectly where I offer my own 
interpretation of constructs that I feel are unclear in the literature.  
Abstract notion Expression or description of a pattern or relationship 
using only general terms 
Abstracting Process of coming to recognise common features 
across knowledge resources; this recognition creates 
associations between concepts. 
Abstraction The process of generalising at a high level. 
Alignment “Determining the same information reliably across 
different contexts” …  “The information determined in 
different situations, possibly using different 
knowledge, must be the same information” (diSessa 
& Wagner 2005). 
Association Link or connection between ideas or pieces of 
knowledge; created when commonalities are 
perceived. 
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Concept An aggregation of ideas and pieces of knowledge 
with at least one common association; continually 
changing in response to experience. 
Conceptual 
resource/knowledge 
resource 
Any (internal or external) piece of knowledge, or 
experience, or way of thinking or acting that might be 
utilised to make meaning in any situation. 
Contextual neighbourhood The full range  of concepts associated (through span 
of resources) with any given situation or resource 
(Pratt & Noss 2002). 
Co-ordination class “a particular kind of concept whose structure exhibits 
a complex system of many elements and kinds of 
knowledge” (diSessa & Wagner 2005; p121) 
Cueing Priority Likelihood that a resource or sense-making 
mechanism will be activated as potentially useful in 
any situation (diSessa 1993; p112). 
Micro-transfer Abstracting; construction and perception and 
utilisation of associations between concepts that 
strengthens links between concepts; might lead to 
abstraction. 
Readout strategies “the ways in which people focus their attention and 
read out information relevant to, but possibly not the 
same as, the defining information.” (diSessa & 
Wagner 2005; p131) e.g. knowing that the numbers 
on a timetable refer to time; knowing that journey 
duration can be inferred from a timetable, even if the 
knower is not able to calculate the duration. 
Reliability Priority Established according to feedback regarding the 
usefulness of the resource on previous occasions, 
taking account of other resources also activated. 
(diSessa 1993; p112). 
Resource in memory Resource constructed out of own direct experience or 
indirectly through exposure to experience and 
knowledge of others. 
Sense-Making Mechanism Internal knowledge resource; cognitive device that 
facilitates learner to infer meaning – includes 
logical/deductive processes, situated abstractions. 
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Situated abstraction “ …Emerge during activity as internal resources that 
serve as relatively general devices for making sense 
of situations that arise within a setting” … “ 
(p458)…expressed in a language that remains 
embedded in the situation in which it was 
constructed, potentially constraining its validity in new 
contexts, with different tools and affordances” (from 
Pratt & Noss 2002 ).  
Span  i. Existence of one or more associations 
between resources; 
ii. Evocation or construction of association 
between resources. (diSessa & Wagner 2005).  
Transfer Application of knowledge constructed in one setting 
in a different setting, including processes that lead to 
transferable knowledge 
Tuning towards expertise Change towards more normalised (“expert”) forms of 
knowledge (from diSessa 1993; p114). 
Webbing Modification of span within and across concepts 
through construction of connections and associations 
between them (based on Noss & Hoyles 1996). 
Table 1. Catalogue of key constructs 
A view of the relationships between some of these constructs, and their 
role in conceptual change and growth and the construction of knowledge, 
is described in Figure 3 overleaf. 
It is very difficult, using a schematic representation of a process, to 
convey the sense of flux and instability in any (or all) of the elements of 
my model. Figure 3 suggests a flow of inputs, through interpretive and 
analytical mediators to outputs that feedback with the effect of modifying 
those mediating processes. It is important that I should emphasise that a 
static interpretation of this model is not entirely appropriate; that the state 
of knowledge, for any individual, is constantly changing.  
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Figure 3: A model of the micro-evolution of knowledge suggested by 
the literature 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1.1 Introduction to methodology 
I have argued that “Grand”, macro-theories are not helpful; they do not 
tell me what I want to know because they do not describe what I want to 
understand. Because, as a teacher, I want to be able to optimise my 
pupils’ opportunities to learn, I need to understand how they learn; how 
and why their concepts change; how they tune towards expertise. These 
processes are not simple nor directly observable, neither are they similar 
for all learners. We know, from the failure of “Grand” and macro-level 
theories to predict learning pathways and outcomes for individuals, that 
research methods that probe the thinking and behaviour of individual 
learners are required.  
It was to qualitative research methods that I turned in order to discover 
fine-grain learning processes used by individual children.  I recognised 
that I must acknowledge the drawbacks as well as embrace the benefits 
associated with qualitative research methods. These considerations  
therefore form part of my presentation of my methodology. 
Denscombe (1998) points out that it is often processes, rather than 
outcomes, that research seeks to discover. He believes that case studies 
are appropriate for research about processes, 
“ The real value of a case study is that it offers the opportunity to 
explain why certain outcomes might happen – more than just find 
out what those outcomes are.” (p31) 
It might be argued that the value of case study research is that it is often 
possible to generalise from knowledge of the particular. Denscombe 
stresses this potential, though noting conditions, 
 “Although each case is in some respects unique, it is also a single 
example of a broader class of things.” “The extent to which 
findings from the case study can be generalised to other examples 
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in the class depends on how far the case study example is similar 
to others of its type.” (p35) 
This was not my primary goal. I wanted to work with a small number of 
children and generate a small number of case studies in order to build 
theory by testing and developing a model of learning which I had 
developed (Figure 3). 
Paradoxically, it would seem that the only way we know how to see 
thinking is through activity (Schwarz, Hershkowitz & Dreyfus 2002), and 
yet the thinking that we see in an activity is, at least to some extent, 
determined by that activity. Therefore, if a type of thinking or behaviour is 
absent it must not be inferred that children cannot or do not do it – if it is 
absent it could simply be because the activity doesn’t allow, facilitate or 
encourage it.  
Schwarz et al suggest that “theoretical spectacles” are needed – so that 
behaviours that might be interpreted as evidence of abstraction can be 
recognised. They believe that “recognising”, ”building with” and 
“constructing” are 3 epistemic actions which are constituent of abstraction 
– and that they are observable. Schwarz et al advocate their “RBC” 
approach for researching thinking and abstraction. 
4.1.2 Research questions 
An obvious starting point in designing my study was to pose the question 
“What do I want to find out?” In the preceding chapters, I have developed 
3 key research questions: 
• What resources shape the nature of transfer and the growth of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
• What is the role of the interplay of resources in the micro-transfer of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
• What is the relationship between abstracting and transferring 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
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This list emerged out of my own personal and professional knowledge 
and experience as well as my review of relevant literature.  
4.2 Case study research 
“Case study is study of a singularity conducted in depth in natural 
settings”. (Bassey 1999; p47) 
A basic tenet of my approach in my research is to accept that, in setting 
children to work, it is not possible to predict outcomes.  At the outset I, the 
researcher, in this case, could not know what would happen and what the 
activity might reveal – though of course I hoped to recognise that thinking 
and capture it. (This is a compelling reason why research in this area has 
to be, in some way, iterative, with each study providing information that 
the next can use, so that it can be more effective than the earlier studies 
at being able to observe and capture that which it seeks to illuminate.) 
However, this is also a major criticism levelled at qualitative research, 
particularly case study; that the notion of emergent design suggests 
something very loose, undisciplined and lacking in direction and rigour. I 
would argue that, although I do not claim to have “known” what would 
emerge from my research, I did have knowledge that equipped me to 
predict, at least tentatively, a range of possible findings. As a researcher, 
I cannot avoid conjecture and I concede that my knowledge led me to 
have some expectations about what I might find. However, I acknowledge 
this as a strength, rather than a weakness, since it prevents too much 
“looseness”. Notwithstanding this advantage, it was important that I 
ensured that my research methodology retained an open-ness and 
readiness to see that which was not expected. 
Robson (1993) defends case study research, saying, 
“Case study need not be of this loose, emergent type”... “In 
principle, it can be as pre-structured or ‘emergent’… as is 
appropriate for the purposes of your case study”. (p148) 
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He explains that the aim of any case study might be exploratory or 
confirmatory or that it might be a combination of these. He warns, 
however, that,  
“The looser the original design, the less selective you can afford to 
be in data selection. Anything might be important.” (p149) 
The approach I took in my study of children’s changing concepts in a 
particular mathematics domain, was case study. 
It is important to acknowledge that case study is a strategy - not a method 
(Denscombe 1998; p32) and that there are not, therefore, rigid “rules” 
about how it should be approached and carried out. 
Denscombe also believes, 
“The aim is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular” 
(p30). 
My aim was to set out a fine-grained analysis in order to gain insights into 
how children’s ideas change and how they re-use ideas. In developing 
my analysis, I use it to test conjectures based on my own experience and 
the literature. In this way, the children’s work became a test-bed from 
which I am better able to evaluate current theory and propose new 
aspects of that theory. 
4.3 Iterative design  
Robson (1993) stresses that, when working with qualitative data, interim 
analysis and iteration are vital. The first iteration of my research took 
place as part of the “Webkit” project1, described in Stringer et al (2005). 
The aims and outcomes of the Webkit project are worth summarising 
here: 
                                            
1
 This is a European project “Webkit: Intuitive physical interfaces to the WWW” (IST-
2001-341 171). 
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4.3.1 Webkit phase 
The Webkit project explored the potential for tangible user interfaces 
(TUIs) to contribute to effective learning of mathematics in a primary 
school. At that time, I designed equipment and facilitated and led 
sessions with children to evaluate the way that they re-used knowledge 
that had been “learned” in a TUI environment, in a different environment – 
i.e. a major focus of this “Webkit” phase of my study was to discover 
whether knowledge recently constructed would be considered relevant 
and be used in a new context – in other words, whether it would transfer 
to a new environment.  
In the lifespan of the project it was not, in the end, possible to evaluate re-
usability but it was possible to observe considerable conceptual change 
in some difficult concept areas (using a TUI). Indeed, it was notable, 
during analysis of data from Webkit “trials” that some of the most 
interesting findings related to children’s re-use of existing internal 
resources, as well as to their use of technology and other external 
resources provided. 
What was most interesting, perhaps, was the insight that the research 
trials provided into the ways children were developing understanding and 
new knowledge by linking it with experiences in their past, as well as with 
other new knowledge. Trials “brought to light” interesting insights into the 
ways children used a wide range of resources available to them.  
(My intention here is to summarise how the project impacted on my 
approach and not to present data; the experience of Webkit was to 
orientate my methodological perspective, rather than to create data which 
forms part of the findings of this thesis.) One type of internal resource that 
children, who were observed and taught as part of Webkit, used on many 
occasions, was existing knowledge, which included all of the following: 
1. secure knowledge – that which had been 
learned/told/experienced and that children believed and 
understood; 
2. misconceptions; 
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3. naïve or fragile knowledge (not secure); 
4. a vague sense of …, something to do with … (tentative link) 
5. “tip of the tongue” (not readily accessible); 
6. Knowledge unexpectedly triggered (relevance only 
unconsciously perceived). 
These are all evidence of links with internal resources – i.e. knowledge 
that had previously been processed in some way. 
There was also evidence of links being made “in-action”; “in –the-
moment”: 
• intrapersonally – i.e. in a child’s own mind; interacting with his/her 
own processing of his/her own experience both existing and new 
or recent; 
• interpersonally – i.e. with another child’s report or presentation of 
knowledge that is seen as relevant. 
So, from a personal standpoint, as initial trials drew to a close and 
analysis was completed, my focus had sharpened. My interest had 
shifted away from a pre-occupation with the use of technology, and 
particularly TUIs, to a more fundamental desire to understand more about 
the processes that contribute to conceptual change – how do children 
construct new concepts, or expand or modify existing concepts? 
I look on the Webkit phase of my work as a preliminary iteration from 
which I obtained a more focused understanding of what I needed to 
consider in order to engage more effectively with research about transfer. 
I had realised that, though new technologies might have something to 
offer that might improve the likelihood that children will transfer new 
knowledge, we do not actually adequately understand transfer itself. I felt 
that a focus on the nature of the context or environment, and particularly 
by narrowly considering this only in terms of the balance of real/virtual, 
might be irrelevant.  
From the end of the Webkit phase, I believed that it was more important 
to understand better what it is that facilitates or inhibits the re-use of 
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knowledge in new situations. In order to be able to learn about the way 
children use and re-use resources (to develop knowledge) and 
knowledge (as a resource) it was necessary to create the conditions 
where this can be observed – i.e. conditions in which children can have 
opportunities to recognise, build and construct (Schwarz et al 2002). 
The second iteration (the focus of this study) was made up of 4 parts and 
took place in a different school; only more conventional technologies (i.e. 
PC and the internet) were used. 
4.4 The research setting 
4.4.1 The researcher 
Denscombe (1998) states that, 
“Qualitative data, whether words or images, are the product of a 
process of interpretation” .. “ .. the researcher’s self plays a 
significant role in the production and interpretation of qualitative 
data. … The researcher’s self is inevitably an integral part of the 
analysis, and should be acknowledged as such.” (p208) 
I have, in a preceding chapter, described the motivation for my research – 
i.e. that though no longer a practising primary teacher, in my current role 
as a teacher of teachers, it is still important to me that I learn more about 
the ways in which children learn mathematics most effectively. My 
professional experience in primary classrooms has provided me with 
innumerable experiences of children apparently failing to transfer 
knowledge. It has, however, also provided me with even more extensive 
experience of children successfully learning mathematics by developing 
knowledge and understanding in very disparate ways. I believe my 
experience in the classroom also has provided me with appreciation of a 
vast range of socio-cultural and affective, rather than only cognitive, 
factors that influence children’s learning.  
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As a teacher and researcher I am part of the learning setting in which my 
research subjects work. I am, myself, therefore, an external resource and 
I agree with Denscombe when he goes on to say that the, 
 “researcher’s self should not be regarded as a limitation to the 
research but a crucial resource”. (p209)  
So, having described, in very broad terms, what I want to achieve, it is 
now appropriate to consider the research setting, and to offer some 
rationale for decisions that were made. 
4.4.2 The school  
In acknowledging that I would be asking to work with children many times 
and that I would need co-operation from teachers and parents, I chose to 
conduct my research in a school in which I have previously worked. It is 
several years since I worked there so I was not known to any of the 
children nor most of the staff. The head teacher and some of the 
teachers, however, did know me and I knew that I could rely on their 
support. 
4.4.3 Class 
Because I had already analysed the curriculum and had selected my 
domain focus, it was appropriate for me to work with children in Year 4. In 
this year group, children are introduced, for the first time, to negative 
numbers. It was important, for my research, to explore children’s re-use 
of existing (and particularly recently constructed) knowledge and I felt that 
in order to be sure whether any existing knowledge in evidence was 
“recently constructed”, it had to relate to something that I could be 
confident they had only recently been taught. (See my comments in 
“Chapter 6: Discussion of Findings” regarding “informal” knowledge about 
negative numbers.) At my research school, there are two Year 4 classes. 
Both classes are timetabled together for mathematics lessons and are 
“set” in 3 ability groups across the year group. Children in both classes 
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were therefore “eligible” for inclusion in my research and parental consent 
was sought for all children in the year group. (See Appendix 1 “Consent 
Form”) 
4.4.4 Children 
Children were selected from all of those whose parents consented to their 
inclusion.  
I had learned from the Webkit phase of my research that the groups I had 
worked with then were too large – that in those groups (of 6-7) some 
individuals did not engage or contribute, allowing the more confident and 
vociferous to dominate the group. I chose, for this phase, to work with 
smaller groups. I did not want to work with individual children as that 
would constitute more of an interview. Although Wagner (2006) had 
reported on work with individual students, I considered it important for 
children to have peers with whom they could share their ideas and 
thoughts as I believe that they would be more relaxed and would use 
each other to scaffold their learning. Also, I was concerned that one-to-
one interviews might be intimidating for such young children. 
Pairing of children might have worked well for discussion and argument 
within the pairs – however, from a pragmatic viewpoint, this would cause 
problems if a child was absent on days when I was due to visit. I therefore 
chose to work with groups of 3 so that an absence would not preclude a 
session and so that group members would be unlikely to fail to 
participate. 
The class teacher was asked to provide a list of groups of 3 children (for 
whom consent had been given) who she thought would co-operate and 
would be supportive of each other. She was asked to exclude any 
children who would “find it extremely difficult to talk about their ideas and 
their thinking”. 
I did not ask the teacher to consider ability when grouping children. She 
provided me with a list of 9 groups of 3. At that time she explained that 
she had considered that children should work with others with whom they 
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are used to “doing maths”. This meant that all 3 children within each 
group were from the same maths set – that is, each group of 3 comprised 
children who had been assessed by teachers as being of similar ability. 
Once I realised this, although initially disappointed because I had 
expected to work with mixed ability groups, I could see that there would 
be advantages to this approach: 
• that the pace of each activity would match more closely the needs 
of every child in the (similar ability) group, rather than a “best-fit” 
match that would be necessary for a mixed ability group; 
• that this approach would afford me the opportunity to consider 
“ability” differences when constructing and developing new 
concepts, more reliably than I would have been able to do (or had 
previously intended to do) with mixed ability groupings. 
I therefore took the decision to embrace this unforeseen differentiation of 
my sample groups, rather than re-group them. I selected 3 groups of 3 
children – one from each of the 3 ability sets. Gray et al (2000) had 
focused on ability differences and reported some interesting findings. I 
considered that their research might support me in analysing and 
comparing the progress of different groups. It is important to note, at this 
point, that ability is not here defined but is some construct in the mind of 
the teacher who made the decision when populating the groups. There 
was no methodological intention to relate findings to ability since my 
interest is in the changing thinking of individuals. 
At this stage I did not choose the particular children who would become 
the focus for individual case studies. This decision was made much later, 
after all sessions with children had taken place and after preliminary 
analysis of the data. 
4.5 Researcher as facilitating observer 
Gravemeijer & Doorman (1999) elaborate on the Realistic Mathematics 
Education principle that cognitive growth requires reinvention of the 
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mathematics by the learner. They point out that reinvention can, and 
should, be supported by tasks and other interventions that enable it, so-
called “guided reinvention”. This would seem to be in line with the 
Vygotskian construct of the “More Knowledgeable Other”; that, another 
person, more knowledgeable than the learner, can support conceptual 
change that would not have been possible independently. 
There were many reasons why I elected to be the person who led my 
planned sessions with the 3 groups of children. The first of these is that I 
felt that, since I wanted to observe children’s conceptual change and to 
optimise their potential for this, I should make myself available as their 
“More Knowledgeable Other” and to guide their reinvention where 
appropriate. 
I did not consider it appropriate for the teacher to lead the research 
sessions. I did not believe it would be possible for her to fully understand 
what I was aiming to achieve and feared that the outcomes of the 
sessions might be adversely affected by something that she might do or 
say (of fail to do or say). Because I was known to the school, the staff and 
the head teacher (and parents) were very happy for me to work with 
groups of children without any other adult present.  
My role was not of observer – this implies a passivity that I believed was 
not in the interests of the children, or of the research. To have been only 
an observer would be to prevent me from responding to children or 
redirecting them if I felt the activity was moving in an unwanted direction. 
Also, I felt that the children would be very accepting of me if I behaved 
something like a teacher – that they were used to sometimes working 
with other adults who they think of as teachers and they would therefore 
not regard our sessions as unusual or abnormal. 
At the same time, however, I wanted to avoid any kind of didactic 
“teaching”. The aim of the research was to provoke children’s 
conversations and activities that reveal their thinking processes, as they 
construct new knowledge and when they engage with a new 
mathematical domain. The guidance I wanted to provide was mainly 
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through the tasks that I would design for them. Although I was happy to 
respond to questions in a way that encouraged them to think for 
themselves, I determined to avoid any kind of direct instruction. 
I therefore intended to be a resource but to minimise any direct teaching 
input. My role would be “facilitating observer”. 
4.6 Ethics 
Although my role was not of “participant observer” per se, it was still 
appropriate to pay regard to the ethics of being a researcher working 
closely within my research context, with the research subjects. The 
children, after all, though informed about the nature and aims of our 
sessions, might well have forgotten that I am not one of their teachers 
and consider me as a member of staff. I was conscious that I might 
become aware of confidential material and I discussed this with the 
teacher. We agreed that I would pass on any concerns that might arise 
from my interaction with the children to her. Other general concerns about 
anonymity and confidentiality are addressed by my checklist below. 
Another disadvantage of participant observation that I felt was relevant for 
me as “facilitating observer” is that it can be difficult to separate my (it 
feels natural) wish to help children to learn, from my interest as a 
researcher in observing what children can achieve without anything but 
the minimum of direct intervention by a teacher. 
Denscombe (1998) states that, 
“The success of participant observation depends of being able to 
walk a tightrope between the involvement and passion associated 
with full participation and the cool detachment associated with 
research observation.” (p154) 
Bassey (1999) noted that respect for the persons involved in, and 
affected by, case study research is shown by consideration of 4 points: 
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• Permission to conduct research must be obtained: in the context of 
my study, I obtained permission from the head teacher, and any 
class teachers involved. I then went on to obtain written consent 
from parents and ensured that children understood the purpose of 
our sessions together; 
• Agreement for transfer of the ownership of the record of utterances 
and actions to the researcher: in the context of my research, this 
was agreed as part of the initial consent agreement with parents; 
• Decision to identify or conceal the identity of individuals and 
setting: I achieved this by using pseudonyms throughout my 
reporting of my research; 
• Permission to publish the report: this was obtained at the outset 
from the head teacher. 
It was important for me to consider whether my decision to work in a 
school where I had previously worked was ethically sound. If I could not 
show this it would be necessary to arrange to conduct my research in a 
different school. Siedman (1991) believes that, 
“ … the easier the access (to interviewees), the more complicated 
the interview.” (p31) 
On the other hand, Fraser (1997) feels that, provided due consideration 
of ethical issues is carried out at all stages, research conducted by an 
“insider” can be, 
“… the most appropriate, most effective and least threatening 
strategy…..” (p169)                                                                                                                
I considered the moral and ethical implications of my research 
methodology and, as advocated by Somekh (1995), compiled my own set 
of “ground rules” which were:- 
• All parties are informed of the purpose of the research; 
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• Informed consent of the school, teachers, parents and children 
was sought and obtained; 
• Children would be given frequent opportunities to withdraw from 
the research; 
• The identity of children’s teachers will not be recorded; 
• The research will not disrupt children’s and teachers’ timetables 
and learning; 
• Any disruption that does become necessary will be negotiated with 
teachers and kept to a minimum; 
• The research will not impinge on children’s play-time; 
• Respondents’ real names will not be used; 
• The school will not be named; 
• Interviews will take place in a quiet, private place in school which 
does not interfere with the normal routines of the school; 
• If respondents show signs of distress at any point, the interview 
will be accelerated or terminated. 
I believe that adherence to these “ground rules” ensured that the potential 
for inequalities of power and status and for role conflict were 
acknowledged, respected and assuaged. Respect was shown for the 
school and its routines, as well as for the integrity of the research. 
4.7 Task design 
4.7.1 Curriculum analysis 
In the UK, the statutory curriculum for mathematics is set out in The 
National Curriculum for England, Key Stages 1-4 (DfEE/QCA 1999). The 
Programme of Study for Number (Ma2) includes requirements that, by the 
end of Year 6, 
“Pupils should be taught to, 
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… ; recognise and continue number sequences formed by 
counting on or back in steps of constant size from any integer, 
extending to negative integers when counting back;. ; order a set 
of negative integers, explaining methods and reasoning;… ” (pp21-
22) 
In the National Numeracy Strategy Framework for Teaching Mathematics 
from Reception to Year 6 (DfEE 1999), the end of Key Stage objectives 
set out in the National Curriculum are broken down into Yearly Teaching 
Programmes (non-statutory). The concept of negative numbers receives 
no mention until Year 4 and is developed in Year 5: 
Year 4 “Recognise negative numbers in context (e.g. on a 
number line, on a temperature scale).”  (Section 3, p18) 
Year 5  “Order a given set of negative and positive integers 
(e.g. on a number line, on a temperature scale); Calculate a 
temperature rise or fall across 0ºC.” (Section 3, p22) 
Therefore, teachers are not advised to teach about negative numbers 
before Year 4 and children are not expected to calculate with negative 
numbers until Year 5. I concluded from this consideration of the statutory 
requirements and non-statutory guidance that children in Year 4 classes, 
at or near the beginning of the academic year, would be unlikely to have 
received teaching about negative numbers in school. This was confirmed 
by their class teacher (Appendix 2 shows the schedule for my interview 
with the class teacher). 
It is appropriate, at this point, to set out my view of an appropriate 
progression in preparing to learn about negative numbers. This is: 
• Secure knowledge of whole numbers greater than zero; 
• Knowledge of how to compare whole numbers greater than zero; 
• Knowledge of how to order whole numbers greater than zero; 
• Knowledge of how to count to find difference between positive 
numbers; 
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• Knowledge of strategies for calculating difference between positive 
numbers. 
I must assume some existing knowledge. At age 8-9 years, children 
should have, available to them, internal knowledge resources about 
positive integers, and should be able to compare them and order them. 
They will be able to count and to use counting knowledge to evaluate or 
calculate the difference between positive integers. They will have 
experience of using number lines to count or calculate these differences. 
What children must learn is that the number system extends through zero 
and beyond. Children of this age understand that positive integers 
increase or “go up” or “get higher” as they move further away from zero 
and that the numbers near zero are “low” numbers. Anything on the other 
side of zero is therefore likely to be conceived as lower than, or below, 
zero. Indeed, children may have encountered the expressions “below 
zero” or “sub-zero” in the everyday world. 
Once aware of such an extension to the number system, pupils must 
learn that the “ - “ sign denotes numbers below zero. This is likely to 
cause some difficulty since children will have a great deal of experience 
with the “-“ sign, used as the symbol for subtraction. Also, the fact that 
negative numbers are often referred to as “minus numbers” is likely to 
contribute to conceptual difficulties relating to the meaning of the sign or 
the “minus” label. Yet another possible source of difficulty in this area is 
that the positive integers with which pupils are so familiar are unlikely to 
have been signed nor referred to as positive in their experience so far. It 
is not therefore a matter of correspondence between “old” and “new” 
numbers that needs to be learned or that might be used to support 
development of the knowledge about the “new” numbers; it is more 
demanding than that. 
Once children learn that the number system is more extensive than they 
had previously known, and how to recognise and refer to the numbers 
below zero, they must learn about the symmetry of the order of numbers 
about zero. In the positive domain, pupils will have learned that “high”, 
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“up”, “further from zero” or “big”, even “right” (direction of movement 
towards higher numbers on a number line) all have some equivalence in 
their knowledge. On the other side of zero, however, these directional, 
positional concepts and any relationships between them will be 
challenged. Reconciliation, or alignment, of old and new knowledge must 
be achieved if children are to be able to move on and function 
mathematically within their new extended number system. 
Pupils must develop the ability to traverse the extended number system, 
in small steps and in both directions. As this ability begins to develop, 
they should then respond to questions and problems that require bridging 
through zero and to those involving larger values both positive and 
negative. 
4.7.2 The nature and range of the tasks 
4.7.2.1 Variety 
From the Webkit phase of my research I had learned that children used 
resources that were provided in different ways – some children enjoyed 
and exploited resources that others did not seem to find at all interesting 
or helpful (Pratt & Simpson 2004a & b). Their use of internal resources 
was also varied – for example, one child displayed advanced knowledge 
about maps and globes; another could remember the temperature in 
Greece when on holiday there. 
It was clear, therefore, from the outset, that, if children were to be 
facilitated to display their thinking processes, a variety of tasks, using 
several different internal, as well as physical and virtual resources, would 
be required in order to provoke such behaviours and processes in the 
children. This is as my model of learning (Figure 3) would predict – i.e. 
that children will construct different types of internal resources from 
experience with all kinds of activities and (formal and informal) learning 
episodes. 
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My model would predict that evidence of knowledge relating to any 
particular concept that is apparent in a single context is not evidence of 
rich, robust conceptual knowledge – that this can only be inferred from 
multiple demonstrations in different contexts. 
A range of tasks, in different contexts and involving different resources, 
was also vital in order to provide the scope for children to engage with the 
different dimensions for negative numbers – i.e. quantity (abstract or 
contextual) and number line dimensions (Peled 1991; Bruno & Martinon 
1996). 
Bruno & Martinon evaluated transferences between dimensions. Since 
conceptual growth and change includes such transferences, I gave 
children the chance to demonstrate this by including opportunities to work 
in/with different dimensions through my provision of a variety of tasks. 
If we accept that it is possible to use existing knowledge in new settings 
then there are two possible explanations when research fails to discover 
evidence of that re-utilisation: 
• that it did not happen in the conditions created; 
• that the methodology was not able to “see” it – it was not visible 
through the methodological lens that was available within that 
study. 
It was therefore crucial that I designed tasks that optimise the possibility 
that children’s thinking processes are made “visible”, either through their 
actions and utterances or through my “theoretical spectacles”. 
4.7.2.2 Images and symbolism: 
From my review of the literature it was clear that children use images, 
metaphors and symbolism in different ways and to different extents, 
depending on the child, the context and available resources. Gray, Pitta & 
Tall (2000) found, 
“The objects of thought of the low achievers were analogues of 
perceptual items that seemed to force them to carry out 
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procedures in the mind, as if they were carrying out the procedures 
with perceptual items on the desk in front of them. Their images 
were essential to the action; they maintained the focus of attention. 
For these children, mathematics involved action and to carry out 
the action they used “real” things.”… “Symbolic images played 
considerably less part in processing for low achievers that they did 
for high achievers.”  (p409) 
Therefore, it was important that I should be alert to such differences and 
design tasks that would facilitate children of all “abilities” to reveal their 
use of images. 
It was also important to consider different types of transfer, as described 
by diSessa & Wagner (2005):  
 Class A Transfer– “where an adequately prepared set of ideas is 
used unproblematically in new situations” (p148); “the knowledge 
whose transfer is at issue is assumed to be, or can be 
demonstrated to be, well prepared and does not, in principle, 
require further learning to apply” (p124). diSessa & Wagner note 
that this is important for schools who “want students to be able to 
solve problems other than the ones used in teaching them 
concepts” (p125); 
 Class B transfer – knowledge constructed that is “presuming 
subjects’ persistent effort… sufficiently prepared so that transfer 
can be reliably accomplished in acceptable periods of time (e.g. in 
a few hours or days… )”  (p125); 
 Class C transfer– How do “relatively unprepared subjects 
(students) use prior knowledge in early work in a domain?” (p125); 
“where bits and pieces of “old” knowledge are invoked, 
productively or unproductively, typically in early stages of learning” 
(p148). Class C transfer might be considered as the processes 
that lead to transferable knowledge. (p125) 
In “Chapter 2: Literature Review”, I argued that it would not be reasonable 
to expect to find Class A transfer of knowledge recently constructed. 
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Therefore, I did not set out to look for children exhibiting Class A transfer 
of negative numbers knowledge from our first session to later sessions 
(though it is, of course, possible that knowledge they had previously 
learned outside school is “well-prepared” and might transfer in a “Class A” 
fashion). I hoped to be able to observe mainly Class B and Class C 
transfer of knowledge constructed in our early work together, in 
subsequent sessions: my interest was in children’s “thinking-in-change” 
(Noss & Hoyles, 1996). 
4.7.3 The tasks 
Task 1: “Journey” 
Gravemeijer & Doorman (1999) state, 
“Context problems can function as anchoring points for the 
reinvention of mathematics by the students”. (p111) 
It was my aim, in designing “Journey”, to instil a sense of purpose.  
Ainley, Pratt & Hansen (2006) emphasise the importance of a sense of 
purpose in mathematics tasks; that children need to believe that their 
efforts make a difference in a way that they care about. By using a 
mythical character with whom all of the children can be expected to have 
some affinity, I hoped that they would engage with the aim of getting 
Father Christmas back to the North Pole so that he can deliver presents 
on Christmas Eve and they would do their best to make it happen.  
In the Webkit phase of my study, one of the tasks developed and used 
was “Journey”. In that iteration, children worked with a large map that was 
electronically linked to a computer. The map, in that phase, was the 
Tangible User Interface.  
In this iteration, the map was used again, though without any connection 
to a computer. It was simply a large map upon which children could move 
a model of Father Christmas . 
 108
 
Figure 4.7.3.1a: Photograph of the map and Father Christmas figure 
being used in Webkit. 
Children were told that Father Christmas had gone on holiday just before 
Christmas, to have a break before his busiest night of the year. They 
were encouraged to think about where he might have gone, that it would 
have been somewhere really hot. I told the children that on Christmas 
Eve he had to travel back to the North Pole and we discussed the idea 
that, as he travelled, he would find that it got colder and colder. I 
explained that they would be planning his journey and pointed out that it 
would be a real nuisance if he had to keep putting on extra clothes and 
taking them off as he travelled – that it would be better if, once he had put 
extra clothes on he didn’t need to take them off again. I demonstrated the 
database to the children and checked that they were all able to use it to 
look up the temperature in the countries shown on the map. I showed 2-3 
different countries on the database so that the children could see the type 
of information shown for each country and could see how Father 
Christmas’s clothes varied. Figures 4.7.3.1c (overleaf) show the various 
states of undress in which Father Christmas appeared. 
Information for each country on the database was displayed as a 
page/slide that showed Father Christmas in appropriate clothing, the 
temperature in that country (average daytime temperature for that 
country’s capital in December) and the country’s national flag. Figure 
4.7.3.1b shows some examples. 
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Mozambique
27°C
Back to list Angola Back to list
26°C
Belarus Back to list
-3°C
Czech Republic
0°C
Back to list
Egypt
16°C
Back to list Gambia
24°C
Back to list
 
  
  
  
Figure 4.7.3.1b Examples of information pages in database. 
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Figure 4.7.3.1c: Father Christmas in various states of undress. 
 
I was conscious, in designing this task, that children would need to draw 
upon concepts that they might have previously developed to some extent: 
• Knowledge that movement towards the north pole and away from 
the equator leads, in general, to colder temperatures; 
• Knowledge that hotter temperatures are represented by higher 
numbers; 
• experience with number lines; 
• experience with maps. 
Task 2: “Cards” 
Table 2 (overleaf) shows the information that was used to create cards for 
Task 2. The list of countries included in this task is not the same as in 
“Journey”. This time, the focus is on Europe so there are often multiple 
countries with the same temperature. There are also smaller differences  
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Table 2.  Information used to create Task 2 “Cards” 
 
 
Albania -6° 
Belarus -3° 
Belgium 3° 
Bosnia & Herzegovina -1° 
Bulgaria -1° 
Croatia 0° 
Cyprus 9° 
Czech Republic 0° 
Denmark 0° 
Estonia -2° 
Finland -4° 
France 5° 
Germany 1° 
Gibraltar 13° 
Greece 12° 
Hungary 1° 
Iceland 0° 
Italy 8° 
Latvia -2° 
Lithuania -3° 
Luxembourg 1° 
Macedonia 0° 
Malta 12° 
Moldova -2° 
Monaco 8° 
Netherlands 4° 
Norway -3° 
Poland 0° 
Portugal 12° 
Romania 1° 
Russia -6° 
Slovakia 1° 
Slovenia -1° 
Spain 7° 
Sweden -2° 
Switzerland 0° 
Turkey -2° 
Ukraine -3° 
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between the temperatures for the countries in the list than there would 
have been if I had included a broader geographical area, as in “Journey”. 
In this task, children were asked to place the cards on the desk in order, 
with “the highest” at the top edge of the desk. I deliberately chose the 
word “highest” rather than “hottest” because I wanted to gently encourage 
expansion of the focus that had, in “Journey” been on hotter/colder rather 
than higher/lower. Also, once zero had been reached, children would be 
forced to consider the negative numbers on the higher/lower continuum 
which I expected to cause some difficulty. 
Task 3: “Quiz” 
Lytle (1994) found that children are unsuccessful with problems using 
negative numbers except for the most basic tasks involving no more than 
“simple location” and addition or subtraction. In “Quiz” it was intended that 
children should be given the opportunity to show that they can engage 
with slightly more demanding tasks than Lytle seems to consider them 
capable of. I created an interactive quiz in which children selected the 
questions they wanted to answer, in any of the 5 (colour coded) question 
types available. The countries included were the same as those in 
“Cards” so children were to use the cards as their main resource for 
temperature information. Figures 4.7.3.3 a-b show the home page of the 
quiz and an example of each question type. 
For the first time in our work together, children were required to operate 
with and on the values they encountered. 
The map and thermometer icons presented on every “Quiz” page were 
hyperlinks to a (non-interactive) map of Europe and to software called 
“Thermometer” produced by the National Numeracy Strategy (Figure 
4.7.3.3c). It is freely available and downloadable for all teachers and 
others using the “Standards Site” website: 
(http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/primary/teachingresources/mathematic
s/nns_itps/thermometer/) 
These icons were provided for children and were pointed out to them at 
the beginning of the “Quiz” activity. 
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Figure 4.7.3.3a Quiz home page 
  
 
 
Figure 4.7.3.3b Samples of different types of questions in “Quiz” 
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Figure 4.7.3.3c: Photographs of Thermometer in use 
 
Task 4: “Balloons” 
For the final task I wanted there to be no mention of Father Christmas or 
of temperatures or of travel. This is so that the only obvious (to me at 
least) theme or concept that previous tasks had in common with this one 
is negative numbers. I sought a PC based activity that the children would 
experience as a game with some element of competition – this might be 
against each other or against the clock. I purchased a suite of games for 
use in primary schools called “Primary Games 4” (Primary Games 2005). 
This includes many “games” including 2 relating to negative numbers  
 
 
Figure 4.7.3.4a : Photograph of “Primary Games 4” contents screen  
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Figure 4.7.3.4 b: Numbers revealed as balloons burst 
  
 
Figure 4.7.3.4c: Checking the answer 
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Figures 4.7.3.4 b-c show photographs of the screen during various stages 
of “Balloon Burst”.  The game required children to watch a screenful of 
balloons as some of them burst and disappear in turn, revealing a value 
in the position of the burst balloons before the value disappears too. 
Children needed to add together the values revealed and type in their 
answer. They therefore needed to add a string of positive and negative 
numbers together. Difficulty levels could be adjusted and were set by me 
before each game starts, sometimes through negotiation with the group. 
It is helpful to summarise the tasks here, as a reminder of the 
opportunities for conceptual development that were intentionally 
facilitated or afforded. The tasks begin with numbers embedded in a 
temperatures context, so the language used includes “warmer”, 
“increase”; and the sense of travel and change is strong. The first task, 
“Journey” also uses a map and children’s knowledge relating north to cold 
and decreasing temperatures (in the northern hemisphere) is also 
involved. In “Cards” and “Quiz” the activities are still linked to 
temperatures and countries, and the virtual thermometer is introduced. A 
number line model has thereby been implied through the thermometer 
and the notion of travel north/south. The children are also encouraged to 
record their thinking in any way that is helpful for them, thus affording 
them the opportunity to de-contextualise their activities and their thinking 
and to consider them symbolically. The final task “Balloons” does not 
include any references to resources, models or images used in previous 
sessions; it focuses on the addition and subtraction of positive and 
negative numbers. The children are forced to confront their understanding 
of the minus sign, whether “-“ or “-“ and to begin to address the tension 
between the meanings of “minus” – i.e. as preposition, adjective or noun. 
4.8 Data Collection 
My selection of strategies and instruments for gathering data has taken 
account of the need to capture evidence of children’s thinking-in-change. 
This included use of metaphors, images, number lines – as well as 
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external physical resources provided including map, Father Christmas 
model, cards. Decisions made took into consideration lessons learned 
from the Webkit phase of my research. 
Bassey (1999) feels that, 
“There are three major methods of collecting research data: asking 
questions (and listening intently to the answers), observing events 
(and noting carefully what happens) and reading documents.” 
(p81) 
My approach was mainly a combination of the first two of these, though 
the third was also included in the form of my curriculum analysis. My 
evidence was therefore obtained from multiple sources, as Robson 
(1993) advocates: 
“Case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”.  (p5) 
The collection of evidence from multiple sources was intended to facilitate 
description and evaluation of children’s thinking through observation and 
inference of their actions and utterances. 
In devising my strategy for data collection it was important to 
acknowledge that the phenomenon under scrutiny is not well defined – 
the purpose of the study is to discover hidden processes that are not well 
understood. It was not possible to know, with any certainty at this stage, 
what is interesting or valuable. Therefore, it was vital that a range of data 
sets should be gathered. 
My data included: 
• National Curriculum and National Numeracy Strategy Framework 
for Teaching Mathematics; 
• Recording of pre-session discussion with teacher (see Appendix 
2); 
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• Recordings of sessions with each group of children (3 groups, 3 or 
4 sessions with each group, each session approximately one 
hour); 
• Field notes; 
• Researcher’s write-up of each session (see Appendices 3-5); 
• Researcher’s account of each session for 2 focus children 
(“Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings”); 
• Children’s jottings. 
The accounts of each session for each focus child were the main data for 
analysis. Accounts were compiled using recordings and field notes and 
write-ups. It is therefore important to clarify issues relating to recordings 
and write-ups and accounts: 
Recordings 
Experience from Webkit had shown that use of video to record sessions 
with children was problematic. Though some difficulties had been 
anticipated and measures introduced to minimise loss of data, there 
remained some issues that had not been resolved:  
• with one camera it was not possible to see all children’s faces and 
hands and the map and computer; 
• technical support was needed from the school; 
• the camera operator was not always clear about aims for data 
capture; 
• risk of loss (or failure to capture) data due to technical breakdown. 
A major problem with video data had been in transcribing group activities: 
it was often impossible to know who was speaking – and often impossible 
to know the words that were being spoken because children did not 
speak “one at a time” when engrossed in the Webkit tasks. 
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I therefore decided not to use video recording for this study. The type of 
recording that I conducted was through use of a program called 
“Camtasia” (TechSmith 2005). This creates a type of video recording of 
the screen activity on a PC together with a synchronous audio recording. 
Using this would provide a record of what children said and what they 
were looking at or doing on the screen at the same time. I chose to 
control children’s contributions so that they spoke only one at a time, 
explaining to them that this was necessary for me to be able to listen 
later. 
Although I realised that I would have no permanent record of children’s 
movements, gestures and expressions, I felt that field notes and my own 
experience of the sessions, when considered alongside Camtasia 
recordings (audio and PC screen) would enable the construction of an 
accurate write-up of each session. I also knew, from Webkit experience, 
that even with video recording, I would not have been able to construct a 
“complete” record without significant input of equipment, personnel, 
technical support and training. 
Write-ups 
Transcription of whole sessions was not to be attempted. Recordings 
were reviewed in one-minute segments and a brief description of each 
minute was written, consisting of approximately 3-5 lines of text. As well 
as recordings, I relied on my own field notes and my memory to write up 
reviews of every session. It was therefore vital that these were written up 
as soon as possible after each session. Denscombe (1998) points out, 
“Field notes are urgent business.” (p151) 
I acknowledge that any summary or description that I created cannot be 
scientific, objective or value-free. It is inevitable that my descriptions are 
based, to some degree, on my interpretation of events and involve 
selection, on my part, of what to include. As Mason (2002) notes, 
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“Description is a cornerstone of all research. Any description is 
based on making distinctions and drawing attention to 
relationships, through the process of stressing some features and 
consequently ignoring or down-playing others. In some research, 
description provides data for analysis, the description becoming a 
substitute for “the real thing.” (p227) 
The write-up for each session was a (summary) time-stamped log of all 
children’s activities and progress through each task. This facilitated 
focused transcription of segments that were considered of interest in 
subsequent analysis, should it be required. 
Accounts 
Write-ups would provide the data to enable the decision as to which 
children were suitable for in-depth study – who would become my chosen 
case studies. Once case study children were selected, detailed accounts 
of their activity and performance in each session were compiled. As well 
as providing sufficient summary information to facilitate selection of 
cases, the write-ups provided a valuable indicator of sections of the 
recordings that should be “re-viewed” (and possibly transcribed at this 
stage) in order to enable the writing of an account for each “case”. 
Mason distinguishes between accounts-of and accounts-for, 
“An account-of describes as objectively as possible by minimising 
emotive terms, evaluation, judgements and explanation.… By 
contrast, an account-for introduces explanation, theorising and 
perhaps judgement and evaluation.” (p40) 
He goes on, 
“To account-for something is to offer interpretation, explanation, 
value-judgement, justification, or criticism. To give an account-of is 
to describe or define something in terms that others who were 
present (or might have been present) can recognise”. (p41) 
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The accounts that I created - after the case studies have been identified, 
and using the same data from which write-ups were created, though in a 
more focused  and “zoomed-in” way - are “accounts-of”. Later, I created 
“accounts-for” in which I attempted to interpret and analyse children’s 
actions and utterances in relation to learning processes which I believe 
might be indicated. It is appropriate for me to acknowledge, at this point, 
the potential for some bias to creep into my “accounts-of”, since these are 
compiled from my own (inevitably, to some extent, subjective) experience 
of the sessions and my own professional interpretation of events. It is 
important that I should be aware of this and to try to be as objective as 
possible when reviewing sessions to compile write-ups. However, as 
Mason (2002) points out, if my interpretations are the same as those that 
others with my knowledge, and in the same situation, would generate, it is 
appropriate to accept them as accounts-of. 
At all stages I recorded “memos to self” (Denscombe 1998, p211). These 
included any observations, questions and remarks relating to 
discrepancies and consistencies in events or data. They were intended to 
serve as reminders and prompts to reflect that would support subsequent 
analysis and conclusions.  
Mason (2002 reminds us, 
“Fidelity to some “actual event” is a highly contentious and 
problematic issue, since for most events, all that remains 
afterwards are stories told by participants, which are bound to be 
selective.”…  “... all accounts are fictions, and the degree of 
fictionality is not the issue. Rather, in common with literature, the 
criterion is whether readers recognise something in their own 
experience, and whether this leads to informing future practice.” 
(p234) 
It is pertinent, at this point, to consider issues of honesty and integrity of 
research generally, and to relate this to my study. 
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4.9 Trustworthiness of the data and of the research 
Robson believes that, 
 “The concepts of “internal validity”, ”external validity” (or 
generalizability) “reliability” and “objectivity” […] represent the 
criteria which have been developed in response to these questions 
within the experimental and survey traditions.” (p403) 
He cites Lincoln & Guba (1985, cited by Robson 1993) who agree that 
these “conventional criteria” are not appropriate and propose: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability as more meaningful 
criteria for qualitative research.  
Transferability 
In case study research, the case(s) that are selected are cases of a class. 
They are not, however, necessarily representative of that class and 
should not be assumed as such. Therefore, I do not claim transferability 
in a straightforward way. However, my research aims to build theory and 
contribute to knowledge about learning; it can achieve this only through 
using any individuals that I select for study as cases (rather than 
exemplars) of a broader class of learners. 
I aim to provide sufficient information to enable others to reach their own 
judgements about the applicability of my findings to other cases or 
situations.  
Confirmability 
Robson (1993) notes that confirmability is similar to objectivity in other 
types of research but that the emphasis is shifted from objectivity as an 
attribute of the enquirer to confirmability as an attribute of the case study 
itself. 
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Credibility 
Robson suggests that, for their research to be credible, researchers must, 
“ … demonstrate that the enquiry was carried out in a way which 
ensures that the subject of the enquiry was accurately identified 
and described”. (p403) 
Bassey (1999) also supports Lincoln & Guba’s (1985, cited in Bassey 
1999) concept of “trustworthiness”. Bassey suggests that strategies that 
contribute to credibility are: 
• prolonged involvement with data sources; 
• persistent observation of emerging issues; 
• triangulation; 
• sharing data and interpretations with a “critical friend”. (p76) 
If I consider these as conditions for credibility (though I understand that 
those working in the field of qualitative research methods such as Lincoln 
& Guba, Bassey, Robson would not be so prescriptive) I see that my 
methodology fulfilled the first of these most certainly. With respect to the 
second, my involvement was for 3-4 hours for each small group; whether 
this is “prolonged” is not clear but seemed sufficient for my purpose and 
demanding in terms of the resource I could bring to the task as a lone 
researcher. Sharing my thoughts with professional colleagues happened 
frequently. Such discussions arose informally but provided valuable 
collaboration through which I was able to develop and test my ideas. 
Triangulation contributes to dependability as well as credibility of 
research 
The notion of triangulation may be interpreted in different ways. I might 
argue that, from a post-modern perspective, the essential purpose of 
triangulation is problematic, since I believe that there is no single truth 
that can be located by seeking some intersection of research findings 
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discovered by different methods. However, if I accept that, by using 
multiple methods and sources to collect data, my research methodology 
is necessarily triangular (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2007), then I must 
clarify the ways in which the variety of data-collection methods enhances 
the trustworthiness of my data and subsequent interpretation. 
The variety of tasks with which the children engage, the group setting in 
which they work and the flexibility with which I can support and respond 
to them, constitute different methods for acquiring research data; in 
creating opportunities for the children to utilise a wide range of external 
and internal resources in unpredictable ways (which I hoped to capture), I 
also employed a variety of methods for obtaining evidence of their 
thinking-in-change. For example, children’s response to the map and the 
data acquired through observing and recording this might have 
complemented or contradicted the data acquired through observing and 
recording discussions they had amongst themselves. The actions and 
utterances provoked by questions from me would generate another set of 
data that might also complement or contradict data generated in other 
ways. Robson comments, 
“Both correspondences and discrepancies are of value. If two 
sources give the same messages then, to some extent, they cross-
validate each other. If there is a discrepancy, its investigation may 
help in explaining the phenomenon of interest”. (p383) 
Different methods for generating data were: 
• provision of external physical resources (map, Father Christmas 
model, cards, standard stationery items); 
• provision of “virtual” and electronic external resources 
(temperatures database,  interactive “Quiz”, “Thermometer” 
Interactive Teaching Program, “Balloons” and other PC “games”); 
• interactions within each group; 
• interactions with me, including instructions, questions, support, 
encouragement to reflect and explain. 
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In summary, it would appear that, in considering the trustworthiness of 
case study research, 
 “The case study relies on the trustworthiness of the human 
instrument (the researcher) rather than on the data collection 
techniques per se”. (Robson, 1993; p160) 
4.10 Data analysis 
“When methods generating qualitative data form the only, or a 
substantial, aspect of the study, then serious and detailed attention 
needs to be given to the principles of their analysis”. (Robson 
1993, p371) 
4.10.1 Primary analysis 
Analysis of data was iterative and reflexive, beginning with the preliminary 
analysis that took place in constructing write-ups. This was Stage1 of my 
data analysis.  
Stage 2 of my data analysis was the identification of one individual in 
each group who would be a suitable candidate for case study. Since 
write-ups, in effect, “tagged” events throughout all sessions, they enabled 
me to identify the extent to which individuals contributed to sessions. I 
could then evaluate those whose actions and utterances seemed to imply 
conceptual change and growth that I could attempt to describe and 
analyse.  
Having identified one child in each group – i.e. 3 candidates for case 
study, Stage 3 of my data analysis was the creation of accounts for each 
of these 3 candidates. 
My raw data, particularly Camtasia recordings, were considered again, at 
this stage, with a focus on one particular child in each group, in order to 
construct “accounts-of” each session. (I maintain that it is not necessary 
or helpful to transcribe whole sessions – that transcription of selected 
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sections was far more effective, if transcription was necessary. This is 
supported in the research methods literature (e.g. Hutchinson 1988; 
Robson 1993; Bassey 1999). At this stage, some data, that which did not 
appear to illuminate the work and progress of the focus child in each 
group, was omitted, though held in storage for later retrieval should new 
insights require its re-analysis at a later stage. 
Mason (2002) points out that, in creating “accounts-of”, a degree of 
professional interpretation of incidents is acceptable as long as others 
sharing that professional culture would be likely to reach the same 
interpretation,  
“Whenever there is any uncertainty as to whether a slide is taking 
place from account-of to accounting-for, ask yourself whether what 
is being described is behaviour, whether it is negotiably visible or 
audible to others who share a similar culture to your own, for the 
focus of accounts-of is negotiable recognition by participants and 
by experienced colleagues of some phenomenon, prior to 
accounting-for it”. (p42) 
“Accounts-of” were presented as a chronological list of events, actions 
and utterances for each session.  
The next stage, Stage 4, of the analysis was the creation of “accounts-
for”. These were written by considering each item of the “account-of” in 
turn and inferring and making judgments about the child’s cognitive 
processes at that point in the task. Each item in the list was presented as 
a row in a table showing the “account-of” and the corresponding 
“account-for” each item. 
My decision to present results of my data analysis in this tabular format 
was a deliberate, considered choice. Mason (2002) noted, 
“Finding a way to retain complexity while still saying something 
useful is extremely difficult”. ( p237) 
It might also contribute to methodological trustworthiness: 
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“Maintaining complexity is usually more valuable than achieving 
simplicity when human interactions are involved.” (Mason 2002, 
p46) 
Tabular presentation of my findings retained the complexity which is, I 
believe, vital if it is to represent issues of learning, cognition and transfer 
which, I have shown, are inherently complex. This tabular format also 
provoked and enabled further analysis and dissemination. 
It was previously noted that, in writing “accounts-for”, the writer selects 
what is considered and what is ignored. It was very important, in order to 
be able ultimately to respond to my research questions, to include 
comments, inferences and questions that would illuminate the 
construction and re-use of knowledge. Children’s use of all kinds of 
resources must be described, based on my own understanding derived 
from my own learning and experience. In particular, constructs that relate 
to a model of learning developed by myself (Figure 3). 
My study aims mainly to build theory rather than to test it, though my 
development of a model of learning (achieved following a thorough review 
of the literature as well as my own professional experience) provides me 
with a preliminary vocabulary and architecture for “describing” and 
“accounting-for” what children do and how their thinking changes. Of 
course, it is possible that children and events might not have been 
consistent with the theoretical positions I took in the light of my earlier 
review. In this respect, I am testing theory in order to be able to build 
further theory. 
It was important that my “accounts-for” should, therefore, consider more 
than what children do and say; I also needed to record what I thought 
they were thinking. 
Stage 5 entailed selection of 2 of the 3 accounts who I would develop into 
deeper case studies which I could analyse and discuss more fully at the 
level of micro-processes. This reduction was necessary to enable 
sufficient depth within the resource allocation (in terms of the maximum 
number of words) that is available to me. At Stage 5, my rationale for 
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selection of cases was to consider each case’s potential for elaborating 
my research questions. It was clear that “G”  and “C” stood out in this 
respect, and that these two cases provided rich and contrasting accounts. 
“N”’s account was the least rich: interestingly, “N” was from the group that 
the teacher had identified as “low ability”. 
4.10.2 Specific analyses 
There are points in my discussion in Chapter 6 at which I carried out 
further analyses of the accounts as data in their own right (secondary 
level, derived data): 
• Stage 6a of my data analysis entailed analysis of types, or 
classes, of transfer according to a taxonomy put forward by 
diSessa & Wagner (2005) which I presented in Chapter 2: 
Literature Review. In order to analyse each transfer event 
(recorded as a row in the accounts for both children created at 
Stage 4 of my data analysis), it was necessary to clarify, within my 
own understanding, features of knowledge that are associated with 
different classes of transfer.  
o Firstly, I concluded that re-use of any knowledge – old or 
new, effective or not – constitutes transfer of knowledge. 
This would mean that, where re-use of knowledge was not 
evident in any row in the accounts, it was judged that 
transfer had not occurred; and that transfer had occurred in 
all other rows. Such rows therefore represented transfer 
events. 
o Next, I considered that a key distinction between transfer 
classes is the notion of preparedness of knowledge. My 
interpretation of preparedness of knowledge, as suggested 
by diSessa & Wagner, and its effect on transfer is that:- 
o Confidence or lack of it is not an indicator of any 
particular class of transfer: confidence may or may 
not be evident in any class of transfer; 
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o Long-lived “-ness”  does seem to influence the 
ways in which knowledge is likely to be transferred, 
in that knowledge that was only very recently 
constructed is unlikely to be sufficiently aligned with 
other knowledge to be considered “well-prepared”. 
Class A transfer is effective and reliable re-use of 
knowledge – such reliability is achieved through 
multiple experiences with the knowledge. Therefore, 
Class A transfer is unlikely where very new 
knowledge is re-used; Class C transfer might be of 
new or old knowledge. 
o diSessa & Wagner describe Class A transfer as 
effective and unproblematic use of well-prepared 
knowledge. Therefore effectiveness is a necessary, 
though not sufficient, condition of Class A transfer. 
On the other hand, Class C transfer is not 
determined by effectiveness, since it is not 
necessarily productive nor unproductive. Invocation 
of some prior knowledge, old or new, is in itself Class 
C transfer; it could be argued that its effectiveness is 
in its potential to be productive. Identification of Class 
C transfer by an observer presumes the learner’s 
perception of relevance of a piece of knowledge, at 
least in its potential to be productive, even where it is 
found not to be so. 
So, factors that determine preparedness and therefore transfer 
class are effectiveness and reliability of knowledge. Having 
excluded learner confidence and long-lived-ness as determinants 
of transfer class, it was possible to devise a key that would help in 
assessment of class of transfer where transfer was determined in 
accounts generated. This is shown in Figure 4.10. Findings from 
this analysis of transfer types are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Evidence of re-use of 
knowledge? No
Transfer is not 
evident
Is it used effectively?
Yes
Is its effectiveness 
reliable, well-aligned/
commensurate with other 
knowledge?
Yes Class AYes
Is transfer likely to be 
reliably accomplished 
soon?
No
Class BYes
Class C
NoNo
Transfer is evident
Start
 
Figure 4.10 Key to determine Transfer Class 
• Stage 6b of my data analysis aimed to discover whether C’s and 
G’s ability to transfer was sensitive to different elements of the 
problem or task, (Wagner, 2006). Each row of the analysis grids 
was examined and where C or G demonstrated success or failure, 
I considered which facets of a problem or task were apparent at 
that point in our work. Wagner defined 3 facets of problems: 
o problem type: the problem can be “distinguished by 
legitimate mathematics descriptors”; 
o problem aspect; “any detail of a problem or problem 
situation that can be a focus of attention”; 
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o problem context: “the cover story in which the problem is 
embedded”. (p13) 
Results of my analysis of problem type/aspect/context in relation to 
the boys’ success and failure in the tasks are shown in Chapter 6. 
o Stage 6c of my data analysis was carried out to consider my two 
cases in relation to Bruno & Martinon’s (1996) work relating to 
transferences between dimensions when working with negative 
numbers. Each row, in each boy’s analysis grid, was analysed to 
consider whether there was evidence of transference between 
“Quantity: abstract”, “Quantity: contextual” and “Number line” 
dimensions. The number of occurrences in either direction was 
recorded to provide a representation of the extent of each boy’s 
ability to make connections between dimensions, evidence of 
richly associated conceptual resources and flexible re-use of 
those resources. Findings are shown in Chapter 6. 
Retrospective note 
Initially, accounts-for included explicit tracking of the growth of specific 
concepts – i.e. the analysis grids originally had 3 columns. However, the 
third column was abandoned when it became clear that it was not 
possible to be at all confident about its content. This type of adjustment is 
what Robson (1993) calls “playing with the data”, 
“ … case study design is flexible, with the final version evolving 
through interaction with the case …  “playing with the data” at this 
intermediate stage may well assist in identifying themes which can 
form the basis for a workable descriptive framework. Even with a 
theoretical frame, initial exploration of this kind may give an early 
warning of its inadequacy, and perhaps lead to a beneficial 
recasting.” (p378) 
Robson commented on the use of matrices to present research findings, 
 132
“It should not be thought that this is an automatic process for 
getting at “the truth” about the case. It is an attempt to provide an 
integrated summary of what I know about it, but is necessarily 
more suggestive than definitive.” (p399) 
I feel this is true of my analysis grids. 
4.11 Concluding thoughts 
Denscombe (1998) writes, 
“The logic behind concentrating efforts on one case rather than 
many is that there may be insights to be gained from looking at the 
individual case that can have wider implications and, importantly, 
that would not have come to light through the use of a research 
strategy that tried to cover a large number of instances”. (p30) 
I firmly believe that the phenomenon that is my focus of interest – i.e. 
children’s conceptual change when working in a new domain – is 
concerned with processes that are difficult to observe. Therefore, 
knowledge about those processes can only be built by looking and 
listening very hard, and with minimal distraction and “noise”, to the way 
that one child achieves it. Case study is a highly appropriate strategy for 
uncovering these processes. 
Robson (1993) explains, 
“Support for the theory may be qualified or partial in any particular 
case, leading to revision and further development of theory …. .” 
(p162) 
There is every reason to believe that the small number of case studies 
that emerged from my research will support some aspects of theory, 
thereby strengthening that theory and enabling further development. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings  
5.1 Introduction to analysis 
In this chapter I present my account and analysis of individual children’s 
experience and performance in a series of group sessions that took place 
in their school over a period of a few weeks. Constructs developed and 
described by researchers into conceptual change provide a basis for a 
vocabulary and architecture to describe what I observed and inferred 
about children’s knowledge as they progressed through the tasks. For 
each of 2 focus children, I have compiled an account of their changing 
skills, knowledge and understanding relating to a mathematics concept of 
which they have no schooled experience. Table 1 sets out an elaboration 
of the constructs that I have adopted, adapted or created. Many of these 
constructs are embedded within the model for the micro-evolution of 
conceptual resources shown in Figure 3. 
I do not believe it is possible to introduce and prepare conceptual 
knowledge to a highly developed and robust state in a short treatment, of 
the kind that it is possible to administer as a guest in the children’s 
school. However, by focusing on understanding the nature of the 
children’s knowledge and thinking; by making considered and informed 
inferences about what they do and say, I was able to describe a learning 
journey which includes micro-developmental processes involved in the 
growth of conceptual knowledge. This, itself, implicitly includes what is 
known as “transfer” or “application”. (I maintain that transfer is not, 
actually, an appropriate word for what occurs: I show that what happens 
is an extension of the span of situations to which knowledge is 
appropriately and effectively applied – i.e. nothing is moved from one 
location to another; it is simply that what is, at first, sensed as applicable 
in one situation, comes to be understood as relevant in other situations.) 
Three groups of 3 children aged 8/9 years worked together on a series of 
tasks related to negative numbers. This is a domain with which they had 
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no previous experience in school, though of course they may have begun 
to construct a concept of negative numbers from their experiences 
outside school. The tasks, which were described in detail in Chapter 4, 
took place over a period of 5-6 weeks, each group spending 3 or 4 
sessions with me. The 2 children I have selected for in-depth analysis 
were in different groups; two boys who I refer to as  “G” and “C”.  
Analysis and discussion of the findings of my study are presented in this 
chapter and the next. To begin, the record of the boys’ contributions to 
their respective group’s activity, alongside my analysis of those 
contributions, is presented and discussed, focussing on the boys’ 
conceptual resources and conceptual changes at different stages of our 
work together. Those records and accompanying analysis are presented 
in tabular form for the sake of economy of words; in order both to avoid 
repetition and to furnish the reader with as comprehensive an account of 
as many aspects of the task, and of the children’s conceptual change, as 
possible. The two columns, “Account of” and “Account for” (Mason 2002) 
form the analysis grids for each of “C” and “G”.  
Having used write-ups as data to inform selection of cases for deep 
study, analysis grids are the outputs of analysis of raw data (recordings 
and field notes). Once created, analysis grids, since they now contain 
case-specific analysis derived from primary data, become the main data 
source for subsequent discussion. For discussion of any event (row in the 
grid), both my description and analysis of it, should be considered 
together. For each boy, I also provide a summary of that child’s 
conceptual development during the tasks. 
For reasons set out in Chapter 4: Methodology, dialogue was transcribed 
only where points of particular interest had been identified through 
consideration of write-ups of all group sessions. C’s and G’s accounts 
comprise details of all of their contributions to their respective groups’ 
work with me in my role of “researcher as facilitating observer”. Where 
appropriate and helpful, their actual words are noted; at other times, 
events and utterances are summarised and paraphrased. 
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For each of the 2 boys selected for individual analysis, every contribution 
by C to his group’s activity and discussion, and by G to his group’s 
activity and discussion, is described and presented as a row in each grid, 
in the “Account of” column. (Where there is no contribution by the focus 
child, no record is noted; therefore, the activity described in the grids’ 
rows are not necessarily continuous, though they are chronological.) The 
“Account for” column of each table contains analysis of conceptual 
change for each entry (row) in the grid.  
My own knowledge and understanding, hypothesising and further 
consideration of conceptual mechanisms, processes and changes are 
ongoing and iterative throughout this chapter and the next, “Chapter 6: 
Discussion of Findings”.  
Having considered both children in a very task-focused way in this current 
chapter, I shall, in the next chapter, broaden my consideration (of the 
boys’ changing concepts) to incorporate the usefulness of particular 
models of learning in describing and facilitating our understanding of the 
cognitive processes involved. I shall go on to evaluate my own emerging 
model for characterising the micro-development of knowledge. 
5.2 Case studies 
(Descriptions were derived from primary data (minute-by-minute 
reflections on recordings and field notes). They are therefore recorded in 
the present tense and analysis and associated comments are consistent 
with this.) 
Case study 1: “C” 
C has conceptual resources relating to “Temperatures in different 
countries and parts of the world” (“TW”). Also, he shows that he takes an 
interest in, and is able to remember facts about Ancient Egypt: 
 
 136
“C”: Events, actions and utterances (selected from researcher’s write-up, Camtasia 
recordings and field notes) 
“Account of” : 
Description of  C’s 
contributions to the 
discussion. 
“Account for” : Conceptual changes (inferred by researcher) 
1. Even before I 
introduce the task, C 
is leaning over the 
map saying “Spain, 
Spain, where’s Spain, 
Spain? Where’s 
Spain?” 
C expects to find Spain on the map – he knows that countries are 
represented on maps. He has been on holiday to Spain and has 
constructed resources relating to Spain. 
2. His interest in Spain is 
sustained throughout 
much of the first 
session. Having 
agreed that Father 
Christmas (“FC”)  
would prefer a warm 
destination for his 
holiday, C suggests 
Spain. 
C’s concept of Spain leads him to expect it to be warm there. This 
resource within his “Spain” concept may span to other similar 
resources which form parts of C’s concepts about other countries 
or parts of the world. If there are associations between such 
resources, a further concept  “Temperature in different parts of the 
world” (“TW”) has been formed, though it might comprise only a 
few elements, and associations between them may be weak or 
unformed. 
3. When I say that we 
should send FC 
somewhere as hot as 
we can, C, straight 
away, says “That’s 
Africa.” 
His “TW” concept contains sufficient alignment between its “Spain” 
and “Africa” components to enable C to compare them and to 
judge that Africa is hotter than Spain. He doesn’t have conceptual 
resources about anywhere being hotter than Africa – at least none 
that span to this situation. 
4. He sees Egypt on the 
map and wants to go 
there because “It’s 
really hot there. There 
used to be people like 
this .. mummies, 
pyramids, .. musca 
C has some knowledge about Egypt – not only resources about the 
temperature but also others about ancient Egyptian civilisations. 
We know that he has learned at least some of this information from 
a book. 
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…muscats, what are 
they called, muscats, 
it’s called suffinks” (he 
means sphynx) He 
says that he read 
about Egypt in a book. 
 
We see that C does have some “sense” of values that he associates with 
“hot”. 
5. While S talks about 
her trip to Pakistan, C 
becomes bored and 
distracted and is 
looking at the map. 
The display for 
Kazakhstan shows -6º. 
C says “That’s not a 
lot.” 
 
C has conceptual resources that are connected to form concepts of 
“Temperature in different countries/parts of the world” (“TW”) and 
“Knowledge about numbers used to represent temperatures and the 
hot/cold ness they represent” (“NT”). 
There is some span across these 2 concepts and, it would seem, 
alignment - at least to some extent as C is able to judge whether a 
number, as a representation of a temperature, is or is not “a lot”. 
6. He spots Germany 
and calls out 
“Germany, Germany. 
Why don’t we send 
him to Germany – 
that’s a hot place.” 
C thinks Germany is hot. It is not possible to begin to infer where this 
idea comes from. 
Kazakhstan
-6°C
Back to list
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7. He also shows, when 
he says in minute 10, 
“That’s not a lot!”, that 
the value for 
temperature in 
Germany (1 degree) is 
not one he associates 
with warmth; he is 
surprised. When no-
one responds to his 
“That’s not a lot!” 
comment he 
perseveres and tries to 
resolve his uncertainty 
and asks N “Is that a 
lot?” When he gets the 
response “No”, C is 
satisfied and doesn’t 
pursue the question 
any further. 
C expects Germany to be hot, based on some inference or 
association that is not clear. The value that is displayed is not one 
that C associates with high temperatures and, though there is some 
tension/conflict between the 2 concepts (TW and NT), C initially 
trusts his knowledge about numbers used to represent temperature 
values (NT). However, it would seem that he is not completely 
confident and in the absence of reassurance from others, C checks 
with his friend N, whose judgement he trusts. N confirms what C had 
thought.  
8. When I then go on to 
talk about what we see 
in Germany and state 
the temperature, C 
says “Oh my God, 
that’s not a lot.” This is 
interesting because we 
know that C didn’t 
know what to think 
about a temperature of 
1 degree, but because 
N has given C some 
information that he 
trusts, C seems happy 
to have a reason to 
contribute to the 
Now confident that what he says is correct, C repeats his comment 
more emphatically to the group. Alignment of the 2 concepts 
involved (“TW” and “NT”)   is reinforced. 
C is also attending to FC’s clothes and it appears that he is aligning 
his readout strategies that enable him to attend to, and interpret  
relevant features of FC’s clothes with his now more secure 
knowledge about “TW” and “NT”  
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discussion. He also 
points out that “He was 
wearing a lot, there, 
too.” (It would seem 
that this was post hoc 
reasoning on C’s part.) 
 
C’s confidence in his knowledge has grown, due to approval of C’s ideas 
by his friend. With new-found confidence, C was able to go on to develop 
these concepts further, seeking and testing alignment with other 
conceptual resources and extending span within and across concepts. 
Next, C has to deal with conflicts arising within his conceptual resources: 
9. When the display 
shows Kenya 19º, C 
laughs at the image of 
FC in his t-shirt shorts 
and flip flops. C says 
“Flip flops, it must be 
hot!” C also remarks 
that, “If it gets hotter, 
he’ll take off his top or 
his shorts.” 
C is reinforcing for himself his understanding that hotter means less 
clothing (co-development of readout strategies and concepts relating 
to temperature (“TW”) and the number system as it represents 
temperature (“NT”)). 
10. S asks whether 
Madagascar is hot. N 
says he doesn’t think 
so and C agrees that 
he doesn’t think so 
either. This is certainly 
a feature of C’s 
contributions to the 
We have already seen that C trusts N’s opinion. C shows repeatedly 
that he feels secure in agreeing with what N says. N’s opinion is a 
resource that C frequently uses. Although I suspect that C would not 
have expressed a view if N had not, it is not actually clear that this is 
true. 
Kenya
19°C
Back to list
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group – he waits until 
N says something and 
copies what N says 
11. When they click on 
Madagascar and see 
that it is 21º they are 
surprised. C says “Oh 
my God! This must be 
playing tricks .. 
because that’s 
(Madagascar) hotter 
than that” (Kenya). 
2 conflicts are evident within C’s conceptual resources: 
He has said that he thinks Madagascar is not hot – and yet  he finds 
that Madagascar is 21 and 21 is a number that he associates with 
“hot”. Within his “NT” concept C has yet to develop a system of 
graduation between hot and cold, as well as alignment between this 
and the numbers themselves. 
For C, Madagascar is hotter (higher number) than Kenya, but also, 
Madagascar is further from Equator than Kenya and further away 
from equator means less hot. 
These conflicts are not resolved. 
 
Although the conflicts are evident, C does not resolve them, nor does he 
appear to make any attempt to do so. Perhaps C does not have adequate 
internal resources to facilitate any efforts to analyse and address the 
contradictions that he does, at least, seem to recognise? These are 
conflicts between: C’s confidence in N’s knowledge and C’s own “NT” 
concept (recently reinforced); and between a situated abstraction, 
“nearest equator is hottest” connected with his “TW” concept and his “NT” 
concept. 
C continues to enjoy making contributions to the group’s activity; at the 
same time he also further aligns conceptual resources relating to 
numbers and temperatures: 
12. C wants to go to Spain 
- he says he wants to 
see what it is because 
he’s been to Spain 
and it’s “real hot”. 
When it’s C’s turn he 
goes to Spain. The 
display shows 7º. C 
He is shocked when he finds that it is 7º (though he pretends not to 
be). His shock might be evidence of a conflict between his “TW” and 
“NT” concepts – i.e. he “reads” 7 as not hot but his resources relating 
to Spain have led him to expect a “real hot” number. It is not clear 
whether he chooses, at this point, to ignore his uncertainty, or 
whether (without vocalising it) he resolves it by drawing upon another 
conceptual resource that enables him to reason that 7º is hotter than 
other countries they have visited so perhaps, in comparison, 7º is 
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seems shocked and 
hesitates. I ask him if 
this is what he 
expected Spain to be. 
He blustered, “Yes, 
yes. I knew Spain was 
hot.” 
“hot” after all. 
13. When the group 
inadvertently click on 
Jordan (9º) C thinks 
“It’s less hot than 
Spain”. He claims this, 
however, without 
being able to 
remember what Spain 
was. 
It is not clear whether C has remembered the Spain temperature 
incorrectly and does actually think that Spain was more than 9º or 
whether he has just become very confused. 
14. N suggests that they 
go to Iceland; he 
knows it’s really cold 
there. When I ask how 
he knows, C joins in 
with “Because it’s 
white!”. He then 
makes a joke. When 
he says “Ice, ice .. get 
it?!” 
It is not clear whether C has any knowledge or expectation about 
Iceland. His joke might have been used to mask a lack of knowledge 
or it may not. 
15. After S tells us that 
she knows something 
about the Arctic, C is 
quick to join in, telling 
us that it’s really, really 
cold there. When S 
starts to tell us about a 
TV programme called 
Serious Arctic, C talks 
over her, saying that 
It would appear that C does have a resource that leads him to think it 
is “really, really cold” in the Arctic. It is not clear whether this 
resource has spanned to his other “TW” and “NT” concepts. 
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he’s seen that too 
16. C thinks that Sweden 
is a bit hot and a bit 
cold, and that Poland 
is “medium”. When I 
ask C how he knows 
this he says that he 
doesn’t know how he 
knows. I say “It’s funny 
how sometimes we 
know things but we 
don’t know how we 
know.” C adds, “And 
sometimes you know 
and you forget.” 
Maybe, C doesn’t 
actually know anything 
about these countries 
but he is (successfully) 
including himself 
without committing 
himself? 
C’s non-committal comments suggest that he does not have 
conceptual resources relating to Sweden or Poland or that, if he 
does, any resources that he has constructed for either Sweden or 
Poland do not span to other concepts. 
17. I explain the task and 
check their 
understanding by 
asking whether the 
places he visits will get 
hotter or colder. N 
answers quickly, and 
C repeats what N says 
“Colder.” 
It is not clear whether C himself correctly interpreted the task or 
whether he “tailgates” N’s reply because he trusts N to give me the 
correct answer. 
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At some points, C’s comments suggest that he has not remembered 
information that was determined previously in the task: 
18. C is keen to be the 
person who chooses 
where FC will start and 
places him at the North 
Pole. I point out that 
that is where he will 
finish. C hadn’t been 
listening very carefully 
or had not understood 
instructions. 
It would seem that C had either not heard or not assimilated 
information about the task previously because he gives the wrong 
answer now.  
19. He quickly says that he 
wants him to start in 
Madagascar “because 
that’s hot – not hot as 
in sexy of course”.  
When I ask why he 
wants it to be there, 
and not anywhere else, 
he says it’s because 
he knows its really hot 
there. He doesn’t seem 
to remember any of the 
information about other 
(hotter) countries from 
a few minutes ago. 
It is interesting that he had discovered previously that Niger was 25 
º but chooses still to use Madagascar as the start of the journey. 
The information (that may or may not have become a resource in 
memory) that Niger is 25 º did not span effectively to C’s “TW” and 
“NT” concepts. Niger was not triggered in response to the “hottest” 
prompt. Furthermore, C’s Madagascar = 21 memory resource does 
not appear to have been triggered. 
 
At other times, it is clear that he has remembered: 
20. As they start to plan 
FCs journey, C says 
something that 
confirms that he has 
remembered that 
Kenya was cooler 
C remembers that Kenya was cooler than Madagascar. He refers to 
it as “cold.” 
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than Madagascar 
when he lands on it 
saying “That was cold, 
wasn’t it?” N queries 
this but C insists that 
Kenya was colder 
than Madagascar. 
21. S is not completely 
clear on whether they 
are looking for hotter 
or colder countries. C 
tells her “We’ve got to 
beat, got to lose 21. 
Look at what he’s 
wearing.” 
C now shows that resources relating to the rules of the task are now 
associated with each other and with other resources, enabling him to 
engage with the task more meaningfully.  He is interested in FC’s 
clothes as an indicator of how hot/cold it his. This shows that C might 
use FC’s clothes as a resource from which he will infer hot/coldness 
and compare different countries. 
22. N decides to visit 
Tanzania to see if 
they should go there 
next. When the 
display shows FC in 
his swimming trunks 
and sunglasses, C 
giggles and tells N 
that they should start 
there.  
 
C is developing and modifying readout strategies that enable him to 
infer whether the temperature in the country being visited satisfies 
their needs of the task at any particular point in the journey. C 
appears to have understood the aim of the task. 
This may be seen as his construction of a situated abstraction “more 
clothes = a move in the correct direction when aiming for a colder 
country”. 
 
However, C’s memory resources are not always so accessible, nor is his 
apparent confidence and success necessarily due to robust conceptual 
resources relating to numbers: 
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23. C thinks Kenya 
should be the next 
stop because it 
should be easy to 
“beat” 28º. 
C knows that 28º is very high compared to other countries they have 
visited during the whole session. His comments suggest that he does 
not actually remember the temperature in Kenya (19º) and simply 
thinks that it is likely that it is not 28º or more because almost all the 
countries they have tried have not been that high. 
24. Kenya is 19º and 
when I point out that 
FC has got “a lot 
more clothes” here, C 
very confidently says 
“Yes, that’s good, 
that’s good.” 
C is focused on the rules of the task and is satisfied that this move is 
in line with aims for FC’s journey and with his “NT” concept. He does 
not attend to my hint about “a lot more clothes”, my (too subtle for C) 
attempt to suggest a too-big temperature difference. This reinforces 
the situated abstraction he has constructed, “more clothes = a move 
in the correct direction when aiming for a colder country”. 
25. C groans when the 
display for Sudan 
shows 25º – he 
seems to understand 
immediately that 25 is 
not lower than 19 so 
Sudan cannot be the 
next stop. 
Both of these concepts (NT and “aim of the task) are sufficiently 
aligned for C to participate and make effective judgments in the task. 
26. Until now C seems to 
have understood the 
objectives very well 
but when they visit 
Ethiopia (16º) he 
shows the first sign of 
confusion. His first 
reaction is “Yes! 16!” 
But then he says 
worriedly, “But it’s 
less hot. Last time he 
was having a coat on, 
wasn’t he?” He 
revisits Kenya to 
check. “He’s got no 
coat on. Blue t-shirt 
The temperature in the last country was 19 (Kenya) and C is initially 
confident that a move to a country with a temperature of 16 is valid.  
However, he questions his judgement when he (mis-) remembers that 
FC had a coat on at the last stop so he “goes back” to check. He is 
reassured when he realises that FC has even more clothes on now 
than before. It appears that C’s attention to FC’s clothes is a readout 
strategy upon which he is quite dependant for giving him confidence 
in his decisions about appropriate journey moves. 
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and shorts. Let’s see, 
Ethio ..  It’s the same 
– blue t-shirt and .. 
trousers, and boots – 
he has got more 
clothes on now so 
that’s alright.”  
27.  When they see that 
Chad is 24º, C says 
“We lost that. We 
gotta go to a different 
one. He asks the 
others where they 
should go. They want 
to go to Niger. When 
they see that it is 25º, 
C says “Oh, that’s 
rubbish now.” 
C had decided that Ethiopia 16º had been the previous stop so 
understands that they should not go to a country where the 
temperature is 24. I think “We lost that” is a reference to winning or 
losing at each step – i.e. whether they click on country that fits the 
requirements of the task at each juncture – in this case they needed 
one that was less than 16 and got one that is more, so they “lost” and 
need to find another one. When the other boys go to one that is even 
hotter C is frustrated. He had quite clearly understood that he was 
aiming to find a country cooler than 16 and the others are clicking on 
countries that are increasingly removed from his aim. His own 
reasoning strategies are functioning effectively, though he is not able 
to find what he seeks. 
 
We see that C uses other resources (i.e. Father Christmas’s clothes) to 
give him confidence in his reasoning about numbers. C has already 
shown that he enjoys aspects of competition and challenge within the 
task and in Row 27 we see that he gets frustrated when he feels that 
others are lagging behind in their understanding of the aims of the game. 
In Row 28, we see, again, that C has greater trust in N’s knowledge than 
he has in his own, especially at a point when C’s excitement about his 
changing conceptual resources had been subdued by others’ lack of 
response to him. 
 147
28. C mumbles 
something about, 
“Do we want it 
warmer?” No-one 
responds. When the 
display shows 6º C 
says “Aahh…” and it 
is only when N starts 
to say “Nnnno” that C 
joins in with “No!” 
C is beginning to lose confidence in his own ability to make sense of 
and resolve problems within the task because the others do not 
appear to share his disappointment with the hot countries they have 
been visiting. He questions whether he has perhaps understood it the 
wrong way round when he asks “Do we want it warmer?”. They do not 
reply and C, at first, feels relieved when a country that is 6º appears 
on the computer screen. He feels pleased “Aahh ..” that they have 
found a lower temperature than 16. However, N says that this is not a 
valid move, C quickly agrees with him, even though this is in conflict 
with C’s own sense-making. He trusts N’s knowledge more than his 
own. 
29. Iran is 6º. C echoes 
N saying “That’s 
going to be hard to 
beat.” 
N has decided that they did need a stop that was lower, not higher, 
than 16 so they have agreed to go to Iran (6º) which N says “will be 
hard to beat”. C agrees with him. There are 2 reasons why C is happy 
to agree with N: firstly, because he has renewed confidence in his 
own knowledge about the aims of the task – N’s decision to go to Iran 
will have reinforced C’s understanding that they were looking for 
numbers lower, not higher, than 16; and secondly, C has faith in N’s 
judgements, generally.  
 
With N’s support, C is able to achieve increasing span and alignment of 
relevant conceptual resources: 
30. C says that 
“Portugal’s gonna be 
too hot though”. 
Portugal is 12º. N 
says, and C echoes, 
“But he’s got exactly 
the same clothes on 
though”. 
C’s conceptual resources about Portugal lead him to expect the 
temperature to be more than 6º – i.e. too hot to be a valid next move 
in the task. The display shows that Portugal is 12º and C “reads” very 
efficiently that he was correct : 12º is hotter than 6º. The span and 
alignment of C’s conceptual resources that he has perceived as 
relevant in this situation is reinforced.  
N’s “But” suggests a tension in his understanding of the situation – a 
misalignment of relevant conceptual resources in that he is not sure 
whether he should make decisions based on clothes or numbers 
when the 2 readouts are not in alignment  (at least in as much as his 
thinking leads him to believe). C agrees with him – again this could 
be because his conceptual environment is similar to N’s and he 
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perceives the same tension: alternatively, it might be simply because 
N thinks so and C has confidence in anything N says, regardless of 
what C’s sense-making mechanisms lead him to think. 
31. He clicks on 
Turkmenistan … The 
display shows 5º. C 
says “Yes. We beat it. 
We beat it, N***. Yes!” 
He is very excited. 
Every time C sees that his concerted resources – i.e. his 
interpretation of the rules (based on associations between resources 
within and across concepts) and of how to “read” the numbers and 
the clothes –  leads to success, these resources are more robustly 
aligned. 
 
Next, we see how easily C becomes confused and distracted. He 
appears to find it hard to maintain his focus on particular aspects of the 
task and on his thinking: 
32. C states that they will 
go to UK next, 
followed by Poland. 
He says that Poland 
is cold. UK is 6º. C 
quickly says “Now we 
go to Poland”. C is 
confused at this 
point. He looks at the 
flag moving within the 
display about UK and 
says “Wait a minute, 
something’s wrong. 
We’re meant to be 
going to U .. Merica 
and that’s British.” He 
has got mixed up 
with United States. 
When the UK temperature is first displayed, C does not seem to 
realise that, if the previous country was 5º, it is not appropriate to go 
next to UK, 6º. He simply accepts the inclusion of UK as a way-point 
on the journey and thinks they should now go to Poland (which he 
believes is cold) as he had intended. Very soon, however, he queries 
whether the display they see is actually the correct one for UK. This 
could be because a situated abstraction that he has constructed, that 
“movement north = lower temperatures” is conflicting with his 
concepts of “TW”  and  UK. This may have  led him to think that UK 
should be less than Turkmenistan. C gets confused between USA 
and UK, itself evidence of an association between them, perhaps 
because the beginning of the 2 names is the same.  
 
In Row 33 we see another example of C’s lack of recall about, even 
recent, experience and about learning that might have resulted from that 
experience. 
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33. Whilst looking for 
Poland on the list of 
countries, the 
children suggest 
other countries that 
they might visit. C 
gets excited at the 
prospect of visiting 
Germany but then 
remembers that they 
have been there. He 
can’t however 
remember the 
temperature in 
Germany. 
Near the beginning of the journey C wanted to visit Germany because 
he thought it was hot. He found out, at that time, that it is 1º . The 
excitement he expresses about the prospect of visiting Germany is 
likely to have the same basis as it did previously. The information he 
learned earlier has not been re-used by C – i.e. the span of his 
resources relating to Germany did not extend into his changing 
concept about temperatures in different countries. 
 
C soon gets excited about zero and we see how he deals with 
temperatures represented by negative numbers: 
34. When they visit 
Czech Republic C is 
very excited about 
the temperature 
being zero, squealing 
with pleasure. He 
confidently tells me 
that this is less than 
one..  
C has a resource that zero is less than one and is particularly excited 
about  visiting a country with a temperature of 0º. C seems to attach 
some special importance to zero – perhaps it is simply that he is 
especially confident about his conceptual resources relating to zero 
and it is this confidence that excites him. On the other hand, C’s 
excitement might not relate to confidence at all. 
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35. N asks “Is that 
minus?” (They are 
looking at Russia). C 
replies “Yes, minus 
6!” I ask if that is 
colder than zero and 
C tells me most 
emphatically “Yes.” 
He starts to say “We 
done it! That’s it! You 
can’t do any more.” S 
says “But you might 
get better. You might 
get minus 8.” I ask “Is 
that colder than 
minus 6?” C replies 
quickly “Yes.” C tries 
to explain “Minus 6 
means you take 6 
away from 6. 6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1, zero.” He tells 
me “You could have 
zero, zero, zero, zero 
– it all means the 
same.” 
C believes that, although he agrees that -6 is colder than zero, they 
have achieved the objective of the task and that it is not worth 
continuing because now that they are visiting countries with 
temperatures of below zero and “You can’t do any more”. S tries to 
make him see that there are differences between “minus” numbers 
and that the task is not yet completed. C’s readout strategies do not 
facilitate him working with numbers below zero – he doesn’t perceive 
any distinction between them. He explains that “Minus 6 means you 
take 6 away from 6”. His concept of the number system does not 
effectively extend below zero, although he accepts that minus 
numbers do exist and seems happy to agree with S that some minus 
numbers are “better” than others. 
36. I say “This says 
minus 6 – how does 
that compare to 
zero?” C tells me “It’s 
colder – look he’s 
wearing more clothes 
now anyway. He’s 
wearing that big coat, 
cloak thing. 
C’s interpretive resources for “reading” FC’s clothes support him in 
his “It’s colder” response. He seems to be persuading himself and 
trying to persuade me that his answer is correct by referring to the 
clothes that FC is wearing. This suggests that C’s understanding 
about FC’s clothes spans effectively to his concept about the number 
system. His confidence in his sense-making mechanisms that enable 
him to evaluate the significance of FC clothes, and alignment of any 
judgements with his number system concept (repeatedly tested and 
reinforced throughout the task) enables C to make inferences about 
extending his number system below zero. 
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Russia
-6°C
Back to list
 
 
C showed that he was focusing on Father Christmas’s clothes to enable 
him to compare temperatures. His lack of resources relating to negative 
numbers meant that he did not possess adequate readout strategies to 
be able to extract meaning from the numbers themselves. 
Next, it is possible to infer the beginning of a significant change in C’s 
contextual neighbourhood. Interestingly, C seems to be invoking a 
number line model to “read” values in relation to their proximity to zero. 
Between rows 37 and 39, C’s sense-making mechanisms change 
considerably. 
37. Finland is -4. C 
doesn’t react straight 
away. Then he says 
“Oh, it’s the same – 
he’s got the same 
clothes on.” I ask how 
minus 4 fits in with 
zero and minus 6. C 
doesn’t know. I ask if 
minus 4 is colder than 
-6. C says “Yes, 
probably”, though is 
clearly uncertain. 
C is still relying on his resources and readout strategies relating to 
FC clothes. Span of his number system concept has not yet 
extended effectively and will need further testing, adjustment  and 
reinforcement. 
38. N wants to go to 
Norway. They see 
that it is -3 and C says 
“That’s even less than 
C thinks -3 is less than -4.  He has not referred to FC clothes this 
time. He is utilising his number system concept, extending its span to 
reason that the value containing the digit 3 is less than the one 
containing “4”. He hasn’t yet learned that this is not the correct way 
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that” (Finland -4º). to extend the number system. His use of the word “even” suggests 
that his number line resources have modified and he realises that 
cold does not mean coldest – that, some minus temperatures are 
“less” than others. His conceptual resources, including readout 
strategies and sense-making mechanisms did not include this 
previously. 
39. To finish off, I ask the 
group a few quick 
questions to check 
their understanding. I 
ask for a temperature 
that is warmer than  -
6 and C tells me 
“minus 2” I ask “Is 
minus one even 
warmer?” C says 
“Minus zero, minus 
zero, that’s warmer.” I 
ask “Which is 
warmest, minus one 
or minus four?” C and 
then N tell me “One.” 
When I ask why, C 
tells me “Because its 
closer to that, minus 
zero and that’s 
warmer.” 
C’s sense making mechanism for comparing numbers has modified. 
Now, he thinks -2 is warmer than -6 and that -1 is even warmer. He 
goes on to tell me that minus zero is warmer than that and that -1 is 
warmer than -4. Although he calls zero “minus zero” he does seem to 
have learned that the digits increase as they become further away 
from zero and that they get smaller towards zero, and that movement 
towards zero from a minus temperature is towards “warmer”. 
Alignment is being established between relevant concepts and every 
question that I give C is an opportunity to test this alignment, 
reinforcing his understanding and his confidence in this new 
expansion of his number system concept, a part of this concept is 
now about “minus numbers” in the context of this task. 
Session 2 of 4  
40. C picks up the Russia 
card and says “That’s 
high. Minus 6. That 
was one of the 
highest ones, wasn’t 
it.?” 
C seems to be attending to the digit 6. There were many examples in 
the previous task that were higher than 6 so it is unlikely that C 
thinks that -6 was the warmest temperature that they included 
previously. However, -6 was the lowest of the negative numbers 
previously considered – it is likely that C is focusing on the digit 6 
and remembers that they didn’t encounter any minus numbers with a 
“higher” digit than 6. It is also possible that he is thinking about the 
position (on the map)of the countries that FC visited towards the end 
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of his journey that were those furthest North. Perhaps “most 
northerly” or “at the end/upper stages of the journey” are what C is 
considering when he says the -6 was “one of the highest ones.”  
 
Next, C is working with a set of cards showing each country’s name and 
temperature. At first, he is not able to “access” any information 
determined in the previous session, which had taken place a few days 
earlier. 
41. C has put the -6 card 
amongst unsigned 
numbers on the 
table. N tells C 
“Russia is not meant 
to be in the hot 
section. Minus six”. 
C says “Don’t you 
remember the last 
time we came? 
Minus was hot.” 
Now that signed (minus) and unsigned numbers are juxtaposed (not 
like in previous task) C shows that his readout strategies have not 
modified to take proper account of the minus sign. C’s comment 
“Minus was hot” does not align with anything he has said or done 
previously. 
42. C goes on, “N***, 
don’t you see the 
pattern? 3, 12, 9, 7, 
6, 5 .. “ I interrupt 
and point out, “It’s 
not 3, is it, it’s 13.” C 
starts again “13, 12, 
9, 7, 6, 5 ..” He looks 
for a 4. N is still 
unhappy that the 
cards are not correct. 
I ask him to tell C 
why he’s not happy. 
C is not “reading” the minus sign. He does not assign it any 
importance at all. Although in the previous task he appeared to have 
learned how to order negative numbers, it is clear that his readout 
strategies have not yet evolved for him to “read” the minus sign 
appropriately here – the juxtaposition with unsigned numbers might 
be leading him to overlook the signs completely. 
When N tries to explain, C argues with him (unlike in previous 
session), insisting that minus does not mean cold. C will not 
acknowledge that the presence of the sign affects the number order. 
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He says “Because 
minus means cold.” 
C replies “No, it 
doesn’t.” They both 
agree that it is -6 but 
C doesn’t agree that 
this affects the order 
of the numbers 
43. I ask C to read out 
the numbers from 
the ordered cards. 
He reads 13 to zero 
in order but doesn’t 
mention any signs. 
Readout strategies do not facilitate perception or interpretation of the 
minus signs. 
44. C thinks that zero is 
the bottom of the list, 
that “Of course zero 
is the lowest 
number.” 
Although he had demonstrated, at the end of the previous session, 
that his conceptual resources included readout strategies and 
resources relating to an extension to the number system beyond zero 
into “minus numbers”, C now reverts to something he believed before 
that change (to his contextual neighbourhood) had occurred. It 
appears that the extended span of his concept of the number system 
and its alignment with other relevant conceptual resources had not 
been tested and reinforced sufficiently for those adjustments and 
developments to persist into this new setting.  
45. N tries to explain to 
him that minus 
numbers are below 
zero – are colder 
than zero, that there 
are things below 
zero. C suddenly 
says “We need some 
more room then. I 
was thinking minus 
was hot but it’s cold 
isn’t it?” 
It seems that N’s explanation has stimulated the resources 
constructed by C in the previous session and has created 
associations between them that C had not previously perceived. C is 
now able to use new associations to see that his earlier thinking had 
been incorrect. It appears that C had associated “high” minus 
numbers with increasing temperatures in the same way that high 
unsigned temperatures are associated with increasing temperatures. 
This suggests that C had applied a situated abstraction, that “higher 
number = higher temperature”  to negative numbers as well as 
unsigned numbers. Now that his resources are connected more 
effectively, he realises that he must create more space on the table 
because there are numbers where he didn’t previously realise any 
might be (i.e. his concept of the number system has extended and 
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now includes memory resources and sense-making mechanisms that 
facilitate continuation beyond zero where numbers are designated 
using a – sign and that these numbers represent temperatures that 
are increasingly cold.) 
46. C reads the new list 
where -6 is now 
below 0 but still 
doesn’t say the 
minus word. 
Readout strategies are still not sufficiently evolved for him to know 
that he needs to say “minus” as part of the number name. 
 
Next, we see the moment when (initiated by himself) C imposes a kind of 
symmetry around zero that reveals co-ordination of his resources: 
47. C says “That’s 6 
under zero. “Minus 
6,” he continues 
“minus 4, minus 2, 
minus one, minus 
one” He doesn’t see 
anything wrong with 
what he says. I point 
to the -4 card and 
ask C what this one 
is if that one is 6 
under zero. He tells 
me, “4 under zero” I 
ask him if there is 
anything wrong with 
the list and he tells 
me “These are 
upside down”. S 
reads the list 
C has put all the numbers with minus signs below zero but has 
positioned the highest digits at the top, closest to zero and the others 
in order of increasing digits. At the end of the previous session, C had 
ordered a list of negative numbers like this list, in the context of the  
”Journey”. The span of this new memory resource appears to have 
extended (though not effectively) to this problem. He is using the 
“higher number = higher temperature”  situated abstraction that was 
evident previously. It seems that, when (Row 45) C appeared to have 
adjusted this situated abstraction, the abstraction changed to “higher 
number = higher temperature and minus temperatures are below zero 
so even the “highest” minus numbers are below zero”. This 
modification to C’s resources is not illogical but does not, of course, 
include any indication that “high” minus numbers (i.e. digits 
representing high value” are “lower” or “further down” than minus 
numbers with “low” digits.   
His exchange with me helps him because I lead him to articulate and 
consider the signed numbers in relation to zero – “6 below zero” and 
“4 below zero”. This seems to help C to align his knowledge about 
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properly. I ask what 
made them change 
their mind. C says 
that it was when he 
said 6 under zero 
because then they 
realised that one 
under zero is hotter 
than 6 under zero. 
….. 
numbers with his knowledge about decreasing temperatures. 
 
We also hear about his “snow” metaphor: 
48. …….  C talks about 
snow – that higher 
snow shows that it is 
colder so -6 is higher 
snow than -1. 
C appears to use an image of a pile of snow to help him compare 
minus temperatures (scan of his diagram in Figure 5.2).  
 
 
(Figure 5.2 C’s “piles of snow”) 
 
Each “minus” degree is represented by an amount of snow that is 
increased for every additional “minus” degree. Therefore, more 
minus degrees = more snow = colder. C talks about colder, rather 
than lower suggesting that he uses his conceptual resources 
relating to ”Journey” as the main focus for appropriate alignment of 
relevant  conceptual resources. 
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Next, we see that C’s concepts are aligning and changing. 
49. C says Norway is 3 
(i.e. doesn’t mention 
minus) 
C’s readout strategies still do not lead him to perceive the need to 
say “minus” as part of the number name. 
50. I ask C to describe 
why Netherlands (4º) 
is where he’s put it. At 
first C asks “Who 
agrees with me to put 
it there?” He goes on 
to say “Because it’s 
under the 5. It’s 4.”I 
ask him why he didn’t 
put it  “down there” 
(towards the bottom 
of the table) because 
that would be under 
the 5 wouldn’t it? But 
he knows it shouldn’t 
go in the “minus 
section”. .. “Because 
that would be under 
zero.” 
C is right. When I challenge his use of “under the 5” by suggesting 
that anywhere on the table that is not at the level of 5 or above would 
be a correct answer to this question, he confidently (and correctly) 
tells me that to put it below zero would put it in “the minus section” 
and that would mean that it was “under zero”. This shows that C 
realises that -5 is quite different to 5 – something he did not believe at 
the beginning of the session. From this I understand that C’s readout 
strategies and his conceptual resources relating to minus numbers, 
the number system and temperatures have modified. 
51. They start the quiz. C 
says “I got it right. 
Look! There’s Norway 
and there’s Russia” C 
thinks Norway is 
hotter than Russia. C 
explains “Because it 
says it on the cards.” I 
argue, pointing out 
Span and alignment of C’s “NT” concept, resources relating to Father 
Christmas and his concept of the number system are tested; C rises 
to the challenge, justifying his judgements effectively. 
Is Norway hotter or 
colder than Russia?
Back
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that it does not say 
“Norway is hotter than 
Russia” on the cards. 
C replies, “It says 3 
minus, that means 3 
behind zero and that’s 
6 behind zero… “ S 
says “So that’s hotter 
than Russia.” C “Yes, 
that’s what said”. I 
ask “How do you 
know?” C says 
“because 6 under 
zero is real cold but 3 
under is only a little 
bit cold” 
52. Next question: “If I 
travel from Denmark 
to Estonia, what will 
happen to the 
temperature? C jokes 
“It’ll go higher”. I ask 
“How are you going to 
find out?” N uses the 
cards, He says it 
changes by 2. C 
agrees. I ask “Does it 
go up or down?” N 
says down. I ask 
“hotter or colder?” C 
says colder. 
(Denmark is 0º; Estonia is -2º.) C’s first remark “It’ll go higher” is not 
correct. When he pauses and listens again to the question and to N, 
he agrees with N and adds that if the temperature goes down, it gets 
colder. It might be that C’s resources and sense-making mechanisms 
(SMMs) relating to up/down and hotter/colder are in some tension 
with each other. When he focuses on the direction of change of 
temperature, rather than the direction of change of number, he is 
able to make sense of the challenge and responds confidently. 
53. New question – 
“Name a country 
where the 
temperature is 
between 3º and 6º” C 
C responds well to this question, answering it correctly and 
explaining well. 
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says “I know what it 
is. It could be 4” S 
says 5. C says 
“Neverland because 
that’s 4”. 
54. ”Name a country 
between 6 Celsius 
and 8 Celsius.” He 
has misread it – it 
actually says -6 and -
8. N says “Seven” 
and C laughs. N says 
“It could be, though, 
couldn’t it?” C agrees 
(though hesitantly) “It 
could be.” 
C’s readout strategies are still not reliable regarding noticing the 
minus sign and responding to it appropriately. When N suggests a 
correct answer to the question as it was read, C’s laughter might 
suggest that (a) he thinks N is making a joke and that this is a silly 
answer or (b) he did perceive and interpret the minus signs in the 
question, he just didn’t say them and so he reasons that N’s answer 
is wrong (as it is to the correct question.) When N persists, C sees 
that N thinks he is right and, hesitatingly, agrees with N, even though 
his own conceptual resources lead him to believe that N has not got 
it right. 
55. C says Spain is 7. S 
says no because 
“there isn’t a minus – 
it’s gotta go down 
here” C argues 
because “minus 
means under zero.” C 
insists that “It can’t be 
something under zero 
because we need 
between 6 and 8.” 
It appears now that C did not “see” the minus signs in the question 
(lack of effective RS) He does know that a minus number would not 
go between 6 and 8 so his concept about negative numbers is 
evolving and developing. 
56. I say that the lowest 
one on our list is -6. C 
still argues that we 
shouldn’t be looking 
for minus anything. 
C is still adamant that they should not be considering a minus answer 
because he did not see the minus signs in the question. 
Name a country where 
the temperature is 
between -6°C and -8°C.
Back
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Even when N tries to 
tell C that Spain won’t 
do because “We need 
minus”, C argues that 
“It doesn’t say minus 
anywhere – it says 
Celsius”. Eventually 
he does see the 
minus signs in the 
question. 
 
Next, C’s evolving concept of an extended number system is effective, 
though a difficulty with the notion of “between” is suggested: 
57. Next question “…. 
country between 0 
and -2?” S says, 
there’s only one and 
it’s got to be minus. 
They look for 
countries. N says “It 
could be any of 
these 3 – I’m 
choosing ..” C says 
“I don’t get it – 
because -1 is going 
to be under zero but 
what about -2. I ask 
“Why can’t it be 1 
rather than -1?! C 
says ”because -2 
isn’t on top.” 
He now recognises that the answer will be below zero. SMMs and 
other resources that would enable him to interpret “between” correctly 
have not been constructed  (and/or are not effectively associated) and 
he does not realise that -1 is the only possible answer. He does 
understand that the minus sign is important and that a number that 
doesn’t have a minus sign can’t be the answer because the lack of the 
sign means that it is “on top” i.e. above zero and that will not do. C is 
therefore demonstrating that he is beginning to be able to interpret 
and co-ordinate knowledge from different conceptual backgrounds in 
order to address this problem. 
 
In Row 58 C doesn’t remember that the map had not been as helpful as 
he had wanted previously: 
 161
58. “If I’m in Albania and 
go to somewhere that 
is 7º colder, where 
might I be?” C 
suggests going to the 
map. N and S say it 
won’t help. C agrees 
“No, that wouldn’t do 
anything would it?”. 
 
C agrees when reminded that the on-screen map was not helpful in a 
previous question even though his conceptual resources about maps 
generally had led him to expect that they might find the information 
he thinks they need on a map. 
 
There is an indication in Row 59 that C’s counting strategies are not 
appropriately evolved: 
59. I repeat “ the 
question says 7 
degrees colder” The 
boys count down, C 
counts 7 cards. 
C counts one card for each degree. He does not question whether this 
correspondence should be assumed. This might suggest that C’s RS 
lead him to “see” each card as an interval on an invisible number line. 
 
Session 3 of 4  
60. I ask what we did with 
the cards last time. C 
says we went to 
countries . 
The previous session included ordering cards containing the names 
of countries but C’s “We went to countries” might be referring to the 
session before, when Father Christmas made his journey using a 
map. 
61. S clicks on the 
question “Name a 
country 12 degrees 
lower than Portugal”. 
They’ve had this 
question before but 
C has remembered a fact from the previous session. This is 
evidence of formation of a resource in memory. For some reason, 
Russia -6 is memorable for him – i.e. the span of resources 
associated with this question includes Russia -6. 
If I am in Albania and go 
to somewhere 7° colder, 
where might I end up?
Back
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can’t remember the 
answer. C remembers 
that Russia was -6. 
The children find the 
Russia card and 
confirm that C is right 
– it is -6. But does this 
answer the question? 
I ask what else we 
need to know to 
answer this question. 
62. Eventually C suggests 
that they look at the 
temperature in 
Portugal and “go 7 
down, -6, 12” He is 
very uncertain, 
confused. C looks for 
the Portugal card. It 
shows 12º. C counts 
back on his fingers. 
It is interesting that C counted down 7º for his last question in the 
previous session. Perhaps “counting down 7” is  a resource that is 
triggered when he gets a question to which he thinks the response 
requires counting down. It would appear that “counting down” is not a 
well prepared concept for C - i.e. span to other resources is limited, 
where it exists at all. This would suggest that, for C, concepts 
relating to numbers, counting and temperatures are not yet aligned 
fluently. He seems to reject this strategy when, having started to 
count down from 12 … (see next row) 
 
C reveals some of his internal resources relating to “the number system”, 
“zero”, “information on maps” that do not appear to be adequately 
associated with other resources to enable C to function effectively, even 
in areas where we know he has some experience: 
63. He finishes on zero. I 
ask “So, are you 
looking for zero?” C 
says that Russia 
could be the answer 
because it’s under 
zero. I challenge this. 
C insists that Russia 
would do 
….he continues all the way to zero (i.e. he correctly counts back 12 
and reaches the answer zero). However, he doesn’t know he has got 
to the answer and gets confused again, thinking that perhaps he 
should find an answer that is below zero. It is possible that he thinks 
that zero cannot be an answer, perhaps because zero has not been 
the answer to any question yet. It is possible that he does not include 
zero within his concept of numerals – that zero is not like the other 
numbers. Indeed, in Row 34, C did show that he feels zero is special. 
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64. S gets all the minus 
cards together and 
puts them in one pile. 
She makes another 
pile using all the 
other cards. She 
says that she is 
going to sort out 
which is the lowest. 
C corrects her – “the 
highest, you mean, 
out of the coldest?” 
C is focusing on the digits when he considers the highest signed 
digits as being “high” whether they are preceded by a minus sign or 
not. He has previously shown that his conceptual resources do 
include a SMM that leads him to believe that these (minus) numbers 
represent cold temperatures. 
65. I say that this is 
going to take ages – 
what else can we 
do? C suggests 
looking at the map. 
C has forgotten that the map didn’t actually help the last time the 
group tried to use it for this reason. This is the second time that C has 
failed to remember this. It would seem that, for C, the association 
within his conceptual resource that leads him to expect maps to 
provide temperature information is somehow more powerful that the 
memory resource constructed from his recent experience with this 
map within this task. He has not “learned from his mistake”. 
 
Again, C seeks alternatives to offering zero as an answer; the alternatives 
that he offers show that his concept of “minus numbers” (that had 
appeared to be forming in our previous work) is not secure. 
66. I return children’s 
attention to the 
question. C still thinks 
the answer is Russia. 
I open the 
Thermometer 
program and recap 
that we know that 
Portugal is 12º and 
Russia is -6º. C says 
“But Russia is better, 
it’s lower.” 
The question has asked for a country with a temperature 12º lower 
than Portugal. C believes that if he finds a country with a temperature 
a lot lower than Portugal he will succeed with this question. This 
might be because he has no confidence in his own ability to work out 
what is 12º lower and he thinks that he has a good chance of getting 
the right answer if he can find a country that is much lower than 
Portugal.  It is possible that this indicates that C’s concept of “12” is 
not effectively connected with other resources- e.g.  for counting, 
numbers, calculations . It might also suggest that C does not 
distinguish between zero and any minus number – that they are all 
equally correct as answers to this question. We saw in Row 47 that 
C’s concept of minus numbers used to represent cold temperatures 
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appeared to be beginning to align with his resources and SMMs 
relating to ”Journey” in that higher digits preceded by minus signs 
equated to increasingly cold temperatures. However, this concept 
has not developed sufficiently robustly to be used effectively here. 
 
Within the task, at this stage, children have been introduced to a piece of 
software that presents an image of a thermometer which the children can 
adjust to display a variety of values on the scale and within the 
thermometer bulb and tube (see Fig. 4.7.3.3c). The quiz questions 
provoke children to increase and decrease the temperature shown. A 
“Change Box” on the display shows the magnitude and direction of any 
difference in the temperature currently displayed and the temperature 
displayed previously by displaying a positive (unsigned) value or a 
negative (signed) value. C shows that his ability to perceive, interpret and 
utilise the minus sign is very limited and he becomes confused; not 
surprising when we remember that he is only just beginning to perceive 
the minus sign when it precedes a numeral.  
67. I point out that the 
change box shows -
12 and ask what this 
is all about. N says 
that it shows that we 
counted down 12. I 
ask again why the 
change box shows 
minus 12. C says 
“It’s because it’s 
below zero”. N says 
“because of counting 
down minuses.” 
C’s concept of minus numbers includes a resource that makes him 
think they are below zero. This is the only (or the first) response he 
believes is applicable here.  His readout strategies have evolved so 
that he sees the signed number and “reads” it as a temperature below 
zero. 
 
C does begin to interpret the minus sign as an indicator of change as we 
see in the first part of Row 68. Subsequently, C’s conceptual resources 
relating to the minus sign are associated with other resources: 
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68. I encourage N to use 
the mouse and then 
to “be the teacher” 
and explain to C and 
S. C feeds back that if 
you “go down” 2 it’s 
minus 2 and if you go 
down 12 it’s minus 
12. He clicks on 
“Name a country 1 
degree warmer than 
Finland”. N says that 
the first step is to get 
Finland.  The children 
find the card for 
Finland which shows -
4º. C wants to use 
Czech Republic 
(which is 0º) as the 
answer. I ask “Is it 1 
degree warmer?” C 
agrees that it is not 
C does suggest a country that is warmer than -4. This type of 
response is in line with his answer in Row 66. We have seen that he 
is able to describe conceptual resources that enable him to visualise 
the comparative coldness of -4 and -6 (piles of snow) but, at the same 
time, he does not seem able to differentiate between negative 
numbers or between zero and any negative number when quantifying 
coldness. This suggests that the resource that enables him to 
perceive and describe the direction of the difference between given 
“minus numbers” does not also enable him to quantify those 
differences. C is not influenced by N’s explanation about “go(ing) 
down” meaning minus. It is possible that he hasn’t heard N. It is also 
possible that he has heard but that what N says does not influence C 
- because C’s conceptual resources do not span to include the 
change box display relating to minus numbers as a process or event 
, as N is trying to explain. 
69. The children say that 
Norway is the answer 
to the question. I ask 
S how that can be 
right – since one has 
got 3 on the card and 
one has got 4 – “How 
can the one with 3 be 
warmer”? C says 
because “that’s only 3 
below and that’s 4 
below zero. He 
repeats “That’s 3 
under zero colder and 
C’s explanation is in line with his earlier description of piles of snow. 
The language he uses shows that this concept is still evolving 
because he combines 2 forms of speech incorrectly “3 under zero 
colder”. His RS have not so far been able to support him in reading 
the minus sign as anything other than a reference to a position on the 
number line below zero. His experiences with recent questions are 
likely to have provoked his consideration that the minus sign is 
sometimes also an indicator of movement, process or change. His 
use of the expression “3 under zero colder” suggests that C is testing 
a new way of combining the relevant words to discover whether it 
helps him work more successfully within the quiz. 
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that’s 4 under zero 
colder.  -4 is colder 
than -3.” 
70. Question: “Name a 
country that is 3º 
colder than 
Luxembourg”. They 
look for the 
Luxembourg card.  C 
interrupts “You’ve got 
to take away”. I ask, 
“Why? It doesn’t tell 
you to take away”. C 
replies “But its like 
taking away, isn’t it?” 
He counts back on his 
fingers. N does too 1, 
0, -1, -2. 
C’s RS and inferential reasoning have developed so that he now 
knows that to move to a colder country is to “take away” from the 
starting temperature.  
 
But C’s growing concept is far from being robust and secure: 
71. C talks through the 
problem correctly. 
Then he questions 
himself “Oh I don’t 
know. I’m lost” 
He does not have sufficient confidence in his knowledge to stand up 
to his own testing of it. 
 
His confidence in his ability to succeed with these tasks appears to swell 
and then be immediately dashed: 
72. They click on the 
question “Name a 
country 4º warmer 
C now knows that it is important, when referring to a minus number, 
to say something as well as the name of the digit. He says the word 
Celsius, though he should say the word minus. N reminds C that he is 
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than Norway”. I ask S 
what we need to do 
first. S finds the 
Norway card. C says 
“3 minus”. Then he 
says excitedly “It’s 1! 
It’s 1!” C plays the 
part of the teacher 
with the thermometer. 
He talks about 3 
Celsius but puts 
thermometer on -2. N 
notices it’s not 3 and 
tells C. C moves it to 
-3 and still talks about 
3 Celsius. The 
display is showing -3 
and C still reads it as 
3. Eventually he 
corrects himself and 
says minus 3. He 
moves the 
thermometer to 3. I 
ask why. C is 
confused - he is not 
listening. He calls out 
7. N agrees, 7. 
not “saying” the number properly and C eventually starts to refer to 
the numbers in the way that N wants him to. C’s concept is not  
robust enough to stand up to challenge from N so C assumes that his 
understanding had been wrong, though it had actually only been his 
language that was not correct. C changes his strategies for operating 
with this task to be opposite to what he had thought because he 
thinks that he had understood things the wrong way round. Now he is 
trying to work through the problem where his sense-making strategies 
are at odds with his other resources. This results in confusion for C. 
73. C reads the question 
out again. N says “Oh 
warmer, 3 Celsius 
add ..” C questions 
why he’s doing 
minus. N says that 
he’s right because it 
starts with 3 minus … 
N says -2, -1, 0 C 
C now focuses on the minus sign only as an instruction to “go down”, 
take away. At first he overlooks the association that he had displayed 
previously when he used the minus sign as an indicator of position on 
the number line. His readout strategies are now challenged and he 
sees only first minus sign that he (appropriately) reads as position 
indicator (i.e. below zero)  but also believes he must take away to 
solve this problem so is anxious that N is “going up”. C’s resources 
are not sufficiently evolved to equip him to see that he must “go up” 
because he needs a country that is warmer. Although the resources 
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says “You’re not 
going down, you’re 
going up. N agrees, 
he is going up 
and associations between them may have been constructed, C 
seems overwhelmed by the need to co-ordinate a wide range of 
resources, including readout strategies, memory resources and 
SMMs from different concepts. 
74. C put thermometer 
on -3. He counts up 4 
and gets 1. C is 
confused because “it 
didn’t say minus on 
the question, only on 
the card”. He still 
doesn’t see/say the 
minus sign. 
This is further evidence of C’s preoccupation with the minus sign. He 
reluctantly accepts that the start value should be -3 but seeks 
justification for this by looking for a reference to “minus” in the 
question. 
 
C’s insecurity has led to him becoming confused and using inappropriate 
strategies to attack this part of the task. 
Soon after this, we see a demonstration of a more effective approach by 
C. It might be that he is able to re-use knowledge about number bonds 
and “bridging through ten” (that he had already learned in some other 
setting) in this setting: 
75. “Name a country 10º 
warmer than 
Sweden”.  They find 
the Sweden card. C 
says 6 minus. The 
temperature is -2. S 
writes 2-10. She 
changes this to -2 + 
10. C says that 
they’ve got to add 10 
because it says 
warmer.  C says the 
C is correct. He knows that in order to get warmer they must add 
something to the start temperature. When I ask how he knows the 
answer he tells me very confidently that 2 and 8 is 10. C appears to 
have an association within his conceptual resources that links 2, 8 
and 10. This might suggest that he is using basic “knowledge” of 
number bonds to 10 (which might be memory resources relating to 
the relationships between 2, 8 and 10) to help him bridge through 
zero when adding on the number line. However, it might suggest 
something far simpler – just that the mention of 2 and 10 (or, in this 
case, -2 and 10) cues or triggers 8 as a response, simply because of 
this association between 2,8 and 10. 
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answer is 8. I ask him 
how he knows and he 
tells me “2 and 8 is 
10”. 
76. “If we start at Belarus 
which is -3 (I put the 
thermometer at -3) 
and want to know 
what the temperature 
is if it’s 20º warmer 
than this…? N moves 
the thermometer up 
and counts up 20. I 
have to help with the 
count and controlling 
the thermometer red 
bar accurately. N 
sees the answer is 
17. I ask how we 
could write this down. 
C writes -3 + 20 = 17. 
I ask him to read it 
out to me and check 
that he is happy with 
this. He does so and 
tells me that he is. 
The question I pose is similar to the previous (Row 75) question and 
C, again, shows confidence in using conceptual resources relating to 
number bonds to derive his (correct) answer. It is still not possible to 
infer whether his response is a simple reaction to a trigger or is 
evidence of a more sophisticated calculating strategy (i.e. bridging 
through 10, or in this case 0). His ability to represent the situation 
symbolically might suggest that his responses are based on 
something more that a “knee-jerk response” and that he might be 
bridging. 
77. We re-open the 
thermometer and set 
it at  -2. N needs to 
add 30. He goes to 
30 (i.e. adds 32). 
When he corrects 
himself, C thinks he 
has made a mistake. 
I recap and confirm 
and ask how we 
This is another opportunity for C to reinforce the resources he has 
successfully employed with this sort of problem in Rows 75 and 76. 
N’s error causes C to question his own knowledge but he perseveres 
and regains confidence in his (correct) answer. It is clear here that C 
is “bridging” effectively through zero, using conceptual resources that 
relate numbers to each other (i.e. “knowledge” of number bonds”). 
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would write this one 
down. C writes -2 + 
30 = 28. I ask N to 
perform the change 
on the thermometer 
again. As he moves it 
through zero, C says 
“There, that’s 2 
warmer so it’s going 
to be another 28.” 
 
It is interesting to observe whether C was able to move downwards 
through zero with similar ease: 
78. New one – start at 6º 
and get 8º colder. N 
slides and counts 
down 8. C thinks the 
answer should be -3 
– he is counting 
down on his fingers 
– 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1,  -1, 
-2. (i.e. faulty 
counting strategy). 
Now that he needs to evaluate a change in the opposite direction, C 
elects to count down using his fingers. His bridging strategy is 
compromised here through his reversion to his faulty counting-on-his-
fingers strategy. 
 
But then C shows, again, that his resource relating to zero is not as well 
established as resources for numerals on either side of it: 
79. C writes numbers as 
a vertical number 
line. Now he answers 
correctly. But his first 
count is his start 
number so he should 
get the wrong 
answer. I ask N if he 
Even when using a number line on paper, C omits to take zero into 
account as a position on the line. This could be symptomatic of a 
wider problem relating to zero for C. He needs better understanding 
about zero (more effective conceptual resources and linkage between 
them)  if he is to effectively develop concepts relating to numbers and 
operating with numbers. His counting strategies are also faulty and 
will benefit from more effective resources  that relate zero to his 
concept of the number system. 
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can explain how C 
gets the right answer 
when the method is 
wrong. (It is because 
he is not including 
zero as one of his 
series of numbers.) 
 
This separation of zero from the other numerals within C’s “number 
system” concept will inevitably lead to errors with calculating strategies 
that involve counting procedures. 
In our last session together, C failed to recognise the relevance of 
information he had determined, and strategies and sense-making 
mechanisms he had used, in the earlier sessions: 
Session 4 of 4  
80. Balloons are -3, 2, 9. 
C reads the numbers 
but doesn’t say word 
minus. N is quick to 
correct him. C says 
“It’s 11 – ‘cause you 
add 9 and 2 together 
… S says “But then 
you minus 3 away” C 
says “It’s gonna be … 
11, 10, 9 “ 
C’s RS are still unreliable in that he fails to acknowledge neither (i) 
the existence of the minus sign nor (ii) the need to vocalise the minus 
sign. C adds the 2 unsigned numbers together correctly – i.e. his 
resources relating to addition of 2 single digit integers is sound and 
spans to this setting. However, he does not attempt to include the -3 
in his calculation until S tells him what to do. Even then, his faulty 
counting strategies (seen in other tasks) lead him to reach an 
incorrect solution. 
81. Balloons are 1, -7, 1.  
C giggles and says 
“That’s zero!” S says 
“1 add 1 minus 7. C 
repeats, “Zero.” He 
enters 0 as the 
answer 
C does seem to “see” the minus sign this time because we see that 
his answer does not correspond with addition of only the positive 
numbers. He is not able to subtract or count back 7 from 2, however. 
His conceptual resources relating to addition, though apparently 
adequate with single digit unsigned integers, does not equip him to 
operate with minus numbers effectively. He has had some 
experience with adding and subtracting negative numbers (including 
bridging through multiples of 10) in our previous session when he 
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used a number line model to support his working. Memory resources 
and other resources constructed in that session, themselves 
associated with a number line-based SMM, have not spanned to this 
new task. Here, he knows he must add 3 numbers together. There is 
nothing in this setting that he “reads” (and recognises) as a prompt to 
consider a number line approach. 
82. C reads out next set 
of balloons: -4, 8, -1 
(at first he omits to 
say the minus sign 
but corrects himself.) 
C says 8 take away 4 
take away 1 … 3 
C’s readout strategies are still unreliable in “reading” the minus sign. 
He appears to have knowledge of (what I know as) commutativity 
when he reorders the numbers so that he starts with the unsigned 8 
and then “reads” the minus sign as an instruction to “take away” for 
the other 2 minus values. 
 
Modification of C’s conceptual resources relating to the minus sign, that 
had been achieved in previous sessions, is only partially evident in this 
final session: 
83. Balloons are 1, -5, -9 
(But C doesn’t say 
minus again) S says 
“Zero, No. It’s got to 
be minus something”. 
C says “add 5 and 
then you’ll know what 
minus it is … 15, -14!” 
C keeps saying 
“Minus 14, minus 14” 
I ask him how he got 
to this answer. He 
tells me “I added 9 
and 5 that makes 15 
but then I’ve got one 
that makes it 14.” I 
ask why minus? C 
RS are still not reliable for reading minus sign – it seems that he does 
“see” it but doesn’t see the need to say it. He reads the minus sign as 
an instruction to subtract. He gives the correct solution and his 
explanation of how he arrives at it suggests that he could be using 
either a number line model or cancellation model. He tells me that he 
adds 9 and 5 and then adjusts for the 1 by decreasing his answer by 
1. It is possible that his methods are quite arbitrary and that he has 
no preferred model. 
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says “Because it’s got 
minuses there” I ask 
“Why don’t you just 
add all 3 numbers 
and call it minus? ”C 
says “No, because 
one of them isn’t 
minus” I get C to think 
it through again, 
pointing out to him 
that he has made a 
careless error. He 
sees that 9 and 5 
make 14, not 15 so 
adjusts his answer to 
-13. 
84. 5, 5, 10, 3, -1 S says “ 
5 and 5 is 10, 20, 
then that’s 23. C says 
“take away 1” S says 
“22. I ask “Why are 
you taking away a 
number? You’re 
supposed to be 
adding all the 
numbers together. N 
says “Because it’s a 
minus”. C agrees, 
“’Cause there’s a 
minus 1 there. It’s 
telling you to go 
below. ” I ask “Why 
does that mean take 
away?” 
C very explicitly tells me that he reads the minus sign as an 
instruction to “go below”. 
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Interestingly, C is able to explicitly relate ideas arising in this session to 
earlier tasks: 
85. I persevere “You 
haven’t explained it 
very well yet. Why, 
when you’re adding a 
minus number, does it 
mean you take it 
away?” C says “’’Cos 
it’s like temperature – 
‘cos you could have 
19 degrees and if you 
take minus one off it’ll 
be …?” He isn’t able 
to reach an answer. I 
ask “So, it’s like 
temperature?” N says 
“Sure, minus, below” 
C agrees “Yeh, cos 
we did it last time and 
I remember.  Santa 
Claus taking his 
clothes off - stripping” 
It is C who mentions that there is some connection with temperature 
and it is clear that he has a concept about minus numbers in the 
context of temperature. An image of Father Christmas taking his 
clothes off is revived for C, showing that his concepts about 
temperature, minus numbers and the “Journey” task all span each 
other. Also apparent, however, is a lack of alignment across these 
concepts which would enable C to work more effectively when trying 
to operate with minus numbers. 
  
Other conceptual connections are implied by C’s actions and words, even 
where he doesn’t articulate any acknowledgement of any recognition of 
relevance: 
86. New balloons 9, -6, 
6, 5, -8. S says 
“They make 11, then 
add 9 ….. 20.”  C 
says “Then take 
away 6”. But he can’t 
count back, gets 
confused. He 
C’s faulty counting strategies lead him to become confused and to 
provide the wrong answer. However, there is again evidence of sound 
resources relating to some number bonds (as well as other resources 
relating to strategies for calculating, perhaps - though not necessarily 
- including explicit knowledge of the commutative law) when he 
suggests taking 8 away first.. Perhaps it is his sound number bonds 
resources that cause him to be uncomfortable with the answers he 
reaches by counting back? His confusion when he tries to count back 
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suggests, “Why don’t 
we just take away 8 
first?”  “12 ..” He 
counts back 
falteringly from 12 
ending up with an 
uncertain “7?” 
,and his uncertainty with the answers he reaches using this method, 
together suggest some conflict within his own contextual 
neighbourhood. 
87. N asks “Shall we try 
to work it out again?” 
I ask “Does it help to 
take the 8 away 
first?” C says “Yes, 
because you add the 
highest number first 
…. “ N and C get 
very confused when 
trying to count back 
8 and then 6. 
C appears to have internalised a situated abstraction (we do not know 
whether this was given or constructed) that it is appropriate to start 
with the highest numbers when calculating. The span of this 
abstraction extends to this type of question and his RS is to actively 
seek out “highest numbers”. 
88. 7 balloons 1, 1, -2, 0, 
-4, 4, -4 C checks 
that we’ve got the 
right number of 
balloons. He says “4 
add 1 add 1 is 6. 
Take away -4 …” 
Boys are distracted. 
C starts appropriately and doesn’t make errors in the early stages of 
this solution. 
89.  C’s turn:  -2, -3, 0, -
1, -3, 3, -3. C recaps 
the numbers. C says 
“There’s a lot of 
minuses.” S 
suggests “Which 
ones are minuses? 
Take out the ones 
that aren’t.” C looks 
at his list again, 
Again, C employs his “highest first” strategy. It appears that its use in 
earlier questions has reinforced its cueing and reliability priorities for 
these questions and C’s RS are now tuned to focus on this aspect. 
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“Which is the highest 
minus? Oh no. I 
don’t ..” 
90. ….  C says “3,6,9, 
(he’s trying to add 
together the 3 minus 
3s) 10,11 (adding the 
-2) add 3 (the only 
+3),  that’s 11 take 
away 3. 8” . I ask 
“Why take 3 away 
from 11?” C can’t 
explain. He thinks it’s 
because “It must be 
minus because 
there’s lots of 
minuses.” 
As in row 83, C’s comment  “ … add 3, that’s 11 take away 3” 
suggests that his conceptual resources include a sense of negating 
what has been achieved so far, when adding a value with a sign 
opposite to those accumulated, and we know he groups together like 
signs and adds them together as the first stage in his calculation. This 
leads him to consider the addition of an unsigned number to the total 
of the signed (minus/negative) numbers, as “taking away”. This might 
suggest the use of some conception of operations with signed 
numbers as movement along a number line that C is not conscious of 
and does not articulate. 
91. C thinks I should “put 
all the adds together 
and all the minuses 
together.” 
C thinks it might be correct to group together numbers of the same 
type “adds” and “minuses”. This might simply be a vocalisation of the 
strategy he has been using. It might also mark the point where he first 
realises that this is what he is doing. 
92. I ask “What if I say 4 
take away -1?”  and I 
write 4 - -1? C is 
shocked . “What??!!” 
N says “5 because 
when it says add you 
take away so it might 
be …” C is 
incredulous, ”You 
really have gone 
mad!” 
Until now, all problems have required C to add values together and 
this one clearly sets out subtraction of a minus number. With the 
previous addition problems, C effectively re-ordered elements so that 
he could move the minus sign to appear after a value. He doesn’t 
have RS that enable him to “read” this question that might prompt 
strategies that he has and could invoke in order to attempt to solve 
the problem. N’s remark about taking away when the question says 
add is an articulation of what C was doing in Row 90 and yet he 
doesn’t recognise it. That particular aspect of his concept of operating 
with signed numbers did not “stick” – did not become a part of the 
concept that is called up now – perhaps because he did not have the 
opportunity to test and reinforce it at that time. 
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C’s story 
It is clear that C brought to the tasks a range of qualities and knowledge. 
He is naturally inquisitive and wants to please and he participated with 
enthusiasm. 
He had some conceptual resources about temperatures in different 
countries and about numbers. At first, C needed to align these 2 concepts 
so that he achieved a sense of the range of numbers that typically 
represent hot and cold temperatures. He learned how to use a set of 
external resources comprising representations of Father Christmas 
wearing different clothes, provided within the task, to help him align 2 key 
concepts: “Numbers as they are used to represent temperatures” (“NT”); 
and “Temperatures in different countries and parts of the world” (“TW”). 
This was achieved through C’s own active creation of associations across 
the concepts that effectively connected them at particular points, 
structuring the relationship between the broader concepts. 
At times, C encountered incongruity and conflict. When this occurred he 
seemed resigned to tolerating the conflict rather than actively pursuing 
lines of thought that might have helped him resolve it. C lacks confidence 
in his knowledge and in his ability to solve problems independently – we 
see this in his (sometimes undeserved) respect for his friend N’s opinion. 
This lack of confidence is likely to be part of the reason that C did not 
attempt to resolve conflicts that he experienced. 
C is very sociable and was eager to please me, the “teacher”. These 
traits, as well as supporting his learning, sometimes compromised 
learning in that, sometimes, C was so keen to interact and make 
gratuitous contributions that he did not listen. Consequently, information 
that may have been determined failed to become internalised and was 
not, therefore, available to him subsequently. There were several 
incidents where C failed to recall some resource that he had appeared to 
have learned in a previous task or dialogue. 
It emerged that C’s contextual neighbourhood relating to numbers was 
very fragmented and there were many resources that were not 
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adequately connected to others – these include the notions of “between” 
and “zero”. Although he appeared to have been exposed to 
representations of negative numbers, he was not able to relate this 
experience to anything else within his contextual neighbourhood and was 
unable to derive meaning from them. He used a range of task-based 
resources to help him construct internal resources about negative 
numbers: firstly to realise that the (positive) number system with which he 
was familiar does extend through zero and beyond to negative numbers; 
next, to recognise the symmetry of integers on either side of zero, and 
then to be able to order negative numbers, with the support of task 
resources. C also went on to increase and decrease values by moving in 
both directions along a number line, beginning with both positive and 
negative values and moving through zero; he was able to do this within a 
“Journey” model and also in purely symbolic mode. 
It is interesting to observe that C had particular difficulty in developing 
readout strategies that reliably perceived and processed the existence of 
the minus sign/symbol when it precedes a numeral to indicate a negative 
value; it took a long time for C to begin to articulate the “minus” when 
referring to a negative number. He did, however, achieve this: he was 
able to modify his resources effectively so that he could extract meaning 
from the minus sign that enabled him to begin to construct his concept of 
negative numbers. C’s other poorly connected resources relating to “zero” 
and “between” and his flawed strategies for counting with his fingers also 
interfered with his ability to learn from the tasks, in that the necessary co-
ordination is not achievable where resources do not span and/or are not 
aligned. 
C did use existing conceptual resources to support his work in a new 
task; we saw this when he successfully used number bonds to bridge 
through multiples of 10 (if that is what he was doing). He also used 
strategies (conceptual resources) that cannot have been constructed 
through activities with me, such as grouping like terms together and 
working from the highest value first. Presumably these strategies were 
previously reinforced and consolidated thoroughly and repeatedly for 
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them to have become connected within C’s knowledge and for high 
structural priorities to be established; since we saw that any new 
conceptual resources and associations between them that C was able to 
build for himself within the new task (thinking-in-change) were fragile and 
that associations, with little or no reinforcement, often faded and did not 
span to new situations. 
In the final task, C needed to aggregate a number of integer values, both 
positive and negative. He had to confront the notion that the minus sign is 
both an indicator of position relative to zero and also an indicator of the 
direction of change to a value. C seemed able to operate these two facets 
of this concept where they did not need to be used together. His strategy 
for working with mathematical operations with minus numbers was to 
invoke his knowledge of commutativity (or at least of strategies based on 
this) to justify re-ordering the values so that the negative number 
becomes the subtrahend in the expression and he can use the minus 
sign as an instruction to subtract, an idea that he is comfortable with. 
However, when there were too many minus signs for this strategy to be 
helpful to him, C could not see his way through the problem. 
C’s learning journey was a bumpy one. He was able to take on some new 
knowledge and to align it with existing knowledge. However, he needed 
repeated opportunities to reinforce those new connections in order to 
sustain any increased span. Without those opportunities to consolidate, 
new connections faded and, though not necessarily lost altogether, they 
were often not recalled in new settings even though relevance had 
previously been discovered. In other words, the cueing priority and 
reliability priority of newly constructed resources remained low until or 
unless associations with other resources are constructed, tested and 
reinforced.  
Case study 2: “G” 
G already has some conceptual resources relating to temperatures in 
different parts of the world (“TW”) and he has a secure understanding of 
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the number system as it is used to represent temperature (“NT”). G and 
his group are very quick to understand the aims and rules of the task. 
(However, some of G’s conceptual resources are not so rational): 
“G”: Events, actions and utterances (selected from researcher’s write-up, Camtasia 
recordings and field notes) 
“Account of” :  
Description of G’s 
contributions to the 
discussion. 
“Account for” : Conceptual changes (inferred by researcher) 
1. Having introduced the 
group to the countries 
list and clicked on 
Madagascar as an 
example to show the 
boys what each page 
looks like, G is the one 
who very quickly says 
“Well, that’s wrong, 
21. It’s really hot in the 
film”, when he sees 
the temperature 
displayed. 
G Reads 21º as “twenty one degrees” and knows that this is a 
representation of “how hot/cold” 
His understanding of 21º conflicts with his understanding of 
Madagascar as he thinks Madagascar is very hot and 21 is not very 
hot. 
The 2 concepts.”, “NT” (“Numbers as they are used to represent 
temperature”) and “Madagascar” do span to each other and are 
already aligned. That  alignment is challenged here. 
2. M starts to answer 
“Well, these are quite 
..” but G interrupts with 
“hot, especially near 
the equator”. 
 
 
G’s conceptual resources include readout strategies (RS), resources 
in memory and sense-making mechanisms (SMMs) that enable him 
to understand that all of the countries indicated are hot; those that 
are closest to the Equator are very hot. 
G is able to judge whether a country is “hot” by considering its 
position on the globe in relation to the equator. This is a sense-
making mechanism (SMM)  that he uses to organise information 
about temperatures in different countries. 
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3. When they click on 
Niger (25º) G quickly 
notices that “He’s 
taken clothes off - we 
can’t go there.” 
G attends to the clothes worn by FC on the screen. 
He knows that less clothing = higher temperature (another SMM, 
perhaps a “situated abstraction”). 
 
4. (The boys) understood 
the basic rules straight 
away and using their 
sound understanding 
of number order and 
its relationship with 
relative temperature 
(i.e. hotter, colder). 
When trying to decide 
whether to go to Libya, 
someone suggested 
that Algeria might be 
better but G 
disagrees, thinking 
that Algeria is “really 
hot”. When I ask him 
why he thinks that, he 
tells me that it’s 
because “It’s got 
sand”. 
G’s “NT” concept has already begun to form –i.e. he has a collection 
of associated resources that he uses to extract or impose meaning 
about “Numbers as representations of temperature.” He has a 
“higher numbers = hotter, lower numbers = colder” SMM. 
It would appear that G has formed a situated abstraction, “sandy 
countries are hot”. Interestingly, there is nothing in the external 
resources provided that shows sand so we cannot know why G 
immediately associated Algeria with sand. It seems that he has an 
association between resources  for Algeria and sand.  
 
 
 
 
Niger
25°C
Back to list
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G has one French parent and has visited France often. He therefore has 
constructed conceptual resources, associated with his “TW” concept, that 
relate to France. 
5. G and the other boys 
are surprised that 
Spain is not hotter 
and M wants to go to 
France because he 
thinks it is hot there. 
G says “It isn’t”. When 
the France 
temperature is 
displayed (5º) G says 
“I told you.” 
He does not consider 5º to be warm/hot. 
G’s resources relating to “Spain” and the resources within his 
“Numbers as they are used to represent temperature” (“NT”) concept 
that relate to “5º” do not span to each other – they cannot begin to be 
aligned until one spans to the other. The span of his “France” concept 
does extend to his “Spain” concept, in that at least one resource 
element in his “Spain” concept is associated with at least one in his 
“France” concept,  and this connection will contribute towards 
achieving alignment within his “NT” concept. 
 
G shows that he can control the pace of the task: 
6. Throughout the task, G 
prefers to visit 
countries that are 
close, rather than 
those that are “far 
away”. Given a choice 
between 2 possible 
destinations, he 
always chooses to go 
to the closest one. (I 
have checked that he 
understands that the 
rules of the game 
allow him to “jump 
over” countries.) When 
I ask him why, he 
smiles and says that 
he’s enjoying himself 
and doesn’t want it to 
It would seem that G believes that closer will mean less difference in 
temperature. 
He thinks that, by keeping the temperature differences small, more 
countries will be included in the journey and so the game will take 
longer to complete. 
 183
be over too quickly. 
 
G and the other boys in his group quickly manoeuvre Father Christmas to 
increasingly cold countries. Now we see how G deals with temperatures 
below zero: 
7. … but G points out,  
“But that’s bad 
because now we have 
to find somewhere 
that’s zero.” 
G’s initial reaction shows that he may not recognise zero as a 
representation of a temperature – i.e. that his “NT” concept and any 
resources that he has relating to zero do not span to each other. 
It is possible that he does associate zero with temperature, but that 
he doesn’t know that places with a zero temperature are not any 
harder to find than others. 
His “TW” concept does not appear to include a resource relating to 
zero. This is not to say that he does not have, somewhere in his 
conceptual resources, a resource for zero but that, if it has been 
constructed, it does not span to this situation. 
Now that he is learning that zero is a number used to represent a 
temperature, the 2 concepts are associated or connected (span is 
established between them). 
8. (I ask) “As you’ve been 
to Poland, a country 
that is zero degrees, 
what are you looking 
for now?” M says, 
“minus” and G agrees. 
I ask “Minus what?”  G 
and M say together, 
“Temperatures”. 
G had previously seen “zero” as somehow more problematic than 
other numbers. His readout strategies (RS)  appear to be evolving in 
parallel with the extension of the span of relevant concepts. He now 
seems to accept zero and negative numbers as an extension of the 
number system he knows. 
The span of G’s conceptual resources about directed numbers is 
expanded to include temperatures as a relevant context for cueing 
these resources. 
9. M and L take the lead 
in making decisions to 
go to Sweden (-2) and 
then Norway (-3). At 
this time, G makes 
contributions to the 
conversation though it 
G’s trust in the other boys’ confidence with this concept may be 
seen as a way for him to “read” or infer information about this 
situation. 
G also infers from my reaction to the other boys’ ideas that the 
sequence of numbers they have just generated is an exemplar of 
the concept he is beginning to develop. 
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is clear from these that 
he doesn’t understand 
much about negative 
numbers: he 
comments on FC’s 
clothes; (he expresses 
uncertainty as to 
whether Norway could 
be colder than -2; after 
Norway he asks “Now 
what?”; he makes a 
joke that suggests he 
thinks there is a 
possibility that 
Svalbard could be 
“hotter” than Sweden 
and Norway. ) Finally 
they go to Svalbard ( -
13). G hesitates briefly 
and looks at me. M 
announces “We made 
it!” Then G repeats, still 
looking at me, “We 
made it.” 
 
G extends the span and tests and improves the alignment of his 
conceptual resources relating to negative numbers by monitoring the 
other boys and my response to their ideas about the final stages of 
the game. 
 
 
 
Svalbard
-13°C
Back to list
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G does not focus on Father Christmas’s clothes for long: 
10. It is interesting to note 
that, although the 
boys were guided 
(and amused) by FC 
clothes for the first 2 
or 3 country visits, 
their focus then 
switched to the 
numbers themselves. 
They didn’t make any 
further reference to 
the clothes. 
 
FC’s clothes had been used by G as a resource from which he was 
able to “read” information about the temperatures, including 
comparing temperatures. 
At this stage in the activity, G uses his knowledge about the numbers 
themselves, rather than any visual resources to support his decision 
making. He is able to “read” and interpret the numbers efficiently in 
relation to the task. 
G makes judgements about effective game moves, based on his 
evolving conceptual resources relating to the numbers. 
G has begun to develop his ability to co-ordinate information that he 
infers using newly extended and aligned conceptual resources. 
G is able to enjoy success within the activity using his ability to co-
ordinate conceptual resources within and across concepts – i.e. those 
relating to the number system, and to a general temperature gradient 
from Equator to North Pole. 
 
Towards the end of the first session with the group, G is asked to 
compare negative numbers: 
11. I ask the boys how 
much the 
temperature changes 
if we go from 
Svalbard (-13º) to 
Norway (-3º). G says 
10º. When I ask 
whether it is 
decreasing or 
increasing, he says it 
is decreasing. I ask 
again “Is it getting 
higher or lower? 
Increasing or 
decreasing?” G, looks 
G’s concept of the number system includes a sense-making 
mechanism (SMM)  that enables him to compare values represented 
as unsigned digits. He is able to compare and make judgements 
about the relative values of unsigned numbers and uses the same 
SMM here, at first. 
He has a conceptual resource (in this case it might be a resource in 
memory or a readout strategy) that a “minus number” is an indication 
of a cold temperature. He also has resources relating to the Equator 
being hot and the North Pole being cold. 
He infers that a change from a value represented by the digit 13 
(ignoring the sign) to a value represented by the digit 3 is a decrease 
in value. The fact that I questioned this, in itself, may have suggested 
to G that he has made an error.  
His evolving “TW” concept also leads him to infer that the temperature 
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at the map and 
changes his mind - 
he tells me that it is 
increasing, not 
decreasing, because 
it is getting warmer. 
should increase if the change is southward. These inferences are in 
conflict with each other. G resolves the conflict by judging that the 
question is about the change in temperature and that the concept of 
temperature is founded on measures of how hot/how cold. He 
chooses to focus on whether the move from Svalbard to Norway is an 
increase in temperature (getting hotter) or a decrease (getting colder). 
He judges that such a move would result in an increase in 
temperature. It would seem that he is willing to accept that, although 
the digits themselves are decreasing, the presence of the minus sign 
changes the “rules” that he thought he knew. This constitutes a 
modification to a SMM that had previously been effective. 
Although G is confident about the magnitude of the change, his 
“decreasing” response is an indication that his conceptual resources 
relating to directed numbers are not securely connected to other 
conceptual resources – i.e. effective span has not been established -  
through associations between resources. The span of G’s “TW” and 
“NT” concepts has already extended to include each other but some 
components within these concepts are much better established than 
others and they are not aligned with each other. He aligns these 
conflicting inferences about “increase/decrease” by focusing on the 
context of the problem and reasoning that “getting warmer” equates to 
an increase in temperature, regardless of whether the digit values are 
increasing or decreasing. G’s engagement with this particular 
question provides evidence of alignment being tested and evolution of 
all relevant conceptual resources. 
This is evidence that span of G’s conceptual resources relating to 
increase/decrease are being extended to be effective in determining 
information in the contexts of temperature and/or directed numbers. 
12. In the next (similar) 
example I ask what 
happens to the 
temperature if you 
travel from Norway ( –
3º)  to Sweden (-2º). 
G says, “It gets 
G focuses on the digits. He has constructed a SMM that enables him 
to reason that “smaller” digits represent increasing temperatures when 
the values are negative. Span of his “increase/decrease” concept has 
extended effectively into the contexts of temperature and/or directed 
numbers. He is co-ordinating different concepts effectively and shows 
this with his final remark which suggests that he is able to call up 
different SMMs, depending on the context – i.e. “increase” or “higher” 
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smaller, so it 
increases by one.” 
Then he adds, “But it 
does kind of 
decrease” and 
smiles. 
or “bigger” are judgments that might have different meaning when 
referring temperature than when referring to the digit value of a 
number. He has achieved this co-ordination very quickly, through only 
limited experience with these problems. 
 
 
Before completing the first session, I tested G’s changing concepts about 
numbers and temperatures. G’s response provides fascinating insight to 
his thinking: 
13. I ask the group what 
would happen when 
you start at   -2 and 
add 5. M says 3 and 
G says 2. G wants to 
explain how he would 
do it. He makes a 
mark on the paper 
and says “This is -2 
and this is a 5 clonk”. 
He explains that he 
thinks of the “amount” 
to be added as a 
brick-like object that 
he lays over what I 
understand as a 
section of a number 
line on his diagram. 
He then changes his 
mind about the 
answer and tells me 
that “It’s 3, not 2 – I 
was getting mixed up 
before.” I ask him 
where he learned to 
do the “clonk” thing. 
G’s “clonk” strategy:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 G’s “clonk” 
G appears to choose to use a number line model to help him with 
addition tasks – i.e. the use of the word “add” in my question is heard 
(“read”) as a cue to employ strategies that he has developed and has 
found effective for addition – G’s use of a number line is a sense-
making mechanism.. 
He does not appear to be at all anxious about the inclusion of 
negative numbers in the problem to be solved – his RS have 
developed to include negative numbers. 
G infers that, as with unsigned numbers, he can use a number line 
model to solve addition problems with negative numbers i.e. G 
recognises that a strategy that he finds helpful when adding in other 
contexts might be helpful in this context. This suggests that there are 
Step 1: This 
is the “clonk” 
Step 2: Here, the clonk is 
applied to the problem 
Step 3: The “3” appears above the clonk, 
rather than at it’s limit because, at first, G 
thought the asnwer was 2; then he 
changed his mind and added the “3”. 
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He says nowhere – he 
just thinks of it like 
that. I ask if someone 
has taught him to 
think of it like that and 
he says no – it’s his 
own thing. 
 
existing associations between his number system concept and his 
negative numbers concept that prompt consideration of his number 
line SMM for addressing the problem.  
His eventual success with this question using this strategy will 
reinforce this expansion of the span of the 2 concepts. The relevance 
of this strategy has also tested and confirmed the alignment of 
conceptual resources about addition with his number system concept 
and his negative numbers concept. 
 
G’s “clonk” is a conceptual tool that he has developed previously that is 
available to him as a resource. That it was perceived by G (not 
necessarily consciously) as potentially relevant in this new situation 
shows that the span of the clonk extends to aspects of this new situation. 
At the beginning of the next session, G demonstrates that conceptual 
resources that he constructed in the previous session are not only cued in 
this session but are more secure; evident through G’s new-found 
confidence: 
SESSION 2 OF 3  
14. When countries with 
temperatures below 
zero appear from the 
pack, the boys take 
them in their stride, 
except to notice that 
Turkey’s temperature 
is not what they 
expected. G reminds 
them that “This is 
around Christmas, 
though”. 
Negative numbers are read efficiently. 
G’s conceptual resources include a SMM that enables him to reason 
that Christmas temperatures are lower than might normally be 
associated with countries that we visit for holidays in the summer. 
Whereas during the previous activity, G was uncertain about ordering 
negative numbers, today he was more confident – his RS, resources 
in memory and SMMs have modified and he now works effectively 
with negative numbers and is able to order them. He did not make 
mistakes. Span and alignment of resources has increased, linking 
resources that G has relating to numbers. 
 
Conceptual resources relating to maps are cued but are not entirely 
helpful: 
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15. G thinks they should click on the map because 
then it might tell them temperature information. 
When the map opens, he says – “Yes, look, 15 
degrees, 30 degrees ” (He has seen the numbers 
with a º symbol marked on the map. He doesn’t 
realise that they are lines of latitude and longitude.) 
 
G is confident that he can interpret 
information about temperature from 
maps. Since he expects to see 
temperature information on the map, 
when he sees numbers with the º 
symbol, he assumes these are 
temperature labels. This shows that he 
has an internal  resource for the º 
symbol that is associated with 
temperature – i.e. G’s conceptual 
resources about maps lead him to have 
expectations relating to temperature 
information. If he has resources relating 
to  lines of latitude and longitude, they 
are not associated with resources he is 
using here. It is possible, even likely, 
that he does not have any resources 
relating to latitude and longitude. G’s 
concept of maps will now be modified as 
knowledge in the form of memory 
resources are added. Associations with 
his “TW” concept might also be 
constructed, extending span of these 
concepts. 
 
Next, we see further evidence of G’s ability to co-ordinate related 
concepts effectively, using new as well as more established resources. 
He appears to have resolved conflicts that interfered with this co-
ordination only a few days previously. 
17. G says that he thinks 
Iceland is cold. I ask 
why he thinks that. M 
replies, saying 
“Because it’s further 
up”. G agrees that 
G appears to have constructed a situated abstraction relating 
temperature to proximity to the Equator. 
His conceptual resources equip him to infer that the fact that the 
equator is further away southwards is some kind of equivalent 
measure of a country’s coldness in its inversion to its north- or “up-
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“The equator is further 
down.” 
ness”. 
Demonstration of knowledge of equivalence of different but related 
measures shows that different conceptual resources are being co-
ordinated effectively. 
18. In response to a quiz 
question, the boys 
need to find a country 
with a temperature 
lower than -6. G 
suggests that they “go 
to” Slovakia because 
he remembers that 
when they used “the 
big map” last time 
there was one that 
was – 32 and he 
thinks it was Slovakia.  
G’s interpretation of the question leads him to seek a country with a 
low temperature and he remembers that there was a country with a 
very low temp of -32 and that this would solve his problem, if he could 
remember which country that was. He is aware that he has a 
resource in memory that is the name of that country and he tries very 
hard to recall what the name of the country with the lowest 
temperature was. He remembers some of the letters in the name of 
the country he is trying to recall:  S L and V. On recognising some of 
the letters in Slovakia, he reasons that this might be the country with 
the very low temperature in the previous activity. 
G is co-ordinating resources from different contexts to help him 
respond to this new problem. 
19. The next question 
asks whether Croatia 
is hotter or colder 
than Estonia.  G is 
quick to find the card 
for Croatia and tell the 
others what they need 
to find . “Look for a E” 
he suggests. 
The boys have already ordered the cards so that each card 
represents a country with a higher temperature than the one shown 
on the card immediately below it on the desk. G’s SMMs enable him 
to reason that cards that are positioned towards the top of the desk 
have higher temperatures than those below and he encourages the 
others to locate the second card so that he can compare the positions 
of the 2 cards. 
 
G is able to filter out redundant contextual information and focus on the 
numbers and the mathematics required to solve the problem in hand. As 
G’s concepts of the number system, “TW” and “NT” evolve, he finds that 
the inadequate span of relevant conceptual resources sometimes “trips 
him up”. This is only a temporary setback which effectively establishes 
that span for the future: 
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20. Question – “If you 
travel from Russia to 
Sweden, what will 
happen to the 
temperature? G finds 
the Russia card on 
the table    ( -6) and 
counts up to the 
Sweden temperature 
(-2) and says “It will 
go 4 degrees higher. 
4 degrees higher, or 
3, I don’t know which.” 
G is confused about 
whether he should 
count Sweden itself in 
the count. 
G is able to “read” negative numbers. His uncertainty is 
uncharacteristic of the way he works with difference problems. When 
working with positive (unsigned) numbers he works them out 
efficiently and effectively. G’s conceptual resources include a set of 
associated resources that he employs when counting comparing and 
calculating with numbers. (These might be seen as a concept 
“Counting, comparing and calculating (“CCC”)” within a broader 
concept about numbers.) These “CCC” resources do not extend to 
resources relating to negative numbers, though he has already 
shown that  the span of his number system concept and associated 
RS  does include some associations with negative numbers. These 2 
concepts, “CCC” and “Negative numbers” are not aligned and this is 
the reason that G finds himself forced to question something that he 
is surprised to find he is not confident about after all. Previously he 
has coped well with tasks involving ordering and comparing 
greater/smaller, higher/lower. So this marks a point of departure for G 
in that he appears to be working just beyond the scope of resources 
with which he is confident and secure. 
21. Once he has decided 
that he should have 
“counted” Sweden, he 
also begins to think 
that he should have 
counted Russia at the 
beginning of the count 
so is confused again. 
(Something he was 
confident with 
previously has now 
been called into 
question). 
There is something in G’s conceptual resources that makes him think 
that rules should be consistently applied . This forces him to question 
a strategy with which he had previously been confident and that had 
been a successful part of well established concepts about numbers 
and counting – i.e. he begins to think that he should count the start 
number as his first count when counting to another number. G does 
not resolve this uncertainty at this point and is content to move on, 
letting someone else take the lead for a short time. 
G’s in-the-moment reasoning might have led to construction of a new 
SMM, (that, since the “end” number is counted, the “start” number 
should be counted too). However, this was not successfully aligned 
with other resources. 
It is interesting to note that this question does not present G with a 
similar dilemma every time he is confronted by (what I recognise as) 
similar challenges later in the task.  It appears that G’s more 
established resources, particularly his counting strategies have high 
priority and are therefore readily cued in (at least most) subsequent, 
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similar challenges. To achieve high priority, the new resource would 
need to provoke feedback that shows that the resource has 
explanatory value in this situation. This feedback is not generated 
here. 
22. Throughout, he is 
very secure in the fact 
that he must include 
an invisible count at 
the -5 position even 
though there is no 
card for -5. (He taps 
the table when a card 
is not present for any 
value). 
G’s conceptual resources relating to the number system appear to 
include a well-established number line model. 
Span is being tested and extended as he finds that what works with 
positive numbers also seems to work with negative numbers. 
With further challenges, G shows his increasing ability and confidence: 
 
23. G argues, saying that 
the question says from 
Denmark to Estonia so 
that means its going 
lower. He explains 
that, “If the question 
had said from Estonia 
to Denmark it would 
have been going up 
but it doesn’t so its 
going down. That way 
it’s getting hotter, that 
way it’s getting colder. 
It’s not the same.” 
(Denmark is 0º; 
Estonia is -2º) 
G interprets the question appropriately and he effectively co-
ordinates a range of conceptual resources, including resources in 
memory and sense-making mechanisms – e.g. 
• Counting, comparing and calculating with numbers; 
• Knowledge about negative numbers as used to represent 
temperatures; 
• Direction of change is important in some situations and 
not others. 
If you travel from 
Denmark to Estonia, 
what will happen to the 
temperature?
Back
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24. A later question is 
“Find a country where 
the temperature is 
between 1 and -1” The 
boys agree 
immediately that there 
are a lot to choose 
from on the table. M 
wants to answer 
Romania. G argues, 
explaining that he 
can’t have 1, it has to 
be less than one. 
G is very confident in his ability to interpret the precise meaning of 
the question and effectively  co-ordinates relevant conceptual 
resources including those relating to: 
• Negative numbers 
• “NT” 
• Counting, comparing and calculating with numbers 
• Knowledge about negative numbers as used to represent 
temperatures 
• Between 2 values 
25. Next question “If I 
travel from Belarus (-3)  
to Belgium (3) what 
happens to 
temperature?”  - they 
all agree an answer 
but it is wrong 
because they have 
counted Belarus as 
their first count. When 
I question this they are 
happy to stick to their 
judgment. 
This type of error is uncharacteristic for this group and for G. We saw 
(in 20-21 above) that G’s previously secure counting strategies 
(particularly relating to the inclusion of the “start” number)  were 
challenged. At that time, he did not find the new idea, suggested by 
his in-the-moment reasoning, to be successful. The new idea – that, 
for consistency,  because the end point is counted, the start point 
should be too – did not seem to have changed his contextual 
neighbourhood. 
However, here, G’s incorrect response might suggest that his 
conceptual resources include the new idea – that a new resource 
was constructed, and that it is associated with the current challenge 
– perhaps it forms a part of a “How to apply rules” concept? 
 
The issue of whether to include the start number when counting arises 
again in the next extract and G is able to become more confident in his 
own ability to be successful through repeated testing of the alignment of 
his concepts: 
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26. I decide to use the 
thermometer ITP to 
model a number line 
method for working on 
the Belarus to 
Belgium question. G 
is able to position the 
starter pointer on -3 
without any difficulty. 
He can also help M to 
move it to 3. When I 
show that the change 
has, therefore, been 6 
not 7 as they had 
answered previously, 
G quickly says “That’s 
because we counted 
that one, Belarus”. He 
is quick to accept their 
mistake and to see 
why it arose. (Maybe 
he had doubted their 
answer in the first 
place?) 
G is quick to learn how to move the interactive display on the screen 
thermometer and is confident to help his friend. The highest reliability 
priority for his counting (include “end” number but not “start” number) 
strategy is re-established when the whole range of his conceptual 
resources relating to it are tested and their alignment reinforced. 
Associations between these resources and those relating to negative 
numbers are also tested and reinforced. 
G’s “NT” concept is strongly connected to his evolving negative 
numbers concept. 
27. L uses cards and gets 
muddled counting up 
from one to the other 
(Slovakia and 
Albania). M thinks the 
difference is 8 and G 
says its 7. M argues 
and G argues back, 
reminding him that 
last time they found 
out that they shouldn’t 
count the first place. 
G is now more confident again. He is aware that his confidence has 
come from the previous example in which he was able to see for 
himself that the start number should not be included in a count 
procedure. 
Co-ordination of relevant conceptual resources is secure. G’s RS and 
SMMs relating to the thermometer scale are secure. 
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G occasionally refers to his impression or experience of the development 
of his own conceptual resources and his ability to co-ordinate them – i.e. 
metacognitive references: 
28. M clicks the change 
box which shows 7 
and G says that he 
thinks the difference 
will also show 7. He’s 
right. I ask him why 
he thought that would 
happen. He tells me 
that he’s noticed the 2 
boxes show the same 
thing. 
G has been observant. Well developed RS mean that G has noticed a 
relationship between the displays in the 2 boxes and uses this make a 
prediction. 
29. They do a few 
questions that they 
make up themselves 
in which they predict 
what the change and 
difference boxes will 
say. They are correct 
but only choose 
examples in which 
the temperature rises. 
The group, including G, spontaneously decide to give themselves 
“practice” questions. This strategy is evidence of metacognition – i.e. 
the boys are consciously aware of processes that help them to learn 
and can see the potential benefit of employing one of those 
processes in this situation. They are proactive in their own learning. 
They make up questions for themselves to give themselves 
opportunities to hone their RS and reinforce their emerging concepts 
This is reinforcing associations across one set of RS, SMMs and 
other resources but is not extending span any further.  
30. I pose a new type of 
question “If I am in 
Moldova and go 
somewhere that is 9º 
warmer, what will the 
new temperature be?” 
G has control of the 
thermometer and 
confidently counts up 
one degree at a time 
from the Moldova 
temp (-2), using the 
G is able to solve the new problem (that has a slightly different 
structure, as I perceive it) without any difficulty. 
Relevant conceptual resources have sufficient span to be triggered 
and are well aligned, each incorporating an appropriate range of 
conceptual resources which act as anchors, enabling G to work 
unproblematically. Concepts used are thereby becoming  increasingly 
secure; strongly connected. 
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thermometer scale as 
a vertical number line. 
31. I set G a similar 
question that will 
have a negative 
change. At first the 
boys don’t notice that 
the change box 
shows a negative 
change. When they 
do, it is only M at first 
who seems to 
remember or 
understand what this 
means. Then G sees 
it “Oh, yes, because 
minuses mean that 
you’re going down.” 
Very soon, however, 
before moving on to 
the next question, he 
says, “I’m confused 
again now. Not sure 
now.”  
G has formed a situated abstraction “minuses mean that you’re going 
down” which is cued when he sees a decrease in temperature and a 
minus sign in the change box. This situated abstraction, as a resource 
for making sense, is however weak and somewhat elusive – this is 
evident when G finds it hard to maintain his grasp on it and tells me 
so. This is evidence of his own awareness of the changing state of his 
contextual neighbourhood. 
 
32. In trying to explain to 
G, I reminded him 
that I had asked him 
to go from 
Netherlands (4º) to 
somewhere that was 
5º colder. He 
remembered “And we 
had minus 5, because 
With the association between “minus” and “down” very recently cued; 
G now also acknowledges a connection between “colder” and “down”, 
and makes the link between “colder”, “minus” and “down”. These 3 
resources are now connected, each spans to the others. They form 
parts of broader concepts about “Number System” and “Counting” 
which are, themselves, part of larger and increasingly complex 
concepts and systems. 
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it went down”. 
 
During this phase of our work together, G seems to be increasingly 
conscious of the way the changes in his contextual neighbourhood make 
him feel: 
33. I ask a supplementary 
question, “If I am in 
Germany (1 degree)  
and I go to 
somewhere that 
shows a change on 
here of 2, where might 
I be?” G hesitates but 
then says “Is it 3?” He 
goes on to explain 
“Because it went up 
because it wasn’t a 
minus. I get it now.” 
G’s “I get it now” remark suggests that he is aware that resources of 
different kinds are connecting together within his contextual 
neighbourhood. 
Other related resources within the evolving conceptual system are 
tested, requiring RS and conceptual resources to trigger extension of 
span to include “up”, “warmer”, “not minus”. 
34. I encourage L to have 
a go at one of these 
questions and G says 
“I’m still a little bit 
confused.” I go 
through another 
example for L. G is 
getting excited now “I 
get it, I get it, 
because if you go 
up.” He says he 
needs to do some 
more straight away. 
He answers the next 
question correctly  
……  but then he 
goes on to say that 
G is aware of the fragility of his evolving concepts and knows that he 
needs to repeatedly reinforce span and alignment of new resources, 
particularly while they are beginning to evolve and connections are 
being constructed. His error, even after getting correct answers, is 
evidence of that fragility. 
Span and alignment need to be tested and reinforced repeatedly in 
order to establish high cueing and reliability priorities. 
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the difference will be -
4 (this is incorrect) 
 
G’s construction of associations between resources are often quite 
transparent: 
35. As soon as I say to G, 
by way of explanation, 
that the difference 
between 5º and 1º is 
(pointing to 
thermometer) “those 4 
degrees”, he says “It’s 
how big the gap is? 
So you can’t have a 
minus gap - you can’t 
ever get to a minus.” I 
work through a few 
more examples with 
the boys and G is able 
to predict what will 
appear in the change 
and difference boxes 
consistently correctly, 
moving in both 
directions. G is 
dissatisfied that there 
are no “add” numbers 
in the difference box 
because “We said it 
would add when you 
go up”. 
G is very quick to take up the metaphor of a gap and seems to 
immediately “see” that it is not possible to have negative gap. He 
notices that the values are unsigned and questions why there are not 
“add” signs. This is likely to be because he associates “add” and “up” 
together. (Later, he reasons that a sign, in this situation, is 
irrelevant.) 
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36. G asks “Are we going 
to discuss about last 
week, going to zero?” 
G appears to think there might be some connection between the 
work we are doing in both sessions. He has identified a particular 
aspect of our previous discussion that has not arisen yet during this 
session. His question might imply that he thinks that the previous 
discussion about “going to zero” is relevant here. 
G has formed resources about “going to zero” that he thinks are 
relevant in today’s discussion – i.e. there is at least one resource that 
is common in both contexts and the span of the “going to zero” 
extends to aspects of today’s work. 
 
G rises to the challenge of representing their activity in written form 
without any real difficulty (and with some enjoyment): 
37. I ask G to “write down 
what we are doing 
with the thermometer” 
and tell the group that 
we are going to start 
on 3 and go up 10 
degrees. G thinks we 
should write 3 + 10. 
For a similar question 
with starting point of -
3 the boys agree that 
we should write  -3 + 
10 and that the 
answer will be 7. They 
model it using the 
thermometer and see 
that they are right. G 
is excited “I get it. I 
get it. If you go down 
it puts it as a minus. 
It’s as if you’re doing 
the sum.” 
G spontaneously extracts the mathematics from the situation. He 
easily uses the 2 numbers involved in the question, relating them to 
each other in terms of starting with one temperature value and “going 
up” by a number of degrees, using the + symbol to show that the first 
quantity/number is increased by second quantity/number. 
G “sees” the similarity between the screen thermometer display and 
his own tentative attempts to express the temperature changes 
symbolically: these 2 situations have at least one resource in 
common. He is excited about this. The span of G’s established 
conceptual resources relating to working with numbers and 
increasing quantities has extended to be perceived as applicable to 
the temperature context. 
G is able to further reinforce his emerging hypotheses about the 
mathematics within the temperature problems. 
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38. I ask G if he can tell 
me a sum that will 
give us a minus 
number in the change 
box. Straight away he 
models 13 minus 
1,2,3,4,5. I prompt 
him to finish, saying 
“.. equals … ?” He 
hesitates, seems a 
little surprised but 
offers “equals 8”. G 
then volunteers,  
“See, it’s as if, look I 
started on 13 then 
you add the minus 5. I 
found it quite … 
funny.” (He means 
peculiar, rather than 
comical.) 
G articulates, quite clearly, his experience of taking on board new 
experiences and his growing ability to make sense of what happens. 
He notices the point at which he realised that there really is a 
relationship between changing temperatures as events or journeys 
and symbolic mathematical expressions. He is able to sense in a 
perceptual way that his ability to co-ordinate a changing range of 
conceptual resources is evolving – he is metacognisant. His 
reference to feeling “funny” might refer to the fact that he is 
scrutinising his own thinking and that this is an unfamiliar experience. 
 
Next, we see that the “add/minus minus” problem is not yet resolved and 
G laughs about being confused: 
39. I ask “so you’re 
adding a minus 
number?” G replies 
“Yes. Now you’re 
confusing yourself” 
He laughs and goes 
on to muse “But 
minus minus 5 
doesn’t make any 
sense?” 
G is making a joke at his own expense – about the fact that someone 
other than him might be confused. However, when he stops to really 
think about my question he realises that he has been doing something 
that seemed to make perfectly good sense but that actually conflicts 
with what he thought he knew. 
G is likely to hold a concept that includes resources relating to “add” 
and “minus” as operations and that, logically therefore the element in 
the expression following “add” or “minus” should be an item that is the 
thing to be operated with or upon. Therefore, in G’s experience, the 
word to describe one operation cannot be followed immediately by 
another word describing an operation without something in between. 
This SMM needs to be modified before he is happy to use the 
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expression “minus minus”. It is the ambiguity of the word “minus” 
which is likely to be the reason for his confusion. His conceptual 
understanding of “minus” has, until now, only involved minus as an 
operation and he interprets it as an instruction to “take away”. Now 
that he has developed a conceptual system incorporating negative 
(or, as he calls them, minus) numbers as points on a number line he 
must modify his “minus sign is an instruction to subtract” rule. 
40. He offers to explain 
again. This time he 
doesn’t actually say 
the “add minus 5” 
part and M 
challenges him over 
it, telling G that he 
was wrong all the 
time and now he 
“must know it 
because he didn’t say 
add minus this time”. 
G denies having said 
it at all and says he’s 
confused again. 
G avoids saying “add minus” because his more established 
conceptual resources lead him to consider this as nonsense. G even 
finds it hard to believe that he had said “add minus” before because 
he knows that it conflicts with his existing conceptual framework. 
Well established knowledge elements have high cueing priority and 
the conceptual systems which they inhabit are themselves structured 
by them. G needs to acknowledge that there are new, different ways 
of interpreting “minus” – that it is not only an operation or an 
instruction to perform it. This would amount to the construction of new 
RS. Bootstrapping of changes to RS and conceptual resources needs 
to occur for G to be able to move forward in his understanding – to be 
able to co-ordinate resources from different concepts effectively. 
 
G’s determination to make sense of his situation is evident when he 
perseveres with his attempts to resolve the conflict and tension that he 
perceives: 
41. G now refers to that 
step simply as “minus 
5” but seems very 
uncertain and 
remembers that with a 
positive change 
everyone was happy 
that the change was 
“added” ….. L says 
G continues to try to make sense of conflicting messages and 
interpretations – his own and the group’s – about the question of 
whether a change is “added”. 
G again voices his confusion, of which he is uncomfortably aware. 
He really wants to find meaning, make sense, of these 
mathematical situations and events. 
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“It’s 13 take away 5, 
basically”. G is just 
getting more confused 
and says so. 
42. L has written 13 - -5 = 
8. G says that’s not 
right  - it’s not the 
same at all because 
its got 2 minuses. I 
ask G to do 13 take 
away minus 5 on the 
thermometer. He says 
“How do you do that? 
How do you take 
away a minus? That’s 
why I don’t think it’s 
right.” He recaps 
starting on 13, doing a 
minus 5 to get to 8. 
G seems to be the only member of the group for whom the 2 
symbols written adjacently carry a bothersome significance which 
he finds hard to accept. 
Using the thermometer he focuses on the minus symbol preceding 
the 5 as an instruction to subtract. This is the only thing he can 
think of to do – the only resource within his contextual 
neighbourhood that spans to this situation is his “minus 5” 
strategy. He thinks he should be trying to “take away a minus” but 
doesn’t even know whether that is possible, and certainly doesn’t 
know how to do it – he has no resources relating to “take away 
minus”, or “minus minus”. 
43. I agree that this is 
what happens when 
you “Do” a minus 5. I 
go on to ask “What 
about when you take 
away a -5 instead of 
doing one?” G asks 
“Is it add?” I show him 
13 on the 
thermometer and ask 
“If this is where I am 
after a minus 5 was 
done, where was I 
before that -5 was 
done? G hesitates 
briefly, then says “18”. 
I ask again “So, if I am 
G seems to interpret from the “instead” in my question that he is 
looking for something other than (even opposite to?) the 
previously approved idea. He offers an “educated guess” that if he 
took away before, perhaps he should trying adding this time. I 
didn’t think this would be helpful to pursue so used the 
thermometer to make my questions more concrete. He succeeds 
with the first question. 
It seems that G hadn’t been entirely convinced the first time we 
had talked through this question, even though he had come up 
with right answer – that, although the experience introduced new 
memory resources into his conceptual resources,  associations 
with other resources had not formed. 
He is excited that he thinks he really understands now – is able to 
perceive associations between resources now.. But his conceptual 
resources also include some which lead him to believe that, when 
he learns new things, he doesn’t “understand” very securely at the 
beginning and that it is only with further reinforcement that he feels 
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at 13 because 
someone had done a 
minus 5 and I want to 
take away that -5 …?” 
G says “You go up! 
So I was right?!” I ask, 
“So 13 take away 
minus 5 is .. ?” G 
responds “18, I get it.” 
But immediately he 
adds “I get it a little bit, 
but not much” 
his evolving resources become robust and reliable. 
44. We work through 
another example (10 - 
-2 = 12) and G says 
“So take away a 
minus is not like add a 
minus – they’re 
different” 
He is pleased to be able to restate his earlier ideas, with more 
confidence this time. 
45. M starts to talk me 
through how he 
bridges downwards 
through zero. But G 
interrupts,  “Oh no! I 
need to do some 
more. I’m losing it.” 
G doesn’t want to be distracted from reinforcing his new ideas. He 
is sufficiently metacognisant to know that, unless he reinforces the 
span and alignment of evolving conceptual resources, he will not 
be able to use them to make sense of situations and problems in 
future - that they will not span effectively to be called up in 
situations like this one and he will be back to “ square one”.  
The efficacy of span across concepts relies on the establishment 
of high cueing priority between relevant RS, SMMs and other 
resources and G actively seeks to establish high cueing priority 
and reliability priority through reinforcement. 
46. G suggests using a 
ruler but can’t 
remember how it will 
help and can’t do 
anything useful with it. 
He chooses to draw 
thermometers to help 
G has resources in memory that lead him to believe that models 
and images often help him understand or work things out. He tries 
to recall those he has used in previous work so that he can 
evaluate whether they might help here. He wants to be able to 
describe to others (and, at the same time to himself) what his new 
conceptual resources are and how they work in concert with other 
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him explain his 
thinking 
(perhaps more established) resources. 
G is (though not consciously) hoping to find conceptual resources 
within his contextual neighbourhood that have sufficient span to 
connect with to his new thoughts and will help him to anchor his 
new knowledge. 
 
Session 3 of 3  
47. They want a new 
game and I suggest 
“Balloon Burst”. I 
explain that 5 
balloons will pop, one 
after another. Each 
time a balloon pops it 
will reveal a number 
that will stay on the 
screen for 2 seconds. 
The boys’ task is to 
add the 5 numbers 
together. G asks if 
they can have a piece 
of paper. When I ask 
why he wants it he 
tells me that, if he 
needs to go over it 
again, he might not 
remember the 
numbers. 
From this I infer that G intends to try to add the numbers as they 
appear but realises that he might want to check or review his addition 
of the 5 numbers. This would become necessary  for him to be able to 
confirm or correct an answer.  
It is likely that G has experience of performing mental calculations on 
strings of numbers. From this he will have developed a collection of 
associated resources relating to “mental calculations”. Although I 
have not told the boys to add mentally, I infer from G’s comments that 
he intends to do it this way, perhaps with the support of jottings. 
48. The numbers are 9, 
21, -21 , 8, -12. G 
says quickly 17 minus 
12, that’s 5, 5. He 
seems to have 
immediately realised 
that the 21 and -21 
We have already seen that G’s “readout” of the minus sign as an 
instruction to subtract  has high cueing priority. If this has led to his 
reading of the 21 and -21 as “21 minus 21”, this might explain why he 
was able to reach a point where he was able to disregard these 2 
numbers from the list so quickly that he didn’t even mention them. It 
also seems that he is able to operate with these numbers very quickly 
and efficiently. His knowledge of commutativity is implicit, and forms 
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cancel each other out 
and that 9 and 8 are 
17. He is very quick 
to do this, offers no 
explanation and the 
other boys don’t 
question him. 
part of his contextual neighbourhood, as a resource in memory and/or 
a SMM. 
49. For the second 
question, L calls out 
the numbers 
(correctly -11, -24, 9, 
14, 5). G goes to use 
the on-screen 
calculator to add and 
subtract the numbers 
as they appeared.  I 
tell him that it won’t 
do that for him – that 
it’s not actually a 
calculator, only a way 
of entering their 
answer when they 
work it out. After a 
few seconds, G 
reaches to enter his 
answer. 
G’s RS recognise the calculator on screen and he does not hesitate 
to attempt to try to use it as his “Calculators” resources are cued. 
He quickly adapts his “Calculators” resources so that he does not 
automatically assume that everything that looks like a calculator can 
be used as one; associated RS must also be modified. G now has a 
new resource relating to other possible uses  for such “pseudo 
calculators”.  This currently forms part of his collection of resources 
relating to playing these games but is not yet associated with 
resources in other concepts. 
 
In the final session, G quickly reveals his mental addition strategies when 
he plays the computer game “Balloon Burst”: 
50. I stop him and ask 
him to explain how 
he worked it out 
(balloons: -11, -24, 9, 
14, 5). He says 9 and 
14 and 5. I ask why 
G has previously shown that he seems to have conceptual resources 
that give him strategies for adding lists of numbers. Here we see 
evidence that G might have some experience of grouping similar 
elements together when calculating with lists of values. He has 
decided to defer consideration of the numbers which are preceded by 
a minus sign. This may or may not be because he is not very 
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those 3 and he tells 
me because “they’re 
the only ones which 
are the adds. 
confident about what to do with them. He refers to the numbers 
preceded by the + sign as “the adds”. This might be because (as we 
soon find) he refers to the others as the “minuses” and he applies the 
same “rule” to naming both kinds of numbers. This is evidence that 
G’s RS are naive when working with directed (signed) numbers. 
51. Then I added the 
other 2 minuses 
together – I got 35 
and then it’s 35 
minus 28 and that 
equals 7. He is 
surprised to see that 
the answer is -7. 
He adds the numbers together as he had for the + numbers and for a 
reason that is not clear, he subtracts the + total from the – total.  From 
this it is possible to tentatively infer a great deal about G’s conceptual 
resources relating to mathematics. It is possible that he is simply 
subtracting the smaller value (28) from the larger  value (35), ignoring 
the signs. This would be predicted if we consider that G’s RS are likely 
to have developed from working with addition and subtraction with 
only positive numbers where the problems he will have experienced 
within his maths teaching will have been designed to avoid moving 
into the negative domain. His conceptual resources relating to 
“Addition” and “Subtraction” have not yet spanned to include 
operations with negative numbers. His recent experience with 
negative numbers in the context of the different tasks has not been 
recognised as relevant – i.e. the span of the conceptual resources 
relating to the different tasks has not extended to G’s concepts of 
addition and subtraction. G’s 2 sets of concepts about operations on 
numbers and what he calls minus numbers are not yet aligned so the 
span of each does not, at this time, extend to include the other. 
Furthermore, G’s RS pertaining to symbols for number operations are 
so well established that it seems he cannot see the minus sign as 
anything other than an instruction to subtract, though he is 
inconsistent in what he subtracts from what. This is evidence of the 
highest level of cueing priority for this interpretation of the minus sign; 
an aspect of G’s RS that needs to be modified if he is to develop more 
effective conceptual resources for working with negative numbers. 
His surprise is evidence that he recognises the inadequacy of his 
conceptual resources. It betrays some anxiety – understandable when 
we consider that he is now forced to question something in which he 
had felt secure.  
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The novelty of working with negative numbers is suggested in G’s lack of 
expectation that values might be negative: 
 
Next, we see how a comment by M leads G to confront, and begin to 
resolve, a conflict in his conceptual resources. This provokes a significant 
change in G’s contextual neighbourhood: 
53. M says “9 add -8, which is 1”. G 
says “You can’t do that”. No-one 
follows up on his remark until after 
they have entered the wrong answer 
to the question and start to think it 
through again. At this point G asks 
“Can you add minus numbers and 
plus numbers?” It is interesting that 
he did not realise that this is what 
they were doing with earlier 
questions. Maybe there is 
something about this question that 
emphasises to him that this is what 
is happening. I think, though, that it 
was M’s articulating “9 add -8..” that 
has triggered something in G’s 
understanding. My suspicion is 
confirmed when he repeats to 
M talks aloud as he writes down what they need to do. As 
he speaks the numbers, including the “minus” sign, he 
includes the word “add” as he recognises that the task is 
to add the numbers together. G finds that this conflicts 
with the interpretation that his own conceptual resources 
facilitate – he believes M has made a mistake. No-one 
else acknowledges his remark. 
When the boys go over the problem again G questions 
whether it is appropriate to add “minus numbers” and 
“plus numbers”. He has not referred to the unsigned 
numbers as “plus numbers” before (though he did refer to 
them as “adds”). So perhaps, we are seeing his concept 
of “minus numbers” expanding to include “the other 
numbers” to become a more inclusive concept about 
signed or directed numbers? If G’s knowledge is 
extending in this way, I think it is almost coincidental as 
his conscious focus is the concatenation of 2 words, both 
of which he previously understood as instructions to carry 
52. G reads out the numbers for the 
next question: 9, -8, -48, 48, -34, 33. 
It is interesting to note that, with 
each negative number, he starts to 
say the number without saying 
“minus” – each time, before he 
finishes saying the number, he 
stops himself and says it again, with 
the “minus” this time. 
This suggests that G’s RS are changing to be able to 
take account of signs – i.e. that where the sign is shown, 
it should be “spoken”. This is not something he is used to 
as his experience of “saying” numbers does not include 
any reference to signs. However, his “Minus Numbers” 
concept has evolved considerably and the span of both of 
these related concepts would appear to include the other 
as he decides that it is appropriate to speak the sign as 
well as the number as he did in earlier activities. He often 
fails to do it at first but corrects himself. 
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himself and looks at M,  “9 ADD 
MINUS ..??” M explains that he had 
written the numbers down and then 
went back and put all the add signs 
in because they need to add all the 
numbers every time. 
out an operation on a number: + (add or plus) and – 
(minus). It is his mention of “add minus” and his 
discomfort when M said the same thing previously that 
leads me to believe this is the cause of G’s anxiety at this 
point. 
It would seem that G’s evolving “Minus numbers” or 
“Signed numbers” concept is undergoing expansion to 
include resources that conflict with elements from other 
collections of conceptual resources that he was beginning 
to align. In his previous experience an instruction (a sign) 
has always been followed by a number, not another sign. 
G’s discomfort, his difficulty in aligning related conceptual 
resources, is evident here. 
 
G recognises the relevance of number lines: 
54. The boys all look at the list of 
numbers. M says “If we cross out 
those we’re on zero still” He is 
referring to -48 and 48. M tries to 
explain why the 1 that is left when 9 
and -8 are added can be put with -34 
and 33 to make zero. He doesn’t 
explain it very well, though uses 
gesticulations, sweeping both his 
hands to the left and to the right. G 
quickly takes over and explains it 
very clearly, using a number line 
model to describe the movements 
through zero to 33  and back to 
zero. He is able to talk about moving 
to the right as adding and moving to 
the left as taking away or minus. He 
uses the signs of the numbers as 
instructions to add or minus (used 
as a verb), assuming a + sign where 
M’s arm movements appear to have triggered a resource 
within G’s contextual neighbourhood. G now realises that 
he can think of these operations as movement along a 
number line. The image of M’s movements cued 
resources relating to number lines. These resources are 
now associated with this activity, though that association 
was not evident previously. It would appear that 
alignment has not yet been achieved but association 
(span) between conceptual resources has begun to be 
constructed. Feedback, and perhaps repetition, will be 
necessary if cueing and reliability priorities of this new 
resource, compared to that of existing resources, are to 
change. 
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there is no minus sign. 
 
Even though G appears to have resolved his difficulty with this idea, he 
continues to grapple with this modification of his contextual 
neighbourhood: 
55. When M tries to explain the way he 
works through the list, he says 9 
add minus 8 and G interrupts “You 
can’t say that. You can’t add a 
minus”. He is still resistant to this 
notion within his own understanding 
of what he is doing. G believes that 
the add sign is superfluous as he 
says “9 minus 8 is already there”. 
He doesn’t see any need for the add 
sign and thinks it confuses the 
question. 
G is still very uncomfortable with add and minus being 
spoken in tandem. He feels that this doesn’t make any 
sense. He appears to “read” the minus prefix as the 
indicator that he needs that tells him which way to move 
on the number line. He clings onto his belief that the 
“add” word cannot occur immediately preceding the 
“minus” word (cueing priority is still very high). His 
developing concepts (“Minus numbers” and 
“Calculations”) contain conflicting resources, they are not 
yet aligned in this respect, even though span of each 
does extend to the other. 
 
G actively seeks ways to work with the task that make sense to him, 
according to the conceptual resources that he possesses. 
56. The boys do not come to agreement 
over this and I ask whether 9 - -8 is 
the same as 9 + -8. G ignores my 
question. He has noticed that by 
rearranging the order of the list of 
numbers he can make sense of it – 
he can avoid doing 9 + -8 by 
switching the order and thinking of it 
as -8 + 9. 
My question challenges G as his conceptual resources do 
not accommodate the idea that 2 operation words can be 
adjacent within an expression. Before he could answer 
my question G’s concepts must be modified. 
G’s SMM relating to the commutative law enables him to 
restate the problem in a way that makes it possible for 
him to solve. This way he can solve the problem using his 
existing conceptual resources without any imperative to 
change or expand them. This is preferable to G. 
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G continues to use a number line model to play the “Balloon Burst” game: 
57. When I ask G to focus 
on the -34 + 33 section 
of the list, he talks 
about being “in the 
minus section” (minus is 
a place/location). He is 
quite comfortable with 
starting “in the minus 
section” and moving up 
by adding a number 
which is not minus. G 
can explain that if he 
starts at -34 and takes 
33 away from 34 he 
knows it will be minus 
one, “still in the 
minuses”. He isn’t able 
to tell me why he is 
“taking away” 33 from 
34 when he is adding 
the 2 numbers together 
It is not surprising to me that since G’s “number line” concept is well 
established, and now that he has learned that this is useful in 
solving the problems presented by this game, he “reads” minus as 
a section of the number line, i.e. a  pseudo-concrete representation; 
a location. 
It is possible that G is able to recognise, implicitly, that in order to 
move up 33 (and I think he equates moving up, or to the right, with 
adding) and if the starting point is a minus value greater than 33, he 
can calculate where he will end up by subtracting 33 from the start 
(negative) number. 
58. I ask him to do one with 
easier numbers, -8 + 6. 
Immediately he tells me 
“that’s -2”. ”He says “6 
is less than 8 so you’re 
still in the minuses.” 
I believe that  “still in the minuses” implies that G’s interpretation of 
this operation, is that, from a starting position of -8, by adding 6, it is 
necessary to move towards zero but that zero will not be reached. 
It is likely that G has a sense making mechanism, that has probably 
emerged from a number line model, that enables him to deduce 
that, if the number added is less than the start value, the fact that 
there is a difference means that there is a “gap” between the 
answer and zero – i.e. upon completion of the operation, “You’re 
still in the minuses”.  
59. G goes on to tell me 
that “if you take away 
from -8 you get bigger 
digits because you go 
He seems to interpret “taking away” as the move is in the opposite 
direction to adding. 
G’s thinking aloud is acting as a window onto the modification of his 
“Minus numbers” concept and to the alignment of this with other 
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that way and you’re on 
the minus side”. (His 
gesticulations suggest 
that he represents the 
calculation/situation to 
himself as movement in 
one direction or the 
other along a number 
line). 
related conceptual resources. We see that he is able to co-ordinate 
the notions that taking away leads to smaller digits on one side of 
zero and to larger digits on the other side of zero. 
 
G attempts to resolve the difficulty of “minus minus”; he once more shows 
his ability to perceive some potential relevance of resources that he has 
previously constructed:  
60. The other boys 
explain their strategies 
which include 
swapping signs 
around for what 
appear to be arbitrary 
reasons. G joins in 
and explains that 
another way to do it is 
to swap the numbers 
around “because you 
can do that” and that 
because the 8 is a 
minus “I’d take away 
that minus sign and 
change this to a minus 
to get 6-8 which is 
minus 2.” 
G is using his SMM relating to the commutative law again here. 
Although he talks about changing the minus sign, he is actually 
changing the order of the number terms so that a positive number 
(i.e. unsigned) appears first and the minus sign of the negative 
number can be treated as an instruction to subtract. 
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61. I redirect G and the 
other boys to my 
earlier question : 9 - -
8. They keep saying it 
aloud “Nine minus 
minus 8”. M says 
“minus, minus” several 
times. G says “I know, 
it’s hard – minus 
minus.” They are not 
at all confident about 
this one. 
G doesn’t attempt to change the order of the numbers . It is possible 
that this strategy is cued but that it doesn’t help with this problem. G 
doesn’t appear to remember how he had succeeded with “minus 
minus” previously – i.e. by using an “undoing” strategy. Perhaps 
cueing of the commutative strategy is blocking cueing of the undoing 
strategy because it’s recent effectiveness has earned it high reliability 
priority (for now, at least)?  
62. L suggests adding 
words to make it 
simpler “because 
people who aren’t very 
good at maths might 
be good at English”. 
He and M exchange 
banter and G 
interrupts “Stop – 
you’re confusing me 
right now.” He seems 
to be trying to process 
something in his head, 
trying to make sense 
of something. 
G appears to be actively trying to organise and secure his conceptual 
resources and connections between them. Things that the other boys 
are saying are not in line with his own contextual neighbourhood and 
he finds it confusing to hear them whilst trying to review his own 
thoughts. This shows that, for G at least, making sense of his own 
conceptual resources and experience, involving modification of old 
concepts through alignment with new resources, requires effort and 
concentration for which he needs to be free of distractions. 
 
Next, G recognises the usefulness of other strategies that form part of his 
conceptual resources: 
63. I ask G if he can 
explain. He says that 
“-5 add 4, if that was 
a 5 it would be zero 
but it’s not, it’s 4 so 
G describes a compensation strategy for calculation. This is 
something that is likely to have been taught in school and G has 
realised (not necessarily consciously) that it might be relevant here – 
there is at least one resource that is common to existing resources 
that relate to “compensation” and to the current task. We have already 
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the zero changes to -
1. I did this with that 
game with the 
countries. I said that 
when we went to 
warmer and colder 
places it was like a 
sum.” This is the first 
time that he’s made 
any reference to our 
previous sessions, 
even though the 
calculations have 
been very similar. 
seen evidence of the co-ordination of “Calculations” and “Minus 
numbers” concepts;  this now suggests that the span of another 
collection of conceptual resources (relating to “Compensation”) has 
been extended. This will improve alignment of all these concepts. It is 
interesting that G also recognises that some resources relating to 
these concepts also form part of his concepts relating to “Journey” 
and “Quiz” tasks. 
 
Next, we see whether the boys are able to create appropriate questions 
using the numbers given. 
64. I ask them if they 
could turn these 
questions into ones 
about countries and 
temperatures. They 
are quite excited 
about this and think 
that they can. L starts 
by saying tentatively 
“It was -5 at 
Antarctica…” The 
others interrupt and G 
points out that “It 
would be way less 
than that!” 
To be successful, the boys will need to co-ordinate several concepts 
that have not previously been used in concert. Even if we see that 
span of these concepts is sufficient for relevance to be perceived in 
working with the challenge that I have set, I would expect to see that 
alignment has not yet been established. 
It is interesting to see that G is not comfortable with the Antarctica 
temperature – there is some dissonance within his contextual 
neighbourhood. I believe that this shows that concepts that he 
employs in the context of this problem are “TW”  and “NT” and/or 
“Antarctica”. The idea that the temperature in Antarctica might be -5º 
does not align with his existing conceptual resources. In his attempt 
to solve the problems posed by the challenge, G feels it necessary to 
invent contextual details that are as realistic (according to the current 
state of his concepts) as he can. This may, of course, simply show 
that he thinks that is what I want him to do. 
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65. L ignores their 
suggestions for 
alternative starting 
countries and 
continues “ .. And then 
he needs to go to …. 
England where it was 
4 degrees.” G says 
“And you’d find out 
how much there was 
between them, how 
much warmer that 
was.” I ask warmer or 
colder? G repeats 
“Warmer. And it’s 9” 
We see that G’s concepts relating to difference, temperature, 
“Journey” and “Quiz” are all being used appropriately. G is using the 
2 given numerals, together with the preceding sign, as the 
temperatures of the 2 countries and then working out the difference 
between them. He is quite comfortable with executing procedures like 
these as he was consistently successful with them in previous work.  
66. I ask G to do the 
same with -2 take 
away -4. He says “If 
Father Christmas 
starts in Norway, 
minus 4 and goes to 
Russia which is minus 
2, how much warmer 
is it?” Straight away 
he sees that this can’t 
be right but can’t think 
of an alternative 
question. He says “I 
know this isn’t right. 
It’s not like those – 
there’s something 
missing. I don’t know 
what, though.” 
G uses the same strategy but this time he thinks he has done 
something wrong – he recognises that his response is not in line with 
his evolving concept relating to “take away minus”. His initial 
response follows the format of questions from “Journey”. This 
suggests that the resources formed about the “Journey” activity, 
though only recently constructed, are quite well established – they 
span to this new task. However, G’s RS have not yet developed in 
ways that would enable him to “read” the signs preceding numbers 
as both instructions to operate and as indicators of location on a 
number line. G has shown that he possesses some knowledge about 
this (e.g. he has talked about “in the minuses” and he does read the 
minus sign as an instruction to move to the left on a number line). 
Although G’s “take away minus” resource has begun to be connected 
with other resources in some ways, his RS that must evolve to 
enable him to fully utilise his new concept of negative numbers, lag 
behind. 
 
So, we, like G, are able to see the point at which his conceptual 
resources about operating with signed and unsigned numbers begin to 
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fail him. In my analysis, I describe how readout strategies and other types 
of conceptual knowledge co-develop and suggest that such development 
of each is mutually dependent on that of the other. 
I prompt the boys to use some sort of number line to help them with the 
hardest problems but they do not respond as I had expected: 
67. I ask the boys to tell 
me what pictures or 
memories they have 
in their heads at the 
moment. They say 
countries, Father 
Christmas, 
temperatures, cards, 
lines on the map. I ask 
whether they might be 
able to talk me 
through the way they 
work these problems 
out if we drew some of 
these things. I suggest 
we see whether a line 
might help us now and 
draw a vertical line on 
the page. G thinks this 
is a good idea “Yes, 
and here is minus 
(indicating the area to 
the left of the line) and 
here is the positive 
(indicating the right 
side). 
It is interesting that G interpreted my line as dividing a space into 
minus and positive. I had expected the boys to see the line as a 
vertical number line, like the scale on the thermometer they had been 
using. G did not interpret it this way, even though he had been using 
vertical number lines and using the interactive screen thermometer in 
previous sessions. Although those experiences will have formed part 
of G’s conceptual resources, those new resources were not cued in 
this situation. 
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68. L then said “But I was 
going to do this – he 
drew onto the line 
several markers 
crossing it at intervals 
from top to bottom.  G 
writes on a 0 next to 
one of the markers in 
the middle and goes 
on to label all the 
other markers 
(intervals of 1). 
As soon as L marks intervals on the vertical line G seems to 
recognise it as a vertical number line and adds the number labels 
appropriately. It seems that his “Number line” concept did not span to 
the previous unmarked line but it does extend to the one with L’s 
marks. The span of his “Number line” resources has now extended to 
include blank vertical lines. This means that, in future, his contextual 
neighbourhood has changed so that G might “read” a blank vertical 
line as a potential number line. 
 
G goes on to recognise further connections within and across his 
concepts and I encourage him to integrate other resources and expand 
his contextual neighbourhood even further: 
69. I ask him to show me 
how this helps with 4 
+ -5. He is excited and 
says, “This is like the 
cards and the 
thermometer!” 
This suggests to me that G had not, until now, connected vertical 
number lines and “Journey” – i.e. his “Journey” resources did not 
actually contain a resource about vertical number lines and/or did not 
span to his “Number line” concept (despite the fact that he appeared 
to have perceived a connection whilst using the thermometer as part 
of “Journey”.) G’s conceptual resources relating to the “Journey” and 
“Temperatures” tasks and number lines and signed numbers are now 
more connected (span has extended) and he has now recognises 
that the image of a vertical number line has some of the same 
properties as the thermometer in the Temperatures activity and can 
be used in the same way. 
70. He shows me how he 
works with the 4 + -5 
problem:  he moves 
from 4 to -1, counting 
4 (to zero), 5 as he 
goes. I ask him to do it 
the other way around, 
to swap the numbers 
G is able to use the vertical number line effectively and his RS are 
changing, enabling him to read the “minus” sign appropriately. 
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round and start with 
the -5. He does it 
confidently, counting 
1,2,3,4  up to  -1. 
71. G tries to resolve the 
“minus minus 8” 
problem again but is 
frustrated “How do 
you minus minus 8? – 
I don’t understand!”  I 
re-read the problem, 
emphasising the “take 
away” aspect of the 
problem. I then ask 
the boys “What would 
I do if the question 
said -9 + -8?” L shows 
on the (vertical) 
number line a 
movement from -9 to -
17. L thinks this 
confirms what he 
thought the answer 
was but G points out 
“But that’s the answer 
to add. I get it. If it’s 
take away do I go the 
other way?!” 
Despite previous experience with this type of problem (and eventual 
success with it) (see Rows 43-44, Session 2 ) G is not able to access 
any conceptual resource that might help him with the “minus minus” 
problem. (This might be due to inadequate RS, insufficient 
associations between resources, low cueing priority or lack of 
appropriate SMMs.) 
Input from me helps G to focus on one particular aspect of the 
statement that he is able to relate to his broad mathematics 
contextual neighbourhood, including concepts of  addition and 
subtraction, as well as a SMM that equips him to infer that , as 
subtract is the opposite of add, perhaps he should move in the 
opposite direction on the number line. Until now, G’s RS have not 
modified to attend to what until now seemed (to G) to be superfluous 
words. RS will now change in this way. 
 218
72. I re-iterate -9 add -8 
means we have to 
start at -9 and DO a -8 
… G picks up and 
continues my 
explanation “So if it’s 
take away -8 you take 
away one that was 
done before. -9 - -8. 
That’s just like 
undoing this into an 
add.” The “this” he 
refers to is the minus 
sign preceding the 8 
in the expression. 
After a pause, he 
adds “We did this with 
that thermometer 
thingy”.  
I give G the opportunity to reflect upon and reinforce what he has just 
done. 
He goes further to link the word undoing with reference to a process 
that appears to have been reversed, producing the effect of adding. 
He remembers that he did something like this in the previous 
session. In doing so, we see that he is already beginning to further 
extend the span of his naïve “Minus numbers” concept to other 
existing conceptual resources and is testing alignment.  
 
 
At the end of our session, when trying to solve difficult problems, G 
describes how he visualises a number line: 
73. I give the boys 
several more 
examples for them to 
work out on the 
number line and they 
quickly abandon the 
number line and are 
able to do them 
mentally. G says he 
doesn’t need to draw 
a number line 
because he can “see 
G and the others only draw number lines until they feel confident to 
work mentally. G does not abandon use of his “Number line” resource, 
however; he simply uses a mental representation rather than a 
concrete diagrammatic one. 
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one in my head”. 
 
As our sessions came to an end, G demonstrates that he has modified 
his contextual neighbourhood: 
74. I ask them to make up 
a “minus minus” 
question using words. 
G is able to give me 
an appropriate Father 
Christmas scenario. 
G is able to work with all relevant concepts simultaneously and 
effectively. Span and alignment of all relevant conceptual resources 
is adequate for this task. RS have already evolved to enable him to 
extract appropriate information in a meaningful way. 
75. When I ask him to 
explain using some 
sort of picture or 
diagram, he draws a 
vertical number line 
and makes it look like 
a thermometer. The 
pointer is Father 
Christmas’s hat. 
G shows very explicitly that he can draw upon different conceptual 
resources effectively and appropriately. He has formed a system for 
integrating and co-ordinating a range of concepts from different 
aspects of his experience.  
 
G’s story 
From the beginning, G demonstrates that he understands each task and 
is able to make good progress towards the goal of the task. He is able to 
co-ordinate a varied range of conceptual resources, including readout 
strategies, resources in memory, conceptual associations and sense-
making mechanisms (about direction of movement, number order and 
Father Christmas’s clothing), effectively and without difficulty. 
Although G has had some informal experience with “minus 
temperatures”, he had not previously interpreted the signed numbers 
used to represent sub-zero temperatures as relative values that could be 
compared, ordered and increased or decreased by mathematical 
operations. Within the sessions we had together, he was able to build 
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connections between resources he had about numbers and a variety of 
other concepts. Those concepts became more organised in relation to 
each other and developed into a conceptual system that G was able to 
use in other contexts. 
The analysis and commentary above also reveal examples of other 
connections that G had previously created that did not become so 
securely or widely connected. Such resources, including generalisations 
developed by G from previous experience, are not necessarily very 
rational, though without knowing their source this is difficult to judge. 
These are likely to fail to become established through lack of 
reinforcement of span and alignment, so structural priorities will not 
become high. 
Other pieces of knowledge that G uses as tools for learning include his 
“clonk” (Figure 5.3). This is a tool that he recognises might be relevant in 
the context of this task and he finds that it does help him to solve the 
problems that arise. 
G is aware of his own thinking and learning and often refers to the way he 
is feeling at several points as he works through the tasks. He describes 
confusion, anxiety, optimism and joy; clearly emotional responses to his 
own activity and development. 
G is very articulate and is able to talk about his thinking and his approach 
to the problems within the tasks. It is clear that conceptual resources that 
he has already constructed are used at various points to help him make 
progress with the challenges he faces; for example, we see resources 
about calculation strategies and number lines and commutativity. Also 
clear is G’s active search for meaning – he really wants to be able to 
make sense of and solve the problems he encounters. 
5.4 Concluding remarks for Chapter 5: Analysis of findings 
Analysis of the two boys’ conceptual change whilst engaged with the 
series of tasks has been most illuminating. Both boys were enthusiastic 
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and well-motivated and they eagerly interacted with the tasks and with 
their peers in pursuit of the goals of the different activities. It has been 
possible to infer much about changes to their respective contextual 
neighbourhoods, using constructs outlined in Table 1, and the model for 
conceptual change that they describe (Figure 3), as tools for analysis and 
elaboration. 
It is clear that, when beginning to work in a new domain, there are 
multiple cognitive processes involved in making sense of all types of 
inputs that must be accommodated harmoniously within the extensive 
pool of conceptual resources already available within each boy’s 
“knowledge”. The evidence presented also suggests that other forces 
exert an influence too – socio-cultural factors (such as roles, relationships 
and rules) appear to have affected both boys’ contributions and 
performance. 
Both C and G drew upon the external resources available, though not 
always in the same ways or to the same extent. However, it was clear 
that they were only able to make progress, that is to be able to make 
sense of negative numbers in the context of different tasks, by making 
connections between a variety of different kinds of internal conceptual 
resources. The construction of those connections was not straightforward 
or predictable nor did it occur as an even and gradual increase in terms of 
the numbers of resources in memory, or associations, or sense-making 
mechanisms. The learning trajectory for each boy was uneven in its 
content and pace – indeed, sometimes even appearing to go backwards. 
It would seem that both boys’ conceptual change is predicted by the 
model shown in Figure 3; in some, broad and general respects, both 
boys’ progress in their learning in a new domain, their tuning towards 
expertise, can be described by the model. However, there were many 
differences in the ways that resources and associations were 
constructed, both within each boy’s learning journey as well as 
differences between the 2 boys. In the next chapter, the conceptual 
changes that occurred for both C and G will be considered further. 
 222
Chapter 6: Discussion of Findings 
In the previous chapter I presented my analysis of each boy’s 
experiences of a sequence of tasks. In each of the two case studies I was 
able to identify or infer conceptual changes and to make inferences about 
internal and external resources that were being used, including existing 
knowledge. 
In compiling my analysis for “Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings”, it was 
apparent to me that several themes were emerging that connected both 
boys’ case studies. In this chapter, I shall identify these themes and, in 
discussing how the boys’ experiences and outcomes relate to those 
themes, will be able to further illuminate any conceptual change that 
occurred. Reconsidering the case studies thematically will also facilitate 
some comparison between the case studies, from which tentative 
questions about ability differences might be posed. 
6.1 Re-use of existing knowledge 
My knowledge of the National Curriculum (DfEE/QCA 2000) and National 
Numeracy Strategy (DfEE 1999), both current at the point in the design 
and data collection phases of my study, led me to believe that children in 
Year 4 in a UK primary school would not yet have received any teaching 
about negative numbers. It was confirmed by the class teacher that the 
children had not. Therefore it was appropriate to infer that any knowledge 
that children had about negative numbers had been acquired or 
developed informally, outside of their lessons in school. 
Any existing knowledge about negative numbers was not, however, 
without interest for me and, in acknowledging that some might exist, I was 
interested to discover how children would use existing knowledge 
resources in their work with me. 
One aspect of the re-use of existing knowledge that I am keen to consider 
is, therefore, the re-use of long-standing, well-established knowledge. 
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6.1.1 Re-use of well-established knowledge 
Throughout all sessions children said and did things that revealed 
knowledge resources that they had previously begun to develop. 
Sometimes, for me to probe their knowledge further might have disturbed 
the flow of the group’s work and on those occasions I chose not to follow 
up on their remarks and am dependant therefore on my own inferences 
about their knowledge. At other times, I did probe further and was able to 
obtain a more direct account of the child’s existing knowledge. 
Both boys revealed knowledge about temperatures in different parts of 
the world, a concept I called “TW”. It was evident that this knowledge had 
originated in a wide range of sources. For example, C knew something 
about Egypt: that it is hot; that there is a “suffinks” (sphynx) there. He also 
knew about extremely cold environments. C had no direct experience or 
formal teaching about either of these subjects and had developed these 
elements of his “TW” concept largely from TV and from books. For C, this 
knowledge meant that he had some understanding (of what it is like in a 
very hot or very cold country) that he brought to the task in Session 1, 
and it contributed to further development of “TW” as the task progressed. 
G brought to the task his experience of travel to Europe, particularly 
France. He had some knowledge of how temperatures in France 
compared with UK and Spain.  
G showed that he was able to access and utilise internal resources about 
the significance of the Equator on a map or globe. He showed, from the 
beginning of the “Journey” task in Session 1, that he knew that countries 
on or close to the equator are hot. He was able to judge whether a 
country is hot by considering its position on the map in relation to the 
equator. 
Whilst working on the “Journey” task, It became clear that C’s exposure 
to, or experience with, negative numbers in the context of values that he 
might have seen and heard in everyday life did not help him; he did not 
appear to have any knowledge of temperatures below zero; (at least, he 
was not able to access and co-ordinate resources effectively). G, on the 
 224
other hand, in Row (G) 9 shows that he did have some knowledge that 
there are “minus” temperatures 
9. (I ask) “As you’ve been to 
Poland, a country that is 
zero degrees, what are you 
looking for now?” M says, 
“minus” and G agrees. I ask 
“Minus what?”  G and M say 
together, “T emperatures”. 
G had previously seen “zero” as somehow more problematic than other numbers. His 
readout strategies (RS)  appear to be evolving in parallel with the extension of the 
span of relevant concepts. He now seems to accept zero and negative numbers as 
an extension of the number system he knows. 
The span of G’s conceptual resources about directed numbers is expanded to include 
temperatures as a relevant context for cueing these resources. 
 
As the sessions progressed, and the boys revealed their existing 
mathematical knowledge, they both used calculation strategies that they 
had not been taught by me but that have been taught and reinforced by 
their Mathematics teacher over an extended period of time. For example: 
C uses his fingers to count up and down (though often unsuccessfully, as 
I shall discuss later); C also habitually wants to start with the highest 
value when adding; he also demonstrates sound knowledge of many 
number bonds – something he will have started to learn in school 3 years 
ago. G also uses mathematical knowledge within our sessions that he 
must have learned previously: for example, in Row (G) 22, he shows that 
his counting strategies using a number line are sound: 
22. Throughout, he is very 
secure in the fact that he 
must include an invisible 
count at the -5 position 
even though there is no 
card for -5. (He taps the 
table when a card is not 
present for any value). 
G’s conceptual resources relating to the number system appear to include a well-
established number line model. 
Span is being tested and extended as he finds that what works with positive numbers 
also seems to work with negative numbers. 
 
So, it is clear that both boys are able to remember and spontaneously 
use long established knowledge in the context of our work together – i.e. 
a new setting or context; different to the one(s) in which they previously 
developed those concepts and strategies. 
It is interesting to consider whether this re-use of long-standing, well 
established knowledge constitutes “transfer”. At times the existing 
knowledge does seem to help G solve a new problem. For example, in 
Row (G) 56, he recognises the relevance of his knowledge of the 
commutative law and finds that it helps him to solve the problem at hand: 
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56. T he boys do not come to agreement over this 
and I ask whether 9 - -8 is the same as 9 + -8. 
G ignores my question. He has noticed that 
by rearranging the order of the list of numbers 
he can make sense of it – he can avoid doing 
9 + -8 by switching the order and thinking of it 
as -8 + 9. 
  
My question challenges G as his conceptual resources do not ac-
commodate the idea that 2 operation words can be adjacent within 
an expression. Before he could answer my question G’s concepts 
must be modified. 
G’s SMM relating to the commutative law enables him to restate the 
problem in a way that makes it possible for him to solve. T his way 
he can solve the problem using his existing conceptual resources 
without any imperative to change or expand them. T his is preferable 
to G. 
 
At other times, for both boys, it does not appear to have any direct 
bearing on the new problem or task objective but does help comprise a 
“backdrop” knowledge that enables the child to achieve a richer 
understanding of the new setting. An example of this is reported in Row 
(C) 4: 
4.  He sees Egypt on the map and 
wants to go there because “It’s 
really hot there. T here used to 
be people like this .. mummies, 
pyramids, .. musca …muscats, 
what are they called, muscats, 
it’s called suffinks” (he means 
sphynx) He says that he read 
about Egypt in a book. 
C has some knowledge about Egypt – not only resources about the temperature but also others 
about ancient Egyptian civilisations. We know that he has learned at least some of this 
information from a book. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 4: Methodology, any re-use of knowledge, 
whether used directly or indirectly, and whether it proves to be effective in 
solving a new problem or not, is transfer. 
6.1.2 Re-use of more recent learning 
Another aspect of the matter of re-use of knowledge concerns knowledge 
that is less well-established – that which has been learned more recently, 
even very recently. In the data and in my analysis it is apparent that G re-
uses newer knowledge on many occasions. For example, in Row (G) 9, 
(shown above) his sense-making mechanisms facilitate incorporation of 
zero into his number system concept, even though only minutes 
beforehand he had perceived zero to be more difficult than the positive 
integers he was very familiar with.  Also, between Session 1 and Session 
2, G remembered how to order negative numbers – something he had 
only learned to do at the end of the first session. 
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C, on the other hand, is less able to re-use knowledge recently learned. 
He does not remember or think to apply related knowledge that he 
seemed to have recently learned. For example, in Row (C) 18 he has 
forgotten the aim of the task: 
18.  C is keen to be the 
person who chooses 
where FC will start and 
places him at the North 
Pole. I point out that that 
is where he will finish. C 
hadn’t been listening very 
carefully or had not 
understood instructions. 
It would seem that C had either not heard or not assimilated information about the task previously 
because he gives the wrong answer now. 
 
And, in Row (C) 13, he has forgotten the (recently discovered) 
temperature for Spain: 
13.  When the group 
inadvertently click on Jordan 
(9º) C thinks “It’s less hot 
than Spain”. He claims this, 
however, without being able 
to remember what Spain 
was. 
It is not clear whether C has remembered the Spain temperature incorrectly and does actually 
think that Spain was more than 9º or whether he has just become very confused. 
 
I should re-iterate, at this point, that my understanding and use of 
“transfer” includes re-use of resources in memory. Therefore, failure to 
evoke a resource in memory (given that such a resource has revealed 
itself on another occasion) is an example of failure to transfer. 
It is actually quite difficult, when searching through the data, to find 
examples of C successfully re-using recently learned knowledge. This 
would be consistent with a “knowledge-in-pieces” model for learning 
(diSessa 1988) in that C is, at this stage, unable to co-ordinate the range 
of resources available to him. C’s behaviour is, perhaps, evidence that 
higher priority meanings are triggered rather than recently constructed 
memory resources which have only low priority at this time. 
There are, however, a few examples, such as Row (C) 20 where C is 
very confident that he has remembered something correctly: 
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20. As they start to plan FCs 
journey, C says something that 
confirms that he has 
remembered that Kenya was 
cooler than Madagascar when 
he lands on it saying “T hat 
was cold, wasn’t it?” N queries 
this but C insists that Kenya 
was colder than Madagascar. 
C remembers that Kenya was cooler than Madagascar. He refers to it as “cold.” 
 
6.1.3 Different types of transfer 
As I set out in Chapter 2: Literature Review, diSessa & Wagner (2005) 
identified 3 types of transfer: Class A, B and C. To recap: 
 Class A Transfer– “where an adequately prepared set of ideas is 
used unproblematically in new situations” (p148); “the knowledge 
whose transfer is at issue is assumed to be, or can be 
demonstrated to be, well prepared and does not, in principle, 
require further learning to apply” (p124). diSessa & Wagner note 
that this is important for schools who “want students to be able to 
solve problems other than the ones used in teaching them 
concepts” (p125); 
 Class B transfer – knowledge constructed that is “presuming 
subjects’ persistent effort… sufficiently prepared so that transfer 
can be reliably accomplished in acceptable periods of time (e.g. in 
a few hours or days… )”  (p125); 
 Class C transfer– How do “relatively unprepared subjects 
(students) use prior knowledge in early work in a domain?” (p125); 
“where bits and pieces of “old” knowledge are invoked, 
productively or unproductively, typically in early stages of learning” 
(p148). Class C transfer might be considered as the processes 
that lead to transferable knowledge. (p125) 
Adopting this typology enables me to distinguish between different kinds 
of transfer evident in the boy’s work. Consideration of the examples 
above and the analysis in Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings, shows that 
both boys demonstrated Class A transfer when they were able to re-use 
long established knowledge to solve problems they encountered in our 
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sessions together. Knowledge about numbers, temperatures and 
calculation strategies are examples of what diSessa & Wagner referred to 
as “well-prepared knowledge”. 
The table below summarises my analysis of the transfer types that were 
evident in each row of both boys’ analysis grids (where transfer was 
indicated at all). For each event, transfer type was evaluated according to 
the key presented in Chapter 4: Methodology (Figure 4.10) 
Transfer type Child “C” 
(row numbers) 
Number of 
instances 
Child “G” 
(row numbers) 
Number of 
instances 
Class A 76, 77 2 11*, 13*†, 15*, 
22*, 23*, 48*, 49*, 
73*, 74*, 75*,     
2, 17, 24, 27, 4†,  
15 
Class B 30, 31, 78, 79,  
24†, 25†, 26†, 27†, 29†, 
52†, 53†, 85†, 86†, 88† 
14 12, 20, 26, 30, 33, 
34, 37, 38, 39, 60,  
10 
Class C 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
28, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 48, 
50, 51, 54, 55, 57, 58, 
59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 
67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 
75, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 
90, 91 
53 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 
18, 21, 25, 28, 29, 
31, 32, 35, 36, 40, 
43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 
56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 
64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 71, 72 
41 
Total number of rows recording transfer 69 
 
66 
* = includes use of knowledge resources developed during our sessions (i.e. “new” knowledge) 
† = borderline with class below (e.g. B/C is recorded in Class B with † 
Table 3: Occurrences of different types of transfer for both boys in 
all tasks. 
Although such an analysis is based only on my interpretation of events, it 
has been carried out on 3 occasions, over a period of a year, and has 
been shown to be reliable. (Of 167 row entries, only 8 were evaluated 
differently at the first re-analysis and 3 at the second re-analysis. Overall 
trends and patterns were not affected by such a low number of 
discrepancies). Table 3 shows the final evaluations. 
 229
Figures 6.1a and 6.1b show each Transfer Class as a proportion of all 
transfer events for each boy (each “transfer event” recorded as a row in 
analysis grids in Chapter 5): 
0%
3%
22%
75%
Class A including new
knowledge
Class A using only old
knowledge
Class B
Class C
 
Figure 6.1a Classes of transfer evident in C’s transfer events 
13%
20%
13%
54%
Class A including new
knowledge
Class A using only old
knowledge
Class B
Class C
 
Figure 6.1b Classes of transfer evident in G’s transfer events 
 
 
It is clear that the pattern of transfer types is different for the 2 boys in 
some respects. For instance, Class A was rare for C and much more 
common for G; almost 33% of G’s instances of transfer were Class A. It is 
important to point out that, although, many of G’s Class A transfer 
occurrences were based wholly on “old” knowledge, some (shown * in 
Table 3) incorporated “new” resources that were used in conjunction with 
“old” ones. C’s Class A accounted for less than 3% of all his transfer 
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events. Class C transfer, although evident in a high number of instances 
for the 2 boys, accounted for a much higher proportion of any transfer 
achieved by C than for G. These differences will be considered later with 
other disparities between the boys’ learning. It is useful to point out here, 
however, that although both boys exhibited all 3 classes of transfer, the 
sophistication of the knowledge being transferred and the confidence with 
which it was applied were very dissimilar.  
Some patterns did emerge from my analysis of transfer types: 
• Where C was able to demonstrate Class A, it was only to use, at 
one point in our work together, a “bridging through 10” strategy, 
using knowledge of number bonds; 
• G’s Class A happened across all phases of our work. At first it was 
to show and use knowledge about “TW”, maps, equator etc. Then 
we saw that he had learned to increase and decrease 
temperatures in the quiz and to use the thermometer. Later with 
“Balloons” he used knowledge of the commutative law to help him 
tackle and solve problems, incorporating his new understanding of 
negative numbers. G’s re-use of knowledge as he progressed 
through the “Journey” and “Quiz” tasks are often Class A or Class 
B transfer. It appears that, in these phases, his knowledge had 
become either “well-prepared” (diSessa & Wagner 2005) or 
“sufficiently prepared” such that transfer could be “reliably 
accomplished soon”. Therefore, it is clear that his knowledge had 
developed beyond that exploratory, undiscriminating use of 
resources that characterises Class C transfer; 
As well as identifying patterns of transfer types for the 2 boys, analysing 
the data in this way reinforced for me the fact that what is most interesting 
in reflecting on my work with these children is not, actually, the 
instantiations of transfer, of whatever class. The real interest and value is 
in acknowledging, and trying to understand, all the other developments 
and contributions and obstacles and deviations that affect the direction, 
extent and pace of children’s learning in a new domain. (Whilst I 
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acknowledge that there is sense in which analysis of transfer classes is 
open to interpretation, I would point out that I have a systematic way of 
working that does promote reliability and validity.) It appears to me that, 
to categorise and classify only according to class of transfer is to reduce 
such experiences (data) to a point where too much data has been lost. 
This just serves to remind me that transfer is only a part of a broad and 
highly complex process of learning and that it is important to attend to all 
aspects of conceptual change involved in learning and the growth of 
knowledge and understanding. 
My analysis of transfer types does, however, illustrate very well the point 
that Class A transfer only accounts for a proportion of the transfer that 
occurs in a learning episode; that a great deal of learning occurs without 
much Class A transfer in evidence. Indeed for some children, like C, 
Class A transfer is quite rare. This is, as previously noted, in line with 
diSessa & Wagner (2005) who describe a theory of co-ordination of 
knowledge resources. Also, it supports the argument within the research 
literature (e.g. diSessa & Wagner, 2005; Schwartz et al, 2005) that 
blames underpinning methodologies and principles for any apparent lack 
of transfer that they are reported to have revealed. These workers believe 
that the early stages in the construction of knowledge - in which learners 
link together pieces of knowledge from different experiences and sources, 
though without understanding the nature of the connections, and without 
being able to co-ordinate the different pieces in anything but a fairly 
haphazard or experimental way –are necessary for conceptual growth 
and transfer. Schwartz et al (2005) called this “Preparation for Future 
Learning”, (PFL). Indeed, the most common type of transfer observed in 
my sessions with C and G was what diSessa & Wagner (2005) would call 
Class C and what Schwartz et al (2005) would call PFL, as these workers 
would predict. 
6.1.4 Failure to re-use existing knowledge 
There are points during our sessions at which the boys might have been 
re-using some aspects of their knowledge but also seemed to fail to use 
 232
other knowledge that they have already shown were available to them – 
i.e. failure to transfer. These instances are noted below: 
Occasions when C failed to transfer: 
• Row 13: He thinks Jordan (9 º) is cooler than Spain, even though 
he found out that Spain was 7 º  only a few minutes previously; 
• Row 18: He thinks that Father Christmas could start at the North 
Pole, even though he was been told that Father Christmas must 
finish at the North Pole; 
• Row 19: Although he does re-use knowledge about Madagascar, 
he doesn’t remember that there were some countries that he has 
“visited” in the game that had hotter temperatures than 
Madagascar; 
• Row 33: He has previously discovered the temperature in 
Germany but can’t remember it – even forgets that he has “been 
there”; 
• Row 40/41: He thinks -6 º is a “high” temperature, despite having 
achieved some success with ordering negative numbers in 
previous session; he is re-using only a very small part of 
knowledge he appeared to have constructed in the previous 
session; 
• Row 42: He argues with N, insisting that minus does not mean 
cold, even though he was happy in previous session that minus 
values represented very cold temperatures; 
• Row 44: He claims that “Of course zero is the lowest number” – 
the list contains negative numbers that, in the previous session, he 
had ordered correctly relative to zero; 
• Row 81: It does not occur to him to use a number line to help him 
count up or down through zero, even though he had achieved this 
in the previous session. 
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For C, there are also many occasions when he omits to read or mis-reads 
the minus sign. 
Occasions when G fails to transfer: 
• Row 67: He did not recognise a vertical line on the page as a 
prompt to use it as a vertical number line, despite working with a 
vertical thermometer both on screen and on paper, including 
thermometers and vertical number lines that he himself had drawn; 
When C failed to transfer knowledge, it was often knowledge that was 
very new and perhaps was not sufficiently associated with other existing 
knowledge resources that he did not re-use. It appears that new pieces of 
knowledge did not span (through associations with existing resources) to 
new situations and were not, therefore, called up in a subsequent 
situation where they would have been relevant.  
There was a point on which both boys failed to transfer knowledge that 
they had shown was available to them; this was their failure to 
spontaneously use a number line model where it would have been 
appropriate in the later tasks. Both C and G had, at previous points in the 
tasks, successfully used number lines, including those they had thought 
to draw for themselves, having recognised their usefulness for the 
questions they were working on at the time. It is interesting that they both, 
when faced with other situations in which a number line would have 
supported them, did not recognise that relevance. Although, in G’s case, 
an alternative interpretation was provided in the analysis grid, even this 
would support the inference that cueing priority and/or reliability priority of 
number lines in that situation was low. 
I shall, later, consider children’s use of number lines in more depth. 
6.1.5  Perception of similarity 
It is clear from many of the boys’ comments that their ability or propensity 
to re-use knowledge is linked to some aspect of the task that reminds 
them of something; that “brings to mind” something they know or have 
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experience of. Previously, in my review of the literature, I showed that 
perception of similarity is key to learning since, without it, connections 
between old and new knowledge cannot develop. I argued that 
conceptual development occurs through recognising and building and 
organising connections within and across concepts.  
In Chapter 3, I set out a model of learning which I had created in the light 
of my own experience and reading (see Table 1 and Figure 3). My 
analysis of the data, presented in Chapter 5, enables me to explore 
instantiations of associations between concepts and contexts being 
utilised and developed; of the extension of span, and of the alignment 
that must also be established between existing and new resources, in 
order for effective co-ordination of concepts to be enabled. 
6.2 Improving span and alignment 
What follows is a reflective summary of some of the events, actions and 
utterances during the tasks in which the extension and testing of span 
and alignment is evident. This is not an exhaustive list but does serve to 
illustrate the wide range of concepts that were developing for both boys in 
different ways in all our work together.  
6.2.1 C’s conceptual resources: development of span and alignment 
Rows (C)3-4:  
3.  When I say that we should 
send FC somewhere as hot as 
we can, C, straight away, says 
“That’s Africa.” 
His “T W” concept contains sufficient alignment between it’s “Spain” and “Africa” components to 
enable C to compare them and to judge that Africa is hotter than Spain. He doesn’t have 
conceptual resources about anywhere being hotter than Africa – at least none that span to this 
situation. 
4.  He sees Egypt on the map and 
wants to go there because “It’s 
really hot there. T here used to 
be people like this .. mummies, 
pyramids, .. musca …muscats, 
what are they called, muscats, 
it’s called suffinks” (he means 
sphynx) He says that he read 
about Egypt in a book. 
C has some knowledge about Egypt – not only resources about the temperature but also others 
about ancient Egyptian civilisations. We know that he has learned at least some of this 
information from a book. 
 
C knows that Spain is hot. He knows that Africa is very hot – “as hot as 
we can get”. He also knows that Egypt is hot. All of these knowledge 
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pieces come from different sources (holidays, TV, books respectively) 
and C thinks of them all in response to seeing a map and to questions 
and discussions about temperatures in different parts of the world. As 
noted in the analysis grid, “His TW concept contains sufficient alignment 
between its Spain and Africa elements to enable C to compare them and 
to judge that Africa is hotter than Spain.” As the task develops it is evident 
that C uses these pieces of “old” knowledge to structure his 
understanding of the task, as a framework for considering temperatures 
in other countries, on different sections of the map – i.e. he is able to 
construct and use a sense-making mechanism. 
The following extracts show that C is able to compare temperature 
values: 
Row (C) 25: 
25.  C groans when the 
display for Sudan shows 
25º – he seems to 
understand immediately 
that 25 is not lower than 
19 so Sudan cannot be 
the next stop. 
Both of these concepts are sufficiently aligned for C to participate and make effective 
judgments in the task. 
 
And Row (C) 27:  
27. When they see that Chad 
is 24º, C says “We lost that. 
We gotta go to a different 
one. He asks the others 
where they should go. T hey 
want to go to Niger. When 
they see that it is 25º, C 
says “Oh, that’s rubbish 
now.” 
C had decided that Ethiopia 16º had been the previous stop so understands that they 
should not go to a country where the temperature is 24. I think “We lost that” is a 
reference to winning or losing at each step – i.e. whether they click on country that fits 
the requirements of the task at each juncture – in this case they needed one that was 
less than 16 and got one that is more, so they “lost” and need to find another one. 
When the other boys go to one that is even hotter C is frustrated. He had quite clearly 
understood that he was aiming to find a country cooler than 16 and the others are 
clicking on countries that are increasingly removed from his aim. His own reasoning 
strategies are functioning effectively, though he is not able to find what he seeks. 
 
Alignment has been established that enables C to know that a country 
with a temperature higher than their current location is not a valid next 
step in the task. This alignment has been achieved within the task: C did 
not understand previously how to use his knowledge about the Journey 
task itself in concert with his NT concept. 
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Row (C) 31: 
 
Here, alignment of all related conceptual resources are further reinforced. 
Row (C) 36: 
Here, C shows that he is able to co-ordinate different resources in order 
to actively create new knowledge which adds to his concept of the 
number system. 
Row (C) 39: 
39. T o finish off, I ask the 
group a few quick questions 
to check their 
understanding. I ask for a 
temperature that is warmer 
than  -6 and C tells me 
“minus 2” I ask “Is minus 
one even warmer?” C says 
“Minus zero, minus zero, 
that’s warmer.” I ask “Which 
is warmest, one or minus 
four?” C and then N tell me 
“One.” When I ask why, C 
tells me “Because its closer 
to that, minus zero and 
that’s warmer.” 
C’s sense making mechanism for comparing numbers has modified. Now, he thinks -2 
is warmer than -6 and that -1 is even warmer. He goes on to tell me that minus zero is 
warmer than that and that -1 is warmer than -4. Although he calls zero “minus zero” he 
does seem to have learned that the digits increase as they become further away from 
zero and that they get smaller towards zero, and that movement towards zero from a 
minus temperature is towards “warmer”. Alignment is being established between 
relevant concepts and every question that I give C is an opportunity to test this 
alignment, reinforcing his understanding and his confidence in this new expansion of 
his number system concept, a part of this concept is now about “minus numbers” in 
the context of this task. 
 
For the first time, C seems to understand how “minus numbers” are 
ordered in relation to zero. 
Russia
-6°C
Back to list
36.  I say “T his says minus 6 – 
how does that compare to 
zero?” C tells me “It’s colder 
– look he’s wearing more 
clothes now anyway. He’s 
wearing that big coat, cloak 
thing. 
 
C’s interpretive resources for “reading” FC’s clothes support him in his “It’s colder” response. He 
seems to be persuading himself and trying to persuade me that his answer is correct by 
referring to the clothes that FC is wearing. T his suggests that C’s understanding about FC’s 
clothes spans effectively to his concept about the number system. His confidence in his sense-
making mechanisms that enable him to evaluate the significance of FC clothes, and alignment 
of any judgements with his number system concept (repeatedly tested and reinforced 
throughout the task) enables C to make inferences about extending his number system below 
zero. 
Every time C sees that his concerted resources – i.e. his interpretation of the rules 
(based on associations between resources within and across concepts) and of how to 
“read” the numbers and the clothes – leads to success, these resources are more 
robustly aligned.
31. He clicks on Turkmenistan 
… The display shows 5º. C 
says “Yes. We beat it. We 
beat it, N***. Yes!” He is 
very excited.
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Row (C) 51: 
Span and alignment of resources relating to zero, below zero and “minus 
numbers” are tested and reinforced. 
Row (C) 81: 
81. Balloons are 1, -7, 1.  C 
giggles and says “T hat’s 
zero!” S says “1 add 1 
minus 7. C repeats, “Zero.” 
He enters 0 as the answer 
C does seem to “see” the minus sign this time because we see that his answer does 
not correspond with addition of only the positive numbers. He is not able to subtract or 
count back 7 from 2, however. His concept of addition, though apparently adequate 
with single digit unsigned integers, does not equip him to operate with minus numbers 
effectively. He has had some experience with adding and subtracting negative 
numbers (including bridging through multiples of 10) in our previous session when he 
used a number line model to support his working. Memory resources and other 
resources constructed in that session, themselves associated with a number line-
based SMM, have not spanned to this new task. Here, he knows he must add 3 
numbers together. T here is nothing in this setting that he “reads” (and recognises) as a 
prompt to consider a number line approach. 
 
Span of C’s number line concept, sometimes effective within the 
“Journey” and “Quiz” tasks does not extend to the “Balloons” task. He 
does not recognise the relevance of number lines in the new setting. 
Is Norway hotter or 
colder than Russia?
Back
51.  They start the quiz. C 
says “I got it right. Look! 
There’s Norway and 
there’s Russia” C thinks 
Norway is hotter than 
Russia. C explains 
“Because it says it on the 
card.” I argue, pointing 
out that i t does not say 
“Norway is hotter than 
Russia” on the card. C 
replies, “It says 3 minus, 
that means 3 behind zero 
and that’s 6 behind 
zero… “ S says “So that’s 
hotter than Russia.” C 
“Yes, that’s what said”. I 
ask “How do you know?” 
C says “because 6 under 
zero is real cold but 3 
under is only a little bit 
cold” 
Span and alignment of C’s “NT ” concept, resources relating to Father Christmas and 
his concept of the number system are tested; C rises to the challenge, justifying his 
judgements effectively. 
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6.2.2 G’s conceptual resources: development of span and alignment 
At the very beginning, G shows that there is some tension within his 
concept of "Madagascar”:  
Row (G) 1: 
1.   Having introduced the group 
to the countries list and 
clicked on Madagascar as 
an example to show the 
boys what each page looks 
like, G is the one who very 
quickly sa ys “Well, that’s 
wrong, 21. It’s really hot in 
the film.” when he sees the 
temperature displayed. 
G Reads 21º as “twenty one degrees” and knows that this is a representation of “how 
hot/cold” 
His understanding of 21º conflicts with his understanding of Madagascar as he thinks 
Madagascar is very hot and 21 is not very hot. 
The 2 concepts.”, “NT ” (“Numbers as they are used to represent temperature”) and 
“Madagascar” do span to each other and are already aligned. That  alignment is 
challenged here. 
 
This suggests alignment between G’s concepts about numbers used to 
represent temperatures (“NT”) and Madagascar. However, this alignment 
is challenged and will need to be reinforced. 
Row (G) 12: 
As G attempts to resolve problems with negative numbers in the context 
of the “Journey” task, many changes in span and alignment can be 
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inferred:
12. I ask the boys how much 
the temperature changes if 
we go from Svalbard (-13º) 
to Norway (-3º). G says 10º. 
When I ask whether it is 
decreasing or increasing, 
he says it is decreasing. I 
ask again “Is it getting 
higher or lower? Increasing 
or decreasing?” G, looks at 
the map and changes his 
mind - he tells me that it is 
increasing, not decreasing, 
because it is getting 
warmer. 
G’s concept of the number system includes a sense-making mechanism (SMM)  that 
enables him to compare values represented as unsigned digits. He is able to compare 
and make judgements about the relative values of unsigned numbers and uses the 
same SMM here, at first. 
He has a conceptual resource (in this case it might be a resource in memory or a 
readout strategy) that a  “minus number” is an indication of a cold temperature. He also 
has resources relating to the Equator being hot and the North Pole being cold. 
He infers that a change from a value represented by the digit 13 (ignoring the sign) to a 
value represented by the digit 3 is a decrease in value. T he fact that I questioned this, 
in itself, may have suggested to G that he has made an error. 
His evolving “T W” concept also leads him to infer that the temperature should increase 
if the change is southward. T hese inferences are in conflict with each other. G resolves 
the conflict by judging that the question is about the change in temperature and that the 
concept of temperature is founded on measures of how hot/how cold. He chooses to 
focus on whether the move from Svalbard to Norway is an increase in temperature 
(getting hotter) or a decrease (getting colder). He judges that such a move would result 
in an increase in temperature. It would seem that he is willing to accept that, although 
the digits themselves are decreasing, the presence of the minus sign changes the 
“rules” that he thought he knew. T his constitutes a modification to a SMM that had 
previously been effecti ve. 
Although G is confident about the magnitude of the change, his “decreasing” response 
is an indication that his conceptual resources relating to directed numbers are not 
securely connected to other concepts – i.e. effective span has not been established -  
through associations between resources. T he span of G’s “T W” and “NT” concepts has 
already extended to include each other but some components within these concepts 
are much better established than others and they are not aligned with each other. He 
aligns these conflicting inferences about “increase/decrease” by focusing on the 
context of the problem and reasoning that “getting warmer” equates to an increase in 
temperature, regardless of whether the digit values are increasing or decreasing. G’s 
engagement with this particular question provides evidence of alignment being tested 
and evolution of all relevant conceptual resources. 
This is evidence that span of G’s concept of increase/decrease is being extended to be 
effective in determining information in the contexts of temperature and/or directed 
numbers 
 
Row (G) 15: 
15. When countries with 
temperatures below zero 
appear from the pack, the 
boys take them in their 
stride, except to notice that 
Turkey’s temperature is not 
what they expected. G 
reminds them that “T his is 
around Christmas, though”. 
Negative numbers are read efficiently. 
G’s conceptual resources include a SMM that enables him to reason that Christmas 
temperatures are lower than might normally be associated with countries that we visit 
for holidays in the summer. 
Whereas during the previous activity, G was uncertain about ordering negative 
numbers, today he was more confident – his RS, resources in memory and SMMs 
have modified and he now works effectively with negative numbers and is able to 
order them. He did not make mistakes. Span and alignment of resources has 
increased, linking resources that G has relating to numbers. 
 
 
At the beginning of the second session, G is able to “read” and order 
negative numbers effectively. He had not been able to do this at the 
beginning of the previous session. Learning about negative numbers has 
taken place in the first session that G is able to use here. Moreover, he is 
able to use it efficiently and without prompting – the result of previous 
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reinforcement of span and alignment. This is tested and extended further 
in Row 22 in which G’s actions suggest that he is using a (well-
established) number line model to support the development of his 
knowledge in this new domain. 
Row (G) 22 
22. T hroughout, he is very 
secure in the fact that he 
must include an invisible 
count at the -5 position even 
though there is no card for -
5. (He taps the table when a 
card is not present for any 
value). 
G’s conceptual resources relating to the number system appear to include a well-
established number line model. 
Span is being tested and extended as he finds that what works with positive numbers 
also seems to work with negative numbers. 
 
In Row (G) 30, G is able to re-use knowledge to address a different type 
of problem – evidence of effective span and alignment, recently modified: 
30. I pose a new type of 
question “If I am in Moldova 
and go somewhere that is 
9º warmer, what will the 
new temperature be?” G 
has control of the 
thermometer and 
confidently counts up one 
degree at a time from the 
Moldova temp (-2), using 
the thermometer scale as a 
vertical number line 
G is able to solve the new problem (that has a slightly different structure, as I perceive 
it) without any difficulty. 
Relevant conceptual resources have sufficient span to be triggered and are well 
aligned, each incorporating an appropriate range of conceptual resource which act as 
anchors, enabling G to work unproblematically. Concepts used are thereby becoming  
increasingly secure; strongly connected. 
 
 
In Row (G) 37, G shows that he is able to perceive similarity across 
settings, including between narrative and iconic and symbolic contexts. 
37. I ask G to “write down what 
we are doing with the 
thermometer” and tell the 
group that we are going to 
start on 3 and go up 10 
degrees. G thinks we 
should write 3 + 10. For a 
similar question with 
starting point of -3 the boys 
agree that we should write  -
3 + 10 and that the answer 
will be 7. T hey model it 
using the thermometer and 
see that they are right. G is 
excited “I get it. I get it. If 
you go down it puts i t as a 
minus. It’s as if you’re doing 
the sum.” 
G spontaneously extracts the mathematics from the situation. He easily uses the 2 
numbers involved in the question, relating them to each other in terms of starting with 
one temperature value and “going up” by a number of degrees, using the + symbol to 
show that the  first quantity/number is increased by second quantity/number. 
G “sees” the similarity between the screen thermometer display and his own tentative 
attempts to express the temperature changes symbolically: these 2  situations ha ve at 
least one resource in common. He is excited about this. T he span of G’s established 
conceptual resources relating to working with numbers and increasing quantities has 
extended to be perceived as applicable to the temperature context. 
G is able to further reinforce his emerging hypotheses about the mathematics within 
the temperature problems. 
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In Row (G) 63, G has recognised the relevance of a number line model 
and has been using it effectively.  
63. I ask G if he can explain. 
He says that “-5 add 4, i f 
that was a 5 it would be 
zero but it’s not, it’s 4 so 
the zero changes to -1. I did 
this with that game with the 
countries. I said that when 
we went to warmer and 
colder places it was like a 
sum.” T his is the first time 
that he’s made any 
reference to our previous 
sessions, even though the 
calculations have been 
very similar. 
G describes a compensation strategy for calculation. This is something that is likely to 
have been taught in school and G has realised that it might be relevant here – there is 
at least one resourcenode that is common to existing resources that relate to 
“compensation” and to the current task. We have already seen evidence of the 
integration of “Calculations” and “Minus numbers” concepts;  this now suggests that the 
span of another collection of conceptual resources (relating to “Compensation”) has 
been extended. T his will improve alignment of all these concepts. It is interesting that G 
also recognises that some resources relating to these concepts also form part of his 
concepts relating to “Journey” and “Quiz” tasks. 
 
 
Here, he recognises that earlier tasks in which he increased and 
decreased temperature values required similar knowledge and strategies 
to those he has used now. So, span across the tasks or settings is 
established through a new association. It is through the establishment of 
multiple associations that alignment emerges. 
I have outlined a few examples in which extension and testing or 
reinforcement of span and alignment can be inferred. There are many 
other such examples within the complete analysis grid in Chapter 5: 
Analysis of Findings. Span and alignment are constructs used by diSessa 
& Wagner (2005) to describe: how connections between concepts begin 
to become constructed; and how those connections, at first tentative and 
uncertain, can become robust such that they anchor the concepts 
together, providing reciprocal reference points across concepts. 
Connections might be across small pieces of knowledge or across more 
complex knowledge systems or concepts. In all cases, the connection 
itself is an association of common attributes within the learner’s 
experience and knowledge. Some commonality or similarity across 
settings is crucial for growth of concepts. Moreover, learners’ perception 
of that commonality or similarity is also crucial. 
Both C and G showed that, where they perceived some kind of similarity 
– i.e. where existing knowledge resources spanned sufficiently to aspects 
of another task or setting to be triggered in that situation - the boys were 
 242
able to begin to develop understanding of concepts on both sides of the 
associative “bridge”. As conceptual knowledge grew, the boys learned 
more about the nature and the extent of the associations between 
different aspects and elements of related concepts, sometimes leading to 
conflation of ideas at first thought to be separate. 
However, in cases where the boys failed to recognise any similarity 
between elements of their knowledge and experience in a new task or 
setting and existing knowledge (previously demonstrated), conceptual 
modification did not occur and the boys failed to make efficient progress 
with the task. 
6.3 What is similar? 
I have stated that it is not sufficient for similarities between facets of one 
task and another to be perceptible to an observer; that it is essential for 
similarity to be perceived by the learner if conceptual change is to occur. 
Moreover, I have been able to provide evidence from my findings that, on 
numerous occasions, the boys did not appear to recognise structural 
similarities between tasks, even where they had previously demonstrated 
some proficiency with a concept in a previous task. 
A view of mathematics learning set out in “Chapter 2: Literature Review”, 
holds that, for transfer or application of knowledge to occur, some 
similarity in the structure of a problem is recognised and matched to 
knowledge of problems with similar structural characteristics. I argued 
that this view does not explain why children who have been exposed to 
particular structures fail to recognise them in new situations. 
I find an alternative stance more credible; that recognition of similarity 
does not rely on a focus on elements that are external to the learner such 
as structural characteristics – that perception of similarity is necessarily 
subjective and for associations to be developed there must be 
connections with elements of experience and knowledge that are internal 
to the learner and that are recognised by the learner, though not 
necessarily consciously. 
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Wagner (2006) found that his subject’s re-use of knowledge was sensitive 
to different elements of the problem or task. These were: 
• Problem type: the problem can be “distinguished by legitimate 
mathematics descriptors”; 
• Problem aspect; “any detail of a problem or problem situation that 
can be a focus of attention”; 
• Problem context: “the cover story in which the problem is 
embedded”. (p13) 
He found that his subjects’ use of resources varied across a range of 
problem types, problem aspects and problem contexts. He illuminates the 
development of his subject’s understanding of concepts through 
descriptions of his subject’s interpretations of, and effectiveness with, a 
growing range of problem types, aspects and contexts.  
Previous analyses, presented in “Chapter 5; Analysis of Findings” set out 
my inferences about the connections and associations that C and G 
perceived and developed. It is interesting at this point in my discussion to 
consider, from the analysis grids, which facets of a problem or task were 
associated with success or failure for both boys – i.e. whether it was 
problem type, aspect or context (as defined by Wagner 2006). 
6.3.1 Effective re-use of knowledge 
• C Row 3-4: C’s ability to make judgments about “how hot” depend 
on his knowledge about measures of temperature – i.e. sensitivity 
to problem type/problem aspect; 
• C Rows 25 & 27 & 31: C had successfully aligned 2 concepts, 
using problem aspect (temperature change and direction of that 
change) to support this alignment; 
• C Row 36: C co-ordinates a wider range of conceptual resources 
effectively, focusing on a different problem aspect – i.e. 
understanding that colder temperatures are associated with more 
clothes; 
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• C Rows 39 and 51: C’s concept of negative numbers is 
developing; he can now order negative numbers in relation to zero 
– i.e. problem type; 
• G Row 12: G attempts to co-ordinate concepts that contain 
conflicting ideas. He uses the problem context to support him in 
making decisions about how to resolve the conflict; 
• G Row 15: The setting of the “Journey” task (i.e. problem context) 
appears to be at the front of G’s mind as he confidently solves 
problems in the next (“Cards”) task. There is a similarity between 
an aspect of the 2 tasks in that they both involved the names of 
countries linked with numbers; 
• G Row 22: G’s decision to use a number line model to solve 
problems with the ordered cards is likely to have been triggered by 
the problem type; 
• G Row 30: Within the same context, a change in the structure of 
the problem does not cause G any difficulty – he recognises 
similarity in problem type; 
• G Row 63: In a new context, G recognises similarities in problem 
type.  
6.3.2 Knowledge not re-used effectively 
• C Row 81: When working on the “Balloons” task, C fails to 
recognise relevance of number lines that he had used proficiently 
in earlier work together – i.e. problem context; 
• G Row 67: G failed to recognise a vertical line as a prompt to draw 
a number line when the problem context changed significantly. 
In summary, I do not find these reflections on the boys’ effective and 
ineffective re-use of knowledge in relation to problem type, aspect or 
context to be very enlightening. However, there is one pattern that is 
perhaps worthy of note – i.e. that, where type is similar and context is the 
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same, C was able to form associations between resources but that, 
where context is different across tasks (even where type is the same) C’s 
resources did not span effectively. Therefore, C’s ability to transfer across 
contexts was very limited. 
Also, it is important to note that there were several instances (described 
previously) where C’s failure to re-use knowledge does not seem to relate 
to problem type, aspect or context. 
6.4 Beginning to learn about negative numbers 
6.4.1 What do children do/say that suggests or illuminates the 
trajectory of growth of their specific conceptual knowledge? 
The main focus for my study is the growth of knowledge about a new 
concept, specifically about negative numbers. As described in “Chapter 4: 
Methodology” the tasks were designed to facilitate the growth of 
knowledge about negative numbers, along a learning pathway that my 
own knowledge led me to believe is logical and progressive. 
For each of the boys I have re-visited the analysis grid and have 
constructed Tables 4a and 4b shown below. These tables set out the 
learning trajectories for each boy. 
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Session
/ task 
Row What does C do or say?/What can be inferred 
about C’s thinking? 
Se
ss
io
n
 
1:
 
“
Jo
u
rn
e
y”
 
35 All minus numbers are same as zero 
36 Compares -6 with zero using FC clothes  
37 Compares -6 with -4 using FC clothes 
38 Thinks -3 less than -4 
39 Thinks closer to zero means warmer 
Se
ss
io
n
 
2:
 
“
Ca
rd
s”
 
a
n
d 
“
Qu
iz”
 
44 Thinks “zero is lowest number”. Does not discriminate between 
signed and unsigned numbers 
47 Begins to see digit as indicator of distance from zero – able to 
order “minus numbers” 
50 Separates signed and unsigned numbers 
53 C does know what is between 3 and 5 
54 C does not know what is between -6 and -8 
57 Realises -6 and -8 are “minus numbers”. Still doesn’t know what is 
between the 2 values 
59 Faulty counting strategy 
Se
ss
io
n
 
3:
 
“
Qu
iz”
 
in
clu
di
n
g 
u
se
 
o
f 
th
e
rm
o
m
et
e
r 
61 & 66 Thinks -6 might be the answer to 12 lower than 12 
67 Knows that “go down” same as “minus” 
68 Thinks zero might be the answer to 1º warmer than -4º 
69 Knows -3 is warmer than -4 because it’s closer to zero 
70 Knows “colder” same as “take away” 
71-74 Very confused about minus sign and “Celsius” 
75 Knows “warmer” same as “add to” 
76-77 Records temperature changes symbolically (correctly) 
Se
ss
io
n
 
4:
 
“
Ba
llo
o
n
s”
 
79 Spontaneously uses number line though uses faulty counting 
strategy 
80 Fails to “read” minus sign 
81 Thinks zero is lowest number 
84 Knows “minus” same as “go below, take away” 
85 Recognises similarity with temperature tasks 
86-91 Consistently effective within the game, using commutative law 
and elementary calculation strategies 
Table 4a – Brief summary of selected events in C’s learning 
trajectory (full account in Chapter 5) 
Table 4a sets out how C’s knowledge of an extended number system, 
including negative numbers, grew steadily during “Journey”. In the next 
session, as he started work with “Cards” and then “Quiz”, C’s knowledge 
about the extended number system faltered at first but soon recovered, 
slow to recognise the relevance of learning from Session 1. Also, a poor 
understanding about “between” hampered his effectiveness, as did faulty 
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counting strategies. Upon returning to “Quiz” in Session 3, C’s extended 
number system knowledge was, again, very weak, never recovering to 
the level he had demonstrated in Session 1. In Session 3 he was able to 
show growing understanding of relationships and connections between 
some basic key concepts, though he was working at a generally low level 
of difficulty. He also showed that he was effective in a symbolic 
environment.  
In the “Balloons” task in Session 4, C again started at a very low level of 
understanding. At one point he experienced a moment of recognition that 
adding the numbers on the balloons was similar in some way to earlier 
work with temperatures and Father Christmas. After this, Table 4a shows 
a marked increase in his knowledge in this area. 
C’s trajectory was, therefore, rather erratic, showing a series of 
developments and relapses in his knowledge. Although the links across 
the tasks, in terms of concepts involved, might be clear or obvious to an 
onlooker, they were not clear to C. When he did perceive such 
connections, as he did towards the end of “Balloons”, he was able to 
quickly improve his effectiveness in the task, displaying increasingly 
secure knowledge 
G’s development and re-use of knowledge is described in Table 4b. G’s 
knowledge and effectiveness in the same conceptual areas, far 
outstripped C’s. It is interesting to note that there is evidence that G had, 
available to him, a range of relevant knowledge resources, and that those 
resources became enhanced and connected, from the earliest stages of 
our work together; C’s fledgling knowledge about an extended number 
system was not discernible until a much later stage. C’s resources did not 
achieve effectiveness beyond some basic tasks and problems. G, on the 
other hand, was able to move his learning forward, not only developing 
understanding of an extended number system but also showing that he 
could function and operate and reason mathematically within it. There 
were occasions where G was forced to confront some tension or 
misconception in his knowledge but, where these occurred, he quickly 
regained any lost ground and moved to a new level.  
 248
Table 4b – Brief summary of selected events in G’s learning 
trajectory (full account in Chapter 5) 
Session/ 
task 
Row What does G do or say?/What can be inferred 
about G’s thinking? 
Se
ss
io
n
 
1:
 
“
Jo
u
rn
e
y”
 
9 Already aware of “minus numbers” 
10 G learns largely by observing the other boys about ordering negative 
numbers 
12 Sense making, co-ordination of related concepts (higher/lower, 
increase/decrease, warmer/colder) 
13 Further evidence of effective co-ordination 
14 “Clonk” (number line) strategy to bridge zero 
Se
ss
io
n
 
2:
 
“
Ca
rd
s”
 
a
n
d 
“
Qu
iz”
,
 
in
clu
di
n
g 
u
se
 
of
 
th
e
rm
o
m
et
e
r 
15 Negative numbers “read” efficiently 
20 Able to describe direction of change and difference between 2 negative 
numbers 
21 Loses confidence in counting strategies temporarily. Conflict not resolved 
25 Counting strategy challenged again – still no resolution 
26 Sees what he was doing wrong 
30 Successful on question with slightly different structure 
32 Sees connection between “Minus” and “down” 
33 This connection reinforced. Knows temperature rise makes positive 
(unsigned) change 
34 Asks for more examples (reinforcement) to give him more confidence 
35 Adopts “gap” explanation of difference. 
37 Can record correctly using symbols 
39 Acknowledges that he is adding a minus number, though cannot accept 
that minus minus is possible 
40 Loses confidence in his understanding of “add minus” just learned 
43 Able to keep up with my “minus minus” explanation (“undoing”) 
45 Wants more practice 
Se
ss
io
n
 
3:
 
“
Ba
llo
o
n
s”
 
48 Effective when adding 5 numbers 
49-51 Largely effective but  retains focus on digits rather than sign, leading to 
wrong answer 
53 Confused again about whether “minus” and “plus” numbers can be 
added together 
55 Reverts to thinking “You can’t add a minus” 
59 Knows that subtracting from a minus number gives solution “ with bigger 
digits and you’re on the minus side” 
63 Describes a compensation strategy for -5 + 4 
65 Co-ordinates multiple concepts: difference, temperature, “Journey” task, 
calculations/operations 
71-2 Achieves understanding (again) that 9 - -8 means “undoing” a minus 8 
previously executed 
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In the “Journey” task, G worked very hard to make sense of the resources 
that must be employed simultaneously in order to meet the challenges of 
the task. In this session, we saw that, following a significant development 
in G’s knowledge, he seemed to experience something of a relapse. It 
was sometimes only after further opportunities to “learn” a particular 
extension to his knowledge that it became more reliable. This was evident 
in all sessions, with different concepts. 
In “Quiz”, G extended his ability to co-ordinate relevant key concepts and 
went on to operate in different ways using all parts of his extended 
number system. This ability to operate mathematically using new 
knowledge resources was also evident when the task changed. Any 
temporary regression during “Balloons” was due to a demand for a more 
advanced knowledge than had been developed or tested in “Quiz”, as 
well as to the requirement for de-contextualisation. 
I should point out that the reason that an additional session was 
conducted for C’s group was because their rate of progress through the 
tasks was much slower than for G’s group. 
6.4.2 What did the boys find difficult? 
C: 
In the early stages of our work together, C had some difficulty with 
remembering or understanding the objective of the “Journey” task. He 
also focused on trying to judge whether any given number was “a lot”, 
wanting to understand “how hot” each number is. He did not realise for a 
while that he needed to focus on comparing and ordering numbers to play 
the game because he was distracted by the context. 
C showed that he often fails to re-use new information. There were 
several occasions where he appeared to have forgotten something which 
he had known a short time previously. (This is likely to be due to low 
cueing priority of new resources.) 
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A major difficulty for C was in his apparent lack of perception of the minus 
sign used to denote negative numbers. He failed to “see” the sign on 
numerous occasions throughout the sessions. 
When his group first encounters zero in “Journey”, C was very excited. 
From his subsequent responses it appears that this excitement was 
because he thought they had achieved the objective of the task – that 
zero was the lowest number they would find. It is clear that C had no 
concept that included a world beyond zero. This belief – that “zero is the 
lowest number” – and C’s apparent “blindness” to the minus sign 
persisted into Session 2, even after he had acknowledged and worked 
with negative numbers in Session 1. 
Another difficulty for C was with the idea of “between”: he did not 
understand that the numbers quoted are excluded (i.e. that neither 3 nor 
6 can be “between 3 and 6”). He also made many errors because of a 
faulty counting process. 
(It is possible that these misconceptions are linked in that C might 
perceive some connection: he might think that the “rules” about counting-
on and counting-back - that 7 is 3 more than 4 because the start number 
is not counted but the end number is included – apply to “between” as 
well. If this were true, it is understandable that C thinks the values 
between 4 and 7 are 5,6 and 7.) 
In C’s 3rd session (of 4) he showed that he had learned to compare 2 
numbers and evaluate which is higher or warmer but that he was not able 
to count or calculate the difference between them. He did begin to 
experience some success with this before the end of Session 3. 
C was comfortable and secure with his knowledge of “-“ as an instruction 
to subtract or take away, though his newly extended number system 
concept was more fragile. 
In the main, C did not appear to conceive of negative numbers in a 
quantity dimension (Peled 1991). He dids have some knowledge of 
negative numbers in a number line dimension, though this wasnaïve and 
incomplete. His experience with subtraction of positive integers enabled 
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him to conceive of negative vectors but his experience with negative 
points was very recent and any development of this concept was very 
limited. 
C’s concept of zero was another source of difficulty for him. He did not 
include it when counting in either direction, compounding his counting 
errors. 
In general, C is very “rules-bound”. He did remember some rules about 
numbers, counting and calculations and often used them effectively. He 
did, sometimes, apply such rules (i.e. “old” knowledge) in the new task 
setting, with some success but without the understanding that would help 
him to know why the rules “work” (or do not). He applied old knowledge 
quite blindly, as Wagner (2006) describes as characteristic of Class C 
transfer. 
C found it difficult to add strings of numbers, getting confused and making 
mistakes. At the end of Session 4, it occured to C that he could “put all 
the adds together and all the minuses together”. This was the first 
indication that he might perceive numbers as quantities, as well as points 
and vectors, and that he was intuitively exploring a neutralisation model, 
rather than a number line model, for operating with sets of mixed positive 
and negative numbers. 
G: 
G did not encounter any real difficulty until, when working on the  “Quiz” 
task, he questioned his own knowledge about counting; he founds that he 
was unsure of whether the destination number should be included in the 
count. He did not resolve this question at this point; rather, he seemed to 
extrapolate that, if the destination number is to be included when counting 
on or back, then there is no logical reason why that start number should 
not also be included (Row (G) 21). Having voiced his uncertainty at that 
point in the task, G did not obviously accept or reject the idea that 
destination numbers, and possibly start numbers, should be included 
when counting on or back to find difference. In subsequent counting-on or 
counting-back activities, G reverted to his established knowledge (that the 
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destination number is included but the start number is not) without 
remark. Again, this supports the notion of reliability priority and its role in 
conceptual change, transfer and knowledge. 
There are other occasions during the tasks when G showed that he was 
aware of uncertainty and inconsistencies in his knowledge – i.e.  when he 
was actively, even consciously, extending span and aligning concepts. An 
example of this occured when the boys were learning how to use the 
virtual thermometer and how it might help them: G has, within his 
resources, a sense-making mechanism “minus means you’re going 
down” and was, at first, comfortable in using that SMM in the new 
context. However, he quickly began to doubt its relevance and I speculate 
that this is because he found little in the new context that was similar to 
previous experience where “minus means you’re going down”. He did not 
reject the impulse to apply this knowledge to the new setting; rather, he 
actively sought to build his confidence in its relevance by talking about his 
thinking and asking for more examples to work with. 
In a similar way, G grappled with the notion of “add a minus” – at first, he 
questioned the relevance of his existing knowledge to the new setting, 
perceiving some kind of similarity but seeking the reassurance of success 
with the new knowledge in the new setting before he had sufficient 
confidence in its relevance to accept and include it in his conceptual 
knowledge. 
Soon afterwards, he questioned again whether it was appropriate to 
consider adding a minus, though he very quickly accepted it this time (the 
level of reliability priority has increased) and soon moved on to consider 
how to “minus minus”. 
G made very good progress through the tasks, his concept of negative 
numbers developing very quickly. He showed that he intuitively adopted a 
number line model for counting and calculating differences between 
temperatures and, later, between numbers. He also showed, when 
working on “Balloons”, that his knowledge included “neutralisation” 
strategies, though when he did this, it was still linked to a number line 
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image (Rows (G) 57-8). He was able to understand numbers as points 
and vectors (as on a number line) and as quantities that might be traded 
and balanced against each other. 
Did the boys find the same things difficult? 
The nature of the difficulties experienced by both boys was quite 
disparate. C was unlikely to re-use new knowledge: there were several 
occasions when he failed to mention or re-use knowledge that he had 
demonstrated he previously had available to him. On these occasions he 
appears to have “forgotten” what he had recently appeared to have 
learned; however, it is actually more likely that new resources simply 
were not triggered – not that they had been lost. Within his more 
established knowledge, he relied heavily on rules and sometimes had 
misconceptions and very fragile knowledge of basic mathematics  - e.g. 
zero, between, counting. 
C’s flawed existing knowledge, itself largely instrumental rather than 
relational, coupled with the low cueing priority of knowledge about new 
information and recent experience, meant that C’s learning was slow. 
New concepts ( i.e. extension of the number system, comparing, ordering 
and operating with negative numbers in different contexts) developed in a 
very fragmentary and uneven fashion. Overall, the difficulties that C had 
in extending span of his resources meant that relevance was not 
recognised and conceptual growth was, therefore, limited and marked by 
“relapses” in his conceptual development. 
G, on the other hand, only demonstrated difficulty where he was trying to 
align new knowledge with old. His own awareness of the development of 
new concepts contributed directly to his confidence in his knowledge as it 
expanded and adjusted its scope and span. It was this fluctuating 
confidence that was the main reason for dips in G’s effectiveness 
throughout the tasks. 
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6.4.3 Does the literature predict these trajectories for conceptual 
growth about negative numbers?  
Peled (1991) set out a hierarchy of knowledge about negative numbers. 
She maintained that children’s experience and representation of negative 
numbers is in two dimensions: a number line dimension and a quantity 
dimension. Peled set out 4 levels of knowledge through which children 
develop their knowledge in each dimension. 
Number line dimension: 
In the number line dimension, the growth of knowledge starts with 
knowing that negative numbers exist “to the left of zero on the number 
line “ (Peled 1991; p 146) and understanding that their order reflects that 
of positive numbers. At the next level, children learn that the direction of 
movement along the number line when numbers are added or subtracted 
is the same on the extension to the number line – i.e. that addition (of an 
unsigned number) is movement to the right, whether operating from a 
positive or a negative number. At this level, children will “agree” to move 
to the right, through zero, if the start number is negative and the number 
to be added is larger. At Level 3, children learn how to deal with 
operations on pairs of numbers with the same sign; that just as in the 
positive world where adding a positive number to a positive number  
gives a value that is even more positive, the same happens in the 
negative world. In this way, children understand that adding a negative 
number to a negative number increase the negativity of the answer (-3 + -
2 = -5) and that subtracting a negative from a negative number, the 
answer will be less negative than the start number (i.e. -3 - -2 = -1). At 
Level 4, for the first time, children are able to perform operations with 
pairs and strings of numbers which have different signs, and starting from 
both positive or negative start numbers. 
Quantity dimension: 
In this dimension, numbers are “amounts of things” (Peled, 1991 p 148), 
though some things carry unfavourable, or negative, connotations; things 
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such as debt. At Level 1 in the quantity dimension the way that numbers 
are ordered (that is, the interpretation of whether numbers are large or 
small) is different to that in the number line dimension because a large 
negative amount is a smaller value than a smaller negative amount 
which, in turn, is of smaller value than a small positive amount.  
In the context of “Journey” (and therefore temperatures), the conflict 
between a decrease/increase comparison and the higher/lower 
comparison exemplifies the difference between the number line 
dimension and the quantity dimension. In Row (G)12  G compares -13 
and -3. At first he believes that -3 is lower than -13; saying that the change 
is a decrease, indicating that he is thinking in the number line dimension 
(Level 3). However, he changes his mind, perhaps because he takes into 
consideration the temperatures context, and says that a change from -13 
to -3 is an increase – this is Level 1 in the quantity dimension.  
At Level 2, children are able to subtract a large number from a smaller 
positive number by bridging through zero and the answer is designated a 
deficiency by adding a ”–“ sign. 
At Level 3 children can, from a negative start number, add and subtract 
negative quantities. Amounts need to be of the same type until Level 4 
when they can be of different types, as in the number line dimension 
where ”the effect of the operation is determined by the operation and the 
sign of the second number” (Peled 1991, p 149), regardless of whether 
the first number is positive or negative, or whether the sign is the same or 
different to the first number.  
It is interesting to consider G’s and C’s development in their knowledge 
about negative numbers in relation to Peled’s framework. G achieved a 
secure Level 3 in the number line dimension and was beginning to 
demonstrate Level 4 knowledge. In the quantity dimension, he confidently 
worked with Level 2 representations, though any performance beyond 
this level was only evident when linked with a number line as well. 
C did achieve Level 1 in the number line dimension, though this was 
hard-won. He does not appear to have developed his knowledge beyond 
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this level, His knowledge did not seem to be even at Level 1 in the 
quantity dimension; however, in Row (C) 64, he referred to what a friend 
called the lowest temperature as “the highest … of the coldest” – this 
suggests that he does have some naïve knowledge about negative 
numbers in the quantity dimension. Also, at the end of the final session 
his comment strongly indicated a readiness for development in this 
dimension when he suggested putting “all the adds together and all the 
minuses together” (Row (C ) 91). 
There appears to be a significant disparity between the extent to which 
the boys developed their concept of negative numbers during our work 
together. 
Bruno & Martinon (1996; 1999) develop their own framework for 
analysing knowledge of negative numbers. They expanded Peled’s 
(1991) framework to include the number line dimension as she had but 
they divided the quantity dimension into distinct “abstract” and 
“contextual” dimensions.  Bruno & Martinon (1996) summarise: 
“Pure and symbolic mathematical knowledge is found in the 
abstract dimension. Use of numerical knowledge in concrete 
situations is found in the contextual dimension. Finally, 
identification of numbers with points on the number line is found in 
the number line dimension.” (p 161) 
Considering this classification, both C and G may be seen to have held 
more knowledge about negative numbers in the quantity dimension than 
my interpretation of Peled’s framework had revealed. 
My analysis of the boys’ achievements, related to Bruno & Martinon’s 
framework are shown in Figures 6.4(C) & 6.4(G).  
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Bruno & Martinon considered children’s ability to translate a situation or 
operation presented in one dimension into the same situation or operation 
described in another dimension. A particular interest for them was to 
contrast the work of groups of more and less able children. 
Quantity 
(abstract) 
 
Quantity 
(contextual) 
Number line 
Quantity 
(abstract) 
Quantity 
(contextual
) 
Number line 
Figure 6.4(C) C’s successful 
transferences between dimensions for 
negative numbers. (see Bruno & 
Martinon 1996) 
(Each arrow represents an occurrence of 
transference between 2 dimensions) 
Figure 6.4(G)  G’s successful 
transferences between dimensions for 
negative numbers. (see Bruno & 
Martinon 1996)  
(Each arrow represents an occurrence of 
transference between 2 dimensions) 
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Bruno & Martinon found that, for all groups, transferences from abstract 
to number line were more difficult than from contextual to number line. 
This was not true for C nor G who both achieved abstract to number line 
transferences quite reliably at the end of our final session. 
Bruno & Martinon also found that children find it difficult to transfer 
between abstract and contextual. Although C did not get the opportunity 
to translate from the abstract to the contextual, he did show that he could 
do the reverse; something which Bruno & Martino only observed in their 
most able subjects. G was successful in both directions between abstract 
and contextual. 
Bruno & Martinon found that, amongst the less able children, translation 
between number line and contextual dimensions, in either direction, was 
much more likely to occur than any transference involving the abstract 
dimension. As already noted, C did achieve translation from abstract to 
number line. We see, then, that C’s development of a concept of negative 
numbers was not as Bruno & Martinon’s framework would have predicted 
since he achieved a level of transference between dimensions that only 
Bruno & Martinon’s most able subjects achieved. 
G also achieved more than Bruno & Martinon’s framework would have 
predicted in that he did experience some success in translation from 
abstract to contextual, something that Bruno & Martinon’s subjects found 
extremely difficult. 
Generally, my analysis shows that Bruno & Martinon’s framework under-
estimates what the boys were actually able to do. 
6.5 Resources 
6.5.1 What internal and external resources do children use to 
support their work in this area? How are they used? 
A range of resources were available in each session. Resources may be 
considered as internal or external or a combination of these. External 
 259
resources include those that were intentionally provided as part of the 
task as well as some others used by the children, though their use had 
not been anticipated. External resources were:- 
• Large map 
• Father Christmas model 
• Database of temperatures in many countries 
• Animated page linked to database, showing, for each country 
represented, a thermometer, the country’s flag, the temperature 
represented as a number, a picture of Father Christmas wearing 
clothing appropriate to that temperature 
• A set of cards, each showing the name of a country and the 
associated temperature 
• Thermometer (Interactive Teaching Program) 
• Quiz questions displayed on the PC, interactive to the extent that 
children selected their own questions 
• (non-interactive) map linked to “Quiz” 
• Paper and pencils 
• CD-ROM based suite of games, including “Balloons” 
• Ruler 
• Globe 
• Researcher as facilitating observer 
Internal resources include children’s memories, attitudes, skills and 
knowledge. They include the wide range of conceptual resources 
described in Figure 3 and Table 1 (“Model of learning” and ”Catalogue of 
constructs”. ) 
It was notable that the 2 boys did not always use resources in the same 
way. 
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Both boys used knowledge gained from previous experience relating to 
geography and travel. At times, this resource was the basis of knowledge 
and ideas about the temperature in different countries, and about 
variations in temperature relating to a country’s position on the map, in 
relation to the north pole, or the equator, or to another country. 
C uses knowledge about Spain and about Egypt (which he has learned 
from books and TV). He appears to have some knowledge about 
Germany and about the Arctic. These internal resources all facilitate C’s 
engagement with the “Journey” task. His “NT” concept is not well 
developed at the outset, though he does have some knowledge of 
temperature comparisons – for example, he thinks Spain is hot and that 
Madagascar is hotter than Kenya. 
G has knowledge about France that he uses as a resource for making 
predictions about comparisons with Spain and UK. 
C pays a lot of attention to the image of Father Christmas wearing 
appropriate clothes in each country. It was noted previously that C uses 
this resource to enable him to compare the temperatures in countries that 
the boys visit in the “Journey” task, showing that he is not able to 
compare the numbers directly and uses Father Christmas’s clothes as an 
interpretive tool. C is amused by the images of Father Christmas, 
especially when he has only few clothes on. G, on the other hand, shows 
little interest in Father Christmas’s clothes after the first 2 or 3 countries. 
G’s use of the cards shows that he does not pay attention, at first, to the 
name of the country on the card; he focuses on the number when solving 
the numerical aspect of the problems presented and is not distracted or 
interested by the country name until (or unless) he needs to look at it in 
order to furnish the answer to the quiz question. 
An interesting resource, drawn upon heavily by C, is his respect for his 
friend N’s opinion. There are many instances in the plain account of the 
work of C’s group that show that C trusts what N thinks and says, more 
than he trusts his own knowledge. 
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The thermometer ITP was adopted by G as a helpful resource. He was 
able to use it to support him when counting or calculating temperature 
increases and decreases. C, however, was not able to use it effectively. 
At one point, G picked up a ruler when he is struggling to understand a 
number line problem, as if he associates a ruler with a number line. 
However, he was unable to remember how to use it as a tool for working 
with number line problems. 
An important resource for both boys was their existing knowledge about 
numbers: how to order them and calculate difference between them; how 
to add and subtract; any previous exposure to, or experience with, 
negative numbers. 
6.5.2 Abstractions as resources 
A further type of internal resource, used by both boys, is the set of any 
previously formed situated abstractions that they re-use in the tasks. 
There are many examples of evidence of these, including:- 
C 
• “Minus 6 means you take 6 away from 6” etc etc (Row 35); 
• 
-3 is less than -4 (Row 38); 
• (Last time we came) “minus was hot” (Row 41); 
• “zero is the lowest number” (Row 44); 
• Snow metaphor (Row 48); 
• Learns that “minus means under zero” (Row 55); 
• “Go down” is same as “minus” (Row 68); 
• “Minus means take away” (minus as sign or operator is associated 
with take away by C) (Row 82 and subsequently); 
• 20 - 6 - 8 is same as 20 - 8 – 6 (Row 86); 
• When adding, add the highest number first (Rows 87 & 89). 
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G 
• 21 does not match with expectation for Madagascar (Row 1); 
• Countries near the equator are very hot (Row 2); 
• Countries that have sand are “really hot” (Row 5); 
• France is not hotter than Spain (Row 6); 
• Travelling to countries close by will mean temperature difference is 
small and game will last longer (Row 7); 
• Clonk (Row 14); 
• Further away from equator on the map is colder (Row 17); 
• 9 + -8 is same as -8 + 9 (Row 56). 
In most cases, these previously formed abstractions were helpful to the 
boys in addressing the challenges they faced in our work together. For 
example, G’s previously formed abstractions generally support his 
development of new conceptual knowledge related to our tasks. This was 
not always true, however: for instance, C’s abstraction that “minus 6 
means you take 6 away from 6” and that “minus 5 is 5 away from 5” led 
him to deduce that all “minus numbers” had the same value as each other 
and the same value as zero and that “zero is the lowest number”. 
Another of C’s abstractions that hindered, rather than helped, him was 
the link he had constructed between “go down” and “minus”. He did not 
discriminate between the minus sign as “-“ or as “-“. This led him to over-
simplify the “rule” that he thought he had recognised, leading to difficulties 
such as in Row 73 in which C had seen the minus sign attached to the 
start number as an indication that he should “go down”, paying no 
attention to the operator or to the question context. (Spooner, (2002) 
pointed out that children’s over-application of a generalisation in this way 
is often the root of a misconception.) 
Some of those listed above are abstractions that may have been 
generated within the context of our tasks. For example, it is not clear 
whether C’s “snow” metaphor was actually something he brought with 
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him to the task (as he wanted me to think) or whether it was something 
he noticed while we were working.  
There were several instances where both boys formed abstractions within 
our work together. As outlined in “Chapter 2: Literature Review”, Pratt & 
Noss (2002) believe that abstractions formed in a setting will be 
expressed and understood by children in language and images linked to 
the settings in which they are developed, and that these “situated 
abstractions” are internal resources for sense-making within the setting in 
which they are constructed.  
Pratt & Noss also felt that, in new settings – even where similarities with a 
previous setting are perceived - children will only attempt to use situated 
abstractions recently generated in that previous setting after they have 
explored the effectiveness of longer-established knowledge and found it 
lacking. This is indicative of the effect of a system of priority for triggering 
or cueing of internal resources. Pratt & Noss believe that high cueing 
priority takes time to develop since effectiveness of resources can only be 
established through repeated reinforcement. My interpretation is that 
effective co-ordination of different resources is dependant on the cueing 
of the most appropriate resources, including (not excluding) those 
recently formed. Therefore, it is to be expected that the capacity to co-
ordinate relevant resources in new settings develops iteratively and 
slowly since it is dependant on newly constructed resources achieving 
high cueing priority. Several examples have been noted in which recently 
formed resources and associations were not readily cued because other 
(longer-held) resources had higher cueing priority. 
6.5.3 Other resources 
Use of metaphors 
The first task, ”Journey” introduced a metaphor to help the boys 
understand the task. They were already familiar with the notion that 
Father Christmas needs to be at the North Pole on Christmas Eve and 
that he travels all over the world with magical ease. They were already 
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familiar with the type of clothes that he is normally depicted wearing – i.e. 
red and white suit with boots, hat and perhaps cloak. The key metaphors 
that were inherent within the task were: Father Christmas homeward 
bound on Christmas Eve, travelling through progressively colder 
temperatures, necessitating the addition of more clothing. Williams & 
Linchevski (1997) and Linchevski & Williams (1999) believe that the use 
of metaphors is valuable to children learning about negative numbers but 
stress that it is difficult to devise authentic goals and that, where 
authenticity is lacking the metaphor’s potential to support learning is 
limited. The metaphors inherent in “Journey”, including the goals of the 
activity, appear to have been sufficiently authentic, and therefore helpful, 
for both boys. Both of them spontaneously referred to and re-used these 
metaphors in the subsequent “Quiz” task, even though no images of 
Father Christmas, nor any suggestion of number lines or movement in a 
north/south orientation were present in “Quiz”. 
Both of the boys also showed that they had constructed their own 
idiosyncratic metaphors that spanned to the new situation and were 
therefore used in the context of our tasks. C told me about the “piles of 
snow” that he thought about when comparing sub-zero temperatures. I 
was not completely convinced that this metaphor existed previously for C 
and suspected that he constructed it while we were working on the task. It 
was, nonetheless, a valuable metaphor that helped him make sense of 
the world of temperatures below zero that he seemed to be discovering 
for the first time.  
G’s “clonk” (which has previously been described in Chapter 5: Analysis 
of Findings) was very helpful to him. More of an image than a metaphor, it 
supported G in moving effectively along a number line in both directions. 
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6.6 Affective factors 
6.6.1 Mindfulness 
G, on several occasions, showed that he was aware of his own thinking 
and sometimes voiced his confidence (or lack thereof) in particular 
aspects of his knowledge. He showed a mature understanding of some of 
the processes that help him to learn, including the need to reinforce new 
knowledge. He told us that he sometimes had a sense of new knowledge 
slipping away; that it had started to hold some meaning for him but that 
he was not able to re-use it without “some more practice”. This might be 
seen as evidence of an intuitive drive to increase cueing priority. 
In Chapter 2: Literature Review, it was noted that Salomon & Perkins 
(1989) described 2 types of transfer – “low-road” and “high-road”. One of 
the key differences between these 2 types is the level of mindfulness (or 
conversely, automaticity) that is involved. The authors argue that low-
road transfer is achieved through varied practice and that high-road 
transfer is achieved through mindful abstraction that “depends on 
conscious control and analytic awareness” (p128). It would appear that G 
is demonstrating mindfulness and that he will achieve high-road transfer 
of those concepts or resources. It could be argued that G is so analytical 
in his thinking that he is able to analyse processes and behaviours after 
they have become automatic (automaticity is achieved through low-road 
transfer) and achieve high-road transfer post-hoc, something that 
Salomon & Perkins accept is possible for some learners. However, I 
would argue that G’s comments about his own thinking and his learning 
needs are very much “in-action” and therefore not retrospective. He is, 
therefore, on these occasions, working towards high-road transfer. One 
exciting outcome for G’s learning about learning, and knowledge of 
himself as a learner is pointed out by Salomon & Perkins, 
“The payoff of such activities, of course, is not just particular 
transfers made, but the establishment of an expectation for 
transfer”. (p136) 
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G is likely, therefore, to continue to seek, and be confident that he will be 
able to find, meaning in new situations. 
C did not show much awareness of his own understanding, though he did 
sometimes bemoan his lack of understanding, demonstrating some 
awareness of that. We saw that C did become able to use recently 
learned knowledge, though only after repeated opportunities for 
reinforcement. Salomon & Perkins (1989) point out, when considering 
low-road transfer, 
“Transfer occurs to the extent that a new circumstance calls on a 
complex of procedures overlapping a complex that was previously 
well-exercised. Varied practice would yield more transfer by 
exercising a wider variety of related complexes …” .(p120) 
The need to “exercise” complexes or concepts or other internal resources 
was something both boys were conscious of, though G’s needs revolved 
around his wish to analyse and generalise, as well as to be able to 
remember his new knowledge in the future. This conscious focus on 
future use of knowledge currently under development indicates a high 
level of mindfulness and is something that C did not demonstrate. 
6.6.2 Confidence, confusion and conflict 
Both boys display at least some confidence throughout our work together, 
with occasional lapses. There are many occasions where C shows his 
lack of confidence and his awareness of this. Sometimes, he is able to 
purposefully choose for himself external resources that he thinks will 
support him. In Row (C) 50 he chooses to use others in the group: 
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50. I ask C to describe why 
Netherlands (4º) is where 
he’s put it. At first C says 
“Who agrees with me to put 
it there?” He goes on to say 
“Because it’s under the 5. 
It’s 4.”I ask him why he 
didn’t put it  “down 
there” (towards the bottom 
of the table) because that 
would be under the 5 
wouldn’t it? But he knows it 
shouldn’t go in the “minus 
section”. .. “Because that 
would be under zero.” 
C is right. When I challenge his use of “under the 5” by suggesting that anywhere on 
the table that is not at the level of 5 or above would be a correct answer to this 
question, he confidently (and correctly) tells me that to put it below zero would put it in 
“the minus section” and that would mean that it was “under zero”. This shows that C 
realises that -5 is quite different to 5 – something he did not believe at the beginning of 
the session. From this I understand that C’s readout strategies and his concepts about 
minus numbers, the number system and temperatures have modified. 
 
On another occasion he thinks that the image of FC and the clothes he is 
wearing will help him: 
26. Until now C seems to have 
understood the objectives 
very well but when they visit 
Ethiopia (16º) he shows the 
first sign of confusion. His 
first reaction is “Yes! 16!” 
But then he says worriedly, 
“But it’s less hot. Last time 
he was having a coat on, 
wasn’t he?” He revisits 
Kenya to check. “He’s got 
no coat on. Blue t-shirt and 
shorts. Let’s see, Ethio ..  
It’s the same – blue t-shirt 
and .. trousers, and boots – 
he has got more clothes on 
now so that’s alright.” 
The temperature in the last country was 19 (Kenya) and C is initially confident that a 
move to a country with a temperature of 16 is valid.  However, he questions his 
judgement when he (mis-) remembers that FC had a coat on at the last stop so he 
“goes back” to check. He is reassured when he realises that FC has even more 
clothes on now than before. It appears that C’s attention to FC’s clothes is a readout 
strategy upon which he is quite dependant for giving him confidence in his decisions 
about appropriate journey moves. 
 
C sometimes showed confidence where (I would suggest) it was feigned 
rather than real – e.g. 
12. C wants to go to Spain 
because he says he wants to 
see what it is because he’s 
been to Spain and it’s “real 
hot”. When it’s C’s turn he 
goes to Spain. T he display 
shows 7º. C seems shocked 
and hesitates. I ask him if this 
is what he expected Spain to 
be. He blustered, “Yes, yes. I 
knew Spain was hot.” 
He is shocked when he finds that it is 7º (though he pretends not to be). His shock 
might be evidence of a conflict between his “T W” and “NT” concepts – i.e. he “reads” 
7 as not hot but his resources relating to Spain have led him to expect a “real hot” 
number. It is not clear whether he chooses, at this point, to ignore his uncertainty, or 
whether (without vocalising it) he resolves it by drawing upon another conceptual 
resource that enables him to reason that 7º is hotter than other countries they have 
visited so perhaps, in comparison, 7º is “hot” after all. 
 
However, in general, where C demonstrated or voiced confidence it was 
genuinely felt – e.g. 
24. Kenya is 19º and when I 
point out that FC has got “a 
lot more clothes” here, C 
very confidently says “Yes, 
that’s good, that’s good.” 
C is focused on the rules of the task and is satisfied that this move is in line with aims 
for FC’s journey and with his “NT ” concept. He does not attend to m y hint about “a lot 
more clothes”, my (too subtle for C) attempt to suggest a too-big temperature 
difference. T his reinforces the situated abstraction he has constructed, “more clothes = 
a move in the correct direction when aiming for a colder country”. 
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… and …. 
34. When they visit Czech 
Republic C is very excited 
about the temperature 
being zero, squealing with 
pleasure. He confidently 
tells me that this is less 
than one.. 
C has a resource that zero is less than one and is particularly excited about  visiting a 
country with a temperature of 0º. C seems to attach some special importance to zero – 
perhaps it is simply that he is especially confident about his conceptual resources 
relating to zero and it is this confidence that excites him. 
 
Where C shows well-founded confidence, he also clearly shows that he 
takes pleasure in his confidence. 
Sometimes, C’s confidence wavers (e.g. Row (C) 77). When this 
happens, he seems to want to recover some level of confidence as 
quickly as possible: 
77. We re-open the 
thermometer and set it at -2. 
N needs to add 30. He goes 
to 30 (i.e. adds 32). When 
he corrects himself, C 
thinks he has made a 
mistake. I recap and 
confirm and ask how we 
would write this one down.. 
C writes -2 + 30 = 28. I ask 
N to perform the change on 
the thermometer again. As 
he moves it through zero, C 
says “T here, that’s 2 
warmer so it’s going to be 
another 28.” 
This is another opportunity for C to reinforce the resources he has successfully 
employed with this sort of problem in Rows 75 and 76. N’s error causes C to question 
his own knowledge but he perseveres and regains confidence in his (correct) answer. 
It is clear here that C is “bridging” effectively through zero, using conceptual resources 
that relate numbers to each other (i.e. “knowledge” of number bonds”). 
 
He seeks any explanation for what he ”sees” and quickly adopts new 
ideas without any attempt to explore and understand links with other 
existing resources. C appears to want to find meaning in what he does 
but, in his unquestioning and superficial acceptance of new ideas, he fails 
to construct associations and therefore span across resources. 
G, on the other hand, is not so easily convinced by new ideas; he needs 
and demands to be able to reinforce and consolidate any connections he 
discovers between new and existing knowledge.  
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His confidence is evident in the way he responds to challenges and in the 
way he helps his peers such as in Row (G) 24 : 
24. A later question is “Find a 
country where the 
temperature is between 1 
and -1” T he boys agree 
immediately that there are a 
lot to choose from on the 
table. M wants to answer 
Romania. G argues, 
explaining that he can’t 
have 1, it has to be less 
than one. 
G is very confident in his ability to interpret the precise meaning of the question and 
effectively  co-ordinates relevant conceptual resources including those relating to: 
Negative numbers 
“NT ” 
Counting, comparing and calculating with numbers 
Knowledge about negative numbers as used to represent temperatures 
Between 2 values 
 
Manifestations of G’s confidence, or the lack of it, are linked with his 
capacity for mindfulness and his desire to understand.  
27. L uses cards and gets 
muddled counting up from 
one to the other (Slovakia 
and Albania). M thinks the 
difference is 8 and G says 
its 7. M argues and G 
argues back, reminding him 
that last time they found out 
that they shouldn’t count the 
first place. 
G is now more confident again. He is aware that his confidence has come from the 
previous example in which he was able to see for himself that the start number should 
not be included in a count procedure. 
Co-ordination of relevant conceptual resources is secure. G’s RS and SMMs relating 
to the thermometer scale are secure. 
 
Also, in Row (G) 61, G’s behaviour might be interpreted as suggesting 
that he feels that he does not expect his available resources to help with 
the problem in hand – that he acknowledges the limits of his resources: 
61. I redirect G and the other 
boys to my earlier question : 
9 - -8. They keep saying it 
aloud “Nine minus minus 8”. 
M says “minus, minus” 
several times.G says “I 
know, it’s hard – minus 
minus.” T hey are not at all 
confident about this one. 
G doesn’t attempt to change the order of the numbers . It is possible that this strategy 
is cued but that it doesn’t help with this problem. G doesn’t appear to remember how 
he had succeeded with “minus minus” previously – i.e. by using an “undoing” strategy. 
Perhaps cueing of the commutative strategy is blocking cueing of the undoing strategy 
because it’s recent effectiveness has earned it high reliability priority (for now, at 
least)? 
 
In Row (G) 73, he shows further awareness of his thinking when he tells 
us that he visualises a number line: 
73. I give the boys several 
more examples for them to 
work out on the number 
line and they quickly 
abandon the number line 
and are able to do them 
mentally. G says he 
doesn’t need to draw a 
number line because he 
can “see one in my head”. 
G and the others only draw number lines until they feel confident to work mentally. G 
does not abandon use of his “Number line” resource, however; he simply uses a mental 
representation rather than a concrete diagrammatic one. 
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G’s confidence often appears to be linked with changing cueing priorities. 
For example, in Rows (G) 15 and (G) 26: 
15. When countries with 
temperatures below zero 
appear from the pack, the 
boys take them in their 
stride, except to notice that 
Turkey’s temperature is not 
what they expected. G 
reminds them that “T his is 
around Christmas, though”. 
Negative numbers are read efficiently. 
G’s conceptual resources include a SMM that enables him to reason that Christmas 
temperatures are lower than might normally be associated with countries that we visit 
for holidays in the summer. 
Whereas during the previous activity, G was uncertain about ordering negative 
numbers, today he was more confident – his RS, resources in memory and SMMs 
have modified and he now works effectively with negati ve numbers and is able to 
order them. He did not make mistakes. Span and alignment of resources has 
increased, linking resources that G has relating to numbers. 
 
26. I decide to use the 
thermometer IT P to model a 
number line method for 
working on the Belarus to 
Belgium question. G is able 
to position the starter 
pointer on -3 without any 
difficulty. He can also help 
M to move it to 3. When I 
show that the change has, 
therefore, been 6 not 7 as 
they had answered 
previously, G quickly says 
“That’s because we counted 
that one, Belarus”. He is 
quick to accept their 
mistake and to see why it 
arose. (Maybe he had 
doubted their answer in the 
first place?) 
G is quick to learn how to move the interactive display on the screen thermometer and 
is confident to help his friend. T he highest reliability priority for his counting (include 
“end” number but not “start” number) strategy is re-established when the whole range 
of his conceptual resources relating to it are tested and their alignment reinforced. 
Associations between these resources and those relating to negative numbers are 
also tested and reinforced. 
G’s “NT ” concept is strongly connected to his evolving negative numbers concept. 
 
The basis for G’s confidence is his already robust conceptual knowledge 
of relevant areas. When G encounters ideas and challenges that require 
him to extend and deepen his knowledge, his confidence level drops. G 
ultimately shows that his conceptual resources are sufficient for him to 
construct new connections (therefore extending span) and to develop 
understanding of the nature of those connections (improve alignment). 
However, it is not until he has achieved this that he voices any confidence 
in his knowledge. Even then, he actively seeks opportunities to reinforce 
new knowledge before he expresses his own confidence in it. 
In Rows (G) 20-21 we see an example of G’s lack of confidence as it 
coincides with the point at which he recognises misalignment or non-
alignment of resources: 
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20. Question – “If you travel 
from Russia to Sweden, 
what will happen to the 
temperature? G finds the 
Russia card on the table  (-
6) and counts up to the 
Sweden temperature (-2) 
and says “It will go 4 
degrees higher. 4 degrees 
higher, or 3, I don’t know 
which.” G is confused about 
whether he should count 
Sweden itself in the count. 
G is able to “read” negative numbers. His uncertainty is uncharacteristic of the way he 
works with difference problems. When working with positive (unsigned) numbers he 
works them out efficiently and effectivel y. G’s conceptual resources include a set of 
associated resources that he employs when counting comparing and calculating with 
numbers. (T hese might be seen as a concept “Counting, comparing and calculating 
(“CCC”)” within a broader concept about numbers.) T hese “CCC” resources do not 
extend to resources relating to negative numbers, though he has already shown that  
the span of his  number system concept and associated RS  does include some 
associations with negative numbers. T hese 2 concepts, “CCC” and “Negative 
numbers” are not aligned and this is the reason that G finds himself forced to question 
something that he is surprised to find he is not confident about after all. Previously he 
has coped well with tasks involving ordering and comparing greater/smaller, higher/
lower. So this marks a point of departure for G in that he appears to be working just 
beyond the scope of resources with which he is confident and secure. 
21. Once he has decided that 
he should have “counted” 
Sweden, he also begins to 
think that he should have 
counted Russia at the 
beginning of the count so is 
confused again. (Something 
he was confident with 
previously has now been 
called into question). 
There is something in G’s conceptual resources that makes him think that rules 
should be consistently applied . T his forces him to question a strategy with which he 
had previously been confident that had been a successful part of well established 
concepts about numbers and counting – i.e. he begins to think that he should count 
the start number as his first count when counting to another number. G does not 
resolve this uncertainty at this point and is content to move on, letting someone else 
take the lead for a short time. 
G’s in-the-moment reasoning might have led to construction of a new SMM, (that, 
since the “end” number is counted, the “start” number should be counted too). 
However, this was not succesfully aligned with other resources. 
It is interesting to note that this question does not present G with a similar dilemma 
every time he is confronted by (what I recognise as) similar challenges later in the 
task.  It appears that G’s more established resources, particularly his counting 
strategies have high priority and are therefore readily cued in (at least most) 
subsequent, similar challenges. T o achieve high priority, the new resource would 
need to provoke feedback that shows that the resource has explanatory value in this 
situation. T his feedback is not generated here. 
 
 
The ways in which G and C deal with such crises in their learning 
trajectories are generally quite different. C’s lack of confidence (perhaps 
itself linked to poorly developed cueing priority for new resources) often 
leads him to doubt his own ideas and seek the reassurance or advice of 
others, especially N, as in Rows (C) 7 and (C) 28: 
7.  He also shows, when he 
says in minute 10, “T hat’s 
not a lot!”, that the value for 
temperature in Germany (1 
degree) is not one he 
associates with warmth; he 
is surprised. When no-one 
responds to his “T hat’s not 
a lot!” comment he 
perseveres and tries to 
resolve his uncertainty and 
asks N “Is that a lot?” When 
he gets the response “No”, 
C is satisfied and doesn’t 
pursue the question any 
further. 
C expects Germany to be hot, based on some inference or association that is not 
clear. T he value that is displayed is not one that C associates with high 
temperatures and, though there is some tension/conflict between the 2 concepts, C 
initially trusts his knowledge about numbers used to represent temperature values. 
However, it would seem that he is not completely confident and in the absence of 
reassurance from others, C checks with his friend N, whose judgement he trusts. N 
confirms what C had thought. 
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28. C mumbles something 
about, “Do we want i t 
warmer?” No-one hears or 
replies. When the display 
shows 6º C says “Ahh…” 
and it is only when N starts 
to say “No” that C joins in 
with “No!” 
C is beginning to lose confidence in his own ability to make sense of and resolve 
problems within the task because the others do not appear to share  his disappointment 
with the hot countries they have been visiting. He questions whether he has perhaps 
understood it the wrong way round when he asks “Do we want i t warmer?”. They do 
not reply and C, at first, feels relieved when a country that is 6º appears on the 
computer screen. He feels pleased “Aahh ..” that they have found a lower temperature 
than 16. However, N says that this is not a valid move, C quickly agrees with him, even 
though this is in conflict with C’s own sense-making. He trust N’s knowledge more than 
his own. 
 
Where external resources, including his friends, do not provide 
explanations and solutions, C does not persevere in seeking to resolve 
the problem using only his own internal resources: 
11. When they click on 
Madagascar and see that it 
is 21º they are surprised. C 
says “Oh my God! T his 
must be playing tricks .. 
because that’s 
(Madagascar) hotter than 
that (Ken ya). 
2 conflicts are evident within C’s conceptual resources: 
He has said that he thinks Madagascar is not hot – and yet  he finds that Madagascar 
is 21 and 21 is is number that he associates with “hot”. Within his “NT ” concept C has 
yet to develop a system of graduation between hot and cold, as well as alighnment 
between this and the numbers themselves. 
For C, Madagascar is hotter (higher number) than Kenya, but also, Madagascar is 
further from Equator than Kenya and further away from equator means less hot. 
These conflicts are not resolved. 
 
 
In Row (C) 32, it could be interpreted that the UK / Umerica issue 
effectively rescued C since it provided a distraction from the conflict within 
his resources that had become evident to him (though not necessarily 
consciously): 
32. C states that they will go to 
UK next, followed by 
Poland. He says that 
Poland is cold. UK is 6º. C 
quickly says “Now we go to 
Poland”. C is confused at 
this point. He looks at the 
flag moving within the 
display about UK and says 
“Wait a minute, 
something’s wrong. We’re 
meant to be going to U .. 
Merica and that’s British.” 
He has got mixed up with 
United States. 
When the UK temperature is first displayed, C does not seem to realise that, if the 
previous country was 5º, it is not appropriate to go next to UK, 6º. He simply accepts the 
inclusion of UK as a way-point on the journey and thinks they should now go to Poland 
(which he believes is cold) as he had intended. Very soon, however, he queries whether 
the display they see is actually the correct one for UK. T his could be because a situated 
abstraction that he has constructed, that “movement north = lower temperatures” is 
conflicting with his concepts of “T W”  and  UK. T his may have  led him to think that UK 
should be less than T urkmenistan. C gets confused between USA and UK, i tself 
evidence of an association between them, perhaps because the beginning of the 2 
names is the same. 
 
G, on the other hand, usually confronts conflict where he finds it. This 
was a significant feature of G’s learning trajectory described in Table 4b. 
Rows (G) 53 & (G) 55 exemplify G’s determination to find meaning in a 
situation where, at first, there was incongruity and tension: 
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53.  M says “9 add -8, which is 1”. G says “You 
can’t do that”. No-one follows up on his 
remark until after they have entered the 
wrong answer to the question and start to 
think it through again. At this point G asks 
“Can you add minus numbers and plus 
numbers?” Interesting that he did not realise 
that this is what they were doing with earlier 
questions. Maybe there is something about 
this question that emphasises to him that 
this is what is happening. I think, though, 
that it was M’s articulating “9 add -8..” that 
has triggered something in G’s 
understanding. My suspicion is confirmed 
when he repeats to himself and looks at M,  
“9 ADD MINUS ..??” M explains that he had 
written the numbers down and then went 
back and put all the add signs in because 
they need to add all the numbers every time. 
M talks aloud as he writes down what they need to do. As he speaks 
the numbers, including the “minus” sign, he includes the word “add” 
as he recognises that the task is to add the numbers together. G finds 
that this conflicts with the interpretation that his own conceptual 
resources facilitate – he believes M has made a mistake. No-one else 
acknowledges his remark. 
When the boys go over the problem again G questions whether it is 
appropriate to add “minus numbers” and “plus numbers”. He has not 
referred to the unsigned numbers as “plus numbers” before (though 
he did refer to them as “adds”). So perhaps, we are seeing his 
concept of “minus numbers” expanding to include “the other numbers” 
to become a more inclusive concept about signed or directed 
numbers? If G’s knowledge is extending in this way, I think it is almost 
coincidental as his conscious focus is the concatenation of 2 words, 
both of which he previously understood as instructions to carry out an 
operation on a number: + (add or plus) and – (minus). It is his mention 
of “add minus” and his discomfort when M said the same thing 
previously that leads me to believe this is the cause of G’s anxiety at 
this point. 
It would seem that G’s evolving “Minus numbers” or “Signed numbers” 
concept is undergoing expansion to include resources that conflict 
with elements from other collections of conceptual resources that he 
was beginning to align. In his previous experience an instruction (a 
sign) has always been followed by a number, not another sign. G’s 
discomfort, his difficulty in aligning related conceptual resources, is 
evident here. 
 
55. When M tries to explain the way he works 
through the list, he says 9 add minus 8 and 
G interrupts “You can’t say tha t. You can’t 
add a minus”. He is still resistant to this 
notion within his own understanding of what 
he is doing. G believes that the add sign is 
superfluous as he says “9 minus 8 is already 
there”. He doesn’t see any need for the add 
sign and thinks it confuses the question. 
G is still very uncomfortable with add and minus being spoken in 
tandem. He feels that this doesn’t make any sense. He appears to 
“read” the minus prefix as the indicator that he needs that tells him 
which way to move on the number line. He clings onto his belief that 
the “add” word cannot occur immediately preceding the “minus” word 
(cueing priority is still very high). His developing concepts (“Minus 
numbers” and “Calculations”) contain conflicting resources, they are 
not yet aligned in this respect, even though span of each does extend 
to the other. 
 
Having considered mindfulness, confidence, confusion and conflict, it is 
clear to me that these are all valuable resources for learning. G showed 
that his progress was, in no small part, due to affective resources. His 
readout strategies, resources in memory and other resources, including 
sense-making mechanisms, co-evolved and we saw that G possessed an 
“expectation for transfer” (Salomon & Perkins 1989, p 136). This 
dialectical relationship between engagement with confusion, confrontation 
of conflict, expectation for transfer and confidence to persevere was 
apparent in G’s achievements during our work together. C did not 
demonstrate these features and his learning did not progress in the same 
way. Perhaps, for C, until high cueing priority for new resources is 
established through repeated reinforcement of new associations, it is 
unreasonable to expect that sense-making mechanisms and readout 
strategies can evolve. Perhaps learning opportunities for C must take into 
 274
account his need to develop affective and attitudinal behaviours so that 
he has confidence that he is capable of finding meaning where he does 
not at first see it. It is, after all, only through success that C can change 
his attitudes and expectations of himself and his confidence in his ability 
to learn and his regard of himself. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Overview – the big picture 
Research questions developed from my review of the literature and my 
professional experience were: 
• What resources shape the nature of transfer and the growth of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
• What is the role of the interplay of resources in the micro-transfer of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
• What is the relationship between abstracting and transferring 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
These questions are quite broad and it was not possible to analyse the 
“big picture” without breaking it down into more focused elements. I shall 
now reflect on what I have learned about different aspects of learning and 
hope, ultimately, to draw together my understanding of the “parts” to form 
a better understanding of broader issues that make up the big picture. 
7.2 Re-use of knowledge 
7.2.1 Abstraction and transfer 
My observations and analysis of the 2 boys’ achievements during our 
work together revealed that there were many different types of knowledge 
that were re-used as they started to work in the new domain of negative 
numbers. Both boys used a range of knowledge resources that were well-
established (i.e. “old” knowledge) including direct primary experience and 
learning as well as learning from secondary sources such as television, 
friends and family. “Old” knowledge sometimes provided background 
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understanding that helped to make sense of aspects of the new domain, 
such as C’s knowledge about Egypt and Spain as it helped him to begin 
to construct a referential framework to solve problems in “Journey”. At 
other times, “old” knowledge was more directly useful – for example, G 
used his knowledge of (what I know as) the commutative law to help him 
solve problems with negative numbers in “Balloons”. (Perhaps it is 
important to remind ourselves, here, that G’s perspective on what I know 
as the commutative law might be somewhat situated.) 
Different types of transfer were evident for both boys in all tasks. Using 
diSessa & Wagner’s (2005) taxonomy, it was possible to identify some 
Class A transfer (i.e. of well-prepared knowledge in a new setting), even 
though I had not set out to look for it. Knowledge about numbers, 
temperatures and calculation strategies are examples of well-prepared 
knowledge that was effectively re-used in new settings, including in the 
new domain of negative numbers. There were also many examples of 
Class B (developing towards A) and Class C (tentative application, 
sometimes blindly, of ideas and resources that are considered potentially 
relevant) transfer for both boys. 
However, the 2 boys demonstrated disparate patterns of types of transfer. 
C’s Class A was extremely limited, whereas G successfully implemented 
well-prepared conceptual resources, some of them quite recently 
constructed, in new problem settings. 
Recently constructed knowledge resources were, however, only rarely 
transferred in a Class A manner. In “Chapter 6: Discussion of Findings” I 
considered the notion of cueing priority and argued that Class A transfer 
of new knowledge is not possible until new resources have been 
reinforced through reiteration of their relevance in appropriate situations. 
It is only when new resources have been successfully re-used in a range 
of settings that span and alignment of those resources can extend and 
improve. G was able to reinforce his new knowledge and expand the 
contextual neighbourhood of those resources, enabling re-use of them, 
even within the few sessions that we had together. C, on the other hand, 
was not able to do this and demonstrated a high rate of failure to transfer, 
 277
compared to G. I argued that this was because cueing priority for new 
knowledge was not reinforced for (or by) C.  
In order for the boys to recognise situations in which old knowledge is 
relevant, they must have available to them resources in the new situation 
and in the old knowledge (the concept in its current state of construction) 
that are associated with each other. Such associations are constructed by 
the learner in response to experience. We saw that, in general, G was 
able to perceive such associations but C was not. It is unhelpful to glibly 
attribute such differential achievements in terms of re-use of knowledge 
to “ability differences”. It is, I believe, imperative that we understand more 
about what it is that G did, in other aspects of his learning, that C did not, 
that might account for such a disparity. 
It was evident, then, that the triggering or cueing of conceptual resources 
to facilitate sense making and problem solving in new settings is 
dependant on the recognition of relevance of those resources; this 
recognition is prompted by the learner’s perception of something in the 
problem or setting that resonates with available resources. This is my 
summary of the processes involved in “knowing-to” (Mason 2002). 
7.2.2 G’s development of his concept of negative numbers 
It is clear to me that learning, for G and C, required changes and 
developments within each boy’s contextual neighbourhood. I attempt to 
describe and represent changes in G’s contextual neighbourhood 
(Figures 7 a-c) that are suggested by his actions and utterances during 
the tasks. (I chose not to present C’s conceptual changes in this way as 
G’s experience and development is most likely to provide a sufficiently 
rich, “thick” description to illuminate relevant issues.) 
It is important to note that there are limitations of presenting, 
diagrammatically, processes that are, after all, extremely complex:  
• firstly, the concept labels (dark grey boxes) are something that I 
impose – i.e. the learner is not aware of “a concept of ..” at the 
level of their own sense-making. As shown previously, in Table 1, I 
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consider a concept as an aggregation of associated resources; I 
believe that it continues to change and grow in response to an 
individual’s experience. I do not conceive of a concept as 
something that is a static collection – it is not fixed in time nor 
location. Dark grey boxes in Figures 7a-c are representations of, 
what I perceive as, themes that are very richly connected through 
a dense web of associations; 
• secondly, the representation of conceptual resources as boxes 
that are shaded the same shade of light grey does not imply that 
all conceptual resources represented are at the same level of 
abstractness/situatedness – i.e. the same grain size. For different 
grain sizes, we might imagine considering a range of conceptual 
resources through a magnifying lens:  
o at a high magnification, a number of resources that are 
highly context-bound and with few or no associations with 
other resources would be visible, though only small sections 
of the entire conceptual web would be visible in any one 
view; 
o as some of these resources become increasingly 
connected, those more densely-connected parts of the 
conceptual web, would appear as patches (when viewed at 
a lower magnification); at this lower level of magnification, 
and as connectedness between associations increases, 
becoming intense in some areas, some level of abstraction 
of commonalities occurs; relationships between these 
patches (notions at an interim level of abstractness) are 
only visible as I, the viewer, “zoom-out”; 
• thirdly, of course, there are many concepts, associations and other 
conceptual resources that are not represented on any of the 
diagrams since it would be impossible to acknowledge, 
exhaustively, all associations that might be involved. It is important 
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to realise that there are many unseen resources that might play a 
part in G’s development of a concept of negative numbers. 
To accurately and comprehensively represent G’s conceptual resources 
and the existence and strength of associations between them, at any one 
level of magnification, would not be possible. However, I strongly believe 
that some diagrammatic representation of the micro-evolution of 
knowledge, for the sake of my thesis, is necessary. I have therefore 
combined elements from different levels of magnification in my 
representation of conceptual resources (light grey boxes) in Figures 7a-c.  
Figures 7a-c are now described; 
• In Figure 7a, (overleaf) we see that, as we began our sessions 
together, G had already formed collections of associated 
resources relating to “Numbers”, “Maps”, “Numbers used to 
represent temperatures” and “Temperatures in different parts of 
the world”. Some associations between resources were stronger 
than between others; 
• Figure 7b shows the process of webbing - new resources are 
being added and associations are formed and strengthened; the 
result of experience of working on the tasks. In the main, new and 
old resources seem to complement each other – sometimes, 
however, new resources introduce tension or dissonance; 
• In Figure 7c, after several new resources relating to negative 
numbers are added to G’s contextual neighbourhood, and 
associations between them and with other resources are 
constructed, it seems appropriate to consider that he has now 
formed a concept of negative numbers that should continue to 
develop according to his experience. 
Figure 7d reproduces Figures 7a-c on a single page, so that general 
changes throughout the process are rendered more visible, though 
details within each box are less visible. 
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Figure 7d: 
Overview of Figs 7a-c 
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associations and emergence 
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Figures 7 a-c represent my impression of the micro-evolution of G’s 
thinking-in-change about negative numbers. It is clear to me that 
abstraction has not been a prominent feature of this process. Therefore, 
the development of mathematical conceptual knowledge does not require 
abstraction.  
7.2.3 Relationships between conceptual growth, abstraction and 
transfer 
Having stated that, on the basis of my analysis of G’s and C’s 
achievements, I find that abstraction is not necessary for conceptual 
change, I should consider the nature of the relationship between 
abstraction and conceptual change, if one exists. I return to Figures 7 a-c 
and note that, in compiling these representations, I deliberately chose to 
record some resources using G’s own words – e.g. “Getting 3 degrees 
colder than 1 degrees puts me in the minuses”. Others were recorded in 
more abstract terms. I believe that abstraction, or lack of it, is implicit in 
the language used to articulate conceptual resources – that is, new 
resources that have not been abstracted are available with contextual 
bells and whistles still firmly attached. As these resources are reinforced 
and modified through other relevant experiences, the label for the 
concept becomes increasingly abstract. For example, G’s  “Getting 3 
degrees colder than 1 degrees puts me in the minuses” resource became 
something he referred to later as “I can take a big number away from a 
smaller number – I just go minus”. (This is an example of a situated 
abstraction (Pratt & Noss 2002)). This shows that, although it wasn’t 
necessary for G to abstract new concepts in order to learn mathematics, 
abstraction may, and does, occur. Wagner (2006) argued  
“ .. abstraction was a consequence of transfer and the growth of 
understanding, not the cause of it.” (p86) 
My findings would support this view. A complementary conclusion is that 
conceptual growth, as represented in Figures 7 a-c, cannot occur without 
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transfer: transfer is substantiated in the construction of associations 
between resources, old and new. Furthermore, I would re-state that: 
• to construct a web of associations is to extend span of applicability 
and relevance of resources; 
• tuning of the appropriate application of those resources leads to 
proper alignment; 
• reinforcement of the span and alignment of associated resources 
improves cueing and reliability priorities which then becomes self 
sustaining and self regulating. 
All of these are constituent of conceptual development. 
It is logical to argue that the disparity in the patterns of incidence of 
different transfer types between the 2 boys is connected to their capacity 
for transfer – i.e. their propensity for extension of span and improvement 
of alignment. This might also be related to the notion of webbing – that 
the extent and density of a learner’s web will predict their capacity to 
transfer – and therefore, their prospect of success in their early work in a 
new domain. I found that most of C’s transfer events were Class C and 
that he often needed to re-start his webbing process in this new domain 
of negative numbers, making slow progress. G, on the other hand, 
showed that he could construct associations between knowledge 
resources old and new,  at each stage extending span and improving 
alignment. This enabled rapid and effective progress through the tasks. 
7.3 Resources 
My model of learning presented in “Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings” 
depicts conceptual development through the interpretation of inputs 
leading to modification of conceptual resources, including sense-making 
mechanisms.  
I have already mentioned that G retained references to contextual details 
in his construction of conceptual resources. There are many examples in 
the analysis grids of both boys doing this. Even when some sense-
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making mechanisms and other resources had become abstract, the 
contextual details in which they had initially been embedded were still 
accessible. An example of this was when C often referred to Father 
Christmas’s clothes to justify, to others, his judgements about 
temperature comparisons. 
We saw that C was sometimes able to use pieces of old knowledge (i.e. 
internal resources)  to provide a framework for evaluating temperatures. 
He actively constructed sense-making mechanisms during the tasks that 
helped him interpret what he found – i.e. he learned to co-ordinate 
different resources in order to make decisions and to have confidence in 
them. In this way, C used this kind of internal resource to develop 
interpretive knowledge. However, although there was evidence of the 
extension and improvement of span and alignment within “Journey” and 
“Quiz”, C did not “know-to” use a number line in “Balloons”. G, as I have 
already noted, made more effective use of internal resources, partly 
because he was able to perceive relevance more readily than C could 
demonstrate. 
The boys’ use of metaphors (C’s piles of snow and G’s clonk) provided 
other interesting examples of their use of internal resources. 
C appeared to be more dependent on the external resources provided – 
for example, he relied on Father Christmas’s clothes and other images 
more than G, who was more focused on the numbers themselves. 
Other resources that appeared to be linked with success were affective, 
rather than cognitive. Mindfulness was a strong feature of G’s work, 
including his drive to practise and reinforce new internal resources (what 
Salomon and Perkins (1989) would refer to as “exercising” new 
“complexes of procedures”). G showed that he needed to be able to 
convince himself of the validity of new pieces of knowledge and actively 
sought to find or construct associations within his contextual 
neighbourhood. For G, confidence and mindfulness are mutually 
supportive and are powerful resources for his learning. Conflict and 
tension within his contextual neighbourhood are also valuable resources 
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in that they provoke G to analyse and resolve such dissonance within his 
knowledge resources.  
C did not display these characteristics in the same way and often seemed 
to accept, without question or challenge, new ideas that arose in the 
tasks, even where they did not align with existing resources. It seemed 
that, where span did not exist between resources and settings, 
misalignment was not therefore perceptible nor addressed. 
7.4 Perception of similarity 
Similarity between problems and/or their contexts is only perceptible 
through associations that exist or are constructed. Indeed, a common 
aspect of the structure of a problem or setting might be a similarity that is 
recognised by learners in mathematics, prompting the use of particular 
strategies and mechanisms. However, the application of appropriate 
knowledge in a new setting does not rely on the recognition of structural 
similarity; rather, it relies on the perception (conscious or unconscious) by 
the learner of some association between the new situation and some 
existing resource. This association might concern structure but, as we 
saw with G and C, might relate to any mathematical or non-mathematical 
feature of the task or setting. 
Perception of similarity is, therefore, necessarily subjective. We saw C fail 
to perceive similarity on many occasions, even where tasks and aspects 
of it might appear similar to an observer. 
The capacity for perception of similarity or the recognition of applicability 
of a resource occurs through a system of priorities that determine the 
likelihood that a resource will be triggered. This likelihood is a measure of 
the connectedness and consistency of the resource with aspects or 
elements of the new situation.  Increased priority can only be realised 
through reinforcement of relevance. G showed that he was able to see 
similarity across narrative, iconic and symbolic settings for negative 
numbers, evidence that he constructed and aligned resources that 
spanned the different settings. 
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7.5 Beginning to learn about negative numbers 
In the domain of negative numbers, the boys used the images and other 
resources provided in different ways. C was quite dependant on images 
of Father Christmas in different clothes to provide the basis for his sense-
making mechanism for interpreting temperature values. In the earlier 
phases of our sessions together, G did not appear to use the imagery 
provided but preferred to focus on the numbers themselves, successfully 
comparing and ordering them. Both boys relied quite heavily on a number 
line model (often drawing one) to support them in making sense of 
changes in temperature in “Quiz” and in adding signed and unsigned 
numbers in “Balloons”. It was their use of a number line that supported 
the boys in extending their knowledge about numbers to include a world 
on the other side of zero. G was also able to use a number line to help 
him make sense of taking away or “undoing” the prior addition of a 
negative number. 
Learning trajectories compiled for both boys show points at which I 
inferred losses or slips in knowledge. For G, these corresponded with 
lapses in confidence which, I found, were associated with his perception 
of conflict or tension within his contextual neighbourhood. These were 
addressed and resolved and G’s trajectory recovered and his conceptual 
resources continued to expand and connect with each other. C’s 
conceptual knowledge from Session 1 faltered but recovered in Session 
2. In Session 3, his knowledge seemed to lapse again before it began to 
recover. Such lapses were characteristic of C’s learning trajectory. C 
found it difficult to “read” or interpret negative numbers whether 
embedded in a context such as “Journey” or presented only symbolically 
within “Balloons” – he consistently failed to perceive the minus sign until 
the latter stages of our work together. 
Within this domain, Peled (1991) and Bruno & Martinon (1996; 1999) set 
out a hierarchy of knowledge based on “number line” and “quantity” 
dimensions for conceptualising negative numbers. I found that both G 
and C demonstrated higher attainment in the number line dimension than 
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in the quantity dimension, though G’s facility in both dimensions was 
higher than C’s. However, when Bruno & Martinon’s distinction between 
abstract quantity and contextual quantity was taken into account, the 
discrepancy between achievements in the number line and contextual 
quantity dimensions was much less than when considering Peled’s 
broader quantity dimension. Therefore, I believe that both boys 
developed their conceptual knowledge about negative numbers in a 
quantity dimension almost as well as they did in a number line dimension. 
This is interesting when I consider that the “Journey”, “Cards” and “Quiz” 
tasks were all based on a number line model of an extended number 
system.  
Linchevski and Williams (1999) and Williams & Linchevski (1997) hold 
that neutralisation is not an effective model for teaching subtraction of 
negative numbers. I could not evaluate this as I did not explicitly introduce 
neutralisation in the teaching tasks. However, in “Balloons”, G may have 
been using neutralisation strategies since it is possible that his 
effectiveness with compensation strategies might be masking his use of a 
neutralisation model. Moreover, I can see that, if we consider that mental 
calculation strategies based on compensation - for a portion (of the total 
to be added or subtracted) that had been, for expediency, previously 
added or subtracted - themselves incorporate a view of “number as 
quantity” inherent within them. So, perhaps application of compensation 
strategies for calculation is itself indicative of a neutralisation model for 
working with all numbers, including negative numbers. 
7.6 Reflections 
It is clear that conceptual resources are continually developed in the light 
of experience and learning in all settings. Concepts are constructed and 
modified through associations with other knowledge resources; previously 
existing knowledge is one of many types of knowledge resources that are 
involved in conceptual change. Other types of resources, evident in my 
work with C and G are as my model of learning predicted. They include 
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external and internal resources, including memory resources and sense-
making mechanisms which themselves include abstractions generated by 
the learner which are, to various degrees, situated in the context in which 
they were first created. Cueing and reliability priorities might be seen as a 
resource. Other internal resources with significance, that appear to be 
underplayed in the transfer literature, are affective; mindfulness, together 
with confidence, and the capacity to resolve dissonance within the 
contextual neighbourhood.  
There is also another type of resource that I have not observed nor 
analysed rigorously and yet feel deserves consideration, if not by me in 
this study, then by myself or by others in further research. This resource 
is social, rather than cognitive or personal: the use by learners of their 
peers. There were many examples of G’s pleasure in his badinage with 
others in his group creating opportunities to articulate (and to challenge) 
his knowledge. C always had something to contribute, though in his case, 
this often amounted to clownish remarks that did little to facilitate the 
construction and reinforcement of new conceptual resources. C was very 
dependent on his friend N, for support of his ideas and he actively sought 
his approval in order to feel any confidence. 
Since I have not analysed N’s experience and contributions, it is not 
appropriate to offer authoritative judgements regarding his influence on 
C’s learning. I did find the interaction between C and N very interesting, 
however. Vygotsky (1978) presented the notion of “More Knowledgeable 
Other” (“MKO”), referring to someone who has more experience, facility 
or knowledge of a concept or process and who facilitates a less 
knowledgeable learner to construct and develop those concepts or 
processes. N, had he been effective as C’s MKO, would have scaffolded 
C to a more sophisticated level of development in the mathematical 
domains in which we worked. It would appear that N was not an effective 
MKO, even though C sought his advice and approval on many occasions. 
C did, therefore, actively try to involve N as an agent for C’s learning, 
though this was largely ineffective. 
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Transfer was very difficult for C. The cueing priority of newly constructed 
resources, including sense making mechanisms, did not get reinforced. In 
the absence of reinforcement, the level of cueing priority for any new 
resource did not improve and new resources were not triggered for C. We 
saw several examples of C using only “old” resources to try to address 
problems for which he needed to apply new resources, indicating that, for 
C, it was very difficult for new knowledge to become sufficiently prepared 
for transfer of that knowledge to occur. The intrapersonal and social 
affective dimensions of G’s experience and contributions – mindfulness, 
confidence and resilience – were not evident in C’s work.  
Although conceptual change for C was hard won and therefore limited, it 
was possible to examine instances where C’s contextual neighbourhood 
changed and to offer possible reasons for the apparent fragility of his 
knowledge. It has also been possible to present a micro-evolution of G’s 
struggle to accommodate new meanings for negative numbers. Indicators 
that his contextual neighbourhood underwent significant changes were 
observable in his actions and utterances. Span of his conceptual 
resources was constantly changing – sometimes expanding and 
sometimes contracting through conflation of previously unassociated 
resources. Generally, however, the span of G’s resources, perceived as 
relevant for particular tasks, changed towards a normalised view. 
Although I did not set out to explore what learners of different abilities 
might achieve (not least because I feel that “ability” is a problematic 
concept), I find that the serendipitous selection of groups by the children’s 
class teacher has revealed considerable differences between the 
conceptual changes observable (or at least inferrable) in 2 boys identified 
by their teacher as belonging to different “ability groups”. G is in the “high 
ability” group and is described by his teacher as “very bright”. C is in the 
“middle ability” group and his teacher points out that he is “at the lower 
end of that group”. Whilst I have tried to avoid reference to the different 
ability  “status” of the boys in my analysis and discussion, there are 
clearly appreciable differences in the ways that the 2 boys were able to 
develop their conceptual resources. Gray, Pitta & Tall (2000) found that 
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high achieving children tended to hold “semantic” images as part of their 
conceptual resources, compared to more “episodic” images held by low 
achieving children. Analysis of C’s and G’s work during our sessions 
revealed that G, at first articulating episodic descriptions of conceptual 
resources did, later, provide semantic references to those resources. 
Gray (1991) emphasised that there are two general types of resources 
available to learners and he explains that less able children have only 
one type available to them, whereas more able children have both types 
available – i.e. that more able children can use procedural strategies and 
can also build on their knowledge by deduction to create new resources 
that also become available to them. Gray believes that  
“More able children appear to be doing a qualitatively different sort 
of mathematics than the less able.” (p551) 
It would seem that G certainly had a wide range of resources available to 
him including: efficacy with basic counting and other procedural 
resources; deductive sense-making mechanisms, including situated 
abstractions, helping him to develop episodic-style resources into more 
abstract concepts based on generalisations; as well as intrapersonal 
resources such as mindfulness. C’s resources did not develop in the 
same way as G’s, seeming to remain largely procedural and dependant 
on external agents (e.g. task-based images, his friend “N”) to trigger their 
application. In this way, perhaps it is true to say that G and C were “doing 
a qualitatively different sort of mathematics”: there clearly were notable 
differences in the ways that one “less able” boy and one “more able” boy 
were able to develop and change their contextual neighbourhoods 
relating to the number system and an extension to this. However, as 
hinted previously, I am uncomfortable with the notion of “ability” as a label 
for children and other learners since I feel it implies something fixed and I 
do not believe that capacity for conceptual change is fixed. The notion of 
“knowing-to” (Mason 2002) captures, meaningfully, what is necessary for 
new resources to be triggered and reinforced and their cueing priority 
thereby increased. “Knowing-to”, for me, implies potential and is 
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necessarily fluid and transient since “knowing-to” refers to an “in-the-
moment” phenomenon. 
I stated at the commencement of the thesis that my motivation for 
undertaking research into learning in mathematics was to discover how to 
help children to learn. I believe that my data suggests that a research 
focus on individual children, which I advocated in the light of my literature 
review, is justified; the data reveals that the two boys interacted with the 
tasks in very different ways and that there was great disparity in the 
conceptual change that they each achieved. One of the differences that 
the boys brought to our work together was the level of achievement 
already attained and it is interesting to consider how children of different 
“abilities” are able to construct and modify conceptual knowledge. It is 
important to point out, however, that C and G were not studied as 
examples of classes of learners – i.e. low ability and high ability. Rather, 
they were studied as two individual cases of 8-9 year olds extending their 
knowledge about the number system into the domain of negative 
numbers. Notwithstanding any reservations I have about the notion of 
“ability”, it is nonetheless helpful to acknowledge evidence of cognitive, 
personal and social processes and attributes that are evident for G and 
not for C and to recognise their role in achievement of mathematical 
knowledge. In so doing, I believe that it is possible to improve knowledge 
about a pedagogy for mathematics in the primary school. 
7.7 Towards a theoretical framework 
Having argued, in my review of the literature, against a focus on 
abstraction as the key to transfer, it is not my intention to engage further 
with that argument here. I prefer to suggest that my data is evidence that 
abstraction is a consequence of transfer, and that, although abstraction is 
the process that enables generalisation and pattern identification that is 
the development of mathematical thinking, it is transfer (rather than 
abstraction) that should be a key aim for mathematics teaching in the 
primary school since without transfer, abstraction will not occur. In order 
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for transfer to be facilitated it is necessary to appreciate the nature of 
cognitive processes involved as well as the interplay between all kinds of 
internal and external resources. I have shown that children respond to 
stimuli, metaphors and other external resources that might be available to 
them in different ways; moreover, their interpretation - both of the problem 
itself and of what they believe is expected of them – will, in part, 
determine their effectiveness with the problem. I found that 2 boys, 
presented with the same problem in the same context and provided with 
similar external resources, interpreted and responded to the challenges of 
the tasks in dissimilar ways. G was very good at interpreting the evolving 
demands of the tasks and the resources available to him, both internal 
and external. He used his old and new knowledge in a sophisticated 
interplay which itself created new associations and modified the span of 
his conceptual resources. New resources that were constructed included 
associations and sense-making mechanisms that facilitated effective 
interpretation of inputs and interim understandings, as well as enabling 
transformation of naïve knowledge resources into “well prepared” 
knowledge from which patterns and generalities might be abstracted. 
G was able to demonstrate not only an ability to traverse a web of 
concepts related through associated resources -  interplay between 
resources that facilitated transfer - but he also displayed a 
transformational interplay (between “operational and structural 
conceptions” (Sfard; 1991) or “episodic and semantic images” (Gray 
1991)) that enabled him to abstract conceptual knowledge. 
Wagner adopted a framework based on Co-ordination Class Theory 
(CCT) to explore the development of his students’ mathematical 
knowledge. Wagner’s (2006) assertion that, 
 “Maria was not abstracting structure from the problem situation, 
but actively structuring it by the most active knowledge frame 
available to her”, p(57) 
supports my notion of transformational interplay between conceptual 
resources. Transformational interplay facilitates interpretation of problems 
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and settings and facilitates transfer. Such development of resources 
might also lead to abstraction.  
It is appropriate, at this point, to reflect upon and review my model for 
learning. At the end of “Chapter 3: Aims”, I presented a model for learning 
that I had compiled in the light of my research and experience (see Figure 
3). This had evolved partly in the light of CCT and adapted and 
incorporated some of its constructs. It also, however, included constructs 
that explicitly identify social and personal influences on conceptual growth 
and change. 
It is now clear that readout strategies are interpretive resources used by 
learners at the first encounter with an opportunity, or prompt, to 
understand. The beginning of the interpretation and analysis of inputs is, 
therefore, when readout strategies come into play, not afterwards as 
Figure 3 shows. Other factors involved with interpretations and analysis 
of inputs were identified in Figure 3 as internal knowledge resources in 
memory and sense-making mechanisms; I am satisfied that this 
categorisation is appropriate. Of the internal resources shown in Figure 3, 
both boys demonstrated that memory resources and personal (learner) 
characteristics did contribute to their perception of relevance, as did the 
range of external resources that were available.  
I now believe that the model I had constructed is too simplistic and does 
not adequately portray the interplay between resources that occurs. 
From the boys’ responses and contributions it  was clear that there was 
an abundance of links across resources, and loops of interpretive 
responses that traversed between all kinds of resources, that sometimes 
incorporated sense-making mechanisms in the early stages of analysis. 
Figure 3 implies a straightforward flow - from inputs through readout 
strategies and then through internal resources before sense-making 
mechanisms are invoked. This, I now find unrepresentative of the 
processes that I observed and inferred. Interpretive knowledge is 
therefore extremely complex and would be better represented by a 
network of links and loops and arrows showing that all elements are able 
to feedback to others. Sense-making mechanisms should be represented 
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as agents incorporated into the processing of resources, mediating within 
the process rather than appearing as a separate and final step in the 
interpretation and analysis of inputs. 
I am satisfied that the internal and external responses to the input that 
provoke the process are appropriately represented. However, the 
influence of learner characteristics (including moods, attitudes, 
propensities and interests) is understated in Figure 3. Figure 7e shows an 
evolution of the model previously presented, emphasising the role of 
learner characteristics. 
7.8 Limitations 
7.8.1. Resources provided 
Most of the resources provided were suitable and children were able to 
utilise them as intended, as well as in unanticipated ways. The 
“Thermometer Interactive Teaching Program” was too difficult to 
understand and manipulate for most of the children, as was evident in the 
analysis of data (Chapter 5). One reason for my incorporation of this 
resource was to implant an image of a vertical number line (further to our 
earlier map work) and movement along it; however, a simpler, more user-
friendly version might have achieved this more efficiently and effectively. 
7.8.2. Age of children 
I believe I was justified in my decision to work with 8 – 9 year olds as they 
began to construct knowledge about negative numbers. I see now that it 
would be even more illuminating to conduct a longitudinal study to follow 
the children’s development of their knowledge in this domain. To study 
their conceptual change over a period of 4-5 years, during which time 
they would be expected (curriculum expectations) to attain greater levels 
of facility with negative numbers would reveal much more about the ways 
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that individuals’ conceptual knowledge in a particular domain modifies 
(both appropriately and inappropriately) over an extended period. 
 
 
 
Figure 7e: Model of the micro-evolution of knowledge, amended in 
response to analysis and discussion of my findings 
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It was not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of teaching a 
neutralisation model for knowledge about negative numbers (and I had 
not intended to do so). Perhaps this would have been possible had I 
worked with a greater number of groups, some of whom might have 
engaged in tasks based on neutralisation. 
7.8.3 Complexity of processes 
As previously described, my representation of the micro processes 
involved in conceptual growth and change had been overly simplistic; my 
study shows that those processes and the interplay between them is 
extremely complex. It has been possible to infer the elements, micro-
processes and links between them with varying degrees of confidence 
since the complexity of the relationships masks, at least to some extent, 
their visibility. In subsequent studies, greater confidence in analysis might 
be achieved as the micro-processes become better understood and 
research is able to “zoom in” to study at increasingly smaller grain sizes. 
7.8.4 Attention to social influences 
It was not my desire, nor within the scope of my expertise, to analyse the 
influence of social aspects of learning. However, I do believe, in the light 
of my analysis and discussion, that these factors cannot be excluded 
from consideration of how children construct and refine knowledge. I feel 
that intrapersonal and interpersonal factors were powerful mediators for 
learning.  
7.9 Implications for the future 
7.9.1 For future research 
I have shown that contextual attributes are not “filtered-out” in the 
development of concepts but that references and links to situation-
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specific knowledge resources form the basis of the growth of knowledge 
and understanding. Therefore, for future research to have value in 
contributing to knowledge about children’s development of concepts, it 
must not focus on the decontextualisation of abstract knowledge. 
What individual children said and did was not simply a product of their 
knowledge but was clearly related to an aggregation of social and 
personal factors – i.e. individuals’ experience of our sessions was 
certainly shaped by cognitive factors, processes and outcomes, but also 
by personal and social behaviours, expectations, perceptions, attitudes 
and relationships. 
Intra-personal factors appear to significantly affect the experience and 
learning of individuals and I would suggest that collaboration between 
workers in the fields of psychology and education are vital in order to 
reach a greater understanding about learning (at the level of micro-
processes). 
At the earliest stages of the design of my methodology for my research, I 
decided not to work with individual children. The reasons for this are set 
out in “Chapter 4: Methodology”. However, having made this decision, I 
was conscious of a range of issues that are relevant to working with 
groups of children – i.e. pertaining to children’s own experience of being 
part of the group; but also relating to the performance of a group as an 
entity rather than only considering individuals. It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to consider, in any depth, issues relating to collaborative 
working; suffice it to say that I recognise that there is an extensive and 
constantly developing literature in this field that might also illuminate the 
issues which I seek to understand. A related, interesting story to be told 
would be to consider and contrast the experiences of individuals within 
the same group. Consider that: there are differential cognitive 
contributions and developments; disparate intra- and inter-personal 
interactions and relationships. It would seem logical to expect that, in 
telling the individuals’ stories, they may seem to be describing different 
episodes when, in fact, they are recounting the same episode through 
different lenses. 
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7.9.2 For teaching and learning 
It is a fundamental aim of teaching that learners will be enabled to 
construct knowledge and be able to implement that knowledge 
appropriately in future. Transfer is therefore implicit in this fundamental 
aim. I have shown that transfer and the growth and change of conceptual 
knowledge are intertwined in a positive feedback loop – i.e. transfer 
cannot occur unless similarity is recognised and when transfer does 
occur, associations are constructed, span of concepts is modified and 
further transfer is enabled. Therefore, failure to transfer will both 
contribute to poor conceptual development and will be a result of it. 
There are many factors that enhance or restrict conceptual change and 
transfer including: the effectiveness of readout strategies; mindfulness; 
and opportunities to reinforce new resources and associations between 
them. It would therefore enhance learning if teachers were to provide 
these opportunities and to provide explicit reminders and prompts that are 
likely to activate new knowledge resources which have not yet achieved 
high cueing priority. 
Some children are able to learn more quickly, due at least in part to 
qualities and behaviours that are well developed within them – such as 
mindfulness and confidence and an expectation to transfer and to 
understand, including engagement with, rather than avoidance of, 
conflict. Teachers who attempt to facilitate the development of these 
qualities and behaviours will be helping their pupils to develop resources 
for learning. 
With regard to the teaching of negative numbers, there was great 
disparity in the extent to which C and G were able to engage with, and 
make progress with this new concept. Those differences have previously 
been thoroughly discussed and analysed; to focus on the differences 
between the two case studies is not appropriate here. Rather, in the 
concluding paragraphs of my thesis, it is most helpful to consider more 
general findings about learning about negative numbers.  
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Both boys were able to work effectively with negative number problems 
and contexts that used number lines and neutralisation. Even though I 
had intended to focus on only one of these models for teaching about 
negative numbers – i.e. a number line model, they both demonstrated an 
ability to utilise notions and images of neutralisation as well as of number 
lines. I would therefore encourage teachers to embrace both models and 
to work with them simultaneously and in concert together. 
Predictably, there were sometimes problems with interpreting the minus 
sign in its usage to denote a negative number – readout strategies that 
confer some significance to this particular symbol (arguably any symbol) 
were slow to develop for one of the boys and contributed to poor 
progress. Explicit checking and reminders about the minus sign when 
negative numbers are first introduced are therefore likely to benefit those 
children who don’t “see” it. 
In one of the case studies it was interesting to note that the same child, 
having engaged with some success with the questions and tasks that 
related to journey or temperatures contexts, reverted to application of 
rules and procedures when the context was removed. For both boys the 
context had facilitated the construction of sense-making mechanisms 
about the new numbers; moreover, further work within the context 
triggered these SMMs and reinforced all associated resources. The 
context therefore supported conceptual change and growth. For one of 
the boys, the support provided by the initial context, in its capacity to cue 
these SMMs, was vital and there were significant consequences when 
this support was withdrawn. When addressing new problems in a different 
context he was unable to perceive any similarity with the previous task. 
The resources that were cued in the new situation were based on rules 
and procedures and were not well connected with the new problem. The 
new context was not sufficiently similar, and/or new associations were not 
sufficiently reinforced, for transfer and further conceptual change to be 
enabled.  
The importance of context and the analysis of potential similarities is an 
important consideration for teachers when designing and evaluating 
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learning tasks. Teachers must consider whether children are likely to 
perceive relevance; if not, teachers should be committed to either 
changing the task, introducing more overt associations and/or explicitly 
articulating those links. The construction and reinforcement of 
associations between resources should be a focus for teachers because 
it is only through increasing networks of these associations that transfer 
and conceptual growth can occur. 
7.10 Moving forward 
My research was conducted using an amalgamation of ideas from a 
variety of theories old and new. In order to be able to observe (or at least 
infer) micro-processes related to conceptual learning, it was necessary to 
exploit aspects of learning processes that had been identified by others. 
Through rigorous and purposeful design and analysis of children’s 
engagement and achievements with learning tasks I have been able to 
make my own contribution to theory relating to children’s construction of 
mathematical knowledge (summarised in 7.11). I find that, even though it 
has been possible to infer trajectories for learning about negative 
numbers for C and G, this knowledge is not sufficient to be able to predict 
learning about negative numbers for other children, or other learning 
pathways for the same two boys. This is because their conceptual growth 
appears to be influenced by a range of factors, of which cognition is only 
one aspect. Analysis of my data suggests that cognitive and affective 
aspects of achievement and performance are deeply connected. 
I found, when conducting my review of the literature in the field of 
educational research about learning and transfer, that workers have 
focused on either the cognitive or the social and cultural dimensions of 
learning; I chose, when planning my research, to concentrate on the area 
of cognition. I am now convinced that, for theory about conceptual 
development to, itself, develop, it must take consideration of affective 
aspects of learning as well as cognitive aspects, since my data shows 
that these two are deeply connected. Upon my most recent perusal of the 
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literature, I attempted to discover whether others have described learning 
with respect to both cognition and affect, acting in combination, as I 
believe they do, to impact on conceptual development in complex ways. 
The notion of “transformational interplay” that I have introduced is 
something that is alluded to by workers in the field of educational 
psychology: Snow (1989) claims that conation is intertwined with 
cognition, emotion and behaviour. He suggests that it is because these 
processes are so difficult to separate that conation is rarely studied in its 
own right. Conation, Huitt (1999) explains, 
 “refers to the connection of knowledge and affect to behaviour … 
is closely associated with the concept of volition”.  
Corno & Kanfer (1993) also urge that research should seek to understand 
better the interaction between factors: 
“The emphasis given to the dynamic interplay between volition and 
other psychological determinants of action (i.e. cognition and 
affection) represents a third distinction between the present 
aptitude approach and current self-regulation research 
perspectives. Although most researchers agree that learning and 
performance are joint functions of these factors, little is understood 
about the way these factors interact.” (p307-8). 
I would point out that “volition”, “self-regulation”, “conation” are just a few 
of the constructs that appear to be related to C’s and G’s progress and 
achievements when working with a new domain. As I suggested 
previously, researchers in education, mathematics education, psychology 
and educational psychology must now collaborate in order to construct 
knowledge about ways in which children construct knowledge. I have 
emphasised that my research found that cognition, affective factors and 
mindfulness are deeply connected and that knowledge about one of 
these factors does not necessarily help us to know about conceptual 
learning. I suggest that they are sufficiently intertwined that research 
should concede that it is not helpful to explore them separately. Research 
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should, therefore, find ways of exploring all three components in 
combination: cognition, affect and conation, since my research informs 
me that it is their combined effect that constitutes the achievement of 
effective conceptual learning. 
7.11 Summary of this final chapter 
I am now able to respond, succinctly, to my three research questions first 
set out in Chapter 3: 
What resources shape the nature of transfer and the growth of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
All kinds of internal and external resources are involved. One of 
the principle findings of my research is that intrapersonal 
resources – particularly mindfulness and an expectation for 
transfer – were strongly associated with pupils’ success in 
constructing knowledge about negative numbers that they could 
use effectively. 
What is the role of the interplay of resources in the micro-transfer of 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
Micro-transfer requires the perception of some similarity across 
any aspects of different problems and settings; where no similarity 
is perceived, micro-transfer is not initiated. It occurs within a web 
of all kinds of knowledge resources including interpersonal and 
intrapersonal skills, knowledge, commitments and beliefs. Interplay 
occurs across resources, forging links and shaping priorities. It 
also occurs across resources at different levels of abstraction, 
transforming knowledge and understanding through perception of 
generalities. The exploitation of all kinds of resources relating to a 
concept generates feedback to all other resources relating to that 
concept and, through association, to other concepts. 
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What is the relationship between abstracting and transferring 
knowledge about negative numbers? 
Abstracting was the process that facilitated recognition of the 
potential relevance of existing resources in new situations. 
Abstracting therefore facilitated micro-transfer and knowledge 
resources were re-used in new situations, albeit sometimes in 
haphazard or unproductive ways. It was often possible to build on 
this low-level transfer and to be able to extend the span of 
perceived relevance of existing knowledge so that it became 
sufficiently prepared for higher levels of transfer. However, it was 
clear that abstraction, as it is normally understood, was not 
necessary for conceptual change, though it might be a 
consequence of it. 
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Appendix 1: Letter to parents 
 (Name of school omitted for confidentiality) 
 
Dear Parent, 
Some of you may remember Mrs Simpson, who taught at ** ******* from 
1995 – 2001. While she was here, she developed an interest and 
conducted research into the way children learn Mathematics. She has 
continued to research in this field and will be working with ** ******* over 
the coming year, particularly with children in Year 4. She will be teaching 
and observing children while they work with her in pairs and small groups 
and will need to ask children questions about they way they think about 
and understand Mathematics.  
If you are happy for your child to take part in Mrs Simpson’s research, 
would you please return the reply slip below before Friday 23 September. 
Please be assured that any information gathered will be anonymous and 
confidential. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
R S****** 
Head Teacher 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
…….. 
 
 
I/We give consent for ………………………………. (Child’s name) in Class 
…….. 
 
to take part in Mrs Simpson’s research, which, I/we understand, might be 
published in the context of her academic work. 
 
Signed …………………………………… (Parent/Guardian) 
Date: ……………………  
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Appendix 2: Schedule for interview with class teacher 
prior to commencing research sessions with children. 
Interview to be: 
• Fairly unstructured in format; 
• Key questions 1-7 noted below; 
• Freedom to exploit relevant issues that may arise 
 
1. Confirm year group/age of children in class? 
2. Introductory script: “I need to be able to observe and work with 
children while they learn something new in Maths. I have 
selected negative numbers because it appears to be introduced 
for the first time in Year 4. Is this correct - will the children begin 
to learn about negative numbers while they are in Year 4? 
Have they begun any work in this area yet? I need to establish 
whether negative numbers is a new concept for children in your 
class.” 
3. “What do the children in your class already know about the 
number system? e.g. integers, fractions, decimals”? 
4. “What experience do the class have with number lines?” 
5. “What have they learned in school about maps?” 
6. “Are they used to talking aloud about their thinking in Maths?” 
7. “In the light of your experience with this age group and your 
knowledge of your class, what would you expect children’s 
difficulties in this area to be?” 
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Appendix 3a: Write-up for Session 1 H, R, W 
Minute number: 
1. children arriving and sitting down 
2. I tell children that they won’t need pens or pencils as they won’t 
need to write anything today 
3. I start to set the scene for the work to be done 
4. We talk about temperatures at Christmas. I ask children if they 
recognise any of the countries on the map 
5. They know Madagascar – have seen the film. They know Jordan is 
the name of someone in the same class. Rome is familiar for one 
whose brother went there recently.. Children talk about holidays 
and where there are family members living – H’s Dad works in 
N.Ireland during the week. R doesn’t know where her Dad is – 
could be in Africa for all she knows.  
6. Children want me to read out all country names that end in … 
istan. They mention hearing about recent earthquake in Pakistan. 
We locate Pakistan on map. 
7. I indicate Africa on map and explain that all these countries are 
part of a continent called Africa. I ask them to read out the names 
of some of the African countries. 
8. I indicate Europe on the map and ask children to read out some of 
the names of countries in Europe. H’s Mum has been to Iceland – 
the supermarket – H is joking – doesn’t really think her Mum has 
been to the country. I pick up the globe and ask what they know 
about the globe. 
9. R points to the equator and knows that it is hot on the equator. 
They expect the black line on the map to be the equator because it 
is in the middle of the map. I explain that our map shows only part 
of the globe and that most of our map is north of the equator 
10. someone knows that the sea is hot in hot countries. I explain the 
“Father Christmas on holiday” scenario. H says she doesn’t 
believe in Father Christmas 
11. H tells me she could see Scotland from Northern Ireland when she 
was there. R has a relative in Scotland 
12. I explain why we need to consider temperatures for FC’s journey 
13. H think Kenya will be a good starting place – as she says it’s 
boiling there 
14. I check that children can use touchpad on laptop. They look up 
Kenya – is 19 degrees. They like the flag. 
15. H hasn’t been to Kenya. I encourage children to try a couple of 
countries each 
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16. W asks does that say Spain? He looks up temp = 7 degrees. R 
says that’s not hot. They talk about what they would wear for 7 
degrees. 
17. go to Tanzania. Children laugh. W describes how the flag would 
have to be different to the Jamaica flag.  
18. W’s turn. I remind him to look at the map first to choose a country 
that he wants to check. W chooses Egypt but clicks on UK (6 
degrees) 
19. Go to Egypt (some trouble with touchpad control) 19 degrees. Go 
to Jordan (by choosing from list, not map) 
20. I ask which other countries will have the same temperature, at the 
same level on the map. They say Iran. They lookup = 6 degrees. 
R’s turn – she wants to look at Madagasgar (so far has been H 
who wanted to go there). I ask R whether she thinks it’s going to 
be hot. She says a little bit hot. 
21. Difficulties with touchpad (it keeps reading clicks where children’s 
touch is too heavy – leads to them being taken to places they don’t 
want to go to. Children plan where they’re going when it’s their turn 
– H wants Czech Republic, W wants Tanzania. 
22. They look up Madagasgar = 21 degrees. I ask if they know what 
UK temperature is today. H says 12 degrees. Cherice clicks on 
Ghana by mistake – she wanted Iceland (H says it’s “cold, man”). 
Ghana = 28 degrees. I ask where it is on map. W says dunno. 
23. Someone has got FC head off model. Children click on Iceland = 0 
degrees (Oh my God, zero!”) 
24. I remind children they should be using the map to plan their 
journey, not randomly visiting pages from the list 
25. They are confident that they can work and discuss together, use 
the map and computer information properly. They decide to check 
Kenya’s temperature as it looks like a good starting point. 
26. They have trouble using touchpad. Distracted, interested in …  
27. Finland, even though they know it’s cold. H suggest they start from 
the top of the list and work down. I remind them that they should 
start from the map, not the list. 
28. Click on Zimbabwe = 22 degrees – agree to start there. Click on 
UAE = 21 degrees. They think they’ve got to stay with same 
clothes so UAE is no good. 
29. They revisit Zimbabwe page to check clothes.  
30. They click on Yemen but didn’t mean to – want to look at Zambia 
and Democratic Republic of Congo. They click on Latvia (2 
degrees) “He looks weird – he’s wearing a coat”. H says “2 
minus!”. R asks “What does that mean?” H explains ”that means 
it’s freezing, freezing” 
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31. Someone is suggesting a journey by bouncing the model around 
on the map. Dem Rep Congo = 26 degrees, H notices that FC has 
taken his top off and says they “need the same clothes” 
32. They look at Angola (– they are trying to decide using the map at 
last). They have changed the start country so that FC doesn’t start 
with too many clothes because they want to include some stops 
where he would have less clothes than Kenya so best to start 
somewhere else – this is my interpretation – they couldn’t explain 
reasons for the change) 
33. R has a turn using the PC – she looks at Gabon but it’s hotter and 
FC has “pants on” 
34. They try Central African Republic = 25 degrees and FC has shorts. 
They like this one. 
35. Children are excited now that they’ve got started. 
36. They want to try Egypt. It is 16 degrees and FC has blue T-shirt. H 
thinks they can’t use it because he’s put more clothes on. I remind 
her of rules. H want Libya next. W is suggesting Jordan. R say the 
flag is just green. 
37. H and W plan routes over land. I point out that FC can travel over 
sea, can fly. Looking  for Greece. H asks if I’m going to listen to 
what they are saying. 
38. H doesn’t want to go to Greece but to Morocco. W has got 
Morocco football kit. His uncle has been there. They are struggling 
with the touchpad. They laugh at their difficulties with touchpad. 
39. Russia comes up by mistake. H says it’s 6 minus. I help them get 
to Morocco (14 degrees) Bell goes. Children ask if they can carry 
on. They want to complete the task. 
40. W takes over the PC and wants to go to Spain. H comes back from 
asking teacher a question and says “Do Portugal”. W starts looking 
for Portugal. H calls out to friend “We’re playing on this – it’s better 
than footie 
41. H describes the “game” to her friend. Portugal = 12 degrees. I ask 
W whether he can remember what temperature and clothes were 
in Morocco. He can 
42. They want Spain next 
43. (eventually) Spain = 7 degrees. I remind them that they don’t have 
to stop at every country on the route. 
44. Someone suggests France but they quickly change their mind and 
go to UK then Norway. They remind each other that it’s OK for him 
to put clothes on. 
45. Norway = -3 degrees. I ask what’s happening to the numbers. H 
says its getting colder. They consider Russia. I encourage them to 
go to Svalbaard (-13 degrees). They’re pleased – “We won!” I ask 
what’s happened to this number – “It’s getting higher and it’s gone 
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colder” W says he has seen numbers like this before in America, 
then changes his mind. 
46. I ask So what is this sign in front of it?. They say take away. I give 
each child a job to do as I review their journey. 
47. Lower numbers, more clothes. 
48. R asks what minus numbers mean. I say we’ll do it next time. 
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Appendix 3b: Write-up for Session 2 H, R and W 
Minute number: 
1. I tell children will be playing a quiz. H reports that Charlie (from the 
other group) “thought minus was hot but it isn’t”. I shuffle cards 
(about ½ of them). I ask children to lay down cards so that 
numbers are in order – highest ones here and lowest there. H asks 
whether zero is minus. 
2. Someone is saying 8, then 7, then it could Russia (this is -6). H 
argues that it couldn’t – because it’s minus. She explains to R that 
it means its really cold. R still doesn’t understand. 
3. H starts laying -1, -2 cards out. R says “Oh does it mean its even 
colder than that?” I press H to explain again. H says “If it’s got a  - 
that means it’s minus and minus means (R says take away). H 
says “No, well it could in Maths but we’re not doing Maths are we, 
means a country is colder than that one that doesn’t have a line (a 
minus sign) 
4. R understands now. I ask her if she’s noticed the minus sign . R 
says yes. I ask did she think it was important . R says yes, she 
thought it was take away 6 or something. 
5. Children have moved cards with zero away from end of the table 
(i.e. have realised that zero isn’t the lowest value). They cooperate 
well to lay out cards. H is not happy with what they’ve done. 
6. I ask R to read down the list of numbers. 0 0  0 1 -1 1 -1 1 -2 -2 -3 -
6 7 8 12 13 (or similar). I re-state original task. R not sure that what 
they’ve done is right. W thinks it is right.  
7. I ask H what’s wrong. She doesn’t explain very clearly – says that 
shouldn’t match that. R seems to understand and says all minuses 
should be together. R says to H “But those zeros haven’t got 
minuses either (i.e. shouldn’t we be picking these up too?). H says 
“No, but they go there of course,” 
8. H says 13 12 8 7 1  13’s the highest. Zero is the lowest. The list is 
in 2 parts. W thinks lowest no is minus 0 
9. H says “I get it – pretend that’s colder than that – do you have to 
put that one before …?” R says “Can we check it out on the 
computer?” I tell her “No, you need to think it through” H reads 13 
12 8 7 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 6. R says H has said it in the 
wrong order. W says yes, because she didn’t say minus. 
10. W points to the negative numbers. H says that she didn’t know that 
she had to say minus (she repeats this). R still thinks that H did it 
wrong. H still thinks she was right. I remove some of the duplicates 
to make more space on the table so that all cards fit in one 
column. 
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11. H says “that’s the hottest because it’s got 13 and it hasn’t got 
minus. W reads 13 12 8 7 1 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -6 (omitted to say the first 
“minus” but immediately self-corrected. 
12. I give children rest of cards 
13. W has put a zero card at the end of the table on it’s own. I ask him 
why. H knows where he should put it. 
14. I ask W why he’s put 5 next to 7 – he can’t explain 
15. more interpolation of cards 
16. more interpolation of cards 
17. H tells us that she’s got a new coat 
18. children complete interpolation of cards. I tell them we’ll do the 
quiz now. 
19. I recap that on the table the card for Gibraltar 13 is at one end and 
the card for Russia -6 is at the other end. I open the powerpoint 
quiz and W reads from the PC screen “Click a question mark” 
20. I show children the links on the screen to a world map and to a 
thermometer – they are excited with this. Back to the main screen. 
W wants a blue question. 
21. Name country between 1 degree C and -1 degree C H ignores 
minus sign when reading number. So does W. R asks what does 
the C mean? H says I wish England was here. H reports that had 
told her friend that England is one of the richest countries and he 
had said no. 
22. Slovenia. I ask H “Is this one?” H says it is minus one. I ask W to 
show a country that’s 1 (he does) and can show a -1 country. I ask 
the quiz question again – i.e. between 1 and -1. Someone 
suggests Germany. I point out that Germany is 1, not between. 
23. H says zero. W suggests Denmark. H says Czech Republic 
(correct). R’s turn – country 12 degrees colder than Portugal. H 
says “We don’t have one” she says it 3 times 
24. They locate Portugal on the list. Don’t seem able to attack the 
question so I ask for countries colder than Portugal. W says “So 
we can pick any of them?” I stress 12 degrees colder. W think 
should just go to bottom of the list. R suggests Germany – she 
says she counted back 12 (cards). I ask so is each card 1 degree? 
25. H mentions rain outside. I repeat “So we need to find somewhere 
12 degrees colder than that”. Children have lost interest because it 
was too hard. I get R to click on the thermometer. It shows zero 
Someone says “Oooh, that’s quite cold.” I explain that we must set 
the temperature at 12 degrees and then count back to see what’s 
12 degrees less than that. 
26. H says “I know what 12 is. I know where 12 is” I demonstrate how 
to reduce temperature on thermometer. I ask “What do you think 
it’s gonna be?” H says “I know already, 12” 
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27. I model 12 – 12 using thermometer.  
28. H calls zero “minus zero”. I explain that we need to find a country 
with a temperature of zero degrees. 
29. New question: Name a country with a temperature between 0 
degrees and … H says 2 minus. H tells me names of counries that 
are zero. R knows that we need -1 countries. 
30. I suggest doing another similar question – between 10 and 15. H 
goes to cards and inidicates all those under 15 
31. Another question – between 3 and 6. W and H say that’s easy, get 
it right. Another question between -6 and -8. W/H call out Spain 
(7). I ask why they’ve gone to that (+ve) end of the table. R read 
question again (correctly). “But we don’t have a country below -6.” 
32. I ask “What have we got that might help us find a country to 
answer the question?” They open thermometer and 
33. set temp at 6. H thinks the question was about “six minus and 
eight. I ask whether this thermometer helps. Children don’t know. I 
open the map 
34. I say “See where Russia is? We need to find a country that’s 
colder. Children don’t know, fed up, distracted 
35. They mention countries all over the map. I ask them to think about 
map we used last time. 
36. “What happened to the temperature when we move that (north) 
way? W says it got colder. H asks – “So we could go up?” W says 
“So every holiday, I’m going to go down, south. H says I’m always 
gonna go up. I recap that we need to find countries colder than 
Russia so which way should we go? H says we just go up. W and 
H suggest Iceland, Greenland. W says his Mum goes to Iceland 
shopping. New question “Is Estonia hotter or colder than Croatia?” 
H say hotter, changes her mind because  
37. “It says there, that’s zero, that’s -2” 
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Appendix 3c: Write-up for Session 3 H, R and W 
Minute number: 
1. – 6 Children play “Reflect – a sketch”. H is not good at this game. 
They realise quickly that they need to put corners on the 
intersections of the lines. R copies rather than reflects. 
7. H asks “How come we’re not doing the country thing? I liked that.” 
R adds “When he changes his clothes and he’s wearing pants, its 
funny.” H asks if I’ve got a 1/2/3/4 player game 
8. H asks for another game that is part of the same games package 
9. talk about games they like 
10. change to “Swimming Pool” game. Straight away H says “I don’t 
get it. What are you supposed to do? No, I don’t get it.” 
11. Start “Balloon Burst” I explain the game 
12. (2 2 -2)   They read 2,2, divide 2.  2 and 2 is 4, divide …. R says 
you add 2 and 2 is 4, then take away 2 is 2. H yeh, but it’s divide. 
R says “It’s take away” She checks her answer – correct. 
13. (4 5 1) H says 6 take away 4 is 1 … is 2. R says 1 add 5 = 6 then 
takeaway 4 is 2. (1 5 -2) R says 6 minus 2 is 4 – they check – 
correct 
14. (-4 -3 -4 ) minus 4, minus 3, minus 4 R say zero because you don’t 
add anything. H says no, it’s minus something. W says minus 
zero? H says 4 add 4 is 8, add ….  I know we’re not adding, add 3 
more, 9 10 11 so it’s minus 11. R says no its not because all of 
them are minuses 
15. Check answer = -11. H says “Told you!” R says how can it be 
minus 11 when there was nothing? (5 -3 4) H says 4 add 5 is 9, 
take away 3 … R says “I think it’s 7” She notices that H doesn’t 
count down with her fingers accurately. R is right. 
16. (-4 4 2)  6 6  H says its 2, 4 minus 4. 
17. R asks “Is it 2? because minus 4 is take away 4. H shall I tell them 
it? You add them 2, 4 and 2 is 6, then take away 4 is 2. (-1 -4 -3) R 
says “Is it-8?” H says yeh. Correct. (3 -3 -4) R asks^? H says no. 3 
take away 3, zero, add 4 is 4. 
18. R says “But it’s minus 4. They check their -4 answer – correct. (1 5 
-4) W enters -1 – wrong. Should be 2 
19. – 21  5 balloons. I give children paper so that they can record the 5 
numbers (3 3 2 -1 -2) Sometimes R forgets to say minus. She 
writes numbers like A on sheet 
22. R says “That’s all a zero on it’s own (she means that one number 
cancels out another) (2 0 -4 1 4 ) – they almost get this one right 
23. (-1 5 -2 3 2 ) No-one paying attention (-4 -3 5 0 0 ) 
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24.  – 27 Children are asking me whether I am a teacher – I explain 
that I used to be. Nimh says -4 and -3 is -7, add 5 is … ? H wonder 
whether starting with the 5 and taking away would help. She is 
able to tell me how to bridge through zero (5 to get to zero then 2 
left because 5 from 7 is 2) She’s not sure whether answer is 2 or -
2 – ip, dip sky blue … 
28. (1 5 -1 -1 1 ) one add 5 is 6, add another one then take away 2. 
The answer is 5 
29. Can explain why adds positives together first i.e. would be harder 
the other way. I ask why are you taking things away when I’ve 
asked you to add all these numbers together?  
30. R says because they’ve “got a little minus on” which means take 
away. 
31. I show the addition sum written out properly. H says you shouldn’t 
write it like that. She has a go at writing it herself but is unhappy 
with it and concedes that mine is right. I ask how they have 
learned to do it this way – who has told them? where have they 
done it? H says she has never done it with Miss Swain or Miss 
Marriott. 
32. (5 3 -4 -3 -4) H says 4 and 4 is 8, add 3 is 11, take away 8. then 
she gets lost or distracted. H says she thinks the answer is 3. 
33. W thinks so too because H says so 
34. (5 -2 4 -1 -3) R asks “Is that normal 5 or minus 5? Is it 3?” H 
agrees 
35. (1 5 -1 1 4 ) I ask H and R to give W a clue. H suggest adding 5 
and 4 first (biggest positive numbers) W can’t do this but 
eventually gets there. R suggests take away 1. H would do that 
last. 
 
FINISH ALL SESSIONS – H, R and W 
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Appendix 4a: Write-up for Session 1 C, S and N 
Minute number: 
1. I set up map while children watch. They are excited. 
2. C notes that FC has got no body. List of countries is showing on 
PC screen. C is looking for Spain on list while I finigh setting up. I 
start to talk about Christmas Eve being a busy night for FC. 
3. I explain that FC likes to go on holiday before Christmas Eve. 
Children think he’d prefer somewhere hot for his holiday. C and N 
suggest Spain, not Africa because it’s too hot. Or he could go to 
Turkey, perhaps? 
4. I say let’s send him to the hottest place we can. The children say 
Africa, S says Egypt as it’s very hot there. C talks about mummies 
and sphynx. He has read about it in a book. Someone mentions 
Togo 
5. Children notice Black Sea (they ask is it black?) They ask is there 
one called the Blue Sea? N says there is a sea where there is dirty 
water and clean water. They see Pakistan. S says its next to India. 
She says something about 3 months. She’s been to Pakistan. S 
says it’s really hot. When she arrived on the plane it was so hot 
that she couldn’t breathe. They agree that FC should go to Africa 
for his holiday. 
6. Children correct me when I mention Egypt. They don’t think that 
Egypt is in Africa. I explain that it is. They notice Niger on the map 
and laugh (because it is like N’s name?). They discuss things that 
they have seen on the news on TV. 
7. S asks where is Iraq? S talks about dirty toilets when she went to 
India. She thinks she was in Uzbekistan (looking at map when she 
says this). 
8. S still talking about her trip to Pakistan. She says it took a whole 
day to get somewhere. She saw whales. Boys mention Germany 
and think it’s hot there. I explain about continents. 
9. Boys think Russia is hot. I explain the table – that it shows us what 
temperature it is on Christmas Eve in each of the countries on the 
list. The ones with the red spot are on the list. N says some places 
are hot on Christmas Eve. C tells S “Go to Germany”. S looks for 
Germany on the list. She clicks on Kazahkstan. 
10. Children talk about what they can see on the screen. I say that’s 
the temperature. C says “That’s not a lot”.  Germany is showing on 
the screen. S asks “When are we going to see FC?” C points at 
temperature (1 degree) and asks “Is that a lot?” N says “No”. N 
finishes off my reading of the temp .. “Celsius” 
11. Back with the list, children are still asking “So is that hot or not?” I 
ask “What do you think?” Children say yes, because he wasn’t 
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wearing a lot, Go to Egypt. 16 degrees. S laughs because he’s 
“taken his clothes off!” I start to explain the game 
12. I demonstrate 2 pages. C wants to go to Madagasgar. C notices 
that the colour of the country name changes on the list once it as 
been “used”. I introduce the game 
13. FC has been on his holidays in Africa. All discuss the red line – 
children know this is the hottest place. Somebody goes to 
classroom to get a globe. 
14. Children look at equator on globe. I ask children to look for Europe 
and Africa on globe. They spot Madagasgar on both globe and 
map. 
15. I show them Kenya, where FC starts his journey. I ask someone to 
look up the temperature in Kenya. I say that he’s got his flip-flops 
on. One of the boys says that it must be hot. 
16. They talk about clothes. I ask what which countries (indicating 
map) might be hotter. They try Madagasgar. C says this is playing 
tricks because Madagascar is hotter than Kenya. N says it’s nearer 
the equator. (They are interested in Madagasgar because of the 
film I think – they don’t really know whether its likely to be hotter 
than Kenya but are interested to know what it is and are surprised 
when they see that it’s not hotter. 
17. N tries Nigeria (wanted to do Niger but thinks he can’t because he 
expect Niger to be hotter than Nigeria. They go to Niger (25 
degrees) They laugh at FC in shorts and shades. 
18. C want to go to Spaiin – he thinks it’s hot – has been there. They 
visit Turkey (1 degree) C still wants to go to Spain but has trouble 
clicking on it. (7 degrees. C says  “Spain’s hot” 
19. Ukraine is -3 degrees. They don’t make any comment, seem to 
have visited in error. They are looking for Jordan. Is 9 degrees. N 
says is hotter than Spain. C says “No, it’s less hot than Spain”. 
They can’t remember what Spain was. 
20. They go to Spain again (7). I recap the temperatures of the 
countries FC has visited so far. N asks “Can we try Iceland?”  ask 
“What will happen there?” N says it will be very very very cold but 
can’t explain why he thinks that. C hints that there could be a clue 
in the name Iceland. 
21. I ask what we think about other countries “up there” (indicating top 
section of the map). They read some of the country names and 
that it will be cold. S says it’s because they are closer to the Arctic. 
I ask what do we know about the Arctic? How do we know? 
22. Children say that they haven’t been there and that it’s not that 
someone has told them what it’s like. N says he has seen it on TV. 
S says she has seen it on TV too – a programmed on in the 
mornings called “Serious Arctic”. She tells us aout the programme 
– mentions teenagers who have very cold hands. 
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23. C or N say “Poland and Finland is cold” He can’t tell me how he 
knows. N notices latitude and longitude lines on the map. I explain 
that they are different. 
24. I tell children they must plan a journey for FC starting with Kenya 
and ending up in Svalbaard. I point out that he will not have many 
clothes on when he starts. I ask whether the places that he visits 
will get hotter or colder. No hesitation – the boys say colder. I 
explain about clothes being added gradually. 
25. I ask children where they want to start.. C says Madagsgar is hot 
(and adds “but not as in sexy”). C says “That was cold, wasn’t I?” 
(Kenya). N says no. They  check Madagascar temperature (21 
degress) C says he’ll go to Kenya and see if it’s colder. 
26. Children talk about “beat the number” “go less”. They check 
Tanzania – 28 degrees, FC wearing trunks – children giggle. C 
says “We’ll start from there” 
27. I check that children understand that the next place can be the 
same or with more clothes, but not less. They laugh about what 
“less clothes” might mean 
28. They think they could go to Kenya next as it should be easy to 
beat 28. They notice they have been to Kenya before. N says Yes, 
FC has more clothes. C says That’s good. N says he wants to try 
that country “Sunderland”. I correct him “Sudan” 
29. Sudan is 25. Oooh unsure what do do. They are disappointed. 
Ethiopia is 16. S says Yes! She notices that FC has boots on now. 
30. I recap: Tanzania 28, Kenya 19. I ask if they want to “Go here 
next?” C says no because it is “less hot”. I ask “Is that wrong?” C 
says “last time he had a coat on”. They check – no coat previously. 
31. Someone says “Look, trousers in Ethiopia, not Kenya. They are 
confused, undecided. S is looking for Chad on the list. 
32. Chad = 24. S says this is kind of hot. They want to go to Niger 
(“N’s country”) 
33. They know they need to get colder. Niger is 25. N says told you it 
was hot. C says that’s rubbish – Go to the one under it. They keep 
talking about Portugal. I show them where it is on the map and say 
its too far to go. S says try Pakistan. I explain that there is no red 
dot so Pakistan is not on our temperature table. 
34. They look for a country with a red dot . They go to Iran (6). N says 
it will be “hard ot beat. He’s got everything on”. S says “Not his hat” 
They go to Portugal (12). C and N notice that FC has got the same 
clothes on. 
35. I remind them “So you’re looking for somewhere colder than 6”. 
They say Germany’s cold, S says could do Scotland.. It rains all 
the time and it’s really cold. C doesn’t want to go to UK yet – too 
far away. He suggests they go there once they are a bit closer. 
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36. Turkmenistan (5).”Yes, we beat it”. S notices that FC has hat on. C 
says now he needs his sunglasses. They decide to go to UK next, 
then Poland. 
37. UK = 6. S says they are not allowed to go backwards. C says 
We’re meant to go to America but that’s British. We’re going to 
Poland. 
38. S would like to go to Germany (1). She says “Yes. I got it right”. C 
says it’ll be hard to beat. “We’re going to Poland” N asks “Can I go 
to Russia”. They talk about whether they are allowed to go “back” 
39. Czech Republic = 0 “Zero!” Children are very happy about this. S 
says this is colder than any oof them. N say “But it might be minus 
in other countries”. C says “can’t go to Russia because it’s too hot 
for that. Let’s just try” 
40. He clicks on Poland by mistake (0). Russia (-6) C laughs. Ns says 
“Is that minus?” C calls it six minus. 
41. C is very excited “Minus 6. That means you’re not allowed any 
more than 6.” S says it might get better. -8 or -10. I ask if that 
would be colder. S says yes. I say that I don’t understand “minus 
numbers”. C explains that it means “for -6, you must take 6 away 
from 6. I challenge this and pretend I still don’t understand – that 
that doesn’t make any sense to me. S agrees that it is confusing. C 
shrugs his shoulders and says “no idea.” 
42. Iceland next – 0. They think it’s warmer than -6 and suggest going 
there first. 
43. They want to check Finland = -4. C says “But it’s the same 
because the clothes are the same. I ask “Is -4 colder than -6?” C 
doesn’t know. N thinks not. 
44. N wants to look at Norway (-3). C says “That one’s even less than 
that!” They look at Sweden (-2) and are disappointed. They agree 
with me that Russia is colder than all of these. C suggests leaving 
Russia out and just going to these. The bell goes. N says he would 
rather carry on with this than have playtime. They look at 
Svalbaard. Someone says “Oh no! That was just one less” 
45. -13. C says “Russia is hotter than that.” S says no it’s colder, not 
hotter. I ask which is coldest -6 or -13. They agree that -6 is hotter. 
I ask for a temperature warmer than -6. C says -2. S says -1. C 
says -0. 
46. I ask which is warmest 1 or -4? N says -4. While he tries to explain 
he gets confused and changes his mind. 
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Appendix 4b: Write-up for Session 2 C, S and N 
Minute number: 
1. I tell children that we’ll being doing a quiz and they must do 
something with these cards ( show children a reduced pile of cards 
– i.e. not all of them) 
2. I explain that each card has the name of a country and a number. 
C or N says “Russia is minus 6” C says “I love Spain” S says “And 
that one’s minus 13. The boys speak the names of some of the 
countries on the cards. S and/or C call out “minus 1!” 
3. I ask for children to put cards in order with the “highest numbers” 
here and the “lowest numbers” here. Someone says “Russia’s 
high. It’s minus 6 – that’s high” 
4. N wants to do the hottest first. 9’s hotter than Spain isn’t it? he 
asks. C talks about 6 6 6 6  then 5 5 5 5. C says “I think that one’s 
colder than that one”. N tells C “Russia is not meant to be in the 
hot section”. They both agree that it is -6 but C doesn’t understand. 
(He only “sees” the number, not the sign) 
5. C reads 13 as 3 
6. N is not happy because he thinks minus means cold and C has put 
Russia in a postion where the numeral is correct but he ignores the 
signs. I ask C to read out the numbers from the ordered cards. He 
reads 13 to zero in order but doesn’t mention any signs. N says 
“He’s wrong” S does it the same way as C. 
7. As S passes Russia (-6), in the sequence, C says “See, you don’t 
have to say the minus” N read the list and includes all (minus” 
words. N explains that minus means cold, below zero. S says 
“minus counts”. 
8. C and N argue about whether minus goes below zero. 
9. C reads the new list where -6 is now below 0 but still doesn’t say 
the minus word. S and N say ”all the minus ones are colder and 
should be below zero.” 
10. S mentions “lowest cold”. N mentions 6 under zero, 4 under zero. 
S reads the list properly. 
11. I ask what made them change their mind. S and C say that it was 
when they said 6 under zero because then then they realised that 
one under zero is hotter than 6 under zero 
12. C talks about snow – that higher snow shows that it is colder so -6 
is higher snow than -1 
13. I remove some cards with duplicate temperatures to make room to 
add in other cards 
14. N mentions “my country”. Someone says Turkey. 
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15. C interpolates cards. N says Portugal. I ask children to describe 
where they are putting things. C does one but says hotter than, 
rather than colder – he corrects himself immediately. 
16. C wants to “go for” Norway, N for Hungary – they laugh at the 
name Hungary. C says Norway is 3 (i.e doesn’t mention minus) 
17. Someone jokes about Neverland/Netherlands – Peter Pan. 
Someone remarks “Poland’s hot”. I ask C to describe why 
Netherlands is where he’s put it. C says it’s “under the 5” But he 
knows it shouldn’t go in the “minus section”. 
18. One more each. N remarks “No Niger in here! My country” 
19. I tell children to stop rushing. N says “It’s hotter than France but 
colder than Italy” (good at explaining) 
20. I explain the question mark icons on the screen. First question “Is 
Norway hotter or colder than Russia” 
21. C says “Yes it is, yes it is. Give me Norway! Yes. I got it right.” I tell 
C to calm down. 
22. Children are laying out cards neatly on the table. 
23. C says “I got it right. Look! There’s Norway and there’s Russia” C 
thinks Norway is hotter than Russia. 
24. C explains “Because it says it on the card. Three minus means 3 
behind zero and that’s 6 behind zeo. S says “So that’s hotter than 
Russia.” C “Yes, that’s what said”. I ask “How do you know?”C 
says “because 6 under zero is real cold but 3 under I’s only a little 
bit cold” 
25. Next quiz question”Name country 12 degrees colder than 
Portugal”. They look for Portugal on the cards. 
26. N says “It is 12. Zero. Iceland” He understands that any that are 
zero will work. N says 12 less than 12 is zero 
27. S says “I don’t get it.” I tell N to expalin. C say it’s easy – he counts 
the cards but skips some – he is corresponding one count with one 
card and shouldn’t 
28. I point out the thermometer icon and say it might help. 
29. Children have never see the thermometer ITP before. I 
demonstrate what it does. 
30. C tries to put the thermometer on 12. He counts down 12 from the 
starting point (which was 20 degrees). N says “It’s gone past 10” 
Cs “wanders” with the virtual thermomenter. N says 12 is 2 more 
than 10.  
31. S thinks its 28 (has she counted down from 40 – max label on 
therm?) 
32. I and N explain to S how things go up from zero. 
33. Thermometer shows 15 but S thinks is 25. S correctly reads 19.  
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34. I show that if it starts at 12, we can use the change display to help 
find 12 below the starting temperature.  
35. They count down and use the change display to check they have 
counted correctly. 
36. Back to the quiz. “If travel from Denmark to Estonia, what will 
happen to the temperature?C jokes “It’ll go higher” 
37. I ask “How are you going to find out?” N uses the cards, He says it 
changes by 2. 
38. I ask “Does it go up or down?” N says down. I ask “hotter or 
colder?” C says colder. S says “higher or lower? lower”. New 
question on quiz – “Name a country where the temperature is 
between 3 degrees and 6 degrees” S misreads the question and 
says she doesn’t understand the degree symbol 
39. C says “I know what it is. It could be 4” Ss says 5. C says 
Neverland because that’s 4. He reads the next question “Name a 
country between 6 celsius and 8 celsius. He has misread it – it 
actually says -6 and -8. 
40. Chalrie says Spain is 7. S says no because “there isn’t a minus – 
it’s gotta go down here” C argues because minus means under 
zero. 
41. I say that the lowest one on our list is -6. C still argues that we 
shouldn’t be looking for minus anything. Eventually he does see 
the minus signs in the question. The boys know that they need a -7 
country and 
42. we don’t have one. They check the map on screen but it doesn’t 
help. The latitude and longitude lines are confusing them. 
43. Children discuss countries they see on the map. They try to click 
on the map and on the £1000 banner on screen. 
44. They chat about travel, airports, driving 
45. Back to the quiz. S asks about why time goes backwards in UK. C 
wants to watch the prize banner until someone wins. 
46. Next question “country between 0 and -2?” S says, there’s only 
one and it’s got to be minus. They look for countries. N says “It 
could be any of these 3 – I’m choosiing ..” C says “I don’t get it – 
because -1 is going to be under zero but what about -2. I ask “Why 
can’t it be 1 rather than -1?! C says 
47. ..”because -2 isn’t on top.”Next question “country between 10 and 
15. Children are bored with this question type. They look at a “pink 
question” “If I’m in Albania and go to somewhere that is 7 degrees 
colder, where might I be?” 
48. C suggests going to the map. N and S say it won’t help. S says 
Albania is 6. She suggest Spain. I repeat “ the question says 7 
degrees colder” The boys count down, C counts 7 cards. 
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49. C says “Lets finish it quick. Is it Spain?” I ask what is the 
temperature in Spain? Is it-7 degrees?” They have looked for a 
country that is 7, not -7 – i.e have ignored the sign. 
50. Finish. Children go out to play. 
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Appendix 4c: Write-up for Session 3 C, S and N 
Minute number: 
1. I ask what we did with the cards last time. N says “Put them from 
highest temperature to lowest”. Cs says we went to counries . N 
says they also answered question, some were temperature 
questions. 
2. I say “Remember the quiz? We’re going to do some more 
questions and look at a couple of other things.” 
3. S clicks on the question “Name a country 12 degrees lower than 
Portugal”. They’ve had this question before but can’t remember the 
answer, C remembers that Russia was -6. 
4. I look for the list of temps in my bag – can’t find it. The children find 
the Russia card and confirm that C is right – it is -6. But does this 
answer the question? I ask what else we need to know to answer 
this question. 
5. Eventually C suggests that they look at the temperature in Portugal 
and “go 7 down, -6, 12. C looks for the Portugal card. It shows 12 
degrees. C counts back on his fingers. 
6. He finishes on zero. I ask “So, are you looking for zero?” C says 
that Russia could be the answer because it’s under zero. I 
challenge this. C insists that Russia would do. They remark that 
the map didn’t help and C mentions the £100 banner. 
7. I ask if they can see Portugal on the map. S finds it.. 
8. I ask whether they still think Russia is the answer. Ss says no. I 
offer pen and paper and children accept – they think it will help. S 
suggest writing down Portugal and all the ones that are minus and 
then they will be able to see which one is the lowest. 
9. S repeats “then they will be able to see which one is the lowest.”. 
C says “But we don’t know how long the minuses go down” He 
looks through the cards for the “lowest minus”. C says it’s probably 
Russia and says that they need to write Russia at thebottom of the 
list. 
10. S gets all the minus cards together. 
11. S makes 2 piles – one of “minuses” and one for all the others. She 
says that she is going to sort out which is the lowest. 
12. C corrects her – “the highest, you mean, out of the the coldest?” N 
argues “No, the coldest, I think she means. C replies “Yes, that’s 
what I said.” C is playing with mouse and map – is not really 
paying attention to the discussion or is pretending not to. 
13. N says “Russia is a big one, isn’t it?” I ask N to explain what he’s 
doing on the paper. He is writing names of countries as if they 
were positioned against a vertical number line. (see children’s 
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annotations). N mentions that he is in the lowest group for spelling 
and is surprised that he can spell some of the names. 
14. C interrupts and takes over saying the numbers in  order -1, -2, -3, 
-4, -5, -6. I say that this is going to take ages – what else can we 
do? C suggests looking at the map. I point out that they have been 
looking at the map already but does it help? C says No. N asks 
why is Asda on the map (advertising banner) 
15. I return children’s attention to the question. C still thinks the 
answer is Russia. I open the Thermometer ITP and recap that we 
know  that Portugal is 12 degrees and Russia is -6. C says “But 
Russia is better, it’s lower.” I ask “But is it 12 degress lower?” N 
says “We have to go to 12, C, I’ve worked it out – it’s zero. 12 
lower than 12, 12 lower than Portugal is zero.” 
16. C counted down on his fingers. They find the card with Czech 
Republic (which is 0 degrees). N puts the thermometer on 12 – he 
says we chould have counted down to make sure. 
17. I get children to count down 12. S doesn’t hink that the 
thermometer actually shows 12 anyway. I move the marker to zero 
and show children the “difference” box on screen which is showing 
12.  
18. I point out that the change box shows -12 and ask what this ms all 
about. N says that is shows that we counted down 12. I ask again 
why the change box shows minus 12. C says its because its below 
zero. N says “because of counting down minuses”. 
19. C asks me about whether I am a teacher and I reply. I ask N to 
explain and he says the same again, adding “it means take away, 
sort of.” 
20. I move the thermometer up and down so that the “change” display 
keeps switching between negaive and not. N is still confused 
though he thinks he understands something “and then when the 
thermometer goes down it’s like taking something away so you get 
the takeaway sign.” 
21. I encourage N to use the mouse and then to be the teacher and 
explain to C and S. C feeds back that if you “go down” 2 its minus 
2 and if you go down 12 its minus 12. 
22. I ask why there is not a minus sometimes. N replies that this 
happens when “you go higher”. C says that he understands but S 
says she does not. 
23. Boys are chatting about the thermometer confidently. 
24. I demonstrate again for S. I ask whether they can predict what will 
be in Change box. N can do it. C is not sure.  
25. S is still unsure. 
26. S still does not understand. 
27. We return to the quiz questions. N’s turn. 
 340
28. He clicks on “Name a country 1 degree warmer than Finland. N 
says that the first step is to get Finland. S thinks the answer to the 
question is Egypt. N says that he thinks Finland “is pretty cold, isn’t 
it?” I ask S why she thinks Egypt is the answer. She replies, 
because its hot. The children find the card for Finland which shows 
-4 degrees. C wants to use Czech Republic (which is 0 degrees) 
as the answer. I ask “Is it 1 degree warmer?”C agrees that it is not. 
29. Bell goes. We stop for playtime. 
30. After playtime, we resume. The children say that Norway is the 
answer to the question.I ask S how that can be right – that one has 
got 3 on the card and one has got 4 – “How can the one with 3 be 
warmer”  
31. C says because “that’s only 3 below and that’s 4 below zero. 
32. C repeats “That’s 3 under zero colder and that’s 4 under zero 
colder. -4 is colder than -3.” They click on another question “Name 
a country that is 3 degrees colder than Luxembourg” 
33. They look for the Luxembourg card. N says he’s already found 
one. He seems to be very uncertain and confused. I ask him to 
explain. 
34. C says that “you’ve got to take away”. I ask why. 
35. .. that it doesn’t tell you to take away. C says “But its like taking 
away, isn’t it?” He counts back on his fingers. N does too 1, 0, -1, -
2. I suggest writing something down like a teacher would on a 
whiteboard. 
36. N writes 1 – 3 = -2. I ask N to use the thermometer. He does it 
correctly (He uses “mathematical” language and talks about taking 
away, rather than the temperature language.)   
37. I ask C to demonstrate the same problem. I ask what is 1, why 1? 
– they all seem to have forgotten 
38. C talks through the problem correctly. Then he questions himself – 
he’s not sure about something but doesn’t know what. 
39. They click on the question “Name a country 4 degrees warmer 
than Norway”. I ask S what we need to do first. S finds the Norway 
card. C says “3 minus” 
40. C says excitely “It’s 1! Its 1!” C plays the part of the teacher with 
the thermometer. 
41. He talks about 3 Celsius but puts thermomeer on -2. N notices its 
not 3. C moves it to -3 and still talks about 3 celsius. I challenge 
him. 
42. The display is showing -3 and C still reads it as 3. Eventually he 
corrects himself and says minus 3. He moves the thermometer to 
3. I asks why. C is confused is not listening. He calls out 7. N 
agrees, 7. 
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43. N reads out what he has written. “3 minus ..” C interrupts “But it’s 
not takeaways” N says “It is. It starts with 3 minus take away 4”. I 
ask why take away 4? N says because it said in the question. C 
read the question out again. N says “Oh warmer, 3 celsius add ..” 
C questions why he’s doing minus. N says that he’s right because 
it starts with 3 minus … N says -2, -1, 0 C says “You’re not going 
down, you’re going up. N agrees, he is going up and he repeats 
the numbers. 
44. S says “If it’s add, you go forward, if it’s take away, you go lower. N 
says word celsius for minus when he reads values. C put 
thermometer on -3. He count up 4 and gets 1. 
45. C is confused because “it didn’t say minus on the question, only on 
the card”. He still doesn’t see/say the minus sign. 
46. N explains how he “pictures minuses”. “I think of a tube of ice, 
blocks of ice, big blocks of ice is zero”. He draws this, he says “ 1 
celsius, 2 celsius etc and writes down -1, -2 as he speaks 
47. C draws his picture too. He also draws ice cubes. 
48. He makes is colder and asks “What is infinity?” N says it’s where 
numbers never end. N adds numbers to C’s diagram. S extends it 
to -4. 
49. They click on new question. “Name a country 3 degrees colder 
than Cyprus”  
50. N looks for the Cyprus card. S finds it. It shows 9 degrees. N wants 
to write it down 9 degrees – 3 degrees = 6. C says “We’ve got no 6 
ones.” 
51. N explains that if the question says colder, in this language, it 
means take away. 
52. New question “Name a country 10 degrees warmer than Sweden”. 
S wants to explain. They find the Sweden card. C says 6 minus.  
53. The temperature is -2. S writes 2-10. She changes this to -2 + 10. 
C says that they’ve got to add 10 because it says warmer. N 
agrees. 
54. C says the answer is 8. I ask S to use the thermometer to work 
through the problem. 
55. S sets the thermometer at -2. She slides the red up and counts up 
10. I ask “What temperature are we at now?” eventually they agree 
that it’s 8 
56. S knows that if the question had said colder, they would have done 
a minus. 
57. The group talks about the other thermometer on-screen buttons 
58. I ask “If we start at Belarus which is -3 (I put the thermometer at -3) 
and want to know what the temperature is if its 20 degrees warmer 
than this…? N moves the thermometer up and counts up 20. 
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59. I have to help with the count and controlling the thermometer red 
bar accurately. 
60. N sees the answer is 17. 
61. I ask how we could write this down. C writes -1 + 20 = 17 
62. I say “Lets start at -4 and go 
63. 30 degrees warmer. N counts up as thermometer moves. 
Something goes wrong with the application and I quit the 
thermometer program. 
64. I check that Camtasia is still working. 
65. We reopen the thermometer and set it at -2. N needs to add 30. 
He goes to 30 (i.e. adds 32). When he corrects himself, 
66. C thinks he has made a mistake. I recap and confirm and ask how 
we would write this one down. 
67. C writes -2 + 30 = 28. New one – start at 6 
68. and get 8 degrees colder. Ns slides and counts down 8. C thinks 
the answer shoud be -3 – he is counting down on his fingers – 6, 5, 
4, 3, 2, 1,  -1, -2 
69. N can see that the correct answer is -2. C writes 
70. numbers as a vertical number line. Now he answers correctly. But 
his first count is his start number so he should get wrong answer 
71. I ask N if he can explain how C gets the right answer when the 
method is wrong. It is because he is not icluding zero as one of his 
series of numbers 
72. Bell has gone. Children are confused with task and tired, now. I 
ask C why he didn’t draw a number line – he doesn’t know. 
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Appendix 4d: Write-up for Session 4 C, S and N 
Minute number: 
1. -6 S wants to do Swimming Pool Sid. Ne thinks dimensions 9 by 9 
is an area of 18. They find that 10 by 9 is 90 but can’t work out that 
the 2 dimensions are multiplied together. 
7. … even when I try to prompt it. S says “If we do 10 and 2 it will be 
20” The boys ignore her. Change game to Reflect a Sketch.  
8. S is quick to see how to do it and helps the boys. 
9. – 12 C understands it. 
13. S explains how she wowrks these out, what she looks at. 
14.  – 17 They change to a horizontal line of reflection 
18. N says “We’re doing better than the one before.” 
19. They go to Balloon Burst. While I explain the game, S asks “Can 
we use paper?” C asks why. S says “Because you have to add” 
20. balloons are -3, 2, 9 C reads the numbers but doesn’t say word 
minus. N is quick to correct him. C says “It’s 11 – ‘cause you add 9 
and 2 together … S says “But then you minus 3 away” C says “It’s 
gonna be … 11, 10, 9 “ S says “I thought so – you added only 2” (I 
think she means take away) 
21. balloons are 1, -7, 1 S says “1 add 1 minus 7. C says “Zero!” He 
enters 0 as the answer and sees the answer on screen and 
corrects to “Minus 5 actually” Niamh asks “What are we doing?” C 
counts on his fingers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 … it’s 9.   
22. C reads out next set of balloons are -4, 8, 1 (last one should be -1 
but C doesn’t say minus) C says 8 take away 4 take away 1 … 3 
23. Ballons are 1, -5, -9 (But C doesn’t say minus again) S says “Zero, 
No. It’s got to be minus something” C says “add 5 and then you’ll 
know what minus it is … 15, -14! I added 9 and 5 that makes 15 
but then I’ve got one that makes it 14.” I ask why minus? C says 
“Because it’s got minuses there” I ask “Why don’t you just add all 3 
numbers and call it minus?”C says “No, because one of them isn’t 
minus”  
24. I get C to think it through again and he spots his error He types in -
13 (correct) 
25. I set the game to 5 balloons. S says “So we know it was minus 
because for this one it was -5 because it went over zero. New 
balloons are 0, -4, 9, 2, 8 Ss says “You could do the tens and units 
thingy, She writes the numbers down and asks “Are we adding or 
taking away?” 
26. I say “S has added all those numbers together and she’s got 23. 
What do you do now?” S says “Zero doesn’t count because you 
don’t take anything away.” Boys want to put 23 in as the answer. 
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27. They take another look. C rushes into the next set of balloons 0, 4, 
-2, -2, 7 C says “Zero, which is nothing, then 7,8,9, 10” S says 
“Then you minus 2” C says “Wait, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 minus 9” N asks 
“Are we sure?” C says Yes. (he’s wrong of course – they hadn’t 
written all the numbers down properly) 
28. 5, 5, 10, 3, -1 S says “ 5 and 5 is 10, 20, then that’s 23. C says 
“take away 1” S says “22. I ask “Why are you taking away a 
number? You’re supposed to be adding all the numbers together. 
N says “Because it’s a minus” C agrees “’Cause there’s a munus 1 
there” I ask “Why does that mean take away?” 
29. I persevere “You haven’t explained it very well yet. Why, when 
you’re adding a minus number, does it mean you take it away?” C 
says “’Cause it’s like temperature – ‘cause you could have 19 
degrees and if you take minus one off it’ll be …” I ask “So, its like 
temperature?” N says “Sure, minus, below” C agrees “Yeh, cos we 
did it last time and I remember.  Santa Calus taking his clothes off- 
stripping” 
30. They type in 22 (correct) New ballooons 9, -6, 6, 5, -8 S says 
“They make 11, then add 9 ….. 20. “  
31. C says “Then take away 8” But he can’t count back, gets confused. 
C “7?” 
32. N asks “Shall we try to work it out again?” I say “Does it help to 
take the 8 away first?  
33. C says “Yes, because you add the highest no first …. “ 
34. I say “Let me show you somethin else You’ve got 6 and -6 “ Niegel 
says “That’s zero” I say “So you just need to add the others 
together … Get me a ruler.  
35. We are going to use a ruler to help us. We’ve already agreed that 
+6 and -6 is zero …. 
36. N says “add 9 is 14 take away minus 8 .. 9 C says “not 9, 6”(he’s 
right) 
37. 7 balloons 1, 1, -2, 0, -4, 4, -4 Cs check that we’ve got the right 
number of balloons. He says “4 add 1 add 1 is 6. Take away -4 …” 
Boys are distracted. Ss says “Minus 4. You showed us the way of 
adding all these ones (positive) before we did thes ones.” I said “I 
didn’t show you that. Has someone else shown you that?” 
38. S says “Altogether they make 6, take away 4, that’s zero, then take 
away another 4, that’s minus 4. (correct) 
39. -41 -2, -3, 0, -1, -3, 3, -3 C recaps the numbers. Ns says “) and 3, 
only 2” S separates munuses. C says “3,6,9,10,11 add 3 that’s 11 
take away 3. 8” I ask “Why take 3 away from 11? C can’t explain. 
They get it right. 
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42. I write -9  9 and ask “Whats the difference?” S says “Well, you add 
the line and then it tells you to take away it …” I write 2+3+-4+-
1+2=  
43. S has already latched onto the “pairing to cancel” idea but gets 
itslightly wrong Ns keeps running total 5, 1, 0, 2 
44. 0, 1, 0, 5, 3, -1, -3 N speaks his running total “1, 1, 6, 9, 8, 5, “ I 
ask “What if I say 4 take away -1? and I write 4 - -1  
45. N says “5 because when say add you take away so it might be … “ 
46. I ask “What is 3 times -2?” N says “You might have to divide it. S 
says “3 times 2 is …” no answer. 
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Appendix 5a: Write-up for Session 1 L, M & G 
Minute number: 
1. I show children the map and explain list of countries and the way 
the on screen database works, including the different types of 
information it holds. They laugh at FC clothes 
2. Children can tell me there are countries and some continents on 
the map. They know that it is hot near the equator. They ask where 
India is and understand why it is not on the map. 
3. I explain the journey task 
4. I emphasise “We don’t want FC to have to take clothes off .. “They 
realise “So we’re not allowed to make him get hotter” Boys discuss 
which hot place to start with. 
5. M suggests “Let’s click on Meroon” (similar to his name) 23 
degrees. L points to Nigeria “I think that’s hotter” 
6. They check Nigeria. They suggest taking turns, G thinks Nigeria is 
a good one to start with M says No. They argue about whether to 
go to Niger or Libya 
7. M is excited “It’s 25! He’s taken his thing off.” They decide to go to 
Chad instead of Nigeria. M, “Yes, 24 . Put him on Chad. Lets go to 
Chad. I ask them to recap. Meroon 21, then Nigeria. 
8. M and G argue whether Meroon was 21 or 23 then agree it was 
24. I check “So, it’s getting hotter?” They check Nigeria – 21 
degrees. They revisit to check Meroon 23. They look at Niger 25. 
They remember that they had decided not to go there and went to 
Chad instead 24. I say it’s too hot. G says – FC has same clothes. 
M insist “But it is the temperature that is most important. 
9. They try Benin. I ask “What are you looking for?” G says, 
something colder. Benin is 25 and the say this is too hot. They 
think they are stuck unless they “jump over”. I tel them that they 
can – they had thought they must move to adjacent countries. 
Boys are all very excited. They find that Burkina Faso is 25. M 
says “We could jump over to Sunday” 
10. They check Sudan 25, Libya is 13. L says Yes, that’s better. I want 
to slow them down. G wants to go to Algeria. M says No as its 
realy, really hot (but they haven’t looked it up yet) When I ask why 
they think that  
11. he says because it’s got sand. Algeria is 13. They check Morocco. 
I recap – Meroon 23, Nigeria 21 What’s next? Libya? .. (is 13). 
They are excited and don’t want to stop. They check Spain and 
find that it is 7 degrees. 
12.  “It doesn’t seem possible – I’ve been there and its really hot. They 
argue about whether France is hot. I ask for a recap. Spain 7, 
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France 5 the UK. Someone says it’s too big a jump. They find UK 
= 6. They think this is “too high – that was 5” 
13. OK Belgium. Let’s see Belgium” They find that it isn’t on the list. 
“You’ll have to go to Germany. There, 1 degree” Boys very 
satisfied with this. “We’ll go there. But that’s bad because we have 
to look for somewhere that’s zero. Poland = zero. They carry on, 
talk about Norway and Sweden. 
14. I ask “Hold on – if that’s zero, what are we looking for?” Chorus, 
emphatic “minus”. I ask “Is that colder, then?” “Yes. Let’s check out 
Sweden.” They find it is -2 “Yes, that.” They laugh at FC coat. They 
try Norway , -3 degrees. L starts to recap, I continue Poland was 
zero, Sweden -2, Norway -3. 
15. They check Svalbaard -13. “We made it!” I check  route with them 
Meroon 23, Nigeria 21,  
16. Algeria 13, Spain 7, France 5, Germany 1, Poland 0, Sweden -2, 
Norway -3, Svalbaard -13 
17. I tell them I want them to think about the numbers from 23 to -13 – 
“Is that colder or hotter?! They chorus, confidently “Colder”. I ask 
what has happened with FC clothes. They tell me he has been 
putting more on. I ask “What’s happening to the numbers?” M says 
they are getting smaller.. when it gets past zero its into minuses 
which is really cold” 
18. I ask why is this (5) hotter than  this (-13)? M says because that 
one (5) is over zeroand its not a minus so its hotter. Minus is 
colder. I ask “So will any minus be colder than even abig plus 
number? G says Yes, the big plus numbers are hotter because 
they’re closer to the equator. M agrees – Yes, the equator is like 
the hottest because it’s like the oven. And that’s like the freezer up 
there. I ask “So give me a number, any number , L, that’s bigger 
than -20” M laughs “-19”. L say 30 
19. I ask “Give me a number that’s smaller than -20.” L says -29. I ask 
for one between -20 and -29. L says -26. I ask “If you’re 
somewhere that’s -13 and go to Norway, how much is the 
temperature changing? 10 degrees, they all tell me emphatically. I 
ask whether it is increasing or decreasing. Lowering, decreasing is 
the reply. They correct themselves, increasing. 
20. I ask “And if I go from Norway to Sweden?” M says it gets smaller 
– then corrects, saying “It increases by one. But it does kind of 
decrease as well. M says “But its minus” I ask “So if I said what is 
minus 2 add 5 ?” M answers 3. G says 2 – they argue G explains 
because you add on to get to the zero. M says 2 take away 5 is 3 
which means you’ll get 3. I ask M to draw what he means. 
21. As he draws, he say “You’re on -2 and you have 5 so you take 
away … 2 which makes zero which means you have 3 left” G 
wants to do it. I intervene “But I asked you to add 5, not take 
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anything away. G mentions “clonk” M understands him – he 
describes it as a brick and draws a diagram 
22. I ask if anyone has taught him to do this L wants to explain his 
way. It is similar but includes going “up” to zero and then past zero. 
Number line model) G thought and still thinks answer is 2 – he has 
come confusion around the zero. Others are both confident with 3. 
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Appendix 5b: Write-up for Session 2 L, M & G 
Minute number: 
1. I ask what boys remember from last time. L recaps the FC journey 
task. 
2. Boys ask if their faces are recorded or just their voices. I explain 
that the screen is recorded too and that they should avoid 
knocking on the table 
3. M tells me that webMs can be used on MSN. I shuffle the country 
cards. L asks “Are we playing dominos or something?” I explain 
that there is no map today but that we do have some of the same 
information on the cards. I ask them to order the cards with the 
highest number here and the lowest one there 
4. They realise immediately that they don’t know where to put first 
cards because they don’t know what others will be. G says some 
will go up to 20 and knows that not every no will be represented. 
Boys start to put cards on the table 
5. More placing of cards on table. They realise there are sometimes 
more than one country with the same number. This doesn’t worry 
them 
6. More cards. They take turns and do each one confidently and 
correctly. 
7. More. The boys are well-motivated and enthusiastic. 
8. More 
9. More. They need to keep moving the cards to create space for 
new ones. 
10. Someone mentions Monaco Grand Prix 
11. The read the list of cards in unison. 
12. Coldest is Russia. There are seven countries with zero. I open the 
quiz slideshow 
13. Question asks for country between 0 and -2. M immediately says -
1. G says Bulgaria. They read the question correctly and say 
“Minus” 
14. Question asks for country between -6 and -8. They agree to use 
Russia -6 because it’s the lowest one they’ve got. They 
understand that they need a -7. I ask whether there is something 
else we could use to find out an answer to the question 
15. M suggests Google. I show them the thermometer ITP. The boys 
think the map will help and click on the map. They mistake the 
latitude longitude lines for temperature labels. I point this out and 
the boys agree they must ignore these. 
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16. I ask “Is there anything else on the map that  could help us?” M 
says could click for information to see how hot or cold it is. G says 
maybe it doesn’t work like that. L says “I know a cold country” M 
says “Egypt’s cold” (he is joking) someone thinks Ireland is cold. 
Someone else thinks Iceland is colder. I ask why. He says 
because it’s further up. The equator is further down and it’s the 
hottest place. M says he’s been to Ireland and it’s not that cold 
there. 
17. L remembers that there had been one that was 13minus on the 
other map. They think it might have been Slovakia (remembering 
the S and L sound in Svalbaard?) But then they remember that the 
question needs between -6 and -8. 
18. L clicks on a “high” yellow question. Is Estonia hotter or colder than 
Croatia. M says Go on the map. G says Croatia is here (looking at 
cards). He finds that Estonia is -2 and says So it’s colder. 
19. M says “between 3 and 6” (Reading from a new question) L says 3 
and 6, up there! M says Minus! G says No, it’s not minus. L holds 
up cards and says France and Netherlands. 
20. G reads next question 4 degrees warmer than Norway. M 
remembers we had Norway last time. They find the Norway card 
and M counts up 4 (not sure whether he is counting cards or 
looking at the temps). M says Germany, Germany. L asks if the 
colours relate to continents because the blue ones were about 
Europe. 
21. I recap the question. I ask M to explain how he got to the answer. 
He says Norway is 3 so you need to go up to -2, up to -1, up to -0, 
to 1, not -0, to 0 12 degrees colder than Portugal. They find the 
Portugal card quickly 
22. Thy count down together in ones to 0 and know they need a 
country with 0. Between 10 and 15. “It’s out of these – Portugal” 
23. They are not bothered that there isn’t a card with 15. I ask them 
how they do it if there is no 15 card. Someone repeats the 
question. I say “So you’re thinking just about the numbers, not the 
cards?” 
24. Question : In Norway, go 4 degrees hotter, where am I? Someone 
says Norway’s down there. L/G “Oh its back to the ones. M says 
Romania, Hungary then jokes about hungry. Someone says that 
Romania is in Harry Potter – dragon 
25. Question: travel from Russia to Sweden, what happens to the 
temperature? Someone says “Russia’s down here. It’ll go 1, 2, 3, 4 
degrees higher or 3 – I don’t know which. Not sure whether to 
count 2s. I say “So you’re imagining that there’s a -5 a counting 
that as your first. And Finland as your second, -3 means you have 
gone up 3, to go to Sweden because Sweden is in 2 – i.e they 
don’t know whether it should be included in the count or not. 
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26. Someone asks “Why don’t we start on that on (Russia) and end up 
at Sweden – they get the answer 5. I suggest they pick another 
green question because it will be similar and might help them.  
27. Question: If travel from Denmark to Estonia, what happens to the 
temperature? Someone answers, 3 degrees lower. M was doing it 
in the wrong direction. M says So, its still the same. L insists it 
does matter – that Denmark to Estonia is not same as Estonia to 
Denmark. M says it is the same and he counts 1,2,3 in both 
directions to show it is the same. 
28. L says Yeah but you’re going up not down. G tried to explain to M 
why the direction is important for this question. M still thinks it’s the 
same. Someone says that way its getting hotter and that way its 
getting colder. L find both cards and stresses that they have to do 
DOWN. 
29. I ask M to re-read the question. He says the temperature will go by 
3. He keeps repeating this. I ask “go what by 3?” M says go down 
by 3. 
30. Question: If travel from Ukraine to Turkey what happens to the 
temperature? Someone says one degree higher, up by one. BELL 
for playtime 
31. Question: Is Norway hotter or colder than Russia. I ask where 
would Norway have to be if it was colder than Russia? They tell 
me “that way” (off the table) i.e. they have the concept of coldest . 
Question: country between 1 and -1. M reads it as one and one, 
corrects to minus one to one, 
32. then corrects again when challenged by G. Gets the right answer. 
Question: country one degree cooler than Croatia 
33. I ask them what they are “looking at” to help them. They can’t 
explain but seem to use cards and relative positions of groups of 
cards with equal values. 
34. I take control of the mouse and fire questions at them. They find 
them easy. Question: start in Monaco and go somewhere 4 
degrees hotter 
35. They start with Monaco card and argue about how to count cards. 
When they don’t have cards for every value they have to find other 
strategies to visualise, mark where they’d be to help them to count 
up/down 
36. They get the right answer. Question: start Czech Republic and go 
somewhere 3 degrees hotter . They get it right, tapping table to 
show missing values within line of cards. Question: If travel from 
Belarus to Belgium what happens to the temperature? They locate 
both cards and answer “will go up 7 degrees”  
37. M counted Belarus as the first count. I ask why. M says because 
the question to start on that one. I model use of the thermometer 
ITP for Belarus -3 to Belgium 3. 
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38. G puts thermometer on -3 correctly. L (eventually) moves it to 3. 
39. I explain that this ITP is good for showing what happens when you 
go from one temperature to another. I point out the “Change” box, 
displayin 6 (i.e. not 7). 
40. I ask what happens if you travel from Slovakia to Albania? They 
find the 2 cards. They try to count the difference with cards and 
argue. L reminds them that last time they were wrong to count the 
start number 
41. They touch the zeros and count as one, two etc. I ask them to do it 
with the thermometer 
42. They get the correct answer. The change box shows 7. M asks if 
he can check the “difference” 
43. (it would seem that M has something in his mind regarding change 
and difference. Question, what happens to temperature if travel 
from Germany (1) to Sweden (-2). M immediately says its going to 
go down 3 
44. I tell M to tell L what to do with the thermometer. Change is -3 this 
time. M says this is because it has gone down 3 but in the 
difference box its just changed by 3. 
45. I recap that the size of the difference is the same whichever way 
round you do it but the change tells us which direction you went in 
46. L picks Russia -6 and Gibraltar 13. M has control of the mouse. L 
works it out by counting cards and reaches answer of 19. L 
changes his mind about the direction he should count in. 
47. M does the thermometer correctly. With the next example, M can 
predict what is in change and difference boxes. 
48. I ask where will I be if start in Moldova  and go somewhere 9 
degrees warmer. L works out using thermometer what temp will 
be. M finishes it off, saying Spain is 7. 
49. They work out Netherlands to 5 degrees colder. They get correct 
answer .. 
50. … using both cards and thermometer 
51. I ask If I wanted to change the  -5 showing in the change box to 5, 
what would I have had to do? M says add 10 (not what I meant). I 
explain that if the question had been from cold to warmer, we 
wouldn’t have had a minus answer in the change box. G says “Oh! 
.. because minuses mean you’re going down!” 
52. I encourage them to do something to the thermometer – he isn’t 
sure what I want. G says “You’ve confused me again now” 
53. I explain again by asking about more examples – “If I’m in 
Germany and I go to somewhere that makes the change box show 
? where might I be?” … If I’m in Germany and go somewhere so 
that the change = 2 not -2, where might I be? G says 3 – says he 
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gets it now. I ask L (G interrupts that he is still a bit confused 
again) .. 
54. If we are in France (5) and we go somewhere that creates a 
“change” of -4, what will temperature be?  L answers correctly 
55. I ask if the change is 4 not -4, what will temperature be? L answers 
correctly. I slide the thermometer to 9 – G think the difference will 
be -4 and is surprised when both boxes show 4. He asks why 
56. I tell him that the difference is those 4 degrees. G says “So it can’t 
get to a minus” I ask “I wonder if we could get the difference to a 
minus. G says No. 
57. I demonstrate that whether the move is up or down, the difference 
does not have a minus. G is still unsure. G says to M “But we said 
it would add when you go up” (has he noticed there’s never a + 
sign?) 
58. I demonstrate 11+6. Boys predict change and difference will both 
be 6. I moves thermometer down – we all count interval of 8. I ask 
can they predict change and difference boxes. L thinks “One’s 
gonna be -8 and that one 8. M says No, -9 and 9. 
59. I give boys paper and say “Use paper, if it helps, use 
thermomenter if it helps. I suggest we start at 3 and go up/add/ get 
warmer by 10. I tell boys I don’t know what to write – what should I 
do? 
60. M says add 10 to 3, 13. L asks is it -3 or normal 3? 13. I ask “If I 
start at -3, then what?” L answers 7. 
61. I ask Is he right? G and M use thermometer and get it right and 
can predict change and difference boxes. G says “I get it. When 
you go down, that one takes off how much you took off because it 
puts a minus as if you’re doing a sum” 
62. I ask Can you think of a sum that would show us a minus number 
in that change box? L says 13 – 5 – it’s gonna be -5. I say “That’s 
interesting. So you’re actually adding a minus 5. G says “Now 
you’re confusing yourself – because minus minus 5 doesn’t make 
any sense. M says 13 add -5? G tries to explain. 
63. G writes as he speaks 13 – 5 = 8. They are unhappy with the 
concept of adding a minus. 
64. G write 13 = -5 … they confuse each other with their explanations 
65. G seems to be trying to explain that the + sign is 
superfluous/redundant so is OK to leave it out. They keep 
“accusing” G of saying 13 add minus 5 and he keeps trying to 
explain it, though it’s not clear whether he only ever said it 
because I hd (who said it first?) G says “I’ve got a number, then it 
goes down (M interjects “minus”) G continues, “Then it goes down, 
minus 5 and I get 8 so.. 
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66. .. the number was ?  M says “Now you’re just confusing me (hints 
of understanding subtraction of minus numbers, doing/undoing) I 
ask G what he thinks of what M has written 13- -5 G  “I think that’s 
wrong. You don’t have to put … All you have to put is 13 minus 5 
67. I ask “Does it mean the same?” G insists “no because it’s got 2 
minus. G questions meaning of first minus – “Is it add because its 
minus …” M thinks he’s being ridiculous. I ask G to do 13 
takeaway -5 with thermometer. G asks “How do I take away -5?” I 
say “That’s what I want you to think about” G “That’s why I don’t 
think it’s right” 
68. I recap 13 – 5 = 8 on the thermometer and says “that’s what 
happens when you DO a minus 5. But what happens when you 
takeaway a minus 5?! I start the thermometer at 13. “Imagine that I 
did a -5 to get there, where must I have been before?? They 
answer 18. 
69. So we’re saying that 18 – 5 would be 13? We check with 
thermometer and it is correct. M says “It’s like 18-5=13? I say “So, 
if I’m at 13 and I want to take away the -5 that somebody did to 
me?” I repeat it. Someone says (triumphantly) “You have to go up 
5!” 
70. G says “So I was right! Because 13 takeaway a -5 is … 18! I get it! 
I get a little bit but not much actually.” I ask another (10 - -2 =?) 
Someone says “You go up 2 to 12. 
71. I tell them “So when you see that (--) it actually means something 
special. Boys say “take away a minus” I ask them “What shall I ask 
you next?” Someone suggests 3 take away 5. I say “Can you show 
me how you work that out .. do a little diagram” 
72. Someone says “Because you take 3 away and you’ve 2 left … 
73. Boys (L?) draw a thermometer to illustrate. L counts down 2, 1 and 
this line is 0 and we’ve only taken away 3 so we have to go into 
the minus. 
74. I ask 11 – 15 Someone asks why we’re not using the cards to help. 
I ask “What could you do with them to help? Or what else could 
you use to help?” L says “We could use a ruler. That’s going to 11, 
we need another object 
75. M says “I’ve got it 11 – 15 = 4 because 11 is smaller than 5, it 
equals -4 … (corrects himself) 11 is smaller than 15, there’s a 4 in 
between so you end up with -4. Coz 11 is smaller so will end up 
with -4” 
76. I ask “Can you draw something?” M writes what he has been 
saying, Eventually is says that when you’re taking 14 away from 
11, there’s a 4 number gap in between so you get to zero and 
you’ve still got 4 left 
77. L (diagram) draws a number line. He counts down to zero and 
shows that he has only taken away 11. 
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78. He says he was keeping count up to 15 “while he moved through 
minus” 
79. I give G new question – 6 add minus 8. G is a bit confused 
because “it’s easier than the ones they’ve just done” 
80. G’s explanation is similar to L’ 
81. … “have to keep going because 8 is 2 more than 6. I give them 
“one last really hard one  -3 go down by 2” they respond -5 (no 
problem?) I then ask -3 takeaway -2. They want to draw it “It’s -1!” 
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Appendix 5c: Write-up for Session 3 L, M & G 
Minute number: 
1. to 7 Swimming pool Sid. They don’t know about area. G says think 
you have to “times them two”. Others don’t listen and suggest 
dimensions of 3 x 2 will give an area of 32. Then they try 4 by 8. G 
and L are first to understand how it works. They realise they can 
use the tables square on the wall to find factor pairs very quickly. 
8. New game – Balloon Burst. 5 balloons. M asks for paper. L asks if 
he can write. They plan who’s going to write, call out etc.   
9. balloons are 9, 21, -21, 8, -12 L says 17 minus 12 .. 5 that’s 5 
10. balloons are -11, -24, 9, 14, 5 G says -11 from zero, that makes -
11 … M says No, add those together then take those minuses 
away…. That’s easy….. 
11. L says 9 + 14 + 5, which is 28 … because they’re the only ones 
which are the adds. Then …1 add the other 2 minuses together – I 
got 35 and then it’s 35 minus 28 and that equals 7. (should be -7) 
L asks G to write the number next time. 
12.  balloons are 20, 17, -14, 15, 15 M says OK so that’s 30. 17 add 
20, that’s 37, that’s 67 .. minus 14 … 3 … 53 L wants to add them 
up as he goes along.  
13. New balloons 17, 13, 17, 17, 10    74 It’s either 74 or 64 but I’m 
gonna go 74 
14. M asks for Space Invaders on main meu. I send them back to 
balloon burst and set it for 6 balloons 9, -8, -48, 48, -34, 33 M says 
OK so 9 … is it take away or plus? .,.. no no it’s plus. (he write it 
down 9 + -8 which is 1… G says You can’t do that. L says I think 
it’s 68. (answer is 0) 
15. I ask boys to slow down and look at this more carefully G asks Can 
you add plus numbers to minus numbers. I ask if he was surprised 
when M wrote it down this way. G says he was. I ask M why he 
wrote them down this way – he doesn’t realise what I’m asking 
about (does not see significance?) and just tells me why he wrote 
them down at all – i.e. he couldn’t remember them unless he wrote 
them down 
16. I point out to M that he then went back through the list of numbers 
and put all these add signs down. M says he needed to see what 
the numbers are. L says “So it got all muddled up. 
17. M cancels -48 and 48 – he explains that they “equal zero” – “that’s 
minus and that’s normal”. He goes on 9 -8 is 1.. minus 34 is -33 … 
add 33 is zero. 
18. M tries to explain to others how to follow his “string”. G doesn’t 
understand how you can add a minus. L says you must start with 
the 8 and put the minus there so it’s 8 minus 9.  
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19. G says No, “9 minus 8 so there  shouldn’t be the add sign” G 
keeps asking what’s the point of putting the add sign? 
20. I ask is 9 - -8 (written) same as 9 + -8? M says No, that’s gonna be 
still 9. L says Yes that’s right because we’re in -8 at the moment, 
then add 9 and hat equals 1. Then -48 plus 48 is still 1. I ask them 
to focus on -34 +33. L says “in -34, add 33, that’s -1” I take away 
33 from 34 and that leaves me with -1 and I’m still in the minuses.  
21. I ask why take 33 away from 34 if you’re adding 33? L says 
because that’s positive and that’s negative and you take the 
positive away from the negative. I ask Why. L replies because its 
easier than saying …… that that’s in minuses and you take away 
… ? 
22. I ask if there is a rule or picture. M tries to explain using 
partitioning. I ask what is -8 + 6? 
23. L says that equals -2. G agrees with -2 and says “But I did the 
other differently, same as L, took the 6 away from 8. I as why. G 
says “Because if you take away 8 …. if you take away from -8 then 
get the higher digits because its on the minus side. L says “Just 
imagine it’s not in the minus 8 – 6 = 2 and then put it back in the 
minuses, minus 2. 
24. M says “I was just gonna do that” I ask why would you do that? M 
says “I would do this, 8 and instead of having minus 6 just put 8, 
no just put 6 -8 seeing as the 8 is a minus (ie reordering) G says 
same as L (though he doesn’t realise that what he says) 
25. I redirect them to 9 - -8. L says “Is it 9 add 8? G says I know – its 
1. M says “No its not, G, we’re in -8.” They try to re-order and get -
8 +9 =1. 
26.  I explain that these operations are not commutative 4 – 8 is not 
the same as 8 – 4. M says It’s -1 then. L asks “Who agrees that it’s 
1?” 
27. I ask “Is there another way of explain it e g for someone who’s not 
as good at maths as you?” L asks “By adding words into it? 
28. e.g. increase?” G says that’s even more confusing. I say “Oh, I 
was thinking of 4 somethings add -5 something else – your idea 
might  be better?”  
29. L says “I could make it 4 t-shirts ad -5 t-shirts. They laugh at the 
idea of -5 t-shirts. M says that -5 is 1/5 of a t-shirt. Someone says 
“Just do what G does, change the order so -5 +4 
30. G says “If that was a 5 it would be zero but it’s not a 5, it’s a 4 s … 
zero take away 1 is minus 1. I ask them if this reminds them of last 
time. G says 50 -13. L says “It makes me think of countries with 
degrees. I ask if they can turn this into some sort of story about 
Father Christmas or countries. 
31. L says “It was -5 at Antarctica.” They laugh and say it would be 
more .. “And then he needed to go to …  
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32. England and in England it was 4 degrees … Actually I don’t know 
what I would do … You’d find out how much was between them 
33. G says “I know what I’m doing but I don’t know how to say it. I ask 
the boys what else is in their minds at the moment. They say 
temperature, countries, adding degrees. I draw blank number lines 
horizontally and veritcally. They talk about the “minus side” and the 
plus side in the space on either side of the line (rather than at 2 
ends or 2 sides of a point called zero) 
34. G puts numbers on the line. I ask “how would you do the sum on 
there?” Gs talks aloud “Start on -5 and move up 4 to add 4” L says 
“Oh I get it, minus 1 add minus 1 is minus 2!” 
35. I say “So can you show me it the other way around, 4 – 5? M says 
“It’ll be the same because it’s like times tables – it doesn’t matter 
which way you put it round. G counts back along the line, realising 
that 0 does count. M doesn’t understand “What are you doing?” 
36. M says -9 minus, minus 8. L is excited “Ooh, I get this!” M says 
eleven. G says 9-8 is 1 ..  
37. L says “I get it. I think it’s minus 17 because you’ve to add the 
minuses together. These 2 have got to be bigger numbers. 
38. I ask “Why can’t it be -17?” L says “It can’t be because when you 
add you get bigger numbers. M/G says “But it’s not adding, it’s 
minusing. G says “Minus minus … I don’t understand” M says 
“minus 9 minus minus 8.. 9 minus 8 equals 1… so minus 9 minus 
minus 8 equals minus 1 – it’s -11.  
39. You add 9 plus 8, that’s 11 and because its going up the minus” L 
corrects him “It’s 17” M realises his mistake. L explains how to 
bridge through 10. 
40. I ask them to use a number line to show it. They say they can’t. G 
asks “How can you minus a minus 8? I don’t understand. I explain 
the “undo” strategy. L sees it straight away. They can do them 
easily now 
41. In their next game, Ghostbusters, the boys very easily respond 
that to get from -50 to 50 they need to score 100. 
42. At the end of the session G says to me “That line thingy made me 
think of a thermometer” L agreed with him. 
 
